When the State of Florida is mentioned on a law blog, it’s usually because something monumentally stupid happened there, and we can all take comfort in knowing that wherever we are, it’s not Florida. Yet, the Supreme Court of Florida has unanimously approved changes to their jury instruction on eyewitness identifications that’s not only worthy of note, but remarkably progressive for a state where its citizens can’t figure how to vote for the candidate of their choice.
From Bill Kaczor of the Associated Press :
Trial judges are being required by the Florida Supreme Court to instruct jurors on factors such as race and familiarity that should be considered when evaluating the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, the leading cause of wrongful convictions.Judges will be required to tell jurors to consider whether witnesses are of the same race or ethnic group as those they are identifying, how familiar they are with people they are identifying and whether they relied solely on their own recollection or have been influenced in some way.
Another factor is the capacity and opportunity of a witness to observe a suspect including length of time, lighting and distance. Jurors also will be told to consider how much time has gone by since an event before identifications are made and any inconsistencies by witnesses.
Despite my less-than-Herculean efforts, I was unable to find the actual pattern jury instruction that the court approved. The good news, according to the story, is that prosecutors opposed the changes, arguing that the court shouldn’t be doing the defense lawyer’s job by telling the jury that their very best evidence isn’t absolutely reliable, as most jurors believe. Whenever prosecutors oppose something, it’s generally a good sign.
The bad news is that, while changing from the old regimen which plays to the “common sense” understanding that eyewitness identification is about as good as it gets, the new instructions fall far short of what they should be.
The Innocence Project of Florida, which has helped free wrongly convicted inmates through DNA testing, contended in comments filed with the high court that the instruction fails to reflect scientific understanding of how to properly asses the reliability of eyewitness identifications. It had urged the justices to ask for a more robust rule or appoint a special master to hear evidence on how it could be strengthened.
The group wrote that the instruction neither warns “the jury of the dangers inherent in eyewitness evidence” nor does it “provide any comprehensive guidance on how jurors weigh certain factors.”
In a curious response to this criticism, the justices wrote that they weren’t “expressing an opinion on the instruction’s correctness.” One would think that before changing jury instructions, that’s exactly what they would do, assure that the instructions are correct. Why would a court change jury instructions from the old incorrect one to a new incorrect one? Oops, I forgot. This is Florida.
It’s long been known, and empirically proven, that eyewitness identifications are not only overwhelming persuasive to jurors, but fraught with error. That nothing has been done to bring the law in line with the science of identifications is a scandal. It’s not good enough to argue that the law moves slowly, methodically, as it adapts to change in our grasp of how the human mind works, or the limits of scientific certainty. Judges have a nasty habit of accepting the validity of methods used to prove guilt despite a shocking lack of evidence sufficient to satisfy scientific method, and once accepted, it moves from courtroom to courtroom around the nation with a speed that makes one’s head spin. Dog sniff, anyone?
Yet, when science (real science, like that stuff they do at the National Academies of it, as opposed to the American Society of Duct Tape Identifiers, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the United State Association of Dog Handlers) disproves the validity of a method that has been found instrumental in achieving convictions, it takes decades before anyone acknowledges they may have put thousands of nice people in prison for crimes they didn’t commit.
Some reformers will applaud the fact that Florida has modified its jury instructions to recognize that maybe, just maybe, eyewitness IDs aren’t as perfect as we’ve been led to believe. Others will note that once a change occurs, another change is often decades away, so that a modest change, perhaps an inadequate change, will be a little better than what existed perviously, but fail to adequately address the problem. And lawyers will be faced with these modest, inadequate changes, when other states finally get off the dime and modify their jury instructions to conform with scientific reality. They’re a bit ahead for the moment, but quickly fall behind later.
While there are other initiatives being made to correct pattern jury instructions, there remains a disturbing lack of concern for those innocent defendants who will be convicted by misidentification while committees of judges and lawyers fight over the language, battle over whether it’s too favorable to the prosecution or the defense and try to figure out what exactly the empirical studies show. Lawyers and judges are notoriously bad at understanding scientific method, which explains a lot about what goes wrong with the law.
