I just watched a Good Morning America segment on “mommy bloggers,” the point of which is that there are a host of mommies out there blogging away for loot. Some get free stuff for their kids from, and I quote, “hundreds of companies,” while another held herself out as professional, supporting her family on her blogging income.
One of the complaints was by a reader, who wanted to know the best stroller, and later realized that the blogger upon whom she relied was a paid shill. This was offered as the genesis of the FTCs consideration of bringing blogs under their control, to prevent the mommies of the world from promoting goods without disclosing that they are on the dole.
What struck me most was the proud pronouncement that the blogger who was keeping the deliveryman so busy bringing hot new kiddie stuff to her home that she had 2000 readers. No, they didn’t leave a zero off the end. Just 2000.
Curiously, this isn’t a problem for lawyer blogs. At least not for this lawyer blog.
Granted, people send me books to read and review, and the occasional movie. Of course, as my reviews make clear, there is absolutely no connection between the free book and my take on it. Whether I love it or hate it, my opinion is never colored by the fact that it’s gratis.
But where are the other perks that are flying out the door to the mommy bloggers? I’m not getting squat. Zero. Zippo. Nada. Is it me or is it us, lawyers, that hold no interest for those who have great stuff to sell us?
It seems most likely that it’s me rather than you. Whenever I go to a meeting or convention, there are always a wealth of vendors trying to entice us to buy their wares, with flashy porn to suck us in to switch from Lexis to Westlaw to Whitney to Lois. They want our money, and send their people across the country to sell, sell, sell. They just don’t do it here.
I get a ton of emails trying to get me to promote stuff for free. For free, they’re interested in me. It’s borderline idiotic, much like the offers to exchange links with websites offering feminine hygiene products because of the wonderful overlap in our respective audiences. What possible reason would I have to promote your commercial enterprise? Either they’re morons or they think I am. Again, the answer is unfortunately obvious.
It’s often crossed my mind what the same companies that are bent on lawyer hegemony don’t do two things: First, allow blawgers access to their offerings, from Lexis to the various fee-based publications. I am not going to link to your story if I can’t read it, and I am not going to pay you for access so that I can give you some free advertising.
Second, you’ve got a lot of nerve sending me your press releases about your new and improved service or product, as if I’m going to post about it, when you haven’t given me your product to use.
Now here’s the downside, and perhaps one of the reasons why you aren’t keeping my mailman busy. If your product sucks, I will say so in no uncertain terms. I don’t care how much you love me, or how sweet your love note. Crap is crap, whether for free or not.
But the fact that this stuff is flowing freely to the mommy bloggers, while not a drib nor drab is coming to the lawyer blawgers, tells me one more thing. We are just one sucky market as far as business is concerned. We’re just not worth the effort.
Two thousand readers? Sheesh. I would do better to blog about pampers.
Monthly Archives: July 2009
Freedom to Move; The American Way
Of the many significant rights that our Constitution protects, there is probably none so basic as the freedom to walk down the street without having to explain yourself to an officer of the government and obtain his approval before proceeding on. Take a walk. It’s so basic. Yet the District of Columbia, in its misguided desire to stem “the violence that plagued the Trinidad neighborhood,” decided to take it away.
After an injunction was refused by the district court, the D.C, Circuit, in an opinion in Mills v. District of Columbia by Chief Judge David Sentelle, rejected this abrogation of one of our most fundamental rights, the right to go where we pleased along a public road without having to explain ourselves to the police.
The plan was called the Neighborhood Safety Zone, no doubt because Neighborhood No-Rights Zone sounded unpleasant. But the court wasn’t fooled.
The harm to the rights of appellants is apparent. It cannot be gainsaid that citizens have a right to drive upon the public streets of the District of Columbia or any other city absent a constitutionally sound reason for limiting their access. As our discussion of the likelihood of success has demonstrated, there is no such constitutionally sound bar in the NSZ checkpoint program. It is apparent that appellants’ constitutional rights are violated. It has long been established that the loss of constitutional freedoms, “for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”
What strikes me as quite amazing is that there was any question whatsoever about the harm done to this basic right to move freely about the District of Columbia, or any city, town or burg, in this nation.
The curious part of this decision is that the initial analysis delved heavily into the law of checkpoints, as approved for such purposes as drunk driving and seatbelts, but disallowed for general crime deterrence. This is yet another example of the slippery slope, where courts carved out 4th Amendment exceptions to allow what were deemed minor intrusions into our freedom from unreasonable seizure to accommodate what was believed to be a socially important purpose. Sure, ridding the roads of drunk drivers is a worthy goal, but at the price of stopping law-abiding people doing nothing more than exercising their right to travel down a public road?
The underlying issue is that the checkpoint concept, one that might conceivably be deemed acceptable by many citizens who are willing to spend a few minutes of their time being subject to police scrutiny in the name of drunk-driving prevention, blurs the notion that we are free to go about our lives without police interference as long as we do nothing to justify their scrutiny. Checkpoints manifestly elevate order over freedom.
