Not long after the redacted Mueller Report went public, I had a discussion about whether it reflected “obstruction” with an editor from an online heterodox website. I should have known better, but I did it anyway. The argument was me talking about the legal definition of obstruction, and him arguing that he wasn’t. He was talking about the “ordinary” meaning of obstruction.
Is there such a thing? Can there be? For lawyers, crimes consist of elements, conduct and intent, as proven by evidence. For non-lawyers, they consist of a vague impression of wrongfulness, bolstered by whatever facts are known, or believed to be known, that support the impression that something bad happened. Where there are no facts, they have no qualms about filling the gaps with argument and belief. But what they do not concern themselves with is the use of legal words and concepts, but disconnected from legal meaning and proof.
The editor grew frustrated with my insistent law-talking-guy view. I wasn’t’ “getting” it, that everything wasn’t some hyper-technical legal problem, but a non-lawyer perception that wrongs were happening and, to the non-lawyer, demanded redress. Why couldn’t I just understand that he wasn’t talking about legal “obstruction,” but, you know, common-people “obstruction.” In his head, these were two entirely different things, both equally real, even if only one had actual objective meaning. Continue reading →