Cross-Racial IDs and Assumptions

Last Friday, I taught at a “Cross to Kill” CLE for the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers on the subject of cross-examining the eyewitness.  Part of my lecture concerned cross-racial identifications, widely regarded as the least reliable of all. 

The question was asked about whether defense counsel should question the eyewitness about where they lived and worked, in order to show that the witness lacked a frame of reference for making a cross-racial ID.  Put in context, the attorney suggested that showing the jury that a white witness lived in a “white” neighborhood and worked in a “white” job would demonstrate that they could not identify a black perp.  The attorney who raised the question was black, which I do not note gratuitously but because it is directly relevant to the point.

My position was that it was more likely to harm the position than help to suggest that because a person did not live in a racially mixed neighborhood, the witness was inherently incapable of identifying the perp.  Rather, I suggested that the only effective means of making the point was through an eyewitness expert, who could do so clinically.  My questioner disagreed.

“But what if you didn’t have an expert,” she urged.  “Then you would have to do this.”  I still demurred.  The defense attorney would never know enough about the eyewitness to presume to challenge her ability to recognize a person of another race.  It was highly unlikely that we will get a witness to admit that she can’t tell one black person from another, and anything short of that smacks of an appeal to prejudice.  It was playing the “race card,” a very risky proposition that was more likely to backfire than help.  And particularly more likely to backfire when the attorney was of the race in issue.  My questioner disagreed.

I didn’t get it, according to my questioner.  White people who live in (location omitted to avoid needlessly offending the locals) can’t tell one black from another.  So if you show that the eyewitness lives in (same place), then you can show the jury that they could never had made a valid ID.  This is where things got a little hairy at the CLE, as some people in this biz can be a bit sensitive about having a frank discussion.  So we agreed to disagree and moved on.

But the question raised important issues, and it bugs me that they remain undiscussed.  What I came to realize during the discussion was that the questioner’s perspective assumed that everyone realized that whites are inherently prejudice against blacks to the extent that they are obviously incapable of making a valid cross-racial ID.  She may be right.  But this is a black attorney’s perception of white witnesses.  I do not agree that white jurors perceive themselves this way.  And while this might strike a meaningful blow for reality, our job is not to right the wrongs of racial prejudice, but to represent our clients. 

So assuming that we have a jury with people of various races, we need to get beyond our own desires to press issues that satisfy our own view of the world and deal with the issues in a way that will cause the jury to “see” things the way our clients desire.  In other words, no matter how “correct” my questioner may have been about racial bias, she forgot to plug the jury into her equation to consider how her personal views would mesh with the jurors’ self-perceptions.  It may have made her feel satisfied by questioning the eyewitness on the extent of her interactions with people of other races, but it would not have played well with jurors of other races and may well cost her client.  In the end, there is one immutable fact about what defense lawyers do:  We represent the defendant.  No matter what our personal beliefs may be, we can never lose sight of our duty.


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2 thoughts on “Cross-Racial IDs and Assumptions

  1. Eh Nonymous

    Scott,

    Thanks for the post.
    You’re confusing something, I think. You’re conflating “biased” with “unpracticed at making cross-racial identifications.” Was it just the brevity of this post, or were you unaware the questioner was making this point?

    An expert will testify (with evidence) that people of a majority population will have more difficulty distinguishing members of a minority population than vice-versa, but that cross-racial IDs are less reliable, other things being equal.

    It’s not a matter of “bias,” and it is squarely a matter of experience and practice. Who is the witness used to seeing, knowing on a personal basis, and identifying? Isn’t that crucial to the entire idea of identification?

    It may be the race card, but only in the sense that blacks do in fact know lots of whites, most of the time, and see many of them on t.v.; whites, in contrast, may or may not know as many blacks, or asians, or hispanics, or pick your group, depending on demographics.

    People often confuse failure to be color-blind with racism. It’s not. Races are illusory; skin tones and ethnic groupings and other facts of life are not. I would love a race-blind society. But if I were involved in a trial where ID was an issue, I would have to focus on the fact that some witness IDs are unreliable precisely because the witness doesn’t know many people who look like the accused.

  2. SHG

    You’re 100% correct, and I thank you for making the point.  Not only is your point important because it presents a more accurate explanation for the difficulties with cross-racial IDs, but it makes a much more palatable argument for a jury.  Rather than “blame” a white juror for being biased, it is a fact based, non-accusatory rationale for a very real problem.

    In my discussion, I was addressing the point raised by my questioner rather than the underlying reason for the problems with cross-racial IDs.  It was pretty clear that my questioner’s position was grounded in assumed white bias, and my discussion went off on the direction of attorney assumptions in addressing a hot-button issue, and the use of such assumptions in arguing to the jury.  Again, a subtle distinction, but as you correctly note a very real one. 

    As I wrote in the piece, the better (and in my opinion, only effective) tact was to have the issue addressed by the expert who could testify as to the “clinical” basis for the difficulties in making cross-racial IDs.  I guess that was my inartful way of raising the point tangentially, so that I could get something into the piece without having the piece veer off into a discussion of the underlying issue.  Obviously, my effort wasn’t as clear as it could have been or it wouldn’t have been necessary for you to make the point as clearly as you did.

    SHG

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