So is it better than Florida moves forward to change its instructions, even if they fall significantly short of what good eyewitness ID instructions should be? Or would it be better to spend a couple more years arguing over each word, while innocent people continue to get convicted under the old, failed instructions?
It’s a tough question to answer, though if I was a defendant headed to prison because of misidentification, I know where I would come out. This may fall far short of a cure for the disease of misidentificsation, but at the least it’s move toward correcting it, and an opportunity for lawyers to argue the point in summation, where before they were precluded for lack of evidence. But it’s hard to say when, or if, the law will ever get this right.
H/T John Burgess
Discover more from Simple Justice
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

The best – tho’ not perfect – EyeID instructions come from New Jersey, via the important Henderson decision by the NJ Supreme Court (preceded by a magnificent special master’s report). We’ve had a little luck in NYC getting judges to permit adaptations. Slow progress for us, but we hope growing.
Dennis
Agreed. My vain hope was that New Jersey’s move would spur New York to action. It did nothing. Maybe New York will be ashamed of being a step (or more) behind Florida.
“changes…that are worthy of note” and “where its citizens” (no apostrophe). Not a big deal, of course, but some folks consider it bad form to have errors in a sentence where you’re insulting other people’s intelligence.
I have an unfortunate tendency when typing fast (and I always type fast when doing a post) to mindlessly use it’s instead of its. I’m corrected on that all the time. Of course, most people let me know of my typos by email rather than comment, but it’s all good with me. I much prefer to correct my errors (as I’ve done now).
The new jury instruction:
[Ed. Note: Links to source of original deleted.]
Thanks. There is only one new line in there of consequence, “8. Whether the eyewitness and the offender are of different races or ethnic groups, and whether this may have affected the accuracy of the identification.”
It’s a crack, but barely. It’s about as inconsequential a change, buried amid the standard instructions, as possible, and fails to alert a jury to why this would be in issue. But at least it gives the lawyers a chance to argue the point.
Juries in England and Australia are directed to be quite sceptical about identification evidence. This has been the case since the late 1970s cases of Turnbull and Domican – so for longer than most of us have been in practice. I thought you might be interested in the Queensland specimen direction. It does not include a reference to the difficulties of cross-racial recognition, but that direction would probably be included on request. It is included in the New South Wales directions as follows:
Does [name of witness] come from the same racial background as the person identified? That is also something you can bear in mind. It may be more difficult for a member of one race to identify an individual of another racial group. [recite evidence]
The Queensland directions are:
The issue of identification is one for you to decide as a question of fact.1
The case against the defendant depends to a significant degree on the correctness of one (or more) visual identification of the defendant, which the defendant alleges to be mistaken. I must therefore warn you of the special need for caution before convicting in reliance on the correctness of that identification.2 The reason for this is that it is quite possible for an honest witness to make a mistaken identification.3 Notorious miscarriages of justice have sometimes occurred in such situations. A mistaken witness may nevertheless be convincing. Even a number of apparently convincing witnesses may all be mistaken.4
You must examine carefully the circumstances in which the identification by the witness was made. How long did the witness have the person, said to be the defendant, under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way? Had the witness ever seen the defendant before? If so, how often? If only occasionally, had the witness any special reason for remembering the defendant? What time elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police?5 Was there any material discrepancy between the description given to the police by the witness when first seen and the evidence the witness has now given?
The evidence of each individual witness, while important in itself, should not be regarded by you in isolation from the other evidence adduced at the trial.
A possible addition is: In general, the powers of observation, and of recollection of observation, are fallible. And the risk of mistake is especially great with fleeting encounters.
Other evidence tending to implicate the defendant may be highly relevant, and may justify a conviction, while the evidence of identification, if it stood alone, would be insufficient.6
Where evidence is given by a stranger to the defendant or a casual acquaintance, you should treat the evidence of identification with care. You should be cautious about concluding that identification has been established in such a case, and scrupulous to be satisfied first that the identifying witn