The Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana, piggybacked on its recent decision in Kanas v. Ventris*, makes one point abundantly clear for anyone accused of a crime:  The first thing out of your mouth is “I want to speak with my lawyer.”  Then shut up.

The Supremes have chosen to go down a strange path, separating the minor detail that a defendant has a lawyer from the invocation of the right to counsel.  Jesse Montejo has already appeared before a judge, who properly assigned a lawyer to represent him.  Before the lawyer had the chance to meet with his new client, the police swooped in for a chat of their own.  As it happens, Jesse spilled his guts.

The rationale for deciding that this was a perfectly fine way for police to interrogate a defendant was spelled out:

Even without Jackson, few badger-ing-induced waivers, if any, would be admitted at trial because the Court has taken substantial other, overlapping measures to exclude them. Under Miranda, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation must be advised of his right to have a lawyer present. 384 U. S., at 474. Under Edwards, once such a defendant “has invoked his [Miranda] right,” interrogation must stop. 451 U. S., at 484. And under Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146, no subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present. Id., at 153. These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. On the other side of the equation, the principal cost of applying Jackson’s rule is that crimes can go unsolved and criminals unpunished when uncoerced confessions are excluded and when officers are deterred from even trying to obtain confessions. The Court concludes that the Jackson rule does not “pay its way,” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 907–908, n. 6, and thus the case should be overruled. Pp. 13–18.

In other words, the right to counsel now falls under the “pay to play” rule, comparing the benefit in the eyes of some robed guys in Washington to defendants with the effectiveness of police getting the bad guy.  The Court ruled that defendants have enough rights already, and don’t need this one as well.  As with Edwards, one of the worst reasoned decisions ever, the Court baselessly concludes that it’s not a big deal for defendants.

Nothing is a big deal for defendants, unless you happen to be the defendant under interrogation.  You can quote me on this.

This trend might be worth a decent parsing if it didn’t sound like a broken record.  I’ve explained the problem already when the Court decided Edwards, and the rationale didn’t get any better in the past month.  Like it or not (and I don’t), the point is now absolutely, totally, 100% crystal clear:  Each and every defendant must personally, individually, loudly and clearly invoke the right to counsel at the first, and every subsequent, opportunity.  It doesn’t matter whether this seems wrong when you already have an attorney assigned to represent you.  Do it anyway.  Just do it.

Officer:  We’d like to ask you a few questions.

Defendant:  I would like to speak with my attorney.

Officer:  It’s no big deal, just a couple of questions to straighten out a few details.

Defendant:  I would like to speak with my attorney.

Officer:  Look, this will only take a few seconds, and it might even help to clear you so you can go home.

Defendant: I would like to speak with my attorney.

Officer:  Sigh.

Just do it.  You will thank me later.

* In my original post, I used the case of Edward v. Arizona where Ventris should have been.  It was entirely my mistake, and it’s now corrected.  Please forgive my brain fart.  It happens at my age.