Among the worst of progressive inconsistencies in “reform” is the shift away from certain offenses that affect groups they favor, such as marijuana, and toward groups they don’t, such as sex offenses. And a huge reform celebrated in a New York Times editorial masquerading as a news article is the reform of the elements of sexual harassment under New York’s Human Rights Law.

Well, calling it reform may be a bit unfair. What the New York legislature has done is removed the words “severe or pervasive,” (note the disjunctive) which means there is no effective limitation on what constitutes harassment at all.

For decades, sexual harassment was the State Capitol’s worst-kept secret.

When a putative news article begins with such silly and irrelevant* hyperbole, you just know it’s going to be lit.

The legislation eliminates the state’s “severe or pervasive” standard for proving harassment, which advocates said had allowed judges to dismiss claims of inappropriate comments or even groping as insufficiently hostile.

What makes a comment “inappropriate” is one question. What makes a comment sufficiently “inappropriate” to be actionable is another. As for “groping,” is the non-sexual touching of an upper arm rather than, say, a breast, groping? It is if the person touched feels harassed by it, now that they’re no longer constrained by the limitation of “severe or pervasive.”

Working individuals in the State who have experienced egregious and debilitating forms of harassment must overcome significant and unwarranted legal barriers before they can seek justice for the wrongdoing they have been subjected to. One such example is the requirement that an employee alleging harassment must prove the harassment was severe or pervasive to prevail on a claim.

One might wonder how it’s possible that harassment can be “egregious and debilitating,” yet fail to meet the elements of “severe or pervasive.” The best answer available is that it is if the “victim” claims it is. After all, what are elements if they stand in the way of a victim’s feelings?

In its largesse, the Lege hasn’t entirely forsaken the possibility that some woman might be so idiosyncratically sensitive that her debilitation from being “stare raped” would be beyond challenge.

IT SHALL BE AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO LIABILITY UNDER THIS SUBDIVISION THAT THE HARASSING CONDUCT DOES NOT RISE ABOVE THE LEVEL OF WHAT A REASONABLE VICTIM OF DISCRIMINATION WITH THE SAME PROTECTED CHARACTERISTIC WOULD CONSIDER PETTY SLIGHTS OR TRIVIAL INCONVENIENCES.

On the one hand, “harassing conduct” is revealed here to be any and all conduct complained of, without limitation. If a “victim” says it’s harassment, then it is. On the other hand, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by affirmative defense that the conduct fails to surpass “petty slights or trivial inconveniences.”

So every claimed act of harassment is, by absence of limitation, actionable harassment, and the “victim” is not only relieved of the burden of proving it to be “severe or pervasive,” but not even greater than a “petty slight or trivial inconvenience.” That’s the accused’s burden to prove. But how that’s proven is yet another curiosity. The bar isn’t what a reasonable person might think, or you or I, or a judge or jury. Only a very special person is entitled under this law to reach that conclusion:

…CONDUCT DOES NOT RISE ABOVE THE LEVEL OF WHAT A REASONABLE VICTIM OF DISCRIMINATION WITH THE SAME PROTECTED CHARACTERISTIC WOULD CONSIDER…

It includes the word “reasonable” to create the facial appearance of objectivity in the same way that the Reasonably Scared Cop Rule does, but only as can be seen through a victim’s feelings. And not just any victim of discrimination, but a victim with the “same protected characteristic.” It’s the defendant’s duty to find that victim as his “expert” to prove his affirmative defense. Without such a handy victim available, there is no claim too petty or trivial to prevail.

The law covers a number of other reforms as well, by extending the statute of limitations, prohibiting NDAs, giving the Attorney General broad enforcement powers and allowing attorney’s fees and punitive damages. It also eliminates the Faragher/Ellerth defense for employment discrimination claims, that the “victim” suffered no harm,

And there’s one huge hidden kicker lurking behind the putative purpose of this “reform,” which is ostensibly to convert all #MeToo moments into actionable lawsuits: It amends New York Executive Law § 296, which covers all forms of discrimination:

age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, or domestic violence victim status

Much as the reform is characterized as applying to “sexual harassment,” it has removed “severe or pervasive” from harassment claimed on any of these basis for discrimination.

Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo has promised to sign the bills.

“We will make it easier for claims to be brought forward and send a strong message that when it comes to sexual harassment in the workplace, time is up,” he said in a statement on Wednesday.

Time is up, indeed, when essentially any claim of harassment, no matter how petty or unintentional, constitutes not only a viable cause of action, but risks damages, attorneys fees and punitive damages.

*The article begins, as all editorials do these days, with a story about sexual harassment in Albany involving a government employee. The law, however, isn’t addressed to government employees, but to everyone. Even if it’s accurate to say that sexual harassment is “the State Capitol’s worst-kept secret,” it has nothing to do with the factory in Brooklyn subject to the change as well.