A couple of days ago, I wrote about a New York Times article hot off the presses. in 1989. Not to be left ahead, the Wall Street Journal reports that there are a huge number of federal crimes and they largely ignore the existence of mens rea.
Shocking. At least this was shocking the first few times around.
Perhaps there were large white areas in these papers that needed filling. Perhaps the reporters were new and hadn’t heard that these issues had been thoroughly covered before. But then, perhaps these issues deserved to be revisited and I’ve been unkind in lambasting these reports.
While there is nothing new about the issues, or the underlying problems, it remains that they are still a blight on our legal system, and our society, that has yet to be cured. Sure, we know about the problems, but whoever said that knowing the problem was half the battle was wrong. A start, but we’re nowhere near solving the problems.
The expectation that people remember is, sadly, no longer reasonable. People don’t remember. Whether it has to do with their attention span or retention span, I can’t say, but they don’t seem to have much capacity to recall that we have problems that remain unresolved. Whether people will remember these articles after the iPhone 5 comes out has yet to be seen. I’m not sanguine about it.
Then there are the n00bs, the people who have just discovered that there is a big world out there with a bunch of important issues worthy of their attention. Maybe the discovery came about because some aspect of it touched their lives. Maybe they tripped over it. No matter. Today, they know.
The problem is that the n00bs never look back. Just because they had the epiphany today doesn’t mean that it’s band, spanking new. Like television reruns, if you never saw it before, it’s new to you. Well, that doesn’t make it new to the rest of us. Think of new parents, like nobody ever had a baby before them and they have invented the concept. And they must tell us about it at unbearable length.
The issues raised by the Times and WSJ are important. And they remain important. And there are likely a great many people who either paid no attention the first (few) times around, or have forgotten, or weren’t there to pay attention because they were too busy cruising in their huggies. Whatever, the problems are of a sufficient magnitude to justify another airing.
To the extent I was critical because these aren’t exactly cutting edge newsy issues, I now think I was wrong. It was the curmudgeon in me, but not every article is written for curmudgeons.
That doesn’t mean that the writers couldn’t have put in a line or two about the fact that these are long-standing problems, problems that have defied ready solution, or problems that have festered for decades. Doesn’t anybody learn about George Santayana anymore?
Still, better that these issues get space in the papers than a generation forget, or never know, they exist.
And Francisco Franco is still dead. Sorry, I couldn’t help myself.
Category Archives: Uncategorized
The Hidden Cost of Blogging
Lawyers who have a marketing blog need not read this post. This will never happen to you, because, frankly, no one really cares when you write and, well, you don’t write anything of substance anyway. If, on the other hand, you have occasional thoughts that appear on a screen, this could matter.
A while back, I wrote a post about Arthur Alan Wolk’s lawsuit against Overlawyered, and Wolk left me a love note that ended with the ominous sentence, “I hope you have insurance.” I didn’t take kindly to his threat, and apparently Wolk decided that I wasn’t worth his time as nothing came of it. In the meantime, he had suits pending against a rather large group of people on the internet, with some particularly unsavory things to say about Reason, it’s editor and its commenters.
Since then, Reason and Overlawyered settled with Wolk. From Paul Alan Levy at Public Citizen :
Wolk recently settled his lawsuits against Reason Magazine and against the Overlawyered defendants, and yesterday the defendants announced that settlement. Reason posted a statement defiantly promising to keep its previous posts about Wolk online, but turning off the comment feature for the claimed purpose of protecting readers against being sued for what they might say in response. Overlawyered went a bit further.Overlawyered issued a joint statement with Wolk noting that it had learned, after making its original post, that Wolk had, in fact, “t[aken] precautions for his clients” in the incident that Overlawyered had originally criticized. Not quite an apology, not quite a retraction, but certainly a correction of the record.
At Reason, Jacob Sullum wrote about the settlement:
On August 12 he dropped the California complaint as well, and he recently agreed to a resolution consisting of mutual releases in which he promises not to sue us again for our past posts and we promise not to sue him over his litigation so far. That’s about as good an outcome as we could have reasonably expected, since the main issue for us all along has been maintaining the freedom to report and comment on issues of public concern.
But then Sullum concludes:
Wolk also sued certain pseudonymous Hit & Run commenters. He recently dismissed the suit against them, which was pending in New York state court, with prejudice, which means he cannot sue them again for the comments that were the subject of that lawsuit.
Note to commenters: This costly and time-consuming litigation is over, and we do not want to see any further lawsuits filed as a result of comments on our site. Because it is impossible for us to screen and monitor all comments, we have disabled them on this post.
To be clear, no one enjoys being sued. Whether justified or frivolous, there are costs involved of time, angst and, yes, money. It’s painful to throw money in the toilet over complete nonsense, and as Overlawyered exists to point out, the American system doesn’t serve to protect the innocent civil defendant from the costs of our legal system.
