Chevron Ran Out of Gas

On the one hand, there’s little doubt that the running of such a diverse and complex society as ours requires a substantial bureaucracy to make it work. On the other hand, the administrative state today is not the administrative state it was 20 years ago, and certainly not what it was in 1984, when the Supreme Court created Chevron Deference.

Our Chevron doctrine requires courts to use a two-step framework to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies. After determining that a case satisfies the various  preconditions we have set for Chevron to apply, a reviewing court must first assess “whether  Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If, and only if, congressional intent is “clear,” that is the end of the inquiry. Ibid. But if the court determines that “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand, the court must, at Chevron’s second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

The notion was that Congress would craft vague and broad enabling legislation with a salutary goal in mind, and then pass it off to an Executive Branch administrative agency to be managed by bureaucrats who would be chosen for expertise in whatever specific field the agency addressed to do the nuts and bolts work of making Congress’ deliberately vague mandate come to life. There were two key aspects to the concept that, when Chevron was decided, were relatively uncontroversial.

First, agencies took their mandate to staff with qualified people, “experts” to a fairly decent extent as today’s hysterics decry, seriously. Second, agencies had humility, the modesty to appreciate that they were not Congress and existed to serve the limited purpose and exercise the limited authority Congress imposed on them. Congress gave them a purpose and they sought to fulfill that purpose, but not abuse their authority by straying beyond it. Even Scalia opined that it “accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately
serves [government’s] needs.”

But times change, and people, being what they are, saw the opportunity to take use Chevron Deference for their own purposes. Beyond Pournelle’s iron law of bureaucracy, industry used the opportunity to “capture” government agencies by either using its people to staff them or using the agency’s people to staff industry, shifting the agency’s goal from serving Congress to serving industry.

Then there was the “expertise” problem, where second-rate bureaucrats had the power of “experts” but not the knowledge and skills of real experts. Government didn’t pay as well as private industry, and once employed, little was demanded of agency staffers of dubious qualifications, who could use bureaucratic fiat to dictate to far more qualified experts. Bureaucrats could smugly sniff yes or no, and there was essentially nothing to be done about it.

But worst of all, idealogues came to realize that by taking the lower paying, lesser demanding, government jobs, they could seize power in a regulatory realm and twist it to their will. One of the most glaring examples is Title IX, where Catherine Lhamon manipulated a mandate to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex in education to create a sexual misconduct inquisition against male students and eradicate the distinction between male and female. Nowhere did Title IX suggest any such thing, and yet Lhamon, through administrative fiat, abused her authority to reinvent the campus to suit her ideological vision.

In Loper Bright Entreprises v. Raimondo, by a 6-3 decision along party lines, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron. On the left, this was met with hysteria and outrage, the conservative justices eschewing expertise and undermining the regulatory state that saved our air and water so that industry can go back to destroying our planet for profit.

It does not, however, serve the needs of America’s business community, which looks at the slew of federal regulations and sees only reduced profits. Deep-pocketed businesses have been the staunchest opponents of the doctrine; along with a raft of committed right-wing activists, they finally managed to get enough like-minded friends on the Supreme Court to kill it off.

But as Chief Justice John Roberts made clear, courts should still show respect to agency determinations, recognizing expertise where it deserved to be recognized. And as Justice Elena Kagan made clear in her dissent, the end of Chevron Deference didn’t mean Skidmore Deference disappeared.

[T]he majority makes clear that what is usually called Skidmore deference continues to apply. Under that decision, agency interpretations “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment” that may be “entitled to respect.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).

What the Court did was shift the final decision on the scope of an agency’s reach where the enabling law was either vague or silent from the agency, which tended to be ever-expanding to grab greater turf within its control, to the courts to decide whether the agency’s authority-grab was an abuse of the authority given it be Congress.

An immediate grievance about Loper Bright was that it would put harsh demands on Congress to write far more extensive and precise laws, making that far longer to cover unforeseen eventuality that agencies had previous dealt with on their own. Whether this was a bad thing, mandating that Congress work a lot hard than write a law saying “Agency X should do good” and leaving it to the agency to decide what that meant, is one question.

But another is whether it’s an accurate complaint. Where enabling legislation is ambiguous or silent, agencies will still be left to decide what the scope of their authority should be. And nothing in Loper Bright precludes a court from deferring to the agency when its determination is sound and reasonable. What it precludes is the mandate courts do so under Chevron Deference.

