Ohio Supreme Court Rejects “Reverse Rape”

Not only were the facts undisputed, but they were appalling. Yet Miranda Smith did it anyway.

The Wednesday ruling came in the case of a Highland County woman charged with rape involving a two-year-old child. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decisions of an appeals court and trial court that convicted the woman of rape, saying instead, the actions, which she admitted to, constitute gross sexual imposition under state law. Gross sexual imposition is a lesser charge that could net less punishment.

Miranda Smith pleaded no contest to multiple sex crimes for a sex act she directed a child to conduct on her. She also filmed the act and sent the video to her boyfriend.

As the opinion makes somewhat more specific, Smith had her two-year-old son insert a ‘sex toy” into her vagina.The trial court and intermediate appellate court upheld the conviction for rape based on the plain meaning of the relevant statutes, Ohio R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and 2907.01(A), the latter defining “sexual conduct.”

(A) “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.

Notably, the definition includes “insertion, however slight,” goes on to state that the object must be inserted “into the vaginal or anal opening of another.”

The issue raised before the Ohio Supreme Court was whether the person into whom the object was inserted can be the rapist of the person doing the inserting. The Fourth District Court of Appeals held it could. The Supreme Court reversed.

Smith contends that to be guilty of rape by insertion under R.C. 2907.01(A), a defendant must have inserted a body part or object into another—as opposed to someone else having inserted a body part or object into the defendant. In other words, Smith argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction because there is a legally significant distinction between engaging in sexual conduct with another and causing another to engage in sexual conduct. Given the plain and unambiguous statutory text, we agree.

Notably, if the rape charges fell, it’s not as if Smith would have walked, as there remained the lesser charge of gross sexual imposition. Ohio R.C. 2907.05(A). But the egregious conduct here, and particularly the fact that it involved a two-year-old, compelled the prosecution to go for rape.

The state asks us to ignore the word “another” and to conclude that Ohio law requires only an act of insertion and that it does not matter whether it is the victim or the defendant who does the inserting. In other words, the state is essentially asking us to rewrite R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to make the statute fit the facts of this case. We cannot do that, though.

Whether the specific language used in the definition simply lacked sufficient imagination to cover the various possible ways in which rape could be committed or intended not to include this conduct within its ambit, the Court held to this specific wording, “into another,” and rejected the interpretation to include Smith’s compelling her son to insert the sex toy into her.

The holding evoked outrage by activists.

It’s this focus on the language of the law rather than the impact the crime had on the child that troubles those who advocate for rape and sex crime survivors.

Amy Dudley is the director of the only accredited rape crisis center in Montgomery and Preble counties, the YWCA Dayton’s Center for Survivors of Sexual Violence. She said the fact that a defendant’s arguments seemed to matter more in this supreme court case than the long-term impact to the child is why laws need to change.

“If we can say that a 2-year-old was complicit in (Smith’s) sexual conduct, what does that say for older survivors?” Dudley said, after reviewing the case and watching oral arguments.

The reaction raised here is one that should give rise to grave concern, regardless of how repugnant the crime was or how it might impact “survivors.” Dudley condemns the Court not for its logic and reasoning, but because it places the language of the law above the “Impact” of the victim, part of the trend that criminality is less about the conduct than the “victim’s” feelings about the conduct.

Seeing a person’s sentence minimized in a crime of this type is something that could have impacts on the entire process of helping survivors, Dudley said. That’s why it’s important that the justice system turn toward a “survivor focus” while giving everyone involved the rights they are owed.

If the rhetoric sounds remarkably familiar, it’s the same rationalization that started on campus in Title IX sex cases, made its way across social media during the #MeToo hunts, and is now winding its way through courts and legislatures.

Notably, the prosecution charging rape, and the two lower courts sustaining the charge, did not let the language of the statute prevent Smith from being convicted, or a passionate “survivor” activist from condemning the Supreme Court’s “slavish” reliance on the language of the statute rather than focus on whether the victim feels that it should be rape.

The Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association said the outcome for the victim is not the fault of the court, but is “ripe for a legislative fix.”

“This was a despicable sexual act against an innocent two-year-old child and I think most Ohioans would be appalled to find out that it’s not considered rape to cause a young child to engage in sexual conduct like this,” Louis Tobin, executive director of the OPAA, told the OCJ.

That the act was despicable and “Ohioans would be appalled” may well be true, and the legislature may change the language to bring the conduct that occurred here within the definition provided by statute. But until that happens, faulting the Supreme Court for adhering to the language of the law because it fails to have a “survivor focus” is a matter of significant concern. The lower courts accepted the premise by ignoring the language of the statute in favor of whether this horrific conduct felt sufficiently rape-ish.

Whether this is just a matter of bad facts make bad law or the trend away from statutory language to what the victim feels is a crime, is unclear, but the trend in the public perception is clear, growing and dangerous.


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11 thoughts on “Ohio Supreme Court Rejects “Reverse Rape”

  1. Gregory Smith

    Almost as if the courts are openly ignoring what passionate people believe the law should have said in making these rulings.

