In Millard v. Rankin, an as-applied challenge, Colorado Senior District Judge Richard Matsch rejected the pretty ribbons the legislature wrapped around the Sex Offender Registry Act. Applying the “intents-effects” test to the law, the court held that it was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), the Supreme Court employed an “intent-effects” analytical framework to determine whether Alaska’s sex offender registration statute was punitive. The Court stated that it would first consider whether the legislative intent was to impose punishment; if so, “that ends the inquiry.” Id. at 92. If the intent was to enact a statutory scheme that is civil and non-punitive, however, the Court stated that it must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the legislative intention to deem it “civil.” Id. In making the “effects” analysis, the Court considered five of the seven factors employed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963):
The factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: [1] has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; [3] promotes the traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5] is excessive with respect to this purpose.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97. The two additional factors considered in Kennedy were [6] whether the statute’s requirements come into play only on a finding of scienter; and [7] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime.