It’s not that police aren’t properly concerned with drunk driving. If someone drives down the road swerving, demonstrating the indicia of being under the influence such that he may harm others, turn on the sirens and nail the sucker. Go to it. But if I’m minding my own business, doing nothing wrong, living clean and sober, then what business do the police have in seizing me, even if only for 10 seconds of my time, to check for the potential of something for which no evidence exists? I’ve got a problem with being seized.
The roads belong to the people. We pay for them. We use them. We are entitled to use them. That the Trinidad neighborhood suffered from terrible violence reflects a lack of effective law enforcement policy coupled with disrespect for the law and other people. I wonder what breeds such disrespect? No doubt someone else will wonder why the residents of the neighborhood are such animals. They always see such people as animals, which offers an easier explanation for why bad things happen in bad neighborhoods.
But the residents of the Trinidad neighborhood, just like my neighbors and I, maintain the right to move freely down the road at will. They need not prove their identities to police. They need not explain their purpose for driving down a public road. They need not lose 10 seconds of their lives to answer a police officer’s inquiry. This is true when we are subjected to the gratuitous inquiry of the police officer without enough to occupy his time, and it’s true when a city comes up with a formalized plan to segregate a neighborhood as a war zone.
One might think that the right to move freely, so basic to our nature as Americans and so little different from the time when our basic rights were formally protected by enactment of the Bill of Rights, would still be in play more than two centuries later. The rules haven’t changed, and it’s appalling that a district court judge was so enamored of the police and the need for order that the Balkanization of the District of Columbia would be viewed as acceptable. It seems that we are destined to keep fighting the American revolution every day, lest our patriot forefathers have died in vain.
H/T Bashman, Eugene and Popehat
Hull Gets Tough: No-Wuss Zone Is For Real
Dan Hull, the guiding force behind What About Clients?, which subtlety transitions into What About Paris? every weekend, is a lawyer who knows right from wrong. And he makes no apologies. And he takes no prisoners.
This is the guy who asked the question, why are we paying associates who can’t produce viable work so that law schools can spend three years discussing the Law of Basket Weaving 101. It seemed to Hull that they ought to be paying firms for the training (and perhaps suing their law schools for fraudulent inducement).
Hull’s blawg has been a consistent award winner and voice for sanity in the blawgosphere, and he’s gone on a new tear against the specter of anonymous comments, proclaiming No Name, No Publish.
Policy: On this blog, the ethos is Step Up: (1) Say Who You Are, and then (2) Say What You Think. We need both bona fides to publish. Exceptions are special needs cases: e.g., CIA undercover operatives, abused housewives, Cuban or Iranian dissidents, ex-hookers who work with severely retarded children, Gen-Ys, or unwed teenage moms, bona fide members of the dreaded Club Ned, and serious non-wimp trailblazers. Garden variety risk-averse lawyer-CPA chickenshits need not apply.**
While I’ve yet to show the fortitude of Dan Hull, still allowing those who insist on hiding behind anonymity to post their comments, I must admit that Hull is an inspiration to me, and I hope to you as well. If you have no real cause to conceal your identity, then get a spine and stop pretending that you’re Publius. You’re not. You never will be. Nothing you have to say compares. That’s just how it is, and no one who reads your comment will ever confuse you with James Madison.Everyone else: get a spine. Above: The highly-respected French Resistance in
action. Twenty-first century counterparts may qualify for a WAC? No-Anonymity
Rule special needs exemption.
Simple Justice will continue to allow comments by wusses, but don’t mistake the fact that you’re a wuss unless you fit within a special exemption. I will know it. Everyone else will know it. Dan Hull will know it. You should know it too.
Book Review: “Three Felonies A Day,” Or Not
The average professional in this country wakes up in the morning, goes to work, comes home, eats dinner, and then goes to sleep, unaware the he or she has likely committed several federal crimes that day. Why” The answer lies in the very nature of modern criminal laws, which have exploded in number but also become impossibly broad and vague.Wow. Add to that tease the name Harvey Silverglate, formerly law partner with now Massachusetts District Court Judge Nancy Gertner, as close to defense lawyer royalty as there is, and this is a book you want to read NOW. So when Three Felonies a Day, How the Feds Target the innocent, wound up in my mailbox, I put everything else aside to get right to it. A very nice note from Harvey suggesting this might be something I would like, to boot.
All that excitement. All that promised. Burned in the first chapter. The first case Silverglate writes about is that of Cuban-American Hialeah, Florida Mayor Raul Martinez. It seems the good mayor accepted a plot of land from a developer who concededly sought to ingratiate himself the Mayor for substantially below market value. Harvey finds this case outrageous, because Martinez gave no particular quid pro quo for the generalized bribe. The guy wanted to be Martinez’s “friend”. Martinez wanted to make some walking around money.Skid to stop. Harvey, that’s not what this book was supposed to be about. Sure, it may be questionable whether Martinez’s conduct met the elements of official corruption, but his conduct smelled awfully bad and it certainly isn’t an “average” joe story, unless all your buddies happen to be the Mayor of Hialeah. And this is Chapter 1? Are you telling me you couldn’t find a decent story to suit your premise for Chapter 1? That’s not a good sign. Where does the book go from here?