  2. Mike V.

    If Ms. Dudley doesn’t like the law as written, maybe she should work to get it changed instead of bashing the court for actually reading and upholding the statute. I know, it’s a novel concept and won’t catch on because it takes actually doing something; but it might be worth trying.

    1. Sgt. Schultz

      If it was just Dudley, then it would be just one ignorant nutjob. But this decision reversed two courts below and the prosecution’s charging decision. It’s not just Dudley.

      The rot runs far deeper than just one crazy activist.

      1. Mike V.

        You DO have a good point. I don’t know if Ohio has elected judges or not; but elected judges are easier to get rid of IMO.

        1. Jeffrey M Gamso

          Yes, Ohio judges are elected. But all of them, and that includes those most hostile to defendants, signed off on this. Three reasons: (1) Ohio law is clear, even if the trial and intermediate appellate courts don’t agree, that when a statute is not ambiguous it should be followed to the letter. (2) The specifics of the offense were unlikely enough to happen again that it’s a one-off decision. (3) Smith remains a convicted sex offender.

  3. Andy

    I’m surprised there’s no comment on Dudley’s hysterical [sic] claim that the holding somehow finds the child “complicit” in the act, like if it isn’t Official Legally Designated Rape then it’s the other party’s fault. It would explain a lot about the stretching of definitions if that’s how certain people really see it, but then, they’re the ones with the problem.

  4. David Cristol

    Under the State Supreme court’s reading, A female would not engage in sexual conduct if she were to have her vagina surround a body part of another. In fact under this reading, a male that made no insertion but was rather engulfed apparently did not participate in sexual conduct either. I don’t believe this was the intent of the legislature nor what the statutes says.

    Section 2907.01(A) reads “of another”, looking at the word “another” in isolation from the modifier can change its meaning. The statute states that the orifice and the ” body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object” has to be from different parties, “of another”. If the legislature wanted to have the meaning found by the court, they would have used “by another” which would lead to the result of the court.

    Removing the extra stuff not applicable to the facts of this case, we have.
    “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; … and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, … of … object into the vaginal … opening of another.

    Simply put sexual conduct as defined by the statute is when at least two people engage in the penetration of an orifice. Based upon the defendant’s admission, that did indeed occur in this case. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) criminalizes this and I don’t think there is much dispute as to the applicability of that statute.

    1. David Meyer-Lindenberg

      Under the State Supreme court’s reading, A female would not engage in sexual conduct if she were to have her vagina surround a body part of another. In fact under this reading, a male that made no insertion but was rather engulfed apparently did not participate in sexual conduct either.

      No. “‘Sexual conduct’ means vaginal intercourse between a male and female […] Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal […] intercourse.” You appear to confuse “penetration” with “insertion.” The former merely observes that A is sticking in B, while the latter carries the meaning that some C has put A into B.

      The statute states that the orifice and the ” body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object” has to be from different parties, “of another”. If the legislature wanted to have the meaning found by the court, they would have used “by another” which would lead to the result of the court.

      No. “‘Sexual conduct’ means […] the insertion [without privilege to do so] of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another.” That is, and as the court held: The person who engages in sexual conduct under this part of the definition must insert something into one of a choice of two openings – not just any old orifice, as you said, either – of someone other than themselves.

      Simply put sexual conduct as defined by the statute is when at least two people engage in the penetration of an orifice.

      No, not even this is true. Apart from your ongoing conflation of “penetration” with “insertion”: If Persons #1 and #2 jointly insert something into Person #1’s opening and Person #2 does so with “privilege,” neither has engaged in sexual conduct.

      Really, Ohio’s definition isn’t half bad. The only edge case I see: If Persons #1 and #2 are both men or both women and engage in penetrative vaginal intercourse with each other, only the person who inserted the body part has engaged in sexual conduct (since the “vaginal intercourse” part of the definition fails, because both partners have the same sex, but the “insertion” part doesn’t).

  5. Another David

    Words don’t quite work that way. The “another” can’t be the person charged with committing the crime or they wouldn’t be “another.” Good try, though.

  6. Scott Jacobs

    while giving everyone involved the rights they are owed.

    I mean, it’s nice they are at least willing to continue the lie that they care about the rights of the accused.

  7. B. McLeod

    There used to be a notion that criminal laws should put people on notice of the prohibited conduct. If the written text of a law didn’t do that, courts that subscribed to that old notion would throw out the charge. If the law was so unclear that maybe it did and maybe it didn’t put people on notice, there was another odd notion called the “rule of lenity”. Courts would throw charges out based on that one too
    The current notion is that if people in the particular backwater hate the defendant, the prosecutor should stretch whatever law is colorably available and claim that it prohibits whatever the defendant did, and the court should allow it because reasons. What it really comes down to is whether a particular place is going to have real “law,” or just prosecute whomever the slack-jawed yokels of the locality hate at the moment.

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