That said, we have to make a choice. Stand up and take the hits, or hide under the bed and avoid any possibility of being sued, whether justifiably or not. Paul Levy, after having written some posts about Wolk’s litigation, addressed this problem:
Wolk responded by threatening to sue me, as well as Techdirt and Scott Greenfield over their comments; he actually did sue me for about a week, although he dropped that action while muttering about how he was going to sue me later. But with Techdirt, Greenfield and me, Wolk encountered a new phenomenon — bloggers who refused to cower before his threats, and even invited him to file suit if he thought he had a valid claim. He has not done so, and I am confident that his bullying in that regard is at an end. Note to other bloggers tempted to comment on Wolk: coraggio!
While I wouldn’t call it bullying, mostly because I hate this abused word, the reality is that one has to decide whether to stand up for things you believe in and, when someone threatens to take a punch or two, take the hit.
The defendants in Rakofsky v. Internet aren’t defending because it’s fun, but because they have made a few choices. The first choice was to speak out against the egregious wrong that was done to a defendant in a murder case due. The second choice was not to cower in the corner when threatened for having told the truth and said what needed to be said. Despite the absurdity of Rakofsky having taken the offensive and attacked the blawgosphere, the defendants have to pay for their choice. And they are, with one notable exception. Unfortunately, New York doesn’t have an effective anti-SLAPP statute.
The case might be over by now, but for the delays caused by Rakofsky’s inability to find an attorney to represent him. His original, nominal lawyer, Richard Borzouye, ran for cover. His Craigslist ad didn’t pan out. Bear in mind, had Rakofsky been prosecuted for his conduct, many if not all of the defendants in this case would be the first to defend him. But Rakofsky isn’t a defendant. He’s the plaintiff, the attacker. Aside from the fact that his claims are absurd and doomed to fail, what sort of perverse, twisted lawyer would take up his cause? None, it would appear.
To the credit of the profession, not a single lawyer, no matter how greedy, desperate or psychotic, has been willing to go so low as to be the hired gun in such a disgraceful attack. I’m not sure I would have believed that there wasn’t some lawyer, somewhere, who was so slimy that he would grab the money and try to use the notoriety of the case for his own benefit.
Some lawyers relish in trying to spin a dead loser into “the good fight,” as if no one would notice that they rep’d the attacker and were lying through their teeth. That no lawyer is that disgraceful comes as something of a pleasant surprise. We’ll see whether disappointment will eventually set in should Rakofsky finally find someone who shares his “values.”
Yet Jacob Sullum’s Wolk post, where he closes the comments to his readers to avoid any further “costly and time-consuming litigation,” provides a disturbing legacy. He has silenced his own readers in capitulation. This time, it’s to avoid a known quantity, a particularly litigious plaintiff. What about next time? The internet is filled with potential plaintiffs who will take umbrage with our posts, our disclosures, our descriptions. People get angry about stuff all the time. Threats fly constantly. Takedown letter come in from lawyers regularly. It happens.
We have a choice. Those of us who have chosen to write about substantive issues of public interest can either shut up or man up. It doesn’t matter that we’re protected by law. It doesn’t matter that claims are frivolous. We are the targets. And when we capitulate to threats or litigation, we only make ourselves bigger, easier targets.
Of course, what’s the big deal of suffering the burdens of threats and litigation when we’re enjoying the vast riches and great prestige of blogging.
It Costs More To Win
There are a variety of costs associated with the criminal justice system that aren’t discussed in polite company, from the time lost to arrest and incarceration to the hard-earned money paid out to lawyers to defend. One of my favorite questions from potential clients is “why do I have to pay if I’m innocent?”
But Massachusetts has raised cost to a new level, by approving a shift of costs to the defendant even when the he prevails. That’s right: Lose, you pay. Win, you pay. Either way, you pay. Via Turley, from the Newspaper :
Motorists issued a traffic ticket in Massachusetts will have to pay money to the state whether or not they committed the alleged crime. According to a state supreme court ruling handed down yesterday, fees are to be imposed even on those found completely innocent. The high court saw no injustice in collecting $70 from Ralph C. Sullivan after he successfully fought a $100 ticket for failure to stay within a marked lane.
Bay State drivers given speeding tickets and other moving violations have twenty days either to pay up or make a non-refundable $20 payment to appeal to a clerk-magistrate. After that, further challenge to a district court judge can be had for a non-refundable payment of $50. Sullivan argued that motorists were being forced to pay “fees” not assessed on other types of violations, including drug possession. He argued this was a violation of the Constitution’s Equal Protection clause, but the high court justices found this to be reasonable.
The court’s rationale, that the state merely needed to meet the rational basis test for its imposition of fees on the innocent, was satisfied by the costs of process.
“We conclude that there is a rational basis for requiring those cited for a noncriminal motor vehicle infraction alone to pay a filing fee and not requiring a filing fee for those contesting other types of civil violations,” Justice Ralph D. Gants wrote for the court. “Where the legislature provides greater process that imposes greater demands on the resources of the District Court, it is rational for the legislature to impose filing fees, waivable where a litigant is indigent, to offset part of the additional cost of these judicial proceedings.”
Implicit in this rationale is that a traffic infraction is non-criminal, a distinction used with convenient frequency to penalize a person without the state being forced to endure all those nasty rights associated with criminal proceedings. From one perspective, it’s better that a person who is convicted of traffic infraction doesn’t have to go on the Heinous Criminals Registry, along with murderers, rapists and jay-walkers.