It goes down, down, down. The book goes on to tell war stories about some of Harvey’s old cases and some other well known oddball prosecutions, ranging from physicians overprescribing medications to the Arthur Anderson prosecution to Buffalo’s nutty Professor Steven Kurtz, whose artwork is comprised of shiny but harmless bacteria, raising a ridiculous bioterrorism scare unearthed when the ambulance came for his dying wife. Bizarre? Sure. But related to the premise of the book? Not even close. These aren’t your average professionals, and these aren’t your ordinary, everyday activities that landed you in the federal dock.
Silverglate’s long career as a criminal defense and civil rights lawyer yields some interesting cases, but his lawyerly writing style, formal to a fault, sucks the fun out of his story-telling. It’s hard to switch from briefs to books, and few people consider briefs fun summer reading. The shame is that had Harvey offered this book on a bunch of his old cases, and had loosened his tie just a bit as his fingers tapped out each Latin-derived word, this might well be a book a lot of criminal defense lawyers would want to read. While Harvey Silverglate’s name may not be a house-hold word, he’s done some great work and has great stories to tell.
But the promise of the back flap, the title itself, made the contents disappointing. As I made my way through the chapters, one problem kept slapping me in the face: In the scheme of unfair, abusive, overreaching prosecutions, Harvey’s cases didn’t even make the first cut. To the extent I already knew about the cases, they offered no new insight, as if Harvey was cautious not to disclose anything too personal and perhaps covered by privilege. That’s fine, but if you’re not going to tell more than what’s already publicly available, there’s really not much reason to tell the story again.
More troubling was that the book essentially disproves its thesis, that while the government could use the broad, vague wealth of laws available to it to go after the most innocuous conduct by ordinary people, the book offers nothing to suggest it actually does. In almost every instance, the conduct involved emitted a sufficient odor to distinguish it from the type of things that ordinary folks do. While they reflect prosecutions that should never have happened, they aren’t so absurd or off the wall to cause fear amongst the masses or outrage within the bar. The distinctions often relied on a technical understanding of law that only a legal wonk could appreciate.
Fear not, unless you happen to be a journalist writing the New York Post’s Page Six gossip column. You’re not? Then what was done Jared Paul Stern probably won’t make you shake in your boots. In fact, it didn’t move me at all.
I’ve no doubt that Harvey Silverglate, with his distinguished career as a criminal defense lawyer, would be a great guy to join for a beer and listen to story after story of his storied career. We all have our war stories, but few have been involved in as many big time cases as Harvey. A book about them, however, doesn’t necessarily include the critical beer aspect or the camaraderie that comes into play when whispering in a dimly lit pub. War stories are always better with a chilled mug in hand.
What leaves me feeling cheated is that I still want Harvey to make good on the premise of the book. Is it three wire frauds from lying to your spouse about why you’ll be late for dinner? I believe that there’s great stuff out there to show how the breadth and vagary of federal law criminalizes all of us, and I am downright miffed that he teased me so and left me unfulfilled.
If you want to hear the war stories of a lawyer with as much to tell as Harvey Silverglate, Three Felonies provides a quick trip through some of his best work. But as an indictment of the federal criminal system, the book is barely a parking ticket. It’s still a great and intriguing premise, and one that I still want to read more about. But it’s going to take another book to seize upon this great idea and make it happen.
Battle of the Strawmen
Paul Lippe jumped in head first when he published his challenge to law schools to pull their collective heads out of their butts when it comes to their failure to turn out viable lawyers after three years of mush in the AmLaw Daily. Comparing the education provided by law schools to that of medical and business schools, Lippe proclaimed that they have failed to adapt and grow.
Law professors didn’t like what Lippe had to say.
Lippe, borrowing from the currently popular lingo, proclaimed it’s time for Law School 4.0, offered some concrete suggestions:
–An accelerated curriculum, with no more than a year of case method, a year of clinical, and then a year of externship with subject area focus, along the lines of medical school.
–More practice orientation in teaching, with far more adjunct faculty who are active practitioners (a random e-mail I received yesterday said, “One of the reasons I chose Northwestern for law school is I believe in the type of changes that Dean Van Zandt is trying to make. My favorite instructors were not academics but adjuncts who were successful practicing attorneys.”)
–Better use of technology (both connectivity, like video or Web conferencing, and Web 2.0 social networks) to connect schools and practitioners and clients. Faculty (rightly) hate the notion of students tweeting each other in the classroom, but they can easily rely on professional networking services to connect to actual practitioners who are dealing with the issues discussed in class. In a networked world, the ability to get someone who knows the answer to help you is a far more valuable skill than the ability to hypothesize your own answer.
–-A much more empirical approach to practice, forcing much deeper inquiry, rather than just trotting out hypotheticals and issue-spotting–e.g., if choosing AAA arbitration is the right dispute resolution clause, do we know that a higher percentage of deals with no arbitration clause ended in a contentious dispute?
–A move back to mission-centered management. In a recent meeting with law school deans, I asked, “If you decided the purpose of law school was to maximize the comfort and income of the faculty, what would you do differently?” The answer: “Nothing.” When my wife’s grandfather was a law school dean, it was understood that the law school was there to serve society, the profession, and students–not vice versa.
