The jury found that the plaintiff was thrown off the roof of a building in Brooklyn?  Fuggehdaboutit.  Via John Hochfelder, the Appellate Division, Second Department, holds that the jury that found for the plaintiff, Pedro Acosta (whose name isn’t really Pedro Acosta, as if that’s a big deal in Brooklyn) and awarded him $1 million for his damages was, well, nuts. 

The trial judge, James G. Starkey, denied the City’s post trial motion for dismissal, stating that while he would have found against Acosta had he been the trier of fact, the divergent versions were for the jury to decide, and the jury had spoken. 

But police throwing a guy named Acosta (kinda) off a building in Brooklyn? That wouldn’t happen, says the appeals court.  The brief decision  states:

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to him, there was no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly have led rational individuals to conclude, based upon the evidence presented, that the defendants were liable. In sum, the plaintiffs version of the events was “manifestly untrue, physically impossible, or contrary to common experience, and such testimony should be disregarded as being without evidentiary value” (Cruz v New York City Tr. Auth., 31 AD3d 688,690, affd 8 NY3d 825). We note that the record is replete with instances where the testimony and other evidence adduced by the plaintiff was manifestly untrue and tailored to avoid the consequences of previous statements made by him to disinterested nonparty witnesses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law.

 

In other words, no way, no how, could that jury have possibly been right.  Even viewing the facts most favorably toward Acosta, the jury was still totally out of their minds, flip-city, kooby-shooby.

Given the dearth of information in the appellate decision, it’s impossible to tell whether the court’s reversal was based upon actual fact, undisputed and irreconcilable as a matter of law with the jury’s finding in Acosta’s (kinda) favor, or whether the court simply refused to accept the premise that some cops threw Acosta (kinda) off a building.

Regardless, this case reflects something fascinating either way.  A jury in Brooklyn, despite evidence that may have been a little less than overwhelming, was inclined to find against the New York City police and in favor of a guy who changed names like other people change clothing, on a claim that the cops threw him off the roof.  These are the very people who live, who work, in Brooklyn.  They breath Brooklyn air.  They smell Brooklyn scents (odors?).  They are Brooklyn.  And they are ready, if not chomping at the bit, to find that cops throw people off roofs in Brooklyn.

What does the jury know that the Appellate Division doesn’t?

What does the Appellate Division know that the jury doesn’t?

Could they be any farther apart?

For a court to hold that no reasonable jury, as a matter of law, could find in favor of a party is as strong a statement that the jury was just totally out of their minds as possible.  It’s almost as if this was a Bronx jury, because everybody knows that people calling themselves Acosta get thrown off rooftops in the Bronx all the time (just watch Fort Apache, The Bronx, if you have any questions).  But that’s an entirely different situation, as the buildings are taller and the Acosta’s aren’t around to testify.