In a decidedly unsatisfying opinion the Second Circuit ruled that Fengling Liu, an immigration lawyer who, inter alia, drafted the papers submitted by pro se litigants without disclosing to the court that it was her work, did not violate her “duty of candor” to the court. The decision reversed the finding of the Committee on Attorney Admissions and Grievances, which concluded that she had, indeed, engaged in unethical conduct by “ghostwriting” pleadings.
For the stay-at-home unbundling lawyer, this strikes at the heart of their practice model, selling bits and pieces of lawyering to clients, without signing onto the case and taking responsibility for both the work they aren’t being paid for as well as the competency of the work they are.
The problem is that the decision does not hold that unbundling is not unethical. Indeed, it recites over and over the reasons why it is.
The court also noted, however, that the trend among bar associations is to endorse unbundling.However, a number of other federal courts have found that attorneys who had ghostwritten briefs or other pleadings for ostensibly pro se litigants had engaged in misconduct. In Duran v. Carris, for example, the Tenth Circuit admonished an attorney for ghostwriting a pro se brief for his former client without acknowledging his participation by signing the brief. 238 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). The court stated that the attorney’s conduct had inappropriately afforded the former client the benefit of the liberal construction rule for pro se pleadings, had shielded the attorney from accountability for his actions, and conflicted with the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) that all pleadings, motions, and papers be signed by the party’s attorney. See id. at 1271-72; see also, e.g., Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (disapproving of members of bar “represent[ing] petitioners, informally or otherwise, and prepar[ing] briefs for them which the assisting lawyers do not sign, and thus escape the obligation imposed on members of the bar … of representing to the court that there is good ground to support the assertions made”); Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 271, 285 and n.73 (2010) (“The federal courts have almost universally condemned ghostwriting.” (collecting cases)).
On the other hand, a number of bar association ethics committees have been more accepting of ghostwriting. The ethics committee opinions described in the following paragraphs are representative of the range of views on the subject and suggest a possible trend toward greater acceptance of various forms of ghostwriting.
The court let Liu off the hook not because it approved of ghostwriting, but because it concluded that, given these conflicting messages, it was unclear whether it was unethical.
In light of this Court’s lack of any rule or precedent governing attorney ghostwriting, and the various authorities that permit that practice, we conclude that Liu could not have been aware of any general obligation to disclose her participation to this Court.5 We also conclude that there is no evidence suggesting that Liu knew, or should have known, that she was withholding material information from the Court or that she otherwise acted in bad faith.
But then, the court drops a footnote that makes this decision more of a problem than an aid.
However, in light of the importance of the ghostwriting issue, and the fact that the effect of ghostwriting on disqualification issues is not discussed in the ethics opinions described in the text, we recommend to the Court that it consider the amendment of its rules to resolve the matter.
To the extent that Liu found refuge in the confusion, it seems that the court has now given her it’s one free pass, and this decision warns everyone else in the Second Circuit that unless and until the rules are clarified, no one can claim confusion as a safe harbor.
This should put a crimp in the social media twinkies’ pontificating about ignoring their ethical obligations because courts are just not sufficiently forward thinking and too far behind the times. Whether that’s so isnt the point. Try arguing your way out of discipline because somebody on the internet said so, particularly somebody trying to make a living by life-coach other lawyers because they’ve been disbarred, failed in practice or have a sum total of 12 minutes legal experience. Do you really think the Second Circuit is going to be impressed with their number of twitter followers?