–A lifetime (or at least ten years) of orientation for skills development for students/alums. While law schools need to figure out how to get graduates out the door faster and for less money, they also are the logical source (although realistically, today, not the most fully competent source) of skills (as well as reputation and network) development for lawyers to become fully functional, especially as firms’ appetite for subsidizing training will decline. Medical schools and business schools make a ton of money at continuing/executive education, so this is a great opportunity to enrich the faculty and student experience, generate an income stream, and engender more alumni loyalty.
J.B. Ruhl, a former Biglaw hiring partner now teaching at FSU Law School (and who, like yours truly, sports a gray beard despite his otherwise youthful looking dark locks), rose to the challenge of ripping Lippe a new one with a post at Jurisdynamics, reposted at PrawfsBlawg.
Ruhl acknowledges that Lippe may not be entirely wrong about the need for some minor tweaking, “meaning law schools must be attentive to the needs of our students to be able to succeed in a transformed professional environment. Nevertheless, let us not get so carried away in laying the blame on law schools as Lippe does.” I know, this may be the strongest smack across the face I’ve ever seen from a lawprof.
Setting forth 6 reasons why Paul Lippe is “thoroughly off base,” here’s what Ruhl has to say:
1. Lippe repeatedly suggests that medical and business schools have got it right and law schools provide “inferior training.” Oh really? So, when our nation is in the throes of a debate over the runaway costs of health care and the global economy is in a massive recession due largely to the utter largess and indulgence of our big business and investment industries, law schools should emulate medical and business schools? I think not.
I’m going to jump to an assumption, that Ruhl leads off with what he perceives as his strongest argument, since that’s the way lawyers are taught to present their contentions. If that’s so, then Ruhl’s in trouble from the start. Lippe speaks to the training regime, where docs aren’t let loose to hang out a shingle to perform their first appendectomy on the first patient who walks in the door. Ruhl’s half-baked attempt to connect that to the cost structure issues of health insurance makes no sense at all.
Unfortunately, Ruhl neglects entirely the point that lawyers graduate from school with the ability to proclaim their shop open for business the day after they pass the bar exam, even though they may have never written a motion or walked through a courtroom door. Is Lippe’s analogy perfect? No, but not for the reasons asserted by Ruhl. Score one for Lippe.
2. Lippe goes further, arguing that “law schools will have to produce fully functioning lawyers who can quickly become economically viable–not just proto appellate clerks.” Just like medical and business schools do, right? Wrong. Medical schools do not produce “fully functioning physicians” and business schools do not produce “fully functioning corporate executives.” Medical residencies and corporate ladders are the next training grounds for graduates of those professional schools.
3. Nowhere, for that matter, does Lippe define what a “fully functional lawyer” is. What does Lippe expect law schools to produce? Is it a lawyer equipped out of the box to argue a case in the U.S. Supreme Court? To take the deposition of a Fortune 50 CEO? To negotiate the terms of a major corporate acquisition? Of course not.
I see this as a subargument of Ruhl’s second point, but one crafted entirely of straw. Of course a young lawyer on day 1 isn’t equipped to argue before the Supremes. But what about arguing before the local yokel magistrate? He can’t do that either. What about negotiating the terms of a house closing? Nope. At least the deposition of an accounts payable secretary? Not even that. But no points for Lippe, since this was already covered by Ruhl’s second argument.
4. Part of the problem with Lippe’s pitch in this respect is that he talks about law schools preparing graduates for the “legal profession” as if the legal profession consists exclusively of private law firms and corporate counsel offices, where, if I understand him correctly, the theory and policy of law are irrelevant.
Ruhl ends this point by asking, “What happened to thinking about what the law should be, rather than just what it is?” I’ve got my hand raised! Pick me! Pick me! Initially, lawprofs confuse their indoctrinating their students as to what they believe the law should be with as opposed to generating an open marketplace of ideas. Of course, they think they’re brilliant and scholarly, so this would be a good thing and just in case one of their students winds up on the Supreme Court one day, they can change the course of the law to suit the lawprof’s views. But what makes Ruhl think that thinking and practicing are mutually exclusive? Few law students are prepared to understand what the “law should be” because they have no experience in it or with real people who suffer for their theories. Score three for Lippe, by default since Ruhl’s point here is just awful. I’m almost inclined to take a point away from Ruhl for this one, except he hasn’t won any yet.
5. Lippe’s central objection with law school faculties is that they “have grown more distant from the profession, and the legal academy has come to define itself as primarily engaged in a scholarly pursuit (like, say, literature or history), as opposed to a professional pursuit, like, say, medicine or business.” But if one believes there is any value to ensuring that law students learn to think about the “ought” and not just the “is” of law, there has to be an emphasis on the part of the faculty to exploring the “ought” in order to be able competently to teach their students how to do so.
6. Along with his claim that law schools have “have grown more distant from the profession,” Lippe goes so far as to claim that law professors hold law firms “in low regard.”
