No, it’s not the path of social media, no matter what any of the gurus or marketers tell you. It’s the road that leads through the United States Attorneys Office for the Southern District of New York. Oh yeah. Via Volokh Conspiracy, David Zaring at The Conglomerate (appropriately referred to as the “Glom”):
It’s pretty interesting. The resumes are outstanding – ten years ago, there were four out of 150 odd of the prosecutors in the office who clerked for the Supreme Court, now about as many are judges, two are U.S. Attorneys, and the large majority of the rest are partners in white shoe firms in New York.
My guess is that a gig in the Southern District is the greatest path to wealth maximization in the federal government that there is — I say this impressionistically, of course, but the fact is that the financial regulators rarely get picked up by investment banks, and the SEC enforcer to partner rate is pretty low. And I think lobbyist salaries don’t match New York law firm salaries, while Pentagon procurement officials have far too difficult a tournament to win to get the payday of a job with Boeing. Which makes white collar the straightest path to law firm style riches.
Zaring attributes it in part to the rise in “White Collar” defense at Biglaw, which he notes held no allure for Biglaw until the last few years as FCPA and honest services fraud prosecutions burgeoned. If that was the case, it would be better attributed to Enron and the trebling of the sentencing guidelines for corporate and financial crime.
My experience is that Zaring is partially right, but mostly wrong. The SDNY is one of the surest paths to Biglaw wealth, but not for the reasons he thinks.
Think of a stint in the SDNY as finishing school for lawyers. They don’t take kids straight out of law school, but from judicial clerkships, Biglaw and, occasionally, other prosecutor’s offices. They are well trained, then sent out with powers that would shock and appal most people. They get the opportunity to appear in court, do hearings and try a few cases. They learn how the wheels of federal law enforcement work, the awesome power of the various federal policing agencies and the extent of information the government can obtain about others. Their confidence grew from their omnipotence and the deference shown them by judges.
Unlike the rough and tumble of district attorneys offices, or any other area of criminal law, SDNY taught its assistants how to blend with the sensibilities demanded of someone who would later find their home in Biglaw. They learned how to dress and behave, how to play well with others. They metaphorically learned which fork to use for what course at dinner. After their three year commitment, they are ready to put that education to use.
Once out of the office, they possess two things of enormous perceived value. They can lay claim to the title former federal prosecutor, which impresses most people, and they are part of the network of former SDNY AUSAs, an elite group. This all comprises a package that has long been seen as enormously valuable by Biglaw, which is why former SDNY prosecutors, unlike almost anyone else, find themselves partnership positions in Biglaw despite having no book of business to bring into the firm. While everyone else is expected to pay their own way, they get a free ride to a corner office.
While it’s understandable why Zaring would assume that these firms are interested in former prosecutors for White Collar defense, this was happening long before there was any interest in the practice by Biglaw. These were lawyers with trial experience, which is nearly impossible to obtain for Biglaw associates. No, being one of twelve lawyers in the back of the courtroom during a trial is not trial experience. AUSAs opened, closed, questioned and argued. This was trial experience.
Think of it as the West Point graduate who needs to gain some combat experience in order to reach the pinnacle of a general officer. Some will find themselves leading soldiers under fire, while some will be in charge of the motor pool at the combat zone base, but all will come out with a line on their resume showing that they were in combat. Once battle hardened, no one who never left the comfort of home can challenge your legitimacy. You’ve paid your dues.
Those who wanted to do criminal defense used to go to the handful of firms that were comprised of former prosecutors, such as Morvillo, Abramowitz. A few struck out on their own. The ones who went to Biglaw went into litigation, and would be pulled out when a corporation needed to go to trial as one of the firms “trial guys.” All that needed to be said was that he was a former federal prosecutor, and the general counsel would be suitably impressed and confident that the corporation was in good hands.
Ironically, as Biglaw took a sudden interest in “White Collar” crime, realizing how hugely profitable it could be to defend a corporation through years of investigations and prosecution, and now reclassified their former AUSA partners as criminal defense specialists, they put these former AUSA as far outside their zone of competency as possible, though they didn’t realize it. The Biglaw partners understood as little about criminal defense as did their former AUSAs. What they did understand was that the corporate mentality was far more attuned to official titles and simple indicia of perceived competence than winning. The myth of White Collar defense was born and thrived, but that’s a discussion for another day.
On the whole, former SDNY prosecutors are exceptionally well prepared to take their place in the ranks of Biglaw partners. Smart, experienced, battle-hardened, and groomed to thrive in that environment, it’s indeed the road to a wonderful future of wealth and prestige at Biglaw. If that’s what you’re looking for, and you’ve got the goods to get the gig, it’s definitely the road to take.
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Just one thing, which I think you are hinting at with your allusion to a “discussion for another day”.
There is no comparison between litigating for the government and litigating for a criminal defendant. It is not fair to say that former prosecutors are “battle hardened” except in the sense that they know from personal experience the forms: opening, putting in evidence, closing.
Aside from that, their experience is largely one of having been pampered. Needless to say – at least to you – the CDL experience is the opposite.
I would say that it is 1,000 times harder to win for a criminal defendant than it is to win a prosecution, but in truth I think that doesn’t go far enough. It’s like they are two completely different kinds of endeavors, even though on the surface the share some procedural forms.
Don’t forget the psychological element that the former AUSAs offer.
The companies (and increasingly rarely, individuals) who can afford to pay BigLaw prices do not see themselves as criminals, or targets of investigations, or defendants. In the minds of the corporate leaders, and the individual defendants, they are the victims of overzealousness of rogue prosecutors, or of unfortunate misunderstandings. They convince themselves that they don’t need criminal defense lawyers; those are for criminals. They need former prosecutors, who are somehow different, and whose job it is to re-adjust the government’s understanding of them.
It’s a tremendous marketing tool.
No, there is no comparison, but this isn’t a comparison post which is why it’s a discussion for another day.
This was a major aspect of my presentation to the GCs at SuperConference in Chicago.
If you look at dollars paid by corporations in the last decade to settle the largest criminal // False Claims Act cases, look at what the fines / damages could have been (i.e. a lot higher) – and look at the identities of all of the lawyers involved – you might draw the conclusion that former federal lawyers do a bang up job of negotiating with current federal lawyers. Some might argue that corporations represented by former federal lawyers are doing quite well in the arena of NPA’s, DPA’s and paying a fraction of what they thought they might owe – plus, no conviction. The really big dollar cases aren’t about trials, they’re about deals. And negotiation 101 says that a trusting relationship between opposing parties matters when it comes to deal making.
So the rationale goes. I don’t buy it. It fails to account for the bodies thrown under the bus in the process, It empowers the government to go after corporations and executives when there is no crime committed, knowing they will never be challenged. It’s cost may be less, or may be far more, based upon outcome, but we never know because there is never an outcome other than capitulation. We’re never even sure of the evidence or the elements, since internal reviews fall all over themselves to agree with the government and prove they are willing to cut off their nose upon demand.
Negotiation 201 is that a relationship built on respect is far more effective than one built on trust. Respect comes from knowing that your opposing party has the will and skill to fight, not the speed and certainty of capitulation.