There may be no sign over the Chittenden Regional Correctional Facility in Vermont, but for pre-trial detainees, a sign might have read “arbeit macht frei,” according to the Second Circuit in McGarry v. Pallito. Barrington Parker, writing for the court, reversed a lower court ruling that the jail could force detainees to work because it was good for their rehabilitation, as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting involuntary servitude.
McGarry, a pro se defendant, was arrested in December, 2008 on unspecified “charges stemming from a domestic dispute,” and released in June, 2009, when the charges were dismissed. He was held in Chittenden, where he was given a choice:
McGarry alleges that in mid-February 2009 defendants directed him to move to House 1 and required him to work in the prison laundry over his repeated objections. He alleges that he had no choice because defendants told him that his refusal to work would result in his being placed in administrative segregation or “put in the hole,” which, he alleges, involves lock-up for 23 hours-a-day and the use of shackles. McGarry further alleges that defendants told him that he would receive an inmate Disciplinary Report (“DR”) if he refused to work, and that even minor DRs affect when sentenced inmates are eligible for release.
Needless to say, he wasn’t thrilled with the idea, not only because the hours were long and working conditions bad, but because he was constrained to handle soiled laundry without the protection of gloves, causing McGarry to get a serious staph infection. The jail argued that it’s work program was good for McGarry:
[T]hey contend it was objectively reasonable for defendants to believe they could compel pretrial detainees to work because the work program advances a legitimate interest in rehabilitation.
What legitimate purpose exists in rehabilitating presumptively innocent people is never addressed and remains a vexing question.
McGarry brought suit under §1983, arguing that this was involuntary servitude, prohibited by the 13 Amendment, passed after the Civil War to bring slavery to an end in the United States. He was smacked in the district court by Mag. John Conroy.
The Magistrate sua sponte concluded that McGarry’s Thirteenth Amendment allegations were barred as a matter of law because being forced to work in the laundry was “nothing like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the] Amendment.” Finding that McGarry’s “laundry claim” failed “to allege labor that was akin to African slavery,” (internal quotation marks omitted), the Magistrate recommended dismissing his claim and denying leave to amend, holding that any other outcome would “trivialize the pain and anguish that the Thirteenth Amendment sought to remedy.”
For those unaware, there aren’t many involuntary servitude claims made these days. Judge Parker (who, not that it means anything, happens to be African American) rejected this view of the limitation of involuntary servitude.
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, §1. Shortly after its passage, the Supreme Court held that the Amendment “is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, it is well-settled that the term “involuntary servitude” is not limited to chattel slavery-like conditions. The Amendment was intended to prohibit all forms of involuntary labor, not solely to abolish chattel slavery. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872) (“The word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery . . . .”)
The lower court’s comparison to slavery would have effectively made it impossible to maintain any claim under the 13th Amendment, as pretty much any forced labor today falls far short of slavery and “trivialize[d]” its “pain and anguish.” As much as someone may gripe about forced labor, it’s not slavery.
But, as the Circuit held, the prohibition isn’t limited to the institution that remains one of the most disgraceful in our history, but recognized that far less dehumanizing servitude falls within its ambit. The argument is regularly made that the government compels citizens to perform involuntary labor, often with regard to lawyers (ranging from compelled pro bono to forced indigent assignments).
This decision breathes some life into these arguments, though I doubt it suffices to undermine the idea that lawyers, given the monopoly to represent others, can’t be held to a requirement to give back some of their time in return. However, as to forced indigent assignment, the argument seems far stronger.
As for pre-trial detainees, who are commonly required to work during the time they are held in jail awaiting trial, this decision is huge. While the rationale put forward by Chittenden doesn’t withstand scrutiny, the fact is that detainees are not convicts, and are merely warehoused pending the outcome of their charges. They didn’t ask to be there, and they are under no duty to provide compelled labor as well as their loss of freedom.
Jails have long enjoyed the benefit of forced labor from their inmates (even the name inmates as applied to pre-trial detainees rankles), both to perform the jobs needed to maintain a jail on the cheap as well as keep them busy to avoid the “idle hands” dilemma. Good for the jail. Not so much for the pre-trial detainees, although it would not be surprising for some to prefer to work, as some find it better to do something than sit around for months, if not years, with nothing to do.
Regardless, it’s about time that pre-trial detainees be recognized for what they are, people who have been found guilty of no crime and who enjoy the presumption of innocence. It’s bad enough that they suffer the loss of their freedom. It’s about time they were freed from involuntary servitude.
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Now if only this rationale would apply to jury duty and the draft. Unfortunately SCOTUS settled those, too.
Or you could just make a fruit salad by mixing apples and oranges.
Jury Duty and the wartime draft are services required for the maintenance of our freedoms. They are civil duties, and a part of the “dues” of being a citizen.
Think about it this way: When you’re on trial, for a crime you know you didn’t commit, would you rather have a jury of bored, disinterested people whose sole care is getting out of there as fast as possible?
Or would you rather have a group of people with a passion for justice, and who will bend over backwards to ensure that they do teh right thing?
From there, just apply the philosophy of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you”, which is a good philosophy no matter your religious beliefs, and you’ll understand why Jury Duty, at least, is so important.
The draft, I hope, is self-evident as to its importance in a full-on, declared war.
An excellent and most timely decision as local county struggles to design a pre-trial supervised release program which would require ‘community service’ as a condition of release.
And few will complain lest the alternative bail decision be, say, expensive. A deeply troubling trend.
What criteria is there regarding what amendments and laws must be incorporated? I ask as it relates to carrying weapons as I’ve heard that NYC and Chicago can ban firearm ownership because the second amendment was never incorporated. However, since the thirteenth amendment, no city has had to make laws outlawing slavery nor could they made laws legalizing it.
People go to law school to learn the answers to questions like this. I hear there are seats still available for this September.
Nah… The world is a much nicer place without the letters E-S-Q behind my name. 🙂