What would you do for a Chevy Tahoe?   Bobby Frederick in South Carolina notes that it’s not just prosecutors offering cash incentives for “productivity.”

In the past, South Carolina law enforcement officers have been awarded prizes such as Dodge Chargers and Chevy Tahoes based on how many arrests they make over the course of a year. DUI enforcement is a profitable business for law enforcement, for municipalities, and for organizations such as MADD.

Arrests.  Not even convictions.  Arrests are easy, particularly when a cop is coming up to the end of the month and you just happen to be driving that attractive Porsche down the road minding your own business.  Not to suggest that any law enforcement officer would pull someone over without cause, but if your left front tire happened to touch that middle yellow line, well, he’s got a job to do.

Law enforcement receives grant money to make arrests for driving under the influence, and prosecutors receive grant money for prosecuting DUI’s, which does not necessarily translate into effective DUI enforcement – it can just as easily translate into an unforeseeable number of law abiding citizens being harassed on the roadside, jailed, and in some cases forced to trial.

Police departments and prosecutors’ offices, like all governmental entities, live on funding.  It allows them to buy new stuff they wouldn’t otherwise get, provide overtime perks and gain the admiration of good citizens who believe that there crime wave of whatever the cause may be, DUI, driving without seatbelt fastened, whatever, often due to a single aberrational tragic incident.  This must be stopped, they all mutter.

And so grants are developed and dispensed, because police would never simply do their jobs of arresting those who have in fact broken the law and leaving the rest alone without a special incentive.  And throwing in a new pickup truck or SUV certainly won’t hurt.

While there are similarities between the incentive systems used for cops and those for prosecutors, there are also critical differences.  Prosecutors can only try cases of those already arrested.  Cops can go after pretty much anyone they chose.  Assuming that they are not inclined to intentionally arrest the innocent to bolster their numbers, the incentive system provides a strong impetus to color and tailor their claims to make the arrest stick.  Since there’s often nothing more supporting the arrest then the cops’ word, this often proves sufficient to turn a highly questionable arrest into an airtight case.

Those favoring grants and incentives to police, such as MADD, do so with the best of intentions and the worst of plans.  They inexplicably presume that police will not do their job properly and adequately without the added incentive.  They inexplicably presume that there are tons of law-breakers out there getting away with it but for their grant or the lure of a shiny new truck.  Is the rationale behind the plans the belief that cops are lazy, careless and incompetent?

The problem is that if cops are disinclined to perform the duty without incentives because of some inherent performance deficit, why then would they suddenly become paragons of virtue because they can win a prize or get some seed money for that new tank they’ve been eyeing? 

As Bobby says,

When police officers are competing for recognition or even material rewards based on the number of arrests that they make, they are going to err on the side of arresting and any practical use of discretion that there once was has now gone out of the window.

Was there something wrong with the old notion of protect and serve?  Just because they get a car when the hit 50 arrests doesn’t mean there are 50 people out there needing arresting.  What is the likelihood that the cop with 49 arrests, an hour to go and a Chevy Nova parked in the driveway, letting that shiny Porsche continue down the road?  Not good enough.