On the other, you end up with the anomalous situation presented here, where the cost of fighting, and winning, a ticket is higher than just paying it in the first place.
Fines are punitive. They are a punishment for violating a law. But court costs aren’t punitive. They are merely the price of living in a free society that provides a wealth of benefits and services to its citizens for their welfare. To serve you better…
When the financial incentives are crafted in a way that the punishment for losing is less painful than the price of winning, it is irrational. And it violates due process. The recipient of a traffic ticket is being charged with unlawful conduct. That it is nominally an infraction doesn’t make it any the less unlawful. That we don’t call them criminals (at least in court decisions) doesn’t make it light and fluffy. Indeed, see how much fun it is if you don’t bother to respond for your ticket and a warrant is ordered. When they ask you to come to court nicely, they really don’t mean that it’s up to you if you have nothing better to do that day.
So if it’s in the nature of a criminal proceeding, even though conviction isn’t considered criminal (though they still use words like “guilty” and “conviction,” the keystones to a criminal prosecution), the imposition of costs to enjoy the process for the innocent makes no sense at all.
That there are costs to having a legal system isn’t the question. Clearly, there are costs. But crafting a pay to play legal system for matters of a criminal nature, resulting in punishment, is hardly rational. It’s a financial incentive to avoid the exercise of due process and just take the least expensive route by pleading guilty and paying the fine, innocent or not.
Yet again, courts demonstrate that we have the best legal system money can buy. So how much due process can you afford?
T
Silence Isn’t Inconsistent
In a quirky decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Staten Island attempted murder conviction of Henry Tucker based upon the prosecution’s use of his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence to contradict his trial testimony fingering another man, “Mustafa,” as the shooter. From the New York Law Journal :
When arrested in connection to an October 2008 Park Hill double shooting, Henry Tucker refused to answer any questions after being read his Miranda rights.
A police officer then told him he would be charged with two counts of attempted murder, prompting Mr. Tucker to say, “I was there, but I didn’t shoot anybody.”
Mr. Tucker made no further statements until his June 2009 trial, when he again maintained he was present but not the shooter. He instead fingered his friend, an unapprehended man named “Mustafa.”
The typical argument by the prosecution when a defendant offers testimony at trial that exculpates himself is recent fabrication, meaning that given the time between arrest and trial, he invented a story that gets him out of the jam.
To impeach Mr. Tucker, prosecutors at cross-examination repeatedly questioned whether he had told police that Mustafa was the shooter. On summation, Assistant District Attorney Kathleen Naughton told jurors that “an innocent person when they’re arrested for a crime they didn’t commit and they know who did it will say [who] did it.”
The argument was that if Tucker’s claim at trial was truthful, he would have spoken up at the time of his arrest. His failure to do so, to pin the blame on Mustafa, when he did blurt out that he wasn’t the shooter, undermines the credibility of his trial testimony.
The majority held, notably in contrast to the United States Supreme Court’s misguided decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, that Tucker’s refusal to answer questions wasn’t converted to a response by his denial of guilt.
“[H]aving deliberately availed himself of his right to remain silent, the defendant’s failure to give a more complete exculpatory statement to the police ‘may simply [have been] attributable to his awareness that he [was] under no obligation to speak’ to the police, including to implicate his friend in a shooting, and to his knowledge that his decision not to speak would not be used against him at trial,” the majority said in an unsigned opinion, citing the 1981 Court of Appeals ruling People v. Conyers, 52 NY2d 454.
Rather than go down the road of the minefield that the Supreme Court has crafted around the invocation and exercise of Miranda rights, the majority concluded that once a defendant chooses silence, it means something and won’t be so easily ignored.
In dissent, Justice Reinaldo E. Rivera wrote:
“Where, as here, a defendant speaks to the police and omits exculpatory information which he presents for the first time at trial, the defendant’s credibility may properly be impeached with that omission,” he wrote, adding that the evidence against Mr. Tucker was overpowering.
While the majority failed to see the evidence as particularly overwhelming, it didn’t dispute that a defendant’s credibility can be impeached by a prior omission that suggests that his trial testimony is a recent fabrication. Rather, the court held that the exercise of his right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions cannot be used, even as a means of challenging Tucker’s “Mustafa” revelation. The right to remain silent, once invoked, cannot be used against a defendant for any purpose.
What’s significant about this decision is that firmness of the court’s holding in light of the ongoing federal mushiness of Miranda invocations. As the Supreme Court appears bent on dismantling Miranda, turning its exercise into a hypertechnicality rather than a shield to protect constitutional rights, the Second Department both strongly backed its invocation, without the subsequent exculpatory blurt somehow undoing the certainty of invocation by silence, and similarly held firm on the notion that the defendant’s enjoyment of a constitutional right cannot be used against him, even when it proves highly material to his credibility.
Of course, while the majority held that the evidence aside from the silence used to impeach the defendant’s credibility was not so overwhelming as to preclude its finding that there was a reasonable possibility that he would have been acquitted, Tucker will still face retrial, and the other evidence, eyewitness identifications of him as the shooter, plus video and still images of the shooting. It would be highly premature to say that Tucker’s out of the woods.
