Long ago, almost all criminal prosecutions took place in state courts, with the clean marble hallways of federal courthouses preserves for the rarified “white collar” fraud case or the occasional mob conspiracy prosecution. That ended in with the crack epidemic, and federal prosecutions have taken their share of violent and street crimes under their wing, often with state prosecutions proceeding simultaneously. The Petite Policy has long been forgotten.
This short yet shallow introduction is proffered as context for the petition for cert to the Supreme Court of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in US v. Derick Irisha Brown that use of a car is sufficient under the Interstate Commerce Clause to establish federal criminal jurisdiction. The holding was bad enough, but limited to the circuit. Should the Supreme Court take the case, it could become the law nationwide.
In a case that has not yet gone to trial, Brown is charged with capital murder under Alabama law, which means she would face the death penalty or a life sentence without the possibility of parole if convicted. But in September 2024, a jury convicted her of federal kidnapping charges, which resulted in two concurrent life sentences. The justification for that prosecution was that Brown used a car to kidnap the victim, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit said was enough, by itself, to establish federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.
The facts of the crime are, to put it mildly, horrific. involving a toddler, Kamille Cupcake McKinney, being raped and murdered. The crime involved a truck, used non-commercially and wholly within the State of Alabama. That, the circuit held, was close enough to invoke federal jurisdiction.
This argument is foreclosed by binding precedent. In United States v. Bryan, the defendants argued that there was insufficient evidence to support their § 1201(a) attempted kidnapping convictions. 159 F.4th 1274, 1293 (11th Cir. 2025). Specifically, they argued that the government did not establish that they used an instrumentality of interstate commerce in the commission of their offenses because trial evidence showed that their use of a truck was wholly intrastate. Id. at 1294-95. We rejected the defendants’ argument and held that automobiles, such as the truck used by the defendants, are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
In one way or another, cars are involved in a great many crimes, even though they bear no relationship to interstate commerce. Sure, a car or truck can be used in interstate commerce. It has the capability of driving over state lines. Then again, so do shoes when a person walks across a state line. The defendant argues that this expands the reach of federal criminal prosecution to pretty much every crime the feds choose to prosecute.
While this might not have been a big concern back in the olden days when the feds had little interest in getting their hands dirty with the ugly state offenses that filled the holding cells of local courthouses, federal prosecutors have since not only taken interest in prosecuting state crimes, but have regularly done so while states simultaneously prosecuted under state law, making the defendants subject to double prosecution, double punishment, and double potential of conviction.
In its cert petition, the defendant raises a circuit split before with the Tenth Circuit, which is the sort of problem that could well give rise to the Supreme Court’s taking the case in order to resolve the conflict.
This case presents an important, recurring question about the outer bounds of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The decision below reinforces a circuit split over whether, in a prosecution for kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), automobiles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In the Tenth Circuit they are not, while in the Eleventh Circuit and a few others, they are. This question has applications well beyond kidnapping, because there are many other federal criminal statutes with the same jurisdictional hook.
The Tenth Circuit’s view is the correct one. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s view, there would be virtually no limit to the power of Congress. The Court should grant certiorari and reverse.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that using cars as per se commerce clause hooks expanded federal jurisdiction without any limiting principle.
“Allowing the government to bring charges based on the use of any ordinary motor vehicle (here, a Jeep) to commit a purely intrastate crime would transform any crime that uses a vehicle into a federal matter,” the 10th Circuit noted. “That interpretation—unbound by a cognizable limiting principle—stretches Congress’s authority beyond the Constitution’s boundaries.”
In support of Brown’s petition, the Cato Institute joined the fray.
The Cato Institute amplifies that warning in a brief urging the Supreme Court to accept Brown’s petition. The 11th Circuit’s decision “brings the Commerce Clause one step closer to becoming the engine of a general federal police power—a power that the Framers deliberately withheld from the national government,” Cato lawyers Thomas Berry, Daniel Greenberg, and Kimberly Coleman say. “Such a power would erode the distinction between national and state authority on which our federal system depends. And it would offend the Constitution’s structural guarantees of liberty by allowing Congress to regulate multiple new dimensions of American life.”
While Cato’s argument is certainly correct, it presumes that the Supreme Court isn’t on board with the notion that there ought to be a “general federal police power,” such that the feds can put their sticky fingers on pretty much any criminal prosecution they choose, essentially giving the Department of Justice the power to prosecute any crime that would put their faces on the front page of the newspaper and empower Kash Patel and Todd Blanche to throw a news conference about how their saving heritage citizens from the unwashed masses.
The 11th Circuit’s per se rule “converts one of the most common—and local—objects of everyday life into an all-purpose jurisdictional hook,” [Randy] Barnett warns. “That is not a faithful implementation of the Commerce power. It is an end-run around its limits.”
This is quite right, and may well be exactly what will be given the Supreme Court’s blessing, limitless federal criminal jurisdiction.
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