This is another subargument, and hence no points are at stake for this one. Yet, who is Ruhl kidding? I’ve addressed this at greater length here, but to suggest that academia doesn’t harbor disdain for practitioners is just plain disingenuous. The support for this position, that FSU has “a plethora of practical and skills oriented courses” that are “taught by adjuncts who are leading practitioners” is just plain vanilla hyperbole.
Indeed, it gets worse when Ruhl asserts that “[m]any of our faculty members, like those at most law schools, actively participate in local, state, and national legal professional associations such as the American Bar Association and state bar associations–writing for their journals, speaking at conferences, and chairing committees.” I hate to be the one to break this to Ruhl, but sitting on committees isn’t practicing law. Law is something that happens in courtrooms and with these people called “clients”. Committees are something that confound collegial folks, inclined to that believe that a satisfying discussion is a substitute for doing something.
Having reached the end of Ruhl’s arguments, the score is still Lippe 4, Ruhl 0. But then Ruhl reaches the part where he credits Paul Lippe’s position.
We must get control of the cost of legal education–it is pricing people of modest means out of the profession and making it near impossible for new law grads to enter public service. We must deliver the skill set that will enable our grads to enter the path to becoming a “fully functional lawyer,” a path that is clearly changing at their feet. And we must continue to ensure that law school is about the law student, not the law faculty.
Having given Paul Lippe the slightest tip of the hat, J.B. Ruhl then tries to get in one final dig:
My problem isn’t with those ideals, it’s with how Lippe articulates them and the solutions he offers. Less emphasis on teaching appellate common law decisions and more emphasis on clinical experiences are both part of the mix for legal education reform, but the trade school mentality that permeates Lippe’s vision of legal education would be a giant step into backwardness and the last nail in the coffin of law as a profession.See, I told you that the lawprofs denigrate the practice of law by calling it a trade school. But then, what’s a strawman argument without the occasional ad hominem. It’s not that Paul Lippe’s points, or solutions, are perfect, or perhaps slightly more extreme than would best serve the future of the profession. Lawyers shouldn’t be mere mechanics, and the ability to construct novel arguments and theories must be part of the mix. But then, what good is an air conditioning repairman, fully versed in the debate over freon recycling, who has never laid hands on an air conditioner? Given the current state of legal education, unversally viewed as pathetic by those who are charged with the task of actually representing human beings, J.B. Ruhl’s defensive and illogical arguments fall flat on their face and, ironically, fail the test of intellectual rigor that one would expect of a scholar.
Game, set, match. Lippe.
A Trophy, A Twinkie and Your Respect
As much as I hoped to never be compelled to use the word “Slackoisie” again, something new comes to me and the little devil on my left shoulder whispers in my ear, “you can’t ignore this.” I can’t.
Following some of my past posts on the subject of Gen Ys demands and characteristics, I’ve received a wealth of colorful comments informing me in well-chosen expletives of a few salient details, foremost of which is that I am a blithering idiot and have grossly mischaracterized an entire generation. While I’m not inclined to support the proposition that there are two sides to every story, I do believe that the Millennial should have the chance to defend and explain themselves.
My young friend Adrian Dayton has sought to carry the water for his generation, establishing himself as the voice of reason for the unreasonable. There is now some competition for the job, Meet Edmund Scanlan.
He’s 32 years old and views his purpose in life to tell American CEOs how to do their job. He “strongly believes” (as in lawyers who “strenuously object”) that all CEOs should all be on twitter, for example. He used to believe that everything sounded way cooler if you put 2.0 after it, but no longer believes that since Obama used it to describe the Whitehouse (which makes it uncool by definition). But foremost, he explains why it’s necessary for all of us to “reinvent” the day job.
In case you’re wondering, “hey, is this guy available to take control of my firm and guide us successfully into the future,” the answer unfortunately is no. He already has a company, called Total Attorneys, dedicated to selling lawyers the road map to work/life balance. He offers this Slackoisie manifesto:
A new generation is starting to establish leadership positions in companies all of this country. They are driving change. They are driving innovation. You should want them driving in your company!
This generation wants work to be in balance with outside interests, like playing in band, acting, family time, traveling, and maybe all of those. Working 70 hours a week is not acceptable. Hyper productivity in 38 hours, perfect!
They want the company they work for to be fun.
They want the company they work for to be different.
They want the company they work for to have integrity.
They want the company they work for to treat them like an individual and not with a one sized fits all HR policy.
They want to be enabled to make decisions and impact rapid change. The way something was done yesterday is rather boring to this generation.
I want my firm to be fun too. Now if all my clients would just send me money and stop calling me and telling me all those depressing stories about how miserable they are because of being prosecuted. Or expecting me to show up in court every single time they are required to be there, or worse still, when that mean man in the black robe says something about trial and prison. Seriously, doesn’t he understand that sometimes you just want to sleep late? Like he’s not going to be there the next day? Sheesh.
And for all you Biglaw managing partners, open your minds to the idea of our newest, youngest, neediest brethren, who only want the right to tell you how the firm should be run. Is that too much to ask? Just because you are the managing partner doesn’t mean you get to tell them what to do. Just because clients pay the freight doesn’t mean that they have to jump every time a partner tells them to work on the client’s case. You guys just don’t get it.