Still, given the evidence against him, the strength of the majority decision is certainly worthy of note, and supports the vitality of New York’s independent constitutional protections of a defendant’s right to remain silent, and ability to exercise his Constitutional rights without fear that it will come in through the back door to bite him in the butt.
The win by Kathleen E. Whooley of Appellate Advocates promises Tucker a fairer trial, but it’s still going to be a huge uphill battle.
SCOTUSBlog: The Business
One of the longtime bulwarks of the blawgosphere, SCOTUSBlog, is gone. Having served to make Tom Goldstein a player in that rarified niche, Supreme Court litigation, what once reflected some of the finest blawging is gone. In its place, an enterprise has arisen.
SCOTUSBlog is now under the “exclusive sponsorship” of Bloomberg Law, whose funding allows it to do mainstream.
The sponsorship represents a tremendous public service by Bloomberg Law. It allows us to improve and expand the information we distribute about the Court. We now have four full-time staff. Along with our reporter Lyle Denniston, Amy will devote almost all her time to editing and directing the blog; Kali and Kiera have converted to full-time blog employees.
Despite this staff, expect a fairly new direction in Supreme Court commentary.
Substantively, we are continuing our transition to more expert coverage. Last Term, we published symposia with leading commentators, as well as coverage of individual cases from professors like Ronald Mann and Orin Kerr. This Term, we have commitments from many more prominent academics to take responsibility for merits cases in their fields of expertise. So we expect that the quality of our analysis will improve considerably.
Instead of getting a lawyer’s view of the decisions, anticipate the “prominent academic’s” approach, Not that they don’t have the time and inclination to write, some at enormous length and in excruciating detail, about important (and inconsequential) decisions, but the days of the “quick and dirty” or pragmatic reaction appear past.
As for the views of readers, whether lawyers, lawprofs or lay-people, it’s clean and smart or the highway.
To comment, you will need to log in. This involves a simple registration process, and all of the information provided during the registration process will remain confidential. Registration is not required just to read the blog or community posts by other readers.
Of note, we will heavily moderate the community for civility and substance (in the sense that the comment has to be substantive, not that we have to agree with it). We will delete comments and ban commenters when they fail to meet our standards. Our goal is not to limit or to manipulate the debate. But we will aggressively control its tenor and ensure that its quality is high. By “high” quality, we don’t mean that the comments have to be lawyerly or contain detailed legal analysis. Rather, they have to contribute to the discussion in some fashion, even if by asking further questions. We hope many commenters will be non-lawyers.
Comments of this sort are a blawgers dream. We all want brilliant and fascinating discussion, or at least a reasonable facsimile. There’s nothing about Tom’s new “community” approach that is particularly novel, though he puts together as many rules and controls as the internet has to offer in order to keep the riff-raff out.
It seems curious that Tom emphasizes his hope that many commenters will be non-lawyers, given that SCOTUSBlog’s direction seems to be uber-law-geek with the reliance on academics rather than lawyers (or judges, for that matter) who will use these decisions in the trenches. I expect it has more to do with the expansion of his reader base, given that lawyers comprise a relatively small universe of potential readers, but Supreme Court sausage-making is hardly the sort of stuff that benefits from the common touch.
Goldstein’s entrepreneurial spirit is nothing to sneeze at. He’s turned himself into a viable Supreme Court commodity, and his blog into the primary destination when it comes to all things Supreme Court. Granted, it was more recitation and description than hard commentary, but that left something for the rest of the blawgosphere to do. And Tom has now effectively monetized SCOTUSBlog, electing revenue over his Great Humanitarian Award. Most of us would do the same.
Yet there’s something about this shift from, say, the amateur enthusiasm and freedom of a blawg unfettered by corporate concerns and one that adopts the mantle of officialdom. There’s something about commenters who are vetted to create a “smarter” discussion, particularly given how many lawyers offer some incredibly dopey observations, but give rise to responses that generate light as well as some occasional heat.
Most disturbing is the resort to the formulaic approach of “ask the expert,” and the expert invariably being someone with scholarly credentials so that their every utterance comes with built-in academic credibility. We see it in newspaper articles and on television news, the lawprof opining about things he’s never personally touched and only seen from afar. We were knee deep in ideas from people who have never actually done the things they speak about with such refined expertise. Now we’ll be neck-deep.
For those of us who have long appreciated SCOTUSBlog being there, being the first resource for Supreme Court decisions, briefs, reports, it seems unfair and unappreciative to question Tom Goldstein’s effort to make money off his blog and further his career as a Supreme Court litigator. And yet, I can’t help feeling that we’ve lost a trusted friend, a reliable neighbor, who is moving from the ‘hood to the corporate bigtime. And that our comments will be deemed too stupid and unworthy to make it onto the small screen.
Best of luck to Tom Goldstein, but don’t forget the lawyers who actually do the work in the trenches. We’re not likely to bring you fame, big bucks or scholarly prestige, but we’ll be the ones cleaning up the mess left behind by the Supreme Court.
So What’s New?
