This is a Cop on Drugs

Meet former Westminster, California, police detective Anthony Nicholas Orban.


He was just a normal law enforcement officer, until one night he had a yearning for a woman.  No woman, apparently, had a yearning for him.  And so he took matters into his own hands.  Well, to be more precise, he took his semi-automatic service weapon into his own hand and shoved it into the mouth of a waitress under the ill-conceived assumption this would make him more attractive.  It did not.

From the Los Angeles Times :



“He was a highly trained officer who wanted to have sex. He had sex on the mind. Don’t forget that,”  Deputy Dist. Atty. Debbie Ploghaus told jurors in her closing arguments earlier this week.


The woman, then 25 and working as a waitress at Ontario Mills Mall, testified that Orban chambered a round in his semi-automatic service pistol, shoving the barrel deep into her mouth as tears rolled down her cheeks. “He said if I cried, he would kill me,” the victim told jurors. “Then he pulled the gun out and said, ‘I think we’ll continue this in the desert.'”


At trial, the defense was a variation on the twinkie defense; Zoloft made me do it.



Defense attorney James Blatt had argued that Orban was rendered “unconscious” by use of the antidepressant, and therefore was not responsible for his actions in the brutal 2010 attack in Fontana.


A defense psychiatrist testified that Orban had stopped taking the prescribed antidepressant, then resumed it at full dose, provoking a psychotic break during which he was not fully aware of his actions.


The prosecution ridiculed the defense as “baloney.”  After all, it’s outrageous to suggest that drugs created to be mind-altering might be, well, mind-altering.

The jury didn’t buy it.


The jury of eight women and four men began deliberations late Tuesday and reached the verdict Wednesday morning. It found the defendant, Anthony Nicholas Orban, a Marine veteran of the Iraq War, guilty of two counts of rape, two counts of forced oral copulation, two of sexual penetration with a foreign object, one count of making a criminal threat, and a sentence enhancement of using a firearm in commission of a kidnapping.

The underlying facts, of Orban going out to a bar to get drunk and find a woman, suggests that what came later wasn’t the product of a psychotic break.  His conduct was calculated, not merely to commit a rape but to do so in a way that would prevent his getting caught by taking his victim to the desert where he could rape her unobserved. 

But that doesn’t mean that the ingestion of the SSRI sertraline hydrochloride played no role, and more importantly, should be so easily dismissed.  The prosecution argued that raping women wasn’t a side effect of Zoloft, which may be accurate as far as it goes. But disinhibition, the inability to control impulse, is a  known side effect, and disinhibition gives rise to an individual acting upon his worst impulses without the control of rational thought.

In other words, it’s quite possible that Orban’s conduct was affected by Zoloft.

The twinkie defense, and its various permutations, has been the subject of such enormous public ridicule as to be easily rejected by a jury despite medical testimony to the contrary.  In a way, it’s much like false confessions, something that jurors refuse to accept because it fails to comport with their experience.  After all, they’ve taken medicine and it never made them rape anyone.

On the other hand, the defense is facile, a ready excuse for inexcusable conduct.  Is society prepared to give every Zoloft user a free rape?  Or worse?  Not likely.

That a defendant who has otherwise demonstrated no inclination toward criminal conduct suddenly engages in something horrendous, as did Orban, seems to suggest that this isn’t his character, but his medication, at work.  But this too is a slippery slope, since accepting the premise that mind-altering drugs can cause an otherwise law-abiding person to engage in a terrible act doesn’t change because of an alleged propensity. If it’s the drugs, it’s the drugs. If it’s not, it’s not.  Guessing games don’t prove anything either way.

This is a particularly difficult issue, since drugs (which can include all manner of things that alter a brain’s chemistry) can obviate the mens rea, and most of us remain of the belief that it’s the intent rather than the mere outcome that distinguishes a crime.

But how to know?  As more mind-altering drugs become available (and are even sold over the counter), and as more people take drugs to achieve their personal level of “normal,” this problem becomes more acute.  The answer, unfortunately, remains elusive, and to the extent that drugs are a very real defense to the formulation of criminal intent, are increasingly unlikely to be accepted by a jury.




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10 thoughts on “This is a Cop on Drugs

  1. Frank

    The jury may not have experience with mind-altering drugs, but I’ll bet that a significant number of them have personal experience, or at one remove, with officers who have gone off the reservation. I submit to you that this probably played a larger role in deliberations than the Twinkie Defense.

  2. DHMCarver

    Interesting discussing of a horrific incident, and I think that the increased prevalence of strong psychiatric drugs poses particular criminal justice problems. I think your postulation that Orban’s Zoloft use could have triggered this incident is compelling, but I also feel that if you are taking such a drug, you therefore assume the responsibility of taking the drug as prescribed and ordered, and if you do not, then you are responsible for your actions (analogous to how we view drunk drivers).

    And perhaps I have become quite cynical, but my gut tells me that this is probably not the first time this guy has done something like this, just the first time he has been caught.

  3. A Voice of Sanity

    “he took his semi-automatic service weapon into his own hand and shoved it into the mouth of a waitress”

    I wonder how the forensics here compare to the total lack of forensics in the Phil Spector case? The latter seems to me to be one of the most blatantly obvious wrongful convictions of recent years.

  4. Ahcuah

    My son has experience with Zoloft (and now refuses to take it). While taking it it totally screwed up his thinking, so he stopped. When he accidentally took another one, he went catatonic for a day.

    The drugs mess with your mind so much that as far as I can tell one also cannot be responsible for taking it according to directions. (And according to directions is also often a problem.)

  5. SHG

    Those who experience it understand. Those who don’t have no clue. We ask juries to guage the veracity of evidence and arguments based on their own life experiences. Unfortunately, they usually aren’t the same as the defendants, which could explain why they’re sitting in the jury box rather than at the defense table.

  6. Marc R

    You can still have malice intent while being crazy. I remember a case where both sides basically conceded the defendant probably thought his mom was a demon. But the question still remained…was that demon threatening him to give him a modicum intent of self-defense? Because if not, say the defendant saw the demon but the demon was minding his own business watching tv, then the defendant had malicious intent in shooting or axing the demon. It’s convoluted but I guess the idea is that you can be “crazy” and still perceive whether you are in danger or whether you have free-will within the sphere of altered perceptions. Then of course is secondary intentions…was the drug taking voluntary or involuntary, defendant’s knowledge of drug’s effects through study or experience, etc.

  7. SHG

    I dunno about that. Can you really assess malice from a person’s psychotic delusions?  By definition, delusions can’t be understood in a rational framework, which seems to me to make it impossible to hold an insane person legally responsible to the extent it fits within a sane world.

  8. Marc R

    I see what you’re saying, and it makes sense, but so does the law that you can discern intentions within admitted delusions. See Iowa v. Hall 214 N.W. 2d 205 (Iowa 1974). Also Tenn v. Wagner 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1344.

  9. SHG

    The good judges in Iowa and Tennessee have magic skills that people on the coasts are constrained to do without.

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