There was great doubt as to whether this day would ever come, with far too many good reasons for the New York Court of Appeals to punt a decision that was political as it gets. But they didn’t, to their credit, and despite the reluctance of so many judges to believe it was worth what was consistently called an “unseemly” effort, the court decided that the Legislatures failure to consider raising the pay of judges without tying it to their own or otherwise stuffing appropriations add-ons into the mix was unconstitutional.
The decision, in the three consolidated cases, was 5-1, with Chief Judge Lippman recusing himself as he was a plaintiff from back when he was the state administrative judge. Judge Eugene Pigott wrote the majority opinion, with Judge Robert Smith dissenting. Though rejecting most of the claims, the court held:
Although a function of the Legislature is to approve the compensation of each of the three branches, this fact underscores only the checks and balances of the system; it does not rebut the fact that the compensation to be paid to members of each particular branch must be determined separately and distinctly from the others. Indeed, whether the Judiciary is entitled to a compensation increase must be based upon an objective assessment of the Judiciary’s needs if it is to retain its functional and structural independence. Simply put, by failing to consider judicial compensation increases on the merits, and instead holding it hostage to other legislative objectives, the Legislature “[w]eaken[s the Judiciary] . . . by making it unduly dependent” on the Legislature.
Judges and justices, on the other hand, are not afforded that opportunity. They have no seat at the bargaining table and, in fact, are precluded from participating in politics. The judicial branch therefore depends on the good faith of the other two branches to provide sufficient funding to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. Given its unique place in the constitutional scheme, it is imperative that the legitimate needs of the judicial branch receive the appropriate respect and attention. This cannot occur if the Judiciary is used as a pawn or bargaining chip in order to achieve ends that are entirely unrelated to the judicial mission.
Recognizing that the Lege has used judicial compensation as nothing more than a bargaining chip in efforts to obtain its own goal of increased legislative compensation, a perpetually unpopular political cause that stymied raising judicial salaries, the court held:
But by failing to consider judicial compensation independently of legislative compensation, the State defendants have imposed upon the Judiciary the same restrictions that have been imposed on the Legislature, and have blurred the line between the compensation of the two branches, thereby threatening the structural independence of the Judiciary.
The decision is enormously bold, given how wrapped it is in the nature of both Albany politics and the open reluctance of judges to appear self-serving in deciding their own pocketbook issue. But it had to be done.
In dissent, Judge Smith doesn’t so much dispute the point of the majority, as recognize that the failure to increase judicial pay hasn’t resulted in the inability of the judiciary to find qualified people or the failure of the judiciary to perform its function. Thus, he’s constrained to conclude that it hasn’t affected judicial independence.
The last pay raise received by New York judges was a COLA increase in 1998. Since then, the caseload increased from 3.5 million to 4.5 million. The net result was a de facto reduction in spending power of one third. While this doesn’t constitute a salary reduction, which itself would be unconstitutional, it highlights how using the salaries paid to a co-equal branch of government became a political football for the others. It was wrong. It was manipulative. And left to their own devices, there is no reason to believe that the political branches of government would have changed their evil ways.
Despite the fact that the court’s decision is open to criticism from a variety of different directions, I applaud the court for making it, as I’ve no doubt it was painful to do. No judge wants to put him or herself directly in the political crosshairs, and yet that’s precisely what they’ve done. The Court of Appeals called out the Legislature, as well as the Governor, and stated that it is unconstitutional for those branches to screw with this branch.
Of course, paving the way for a freestanding decision on judicial salaries, unencumbered by the weight of collateral political issues, doesn’t guarantee the judiciary of a pay raise. The court didn’t order the Lege to raise salaries, and the Lege may still, whether as payback or given the state’s budgetary shortfall, decide that judges get squat.
Should the Lege either refuse to increase judicial salaries, or provide some insignificant increase just to shut the judges up, however, at least it will be a based solely on judicial compensation rather than as part of some general appropriations mashup. And if the people aren’t happy about it, or the judges aren’t happy with it, they will bear the political consequences of their decision. No more hiding their own pay issues behind judicial salaries, and this is how it should be when it comes to performing a constitutional duty for a co-equal branch of government.
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The Lege can’t order the raise as they have no way to enforce it. They would be stuck with the Lege disregarding its order.
Same problem judiciaries have always had: no army.
And similar to the problems in Maricopa where the judge orders a court officer to be held in contempt, but can’t actually enforce it without the very same court officers, who somehow all became sick on the same day.
Oddly enough, I touched on this very problem just hours before the decision when I was discussing how SCOTUS could hear the issue of secession, and its historical lack of ability to independently enforce orders.
Maricopa, secession and judicial pay raises all share a common element.
I believe you mean the court can’t order the raise as they can’t force the Lege to go along. Which is definitely the case, but from the lack of an army perspective as well as its own separation of powers perspective. But neither the Lege nor Governor really have any issue with judicial pay raises. They are all pretty much on board, though they may quibble over amounts.
I can’t imagine the Lege refusing to adhere to the decision, as it would make them look like total dirt, and nobody in New York is very happy with them anyway. I suspect that this is all that was needed to break the logjam, but then, the Lege always has the power to surprise.
Now Maricopa, that’s different. There they need an army.