A front page story in the New York Times trumpets Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors. Oh my, did I miss something? Did I miss something that so monumentally huge, and so fundamentally affects my very own practice area?
After decades of new laws to toughen sentencing for criminals, prosecutors have gained greater leverage to extract guilty pleas from defendants and reduce the number of cases that go to trial, often by using the threat of more serious charges with mandatory sentences or other harsher penalties.The articles goes on and on. And I read and read. And read. And at the end of this lengthy article, I realized something. It’s not me who’s been asleep, but the New York Times.Some experts say the process has become coercive in many state and federal jurisdictions, forcing defendants to weigh their options based on the relative risks of facing a judge and jury rather than simple matters of guilt or innocence. In effect, prosecutors are giving defendants more reasons to avoid having their day in court.
The slide began in earnest with the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Mistretta, holding the 1987 federal sentencing guidelines constitutional despite every decision below them reaching the contrary conclusion. The concept was simple, create mandatory guidelines to assure consistency in sentencing across the country. That the guidelines happened to be outrageously Draconian was merely fortuitous.
The upshot was that charging decisions dictated sentence, and federal judges were reduced to bean counters. Some judges balked. Some didn’t. It took a lot of weight off judges when it came to sentencing, and for those whose sleep cycles weren’t subject to moral influence, it was one less problem to deal with.
Though I was still a young lawyer back then, the writing on the wall was immediately clear. The risk of rolling the dice just went from bad to unbearable. Lawyers raced down to the United States Attorneys office, because the last rat to flip was the one who took the weight.
It was an incredibly effective means of assuring pleas, and by the use of some artfully crafted language of dubious reliability, it allowed most of the players to sleep well at night. Each cooperation agreement provided that the 5K1.1 letter was contingent on the cooperator providing the government with truthful information, as opposed to information that guaranteed the cooperators friends, children or mothers would be convicted. Of course, no rat who happened to provide information that nailed his mother was ever denied a 5K1.1 letter because it might have been bit less than truthful.
And thereafter came the inevitable rush of state legislators trying to show that they could be as tough as any other re-elected official by an assortment of criminal justice initiatives designed to assure that defendants wouldn’t challenge their charges. Mandatory minimums, three-strikes laws, zero-tolerance. Cool names, bro. And highly effective in coercing defendants to plead guilty and get out of prison some day as opposed to never.
And then the Supreme Court began a series of decisions with Apprendi, then Blakely and eventually in 2005, Booker, holding the mandatory sentencing guidelines that had fundamentally altered the balance of power between court and prosecutor were now merely advisory. It took a while for this change to filter through the system because no one believed the Supreme meant what they said, their having something of a credibility gap when they came back later to smack a lower court for accurately applying rules.
Throughout this period of time, defendants chose not to go to trial because the price of losing was unbearably high. Today, the Times reports:
Now? Unheralded? This is suddenly “coming into sharper view, according to academics who study the issue?” There are a few hundred thousand defendants who could have told you this, most of whom have not only made their decisions based upon this reality, but have already completed their unduly lengthy sentence. A few have died of old age since paying their debt for their youthful indiscretions.“We now have an incredible concentration of power in the hands of prosecutors,” said Richard E. Myers II, a former assistant United States attorney who is now an associate professor of law at the University of North Carolina. He said that so much influence now resides with prosecutors that “in the wrong hands, the criminal justice system can be held hostage.”
One crucial, if unheralded, effect of this shift is now coming into sharper view, according to academics who study the issue. Growing prosecutorial power is a significant reason that the percentage of felony cases that go to trial has dropped sharply in many places.
It would be fine, maybe even welcome, had the New York Times gone on at great length about how the residual culture of the criminal justice system still made taking a case to trial a game of Russian Roulette, or how the trial tax continues to coerce defendants who are innocent or overcharged into sucking it up. But to contend, as the articles does, that this is some newfangled notion that was just discovered by academics, as if it’s the criminal justice version of the speedy neutrino, is ridiculous and insulting.
Prosecutor’s manipulation of charging decisions, as empowered by the wealth of potential crimes created hourly by legislatures and Congress, by hare-brained “tough on crime” regimens, and by judges disinclined to heed Nancy Reagan’s advice, have produced a system that unduly coerces defendants to take pleas rather than challenge accusations, with the full support of all red-blooded Americans.
And Francisco Franco is still dead.
The Day Lawyers Died
While lawyers were busy representing clients, fighting fights and cutting deals, making sense of the mess people make of things, taking relatively easy problems and turning them into monumental fiascos, a bunch of lawprofs held a virtual symposium directed toward one goal: the end of lawyers.
At Truth on the Market, a group of lawprofs (with a notable non-lawprof, Walter Olson of Overlawyered) discussed “Unlocking the Law: Deregulating the Legal Profession.” The scope of discussion was broad, venturing from the elimination of law school entirely to the elimination of the monopoly entirely. The scope was explained:
The Head Mortician was Larry Ribstein, who opened and closed the show. His rhetoric of death aside, his approach was cautiously limited.Welcome to “Unlocking the Law: Deregulating the Legal Profession.”
