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Touching Officer Teacup

The  press release by upstate New York Senator Joe Griffo (R-C-I, Rome) was deeply touching. Maybe “touching” isn’t the right word here.


The New York State Senate today passed a bill that creates the crime of aggravated harassment of a police or peace officer. The bill  (S.2402), sponsored by Senator Joe Griffo (R-C-I, Rome) would make it a felony to harass, annoy, or threaten a police officer while on duty.  

“Our system of laws is established to protect the foundations of our society,” Senator Griffo said. “Police officers who risk their lives every day in our cities and on our highways deserve every possible protection, and those who treat them with disrespect, harass them and create situations that can lead to injuries deserve to pay a price for their actions.”

A felony? Because protecting the foundations of society requires us to treat cops more respectfully? Perhaps they don’t teach civics in the Rome public schools? The only thing surprising about this bill is that Griffo didn’t include state senators as well, since they clearly don’t get much respect.


“At a time when shocking incidents of disrespect and outright confrontation are at an all-time high, the men and women who patrol the streets of our cities deserve every possible protection we can offer them,” Senator Griffo stated.

Apparently, there is an epidemic of disrespect, an all-time high, that no one but Griffo is aware of, causing police officers to feel badly about themselves. If so, I know I’ve certainly contributed to hurting police officers’ feelings on occasion. Now I feel ashamed of myself for saying mean things about the people who deserve every possible protection we can offer them.


“My bill would make it a crime to take any type of physical action to try to intimidate a police officer. This is a necessary action because we can see from the rise in incidents that too many people in our society have lost the respect they need to have for a police officer. We need to make it very clear that when a police officer is performing his duty, every citizen needs to comply and that refusal to comply carries a penalty.”

Aha! So it’s not just hurting feelings, but “physical action to try to intimidate a police officer.” Well, that’s interesting. And by “intimidate,” Griffo means “every citizen needs to comply” when a cop is performing his duty?  This press release appears to present strings of meaningless phrases connected in such a way as to give the appearance of offering something substantive while ultimately saying nothing.

So what does Griffo’s bill, passed by the Senate, provide?


S 240.33 AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT OF A POLICE OFFICER OR PEACE OFFICER.

    A  PERSON  IS  GUILTY  OF AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT OF A POLICE OFFICER OR   PEACE OFFICER WHEN, WITH THE INTENT TO HARASS, ANNOY, THREATEN OR  ALARM   A  PERSON  WHOM HE OR SHE KNOWS OR REASONABLY SHOULD KNOW TO BE A POLICE   OFFICER OR PEACE OFFICER ENGAGED IN THE COURSE  OF PERFORMING HIS OR HER   OFFICIAL DUTIES, HE OR SHE STRIKES, SHOVES, KICKS OR OTHERWISE  SUBJECTS  SUCH PERSON TO PHYSICAL CONTACT.

    AGGRAVATED  HARASSMENT OF A POLICE OFFICER OR PEACE OFFICER IS A CLASS   E FELONY.

Griffo’s nonsensical and meaningless hyperbole aside, the purpose of the bill is to extend the protections of Penal Law §120.08 for an assault on a police officer, a class C felony, requiring the cop to suffer “serious physical injury,” to situations where they suffer no injury at all.  While the meaningless intent language is shared by other offenses, the conduct here applied to anyone who “strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects” a cop “to physical contact,” which apparently means any touching at all.

While many argue for their right to physically oppose police officers, in the course of performing their “official duties” (note that it doesn’t say lawful duties), when they act either without lawful authority or, more significantly, when they beat the daylights out of someone for no particular reason, this bill would create a felony out of any touching whatsoever. 

It appears that the foundation of Griffo’s rhetoric, that there is some epidemic of harassment of cops that hurts their sensitive feelings, coupled with people touching them, exists only in the minds of those in a large room in Albany.  It certainly isn’t reality on the street, where the worst of the harassment is the blood people’s heads leave on the ends of batons, or the damage people to do taser darts with their rock-hard bodies.  In other words, this is a cure for non-existent problem.

But far, far worse is the potential for abuse. At least where evidence of an actual physical injury is required, an officer can’t claim a “touching” that leaves no proof of it ever happening, even though an injury fails to explain who did what to whom.  At least there’s evidence that something happened here. With this bill, there need be no evidence but for the officer’s word.  What could possibly go wrong?

The message this sends is similarly alarming. Are Griffo and his senatorial cohorts seriously contending that the heart and soul of society is to comply with police officers?  Did he get his words backwards, and maybe mean to say that cops are public servants who must be compelled to respect the constitutional rights and physical integrity of the public?  Sadly, I’m pretty sure he meant what he said, inane as it may be.

Does this mean that a person who taps a police officer on the shoulder to ask for directions, thus annoying the cop who is carefully focusing his attention on the new donuts being laid out on the racks of Dunkin’ has committed a felony?  Well, potentially yes, but it’s not likely the way the law will be used. Rather, this would be more likely akin to resisting arrest, a weapon in the cops’ arsenal to ensure compliance upon pain of a felony charge. 

It will take all of five minutes for a few magic words to find their way into an accusatory instrument to teach people that inadequate compliance with a cop means they’re in for a much harsher ride.  But what of the touching, you ask?  Well, it’s really not much of a stretch to toss in some language like “and the defendant subjected the officer to physical contact by touching his hand to the officer’s body.” Prove it didn’t happen?

Just nuts.  Let’s see whether the legislature sees a similar epidemic to soothe the cops’ delicate sensibilities.