And if you just change everything you do to make these emerging leaders happy, like paying them even thought they aren’t working or the work they produce is incomprehensible crap, you will WIN! Scanlan “strongly believes” so, and isn’t that good enough for you?
Now some of my fellow curmudgeons might challenge the lack of logic, intellectual depth and rank immaturity of Scanlan’s ideas, just as they do with Adrian, who ask how a kid who’s total work legal work experience can fit in a thimble believes that he’s entitled to tell the world it’s wrong. Do we “just not get it 2.0” as Scanlan asserts? Isn’t it enough that this is what the Slackoisie wants and demands? Don’t we have to change everything because they say so?
Tough questions all from these future leaders. And if you don’t answer them immediately, they’re going to whine, stamp their feet and stay down in the basement and refuse to come up for dinner. Maybe they’ll even hold their breath until they’re blue in the face. How would that make you feel?
Dollars to donuts, one of our future leaders is going to respond by saying, “I know you are but what am I.” They think I’m a very mean old man.
H/T Venkat
When Mayberry Lays Off Andy and Barney
There was once a time when the small town police force was the norm. The local fathers (there were no local mothers back then, as they were home baking cherry pies) believed that they were every bit as entitled to control their own destiny as any big city, and part of that control was to make sure that life in their bucolic burg stayed just the way it had always been.
But times change. And cops cost money. Relative to other local concerns, cops cost quite a bit of money, as they carry quite a bit of baggage with them, like cars, guns, uniforms, new comfy shoes, black leather belts and communications equipment. Even the occasional taser on their shiny black leather belts. Someone has to pay for all this.
For those of a certain age, the memory of Andy Griffith and his aide-de-camp, Barney Fife, reflect both the best and worst of small town police. On the one hand, they weren’t exactly the paradigm of professionalism, the mere sight of a gun on Barney’s hip being enough to make one wince. This was not a person who should be allowed within a mile of a weapon, for his own sake if not the rest of us.
On the other hand, the small town police force had the enormous virtue of personal responsibility. The disconnect between police officer and the community she serves didn’t exist. Cops were our neighbors and friends. We talked to them over the barbecue on a warm summer night, just like they were real people. Because they are, once the uniform comes off and they have a beer in their hand.
It’s far harder to shoot a taser at the 14 year old daughter of the fellow you shared a burger with the day before. Everyone in town is a person. You know them. They know you. The anonymity that allows a police officer to dehumanize his perp so that he feels neither concern nor remorse for his conduct, whether it’s a show of force or just a lousy attitude, is almost non-existent in the small town police force. Do something to someone and everyone knows it. And they will remember it for a long, long time.
This didn’t help the transient passing through a small town, who suffered the twin maladies of being suspect by cop and local alike, and having no humanizing connection to prevent the police from seizing the opportunity to enjoy his authority unconstrained by either humanizing connection or adequate training and oversight. The tourist passing through might as well have a bulls-eye painted on his back, and did well to mosey along quietly, attracting as little interest as possible.
The small town police force was an important piece of Americana, and will be missed in many ways as they fade into oblivion. Whether their demise means that we’ve finally come to grips with economies of scale, or the “new professionalism” that Nino keeps dreaming about, I don’t know. But many will miss the fact that they know they names of their local cops. And more importantly, that the cops know their names and the names of their children as well.
To the new kids in town, we’re all going to be tourists.
Ineffective at Plea? Then What?
Via Doug Berman, the Williams v. Jones habeas decision out of the 10th Circuit raises a bunch of interesting issues about ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as the cure for the disease. The set up is that Michael Joe Williams, charged in Oklahoma with first degree murder, is offered a 10 year sentence on a plea to second degree murder before trial.
Williams wants to cut his losses, but his lawyer, believing Williams to be innocent, refuses to be party to the deal. The lawyer tells Williams that he will withdraw from the case if Williams wants to pursue the plea. Williams goes to trial, loses and is sentenced to life without parole.
There was no question as far as either side was concerned that Williams’ lawyer was ineffective, which may come as a surprise for those of you SCOTUS wonks who are thinking to themselves, but what about the Arave v. Hoffman case, with cert granted in 2007?? I know! Me too! For those of you who are more wank than wonk, that case was about the defendant being ill-advised by counsel to reject a plea based upon a mistaken interpretation of precedent, who then went to trial and lost. Unfortunately, the defendant withdrew his IAC claim and it won’t be coming to the Supreme Court. Bummer.
Here, there was no discussion of the integrity of the attorney’s position, or the potential that the defendant may in fact have been innocent of murder. The court goes to great length to note that the only question before it is remedy for a conceded IAC claim, even though the IAC claim itself raises some fascinating ethical challenges.
I’ve addressed these issues in a variety of cases in the past, with the lawyer put to the test of standing idly by while an innocent person lies under oath to admit commission of a crime just to get the deal, and they remain as vexing as ever. Ultimately, the decision to accept a plea offer belongs exclusively to the defendant, regardless of what the lawyer thinks. While we are duty-bound to advice the client, as fully and honestly as humanly possible, and without resort to manipulating the client to reach the conclusion we believe to be correct, the decision must always rest with the client, painful as that may be.