Licensing and regulation of lawyers, long questioned by scholars, is emerging as an important public issue. Legal costs are rising for individuals and firms with increases in litigation and regulation. These costs tax business growth and entrepreneurship and impede ordinary Americans’ access to the civil justice system. Meanwhile, the development of new business structures and technologies and significant regulatory moves toward opening up competition for legal services in the UK and elsewhere are forcing policymakers to address lawyer licensing and regulation. The U.S. is certainly not immune from the economic and other institutional forces nudging toward a reconsideration of existing licensing and regulation regimes. It is an excellent time to reexamine the costs and benefits of existing and alternative regimes in light of these changes.
It’s unlikely that lawyer licensing will completely die. It will be hard to reconcile complete deregulation of law practice with continued licensing of doctors, tour guides and horse dentists. But there’s an important difference between lawyers and these other professions: the prodigiously powerful lawyer interest group has managed to restrict access to the extremely broad field of human activity called the “practice of law.” This regulatory monolith is bound to fracture.
Ribstein goes on to suggest that the barrister/solicitor distinction may prevail, or that lawyers be given “drivers licenses” that ends the jurisdictional distinctions. Nothing earth shattering, and frankly rather modest proposals given the tendency to scream about falling sky.
Others, however, have grander schemes. Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Crandall, for example, decried the lack of lawyers, proven to his conclusive satisfaction by the salaries earned.
Were the practice of law deregulated, allowing anyone to offer a variety of legal services, the prices of the simplest services would surely decline. Equally important, the amount of legal training received would vary across the legal services field. At present, everyone sitting for a bar exam in most states must obtain the equivalent of three years of instruction at an ABA-accredited law school. Surely, three years of law school are not necessary for lawyers handling simple divorces, real estate transfers, or traffic violations.
Has Crandall ever handled a traffic violation?
Under current ABA-sponsored state rules, only lawyers can own law firms. Such a restriction obviously excludes entrepreneurs who might find innovative new ways to deliver legal services, perhaps as complements to other services, such as accounting or business consulting. There is no good reason why lawyers should only work for lawyers in delivering legal services to third parties. More diversity in legal services firms would likely promote innovation and provide consumers of legal services with more options and potentially lower prices.
There are some damn good reasons why only lawyers should own law firms, such as the competing profit motive versus ethical obligations dilemma, but Crandall merely waves his hand to make them disappear.
The obvious argument for occupational licensure in any profession is that it sorts out incompetent and unscrupulous practitioners. In the practice of law, surely the road to competence is not only through three years of an ABA-accredited law school. At the very least, prospective lawyers could be freed to pursue their legal training wherever they choose and then to sit for a bar exam. And the bar exam could have several variants, depending on the sitter’s intended specialty. Why, for example, should those intending to handle domestic disputes be well versed in all of the technicalities involving complex financial transactions?
Everything old is new again, and don’t call me Shirley. Back to the apprentice days, and a push for specialization at the earliest years, meaning the death of lawyer as generalist. Or could Crandall be suggesting the down-sizing of lawyer to Legal Practitioner?
The voices of reason in this symposium turn out to be Walter Olson and Gillian Hadfield, a lawprof who has long been a forceful advocate for affordable legal representation.
Although it has the zing of a slogan that I myself have often used, the call to ‘deregulate’ the legal profession is misleading. Yes, most of us who argue that the legal profession is excessively closed to competition—in a way that hampers both access and innovation, as I have argued in recent papers—think that the entry barriers are too high. But the legal profession is not only over-regulated, it is also under-regulated. The regulatory regime lawyers and judges have put in place is overly protective of lawyers’ interests and insufficiently protective of the public’s interest in an accessible, innovative, and efficient legal system. So the goal should not be ‘deregulation’ but ‘right-regulation.’
Hadfield’s challenge isn’t to dismantle legal education and regulation, but to take it out of the exclusive hands of lawyers and introduce others into the mix of crafting legal economic policy. For this, Crandall immediately takes her to task:
Gillian Hadfield argues that “right-regulation,” not deregulation, is the right palliative for what ails the legal-services industry. But how are we to know what regulation is “right”? Nothing in her posting suggests that three years at an ABA-accredited law school is necessary for the execution of many of the tasks that we now confine to lawyers. Her plea for subjecting the legal services market to the general laws governing coinsumer protection, professional negligence, or antitrust does not translate into the necessity of retaining the current entry barriers for the practice of law. She also argues for transferring the regulation of the legal profession from lawyers and judges to other institutions without explaining why industry-specific regulation is necessary or could could possibly be welfare enhancing.
Anything short of rape and pillage, apparently, is cause for a fight among academics. Always a bright spot when reading their posts.
Olson’s vision is far more pragmatic than the academics. The only thing worse than the regulation of litigators would be the deregulation of litigators.
As a libertarian, I mostly concur in the critique of occupational licensure made famous by (among others) Milton Friedman. For the most part, licensure is a consumer-unfriendly affair that protects incumbent practitioners from competition, locks out promising new methods of service provision, and interferes with voluntary dealings between professional and client. It is dubious enough as applied to occupational groups such as doctors and plumbers, and downright ridiculous (as the Institute for Justice keeps reminding us) as applied to groups like cosmetologists, florists and interior designers.