For many lawyers of a certain age, our appreciation of Chevron Deference waned as agency expertise and modesty gave way to bureaucratic power plays and ideological abuse. Chevron Deference played an important role in the functioning of our complex nation. But as Jerry Pournelle predicted, it would eventually forget its limited purpose and serve only to perpetuate the power of the bureaucracy. It was time for Chevron Deference to go.


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10 thoughts on “Chevron Ran Out of Gas

  1. DaveL

    One of the main problems I had with Chevron was that it demanded courts assume agencies were right when they said the law meant “X”, and then later turn around and say they were also right when they said the law meant “not X”. That’s no longer a question of expertise, that’s a Humpty Dumpty exercise in making words mean whatever you want them to mean.

  2. Hunting Guy

    Maybe now we can get some mining projects underway and no longer be depending on foreign countries for copper, lithium, and rare earth minerals.

  3. abwman

    The abandonment of the Chevron doctrine is long overdue. The longevity of the doctrine is a testament to the power of generational academic indoctrination of legal thought. Many lawyers who attended law school in the 1970’s were “trained” to believe in the concept underlying the doctrine: that judicial review of complex subjects was fundamentally flawed by judges’ lack of expertise and training to address them competently, and the same was effectively true of legislative decision-makers. Hence, the need to defer to a cadre of experts in executive-like agencies (both Executive and so-called “independent ” agencies) who would be called upon to fill the expertise gap. It all made so much theoretical sense to the legal minds of the 50’s and 60’s who were laying the legal foundation for the next decades, and it became the mindset of the next generation of lawyers. These brilliant and influential ivy league law profs molded a generation of lawyers (including me), many of whom became thought, and actual, leaders. But of course academic thinking diverges from real life, then as now, and we’ve been saddled with this idyĺic view of administrative law-making (which morphed into administrative law enforcement) for 40 years now. I hope this is not replicated by the DEI legal framework now dominating academic legal thought, but I fear it will be.

    1. cthulhu

      I was going to say “pretty racy album cover for 1959,” but apparently the “Best of” album came out in 2011. Still, I’m sure Tipper Gore wasn’t pleased, which makes me like it even more 😉

      On the topic of the actual post, IANAL but I thought Scott’s take was spot on, FWIW.

  4. Skywalker

    In curbing executive branch overreach did the Court abandon judicial conservatism? Our government rests on three branches, not two. It is the job of legislature, not the courts, to rein in runaway agencies unless the law provides no rational basis for an agency’s interpretation of its mandate. Judges are no less biased than politicians who appoint and confirm them. Albeit the code of judicial ethics requires judges to be circumspect about their biases. When you have dueling experts disagreeing on issues like the effect of pipeline construction on the environment, the agency and the legislature are much better suited than a judge to balance divergent expert opinions against the intent of the legislation and the political will of the voters. Chevron correctly limited judicial review to those cases where the agency interpretation can’t be squared with any reasonable interpretation of the agency’s mandate.
    To paraphrase Justice Roberts, the role of the courts is to decide cases, not to decide public policy, and, if at all possible, to avoid deciding anything not necessary to determine the winners and losers in the cases before them.
    Finally, IMO the expansion of Title IX is one of the rare cases where there is no rational basis to justify the agency interpretation and where judicial action may be warranted. But we will regret letting laymen in black robes second guess career bureaucrats staffing agencies.

    1. Sgt. Schultz

      Our government rests on three branches, not two. It is the job of legislature, not the courts, to rein in runaway agencies unless the law provides no rational basis for an agency’s interpretation of its mandate.

      In the grand scheme of stupid, you win a prize.

  5. Will J. Richardson

    “If the natural tendencies of mankind are so bad that it is not safe to permit people to be free, how is it that the tendencies of these organizers are always good? Do not the legislators and their appointed agents also belong to the human race? Or do they believe that they themselves are made of a finer clay than the rest of mankind?”

    — Frédéric Bastiat, The Law

  6. phv3773

    Making good decisions requires someone, somewhere, with deep subject knowledge. Who is that going to be in this brave new world?

  7. Anonymous Coward

    I love the idea that Congress has to craft intelligent laws rather than just a fancy title and a handwave at an agency. I play the world’s smallest violin at them having to give up golf playing and donor schmoozing time to do their jobs.
    I don’t think overturning the administrative state puts judges in charge since many judicial decisions effectively say Congress needs to legislate this.

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