Others, of course, have disagreed with me, and believe that they, as counsel, should exercise a level of control to save the client from themselves. While conceding that the decision is the defendants by law and ethical proscription, they feel that there is a moral duty to steer the client toward the decision they believe best. As it’s the defendant, not the lawyer, who lives with the consequences of this crucial decision, I cannot agree that anything beyond the fullest and fairest explanation of the consequences is an appropriate exercise of our persuasive powers. It’s not our life, and not our choice.
The 9th Circuit, however, limited its decision to the question of whether the remedy provided for the ineffective assistance, reducing the sentence from life without parole to the lowest possible sentence available for the crime for which the defendant stood convicted, life with parole, was proper. It said no.
In fashioning the appropriate remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel, the remedy “should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.” We think it axiomatic that the remedy for a properly presented constitutional violation should not be frustrated by the sentencing options available under state law, but rather should be consistent with federal law.
The deficient performance was counsel’s advice concerning the plea agreement—advising Mr. Williams he would be committing perjury by accepting the plea offer and insisting that Mr. Williams proceed to trial or find new counsel if he wanted to accept it. As the OCCA no doubt recognized, the prejudice Mr. Williams identified was that, had he been adequately counseled, there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer and limited his exposure to ten years.
In dissent, Judge Neil Gorsuch took the position that the defendant, having received a fair trial, is screwed (and deservedly so).
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is an instrumental right designed to ensure a fair trial. By his own admission, Michael Williams received just such a trial, at the end of which he was convicted of first degree murder by a jury of his peers. We have no authority to disturb this outcome. The majority says that counsel’s deficient performance in the plea bargain process denied Mr. Williams a lesser second degree murder conviction, and that this justifies voiding the result of Mr. Williams’s fair trial. But the due process clauses of the Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not encompass a right to receive or accept plea offers. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, plea bargains are matters of executive discretion, not judicially enforceable entitlement; due process guarantees a fair trial, not a good bargain.This position, echoing that of Kent Scheideggerat Crime & Consequences, relegates the right to effective assistance of counsel subservient to the jury verdict. After a fair trial, there’s no going back, no matter what. Given how we pretend that this is all a search for justice, as opposed to a system designed to move people into prison as efficiently as possible, there’s a certain sense to this position.
But Judge Gorsuch, and obviously Kent Scheidegger, are misguided. Our criminal justice system makes sausage, not objects of art. The right to effective assistance of counsel is one of the few constants in the system, that the defendant be provided competent counsel throughout so that he both knows and appreciates the sausage-making process, and doesn’t find himself unnecessarily in the grinder. To the extent this is viewed as a windfall, an easy and undeserved way out of his dilemma by the backdoor, it’s time to grow up. There’s no magic in a fair jury trial, anymore than a plea bargain is a gift. If it makes one feel better, consider the trial penalty, given that the offer of ten years to Williams obviously was deemed sufficient by someone in the prosecutor’s office who knew the allegations against him.
Without a doubt, the majority (even though it;’s a per curiam opinion) got it right. It’s too bad, however, that the court took for granted whether the attorney’s position, that he would not allow his client to perjure himself by admitting guilt to a murder he didn’t commit, was ineffective. But at least they got the remedy right.
Blogging For Dollars
As it happens, they’re also Biglaw guys, and bring the Biglaw perspective to the blawgosphere whereas I can only add my snarky and somewhat worthless outside observations about what Biglaw has in mind. On the other hand, if I was in Chicago, and if they would let me anywhere near the Jones Day offices, I would make Herrmann buy me a beer. Probably one of those expensive foreign beers with the odd names too. He can afford it. He’s Biglaw.
Every once in a while Beck/Herrmann (they are actually connected at the hip, which is why they sign every post Beck/Herrmann, and which makes it very hard for them to work at competing firms), take a foray into the wild world of blawgospheric dynamics, and it brings out a whole ‘nuther side that the rest of us neither see nor know. Darn that Herrmann did it again, and it’s a reminder of just how far apart the solo thought process is from that of Biglaw, and how similar we really are as well.
Want to get noticed in the legal blogosphere?
Blog about legal blogging!
Herrmann went off on a frolic and detour (from drug and device law) in a couple of recent posts, first noting that none of the ten firms with the highest profits per partner sponsored blogs and then speculating about why that’s so.
The blogosphere lit up like a Christmas tree!
Zach Lowe, over at AmLawDaily, did the kind of thing that reporters do: He called the managing partners of the high profits-per-partner firms and asked why they didn’t sponsor blogs. Jonathan Schiller, managing partner of Boies Schiller, was blunt: “I think the lawyers here are just too busy,” he says. “I’m too old to blog. I’d rather play golf if I have a bit of free time.”