But lawyers are different. No, seriously — they are.
Bet you didn’t see that coming.
I am not convinced that deregulating the power to commence this sort of civil process and demand money from an opponent for calling it off — in effect, to widen the existing pro se exemption so as to allow anyone to proceed pro se on behalf of anyone else they can get to sign up — would reduce the amount of unjustified legal aggression in a system that already has plenty of it and to spare.
Wally throws the cold water of reality on the theoretical happy faces, that while deregulation offers the promise of a lawyer for everyone (if not everyone being a lawyer), it comes with a side of insanity and incompetence that can’t be ignored. Not surprisingly, the scholars paid no heed.
In the wrap-up, Tom Crandall takes note of what shockingly happens when you put a bunch of like-minded people in the same virtual room.
As we approach the end of this Symposium, I am struck by how much consensus exists on this subject. Of course, we are not conducting this exercise under the auspices of the ABA. Nevertheless, there is sufficient intellectual backing for a major push to begin the deregulation of legal services.
It’s always heartwarming to know that scholars think sufficiently highly of their views of things other people do to demand change. While this recap, obviously and necessarily, scratches the surface of this symposium, and is open to every person involves parsing my omissions at painful length and in excruciating detail (because their words and ideas demand a full airing to appreciate their brilliance), it struck me as worthwhile to point out to lawyers that this was happening off in some ivy covered tower where lawyers never tread.
The discussions were largely superficial, with old arguments rehashed without much scrutiny or recognition of the flaws. Still, most of the revolutionary changes were neither, but rather the same modest proposals that lawyers have been pushing for a while now, and lawprofs have been resisting tooth and nail because, well, law school is absolutely perfect.
But the rhetoric of a failed profession is something to fear, as it gives rise to such irrational and disjointed pronouncements as the death of law schools, which will be seized upon by the shallow and ignorant as a justification for ignoring the ethical and professional obligations as commerce is elevated to the only thing that matters.
I wonder if that’s what the scholars had in mind?
Meanwhile, Miami Cops Protect Us From Down Syndrome
Via Radley Balko, a brave Miami police officer, whose name isn’t revealed by NBC Miami, took down 22-year-old Gilberto Powell. According to the official police report:
And Powell has Down Syndrome.The report said officers spotted a bulge in Powell’s waist band and when they tried to pat him down, he tried to flee. Police say Powell broke free as officers tried to place him in handcuffs, hitting his forehead on the ground.
Powell hit one of the officers in the chest and continued to struggle until one of the officers “struck [Powell] in the left side of his face with an open hand in an attempt to subdue him,” the report said.
After Powell was finally handcuffed and questioned, the officers realized he was “mentally challenged, was not capable of understanding our commands, and that the bulge in his waistband was a colostomy bag,” the report said.
Shockingly, the story from Powell and eyewitnesses differs from the official account.
[Powell’s family attorney, Phillip] Gold said Powell and other witnesses claim police body slammed him to the ground, bloodying his face and eye and causing contusions to his head. The injury to his eye may still require surgery, Gold said.
Even worse, Gold claims Powell’s colostomy bag was “ripped right off his body.”
For anyone with even a slight familiarity with Down Syndrome, the absurdity of the police conduct, and report prepared to justify it, is about as patent as can be.
It would be no stretch for one of the brotherhood to be muttering, “hey, even some kid with Down Syndrome can have a gun in his pants and blow away a cop.” After all, the first rule of policing not only demands that cops place their safety above a good beating of a kid with Down Syndrome, but always provides a handy excuse for any violence needed to make certain that a stop initiated by police over the dreaded colostomy bag/pistol (it could happen).
One of the most brutal problems facing people with physical or intellectual disabilities is that they don’t necessarily have the capacity to satisfy the commands of every cop on the street. Deaf people can’t hear, no matter how loudly they are ordered by a cop to do so. Blind people can’t see. Same thing.
And that’s not a reason to beat them, shoot them or harm them. This conflict between the police need for control and the fact that not everyone on the street is a perp, is physically or mentally capable of being a supplicant and not every bulge is a Magnum .45 cannot continue to result in harm to those most vulnerable. This cannot be tolerated.
And why isn’t the cop who did this to Gilberto Powell named?
Occupy Wall Street: What’s a Protest Without Cops?
For the past six days, a group called Occupy Wall Street has been staging a protest against the influence of greed on American politics. With free pizza. What? You know nothing about it? Not a word in the news? Well, that’s because it’s been fairly uneventful and therefore ignored. That’s over.
New York’s Finest, at least those not under indictment for a ticket fixing scandal, have decided that they’ve had enough of peaceful kids protesting and decided to take an otherwise innocuous situation and make it tense. Tension leads to the police giving orders and trying to herd feral children, which lead to all sorts of mischief.
Since then, 80 protestors have been arrested. Our brave New York police officers have busily maced young ladies, pulled out the hair of those who didn’t jump fast enough and thrown to the ground people who started at them with disrespectful eyes.
The mission of Occupy Wall Street, a group comprised largely of articulate, smart, caring young people, is hardly a threat to the police.
On the 17th of September, we want to see 20,000 people to flood into lower Manhattan, set up beds, kitchens, peaceful barricades and occupy Wall Street for a few months.
Like our brothers and sisters in Egypt, Greece, Spain, and Iceland, we plan to use the revolutionary Arab Spring tactic of mass occupation to restore democracy in America. We also encourage the use of nonviolence to achieve our ends and maximize the safety of all participants.
It warms my heart to hear about young people who care about something other than the size of their paycheck or where their next bag of Cheetos is coming from. Beyond that, I know nothing more about this group, or the young people who are being beaten, than what I can see on the television or youtube videos. No doubt more will be exposed as the day goes on, and we’ll learn more specifics about their cause and more about how their refusal to pay homage to our boys in blue has disrupted the equilibrium of the universe, mandating the imposition of pain and a bunch of DATs for disorderly conduct.
But I do know one thing, as these young people who may not be great with following police orders but haven’t hurt a fly as far as I’ve heard, get beaten, maced and arrested. We now have a real protest on our hands. And this would have faded to obscurity but for the heavy-handed assistance of the NYPD.
If It Works For You
While many disdain marketing philosopher Seth Godin because he’s, well, a marketing philosopher, one does so at one’s peril. There may be a ton of overly simplistic and ethically dubious fluff in marketing, but those guys, at least the good ones, know one thing really well. People.
Wondering, as I was, what pushed anonymous lawyers on the internet to promote their strategies and tactics for success while refusing to reveal their identities so as to protect their delicate internet personas, Mark Bennett made some foundational points about rhetoric and persuasion.
The internet has removed all barriers to mass communication. The cheapest way ever to reach large numbers of people is in the comments sections to popular blog posts and newspaper articles, where a commenter’s thoughts might be read by thousands just because he has posted immediately after some highly popular post or article.
Because of these low barriers we have millions of people yammering for attention online. The vast majority of them aren’t exhibiting anything resembling logical rigor; they produce more heat (pathos) than light (logos).
This post (which I urge everyone to read) addresses the failure of illumination despite the appearance of elucidation.
Aside: I read a highly technical post yesterday about how to repair a small kitchen appliance, which sounded very authoritative to me. For all I know, it was written by an erudite 12 year old, and yet I was ready to subject an expensive appliance to demolition based on this post, because it seemed more correct to someone who was clueless. An anonymous commenter to the post explained why the OP was completely, disastrously wrong. but I opted to follow the OP’s advice. As I heard the humm of a finely tuned machine, I loudly praised my technical brilliance, giving no credit at all to the precise information from the OP. I was lucky.
While Bennett’s post answers questions about the persuasiveness of commentary, the question of what drives a person, particularly one whose thoughts have yet to bear significant fruit, to desire his voice to be heard. What makes a person seize the opportunity to use the internet to speak to millions when he has nothing to say? That’s where Godin comes in.
Marketers love the placebo effect because it opens the door to stories and fables and word of mouth and varied perceptions. It gives marketers room to sell more than price and features. The first cultural byproduct this benefit creates is the notion that everyone is entitled to believe what they believe, and it’s rude to question it.
The second, is a real problem, though. If you spend enough time experiencing your own take on reality, you come to believe that what works for you might actually be a universal truth. Marketing plus psychology might equal science, it seems.For the placebo to work, you have to believe it, but sometimes believing requires suspension of your connection with verifiable fact.
In short, those who feel compelled to publicly offer untested or dubious advice do so, at least in part, because of the placebo effect. the confusion of personal experiences with universal truths.
I’ve known gregarious lawyers who could walk into a room and captivate it with their charm and personality, walking out with a half dozen new cases and the envy of their peers. These are lawyers who have reaped huge success from their marketing efforts, with verifiable practices to prove it. But they aren’t telling others to do what they do, because they know that it’s not their tactics, but their personalities, that make it work.
If you tried it, you would leave the room a pariah, Rather than charm the pants off others, you would come off loud and obnoxious. You aren’t them. If you were, you wouldn’t be asking how they do it. You would already know.
What drives someone to push their belief onto others is the combination of belief, despite the absence of verifiable fact, and the need for validation. You believe you’re onto something real, like post content on a blog for 52 weeks straight, and you will thereupon become a blogging rock star. Having adopted the plan, and though still waiting for the plan to bear fruit, you want to validate your choice by having others embrace it as well. You don’t deliberately mislead, because you believe in what you’re doing. You just don’t have any verifiable basis for it. It’s the triumph of belief over reality, and you need to share it.
Aside: As I stood there staring at my small kitchen appliance, feeling very satisfied with my handiwork, I knew in my heart that a slight error could have not only fried my appliance, but me as well. I was screwing with electricity, and I don’t have a close, dear relationship with electricity. Had the instructions I found on the internet been wrong, even slightly, I might have done some serious damage. I didn’t have the slightest clue, as I put plug into outlet, whether the OP was a brilliant electrical technician or the village idiot, yet I was about to risk my life on his word.
The fact that I’m still alive this morning, and have a cup filled with joe by my side, proves that I know everything there is about fixing small kitchen appliances. Any questions?