So Beck/Herrmann challenged Schiller’s little dis of the blawgosphere, Is it that blawging is just beneath the dignity of someone as important and consequential as Schiller? Obviously, he doesn’t view blawging as intrinsically worthwhile, given that it falls somewhere between golf and flossing as a good way to spend his time. But even if he doesn’t feel the urge to write and/or opine, does he not need to concern himself with business development? Would Schiller also turn down a chance to give the keynote speech to the General Counsels of America?
Oddly, I know the answer to this question, since his partner, David Boies, did exactly that at SuperConference in Chicago last may. I was there. I saw it. Boies was as calm as any lawyer I’ve ever seen when he addressed the room of GCs from across the country. I don’t know whether it’s Zen or Zoloft, but there is a tranquility about him that was amazing.
Clearly, David Boies has nothing against business development. So that means that they don’t consider blawgs a worthy weapon in the “hypercompetitive” Biglaw market. Beck/Herrmann therefore developed a test to determine whether blogging, assuming your purpose is raking in the dough, is the right vehicle for business development for you.
Here’s a blogging self-assessment quiz:
You’ve just gotten a phone call from a new client who wants to retain you for a new matter that is likely to generate $10,000 in fees. What’s your reaction?
A. “Thank God! Now I have something to do!”
B. “Eureka! If I score another dozen just like this one, it’ll be a banner year!”
C. “Refer it out. It’s not worth doing a conflict check for 10 grand in fees.”
If you answered A or B, blogging may be a great business development tool for you. If you answered C, blogging may yield a far less attractive return on investment.
As for us, we continue to think that blogging yields many benefits — personal satisfaction, a raised professional profile, participating in the public debate, becoming a central clearinghouse for information, and the like — but its value as a business development tool for lawyers at large firms remains unproven.See. They really aren’t all that different from the rest of us. They have their personal valets help them to put on their custom made $2,000 trousers one leg at a time, just like us.
The two of us blog for love, not for money.
And if Boies Schiller ever finds the time to start a blawg, chances are that I’m not going to rush to add them to my blawgroll. Unless they start referring their throwaways to me, in which case I’ll give it serious consideration.
Dreier and The Bernie Scale
From the New York Times Citydesk :
The government has recommended that a federal judge in Manhattan impose a 145-year sentence on Marc S. Dreier, the prominent New York lawyer who has pleaded guilty to a fraud scheme that bilked hedge funds and other investors out of at least $400 million.
In seeking some measure of leniency we appeal not to sympathy but to reason. We request a sentence that is both rational and proportionate. As colossal frauds capture national headlines, sentences for while collar offenders must not become disproportionately long. In many ways, the goals of sentencing as embodied in 18 U.S.C. 3553 (a) have suffered collateral damage in the war on white collar crime.
And how does the government explain its 145 year sentence?
There are thousands of lawyers in this and other jurisdictions, who are surrounded by the wealth and lifestyles of the clients they serve. Imposing a long term of imprisonment in this case will serve to deter other lawyers who are tempted to steal, cheat or otherwise dishonor their profession to achieve personal wealth.
But to make matters more clear, lest their be any confusion on where the bar now stands, see footnote number 4 to the government’s memo:
In any event, recent, long-lasting and substantial fraud cases prosecuted in this District – for example, Bernard Madoff (150 years), Bernard Ebbers (WorldCom; 25 years), John and Timothy Rigas (Adelphia; 12 and 17 years, respectively, on re-sentencing), Phillip Bennett (Refco; 16 years), and Samuel Israel (Bayou; 20 years) – support a lengthy sentence in this case.
Clearly, the stage is set. As the dollars get bigger, the sentences get longer, until we’ve reached the point of absurdity. Welcome to absurdity.
It’s not like the government lacks any sense of proportionality. After all, they took 5 years off of Bernie’s sentence to reflect the fact that Dreier only stole $400 million rather than $12 billion, ignoring that the former is a minute fraction of the latter. The problem, it would appear, isn’t that the sentence urged by the government for Dreier is too high, but that the Bernie Bar is still set too low.
There is no doubt that Marc Dreier is going to get slammed by Judge Rakoff at sentence, and Shargel as much as concedes this point up front. Then again, it would be offensive and foolish for him to do otherwise. But how much of a slamming does a financial crime, even a huge one, deserve for the legitimate purpose of sentence? It’s impossible to say anymore, after the 150 years given Madoff on an open plea. Nothing makes sense. The incentive structures mean nothing anymore. The distinction between violent and white collar crime is gone. The notion that there is some benefit to not doing ever greater harm has been lost.
At what point does a white collar defendant say to himself, I’m getting my lifetime plus a few others if they catch me, so there’s no reason to constrain myself at all anymore?
In the early years of this Century, people were outraged that huge financial crimes were being perpetrated and the offenders were getting what was perceived as a slap on the wrist. The government responded by multiplying the sentences to meet the public’s demand for retribution. Okay, we got that.
But as with so many reactions to public outrage, it’s overshot the mark until it reaches the point of total irrationality. This happened with Madoff, the only potential saving grace being that Madoff was supposed to be a one-off case, never again to be repeated. It didn’t take long to put that myth to rest.
Welcome to the Bernie Scale. How many lifetimes will it take before the craziness stops.