H/T @Boatfloating







Blind Justice: As Seen On TV

It’s not my norm to post press releases, but the following release from a new advocacy group called Blind Justice* is worth mention mostly because they put their money where their hearts and minds are.

CAMPAIGN EXPOSING PERILS OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT TO HIT MANHATTAN TELEVISION AND TIMES SQUARE

Blind Justice Launches Ad Campaign to Alert New Yorkers to the Dangers of Unchecked Prosecutors and Urge Cy Vance to Hold His Prosecutors Accountable

 

WASHINGTON, D.C. (June 5, 2013) – Blind Justice, the national nonprofit advocate dedicated to conviction integrity, today announced the launch of a Manhattan focused ad campaign bringing to light the damages caused by unchecked prosecutorial misconduct and calling for accountability in an effort to prevent future wrongful convictions. The new campaign will kick-off today with a series of television ads highlighting real cases of prosecutor misconduct and a 10-second feature ad on the CBS Super Screen in Times Square.
 

 

The television ad series titled “Conviction at Any Cost” will air on multiple networks in the Manhattan area and are available to view at www.blind-justice.org.

Each ad features transcript statements from a deposition of New York County prosecutor, Bureau Chief Kerry O’Connell who withheld witness testimony, hid key evidence and failed to disclose third-party confessions that could have proven the innocence of the wrongfully convicted at the time of the trial in the case featured. 

 

“Every government official needs oversight, especially those powerful enough to put an innocent man behind bars. The Manhattan district attorney can no longer turn a blind eye to the pattern of prosecutor misconduct in New York City courts. Prosecutors that are powerful enough to send an innocent man to prison for life must be held accountable,” says Torin Kelly, Executive Director of Blind Justice.

 

The “Conviction at Any Cost” television ads will air alongside a series of 10-second ads running once an hour, 18 times a day through the end of September, in one of the world’s most famous advertising venues – Times Square.  

 

“Times Square is the perfect venue to launch our ad campaign demonstrating that ‘win-at-all-costs’ prosecutors are a dangerous problem in Manhattan that can no longer be ignored by elected leaders who campaigned on conviction integrity,” concluded Kelly.

 

The new ad campaign in the Manhattan area follows the 501(c)(4) social welfare organization’s national launch last month that included television ads calling for prosecutor accountability in Brooklyn, N.Y. and Houston, Texas.

This is the television ad that will start airing in Manhattan:

Say what you will, but they are spreading their word about prosecutorial responsibility. Who doesn’t want prosecutors to be responsible for their actions? And if courts and bar disciplinary authorities won’t act, then why not Blind Justice?

Whether this will be effective in getting the public to recognize and understand the problem of prosecutorial misconduct, and perhaps even come to understand why it’s a problem in need of address, has yet to be seen, but you can’t blame Blind Justice for trying.

* We walked in, sat down, Obie came in with the twenty seven eight-by-ten colour glossy pictures with circles and arrows and a paragraph on the back of each one, sat down. Man came in said, “All rise.” We all stood up, and Obie stood up with the twenty seven eight-by-ten colour glossy pictures, and the judge walked in sat down with a seeing eye dog, and he sat down, we sat down. Obie looked at the seeing eye dog, and then at the twenty seven eight-by-ten colour glossy pictures with circles and arrows and a paragraph on the back of each one, and looked at the seeing eye dog. And then at twenty seven eight-by-ten colour glossy pictures with circles and arrows and a paragraph on the back of each one and began to cry, ’cause Obie came to the realization that it was a typical case of American blind justice, and there wasn’t nothing he could do about it…

Can’t Buy Me Love, No (Update)

From all accounts, Sean Thomas had a  pretty good cause of action against three New York City cops for excessive force.


When Sean Thomas sued three New York City police officers in 2009, claiming they had used excessive force against him, he appeared to have a strong case. After his arrest the previous year during a dispute with his girlfriend at her home in the Bronx, he was handcuffed, wrapped in a restraint blanket, strapped to a stretcher and taken to the hospital where he was involuntarily sedated, according to court documents. He was never charged with any crime.
He sued. He won. He won big, to the tune of $450,000. Ah, justice, with the help of critical testimony from his girlfriend, Letitia Marrow.  The glow of victory, however, didn’t last too long.


On Nov. 19, 2012, less than a month after the damages were awarded, David Zelman, one of Mr. Thomas’s lawyers, sent a letter to Judge Carter, telling him that he had recently learned of the agreement.

[I]n an order released on Tuesday, a judge threw out the verdict and ordered a new trial. It seems that just days before Ms. Marrow had appeared in court, Mr. Thomas signed a written agreement promising to give her 20 percent of any damages he received if she testified on his behalf.

Marrow’s testimony was critical to the case, and well worth 20% of Thomas’ take.  Except you can’t do that.


Under New York law, it is not permitted to pay a witness in exchange for favorable testimony, Judge Carter wrote. The agreement was signed and notarized on June 30, 2012, three days before Ms. Marrow testified and backed up Mr. Thomas’s version of the events.
What stands out immediately is that boyfriend and girlfriend were so deeply devoted to one another that they not only made a deal where Marrow took a fifth of the award, but she felt it necessary to put it in writing. And get it notarized! If that ain’t love, I don’t know what is.

For his part, Thomas said he had no choice. Marrow told him she wouldn’t testify on his behalf unless he paid her.  It doesn’t mean that Thomas didn’t deserve to win, or to win the amount awarded, but that he did so on the paid testimony of a fact witness. And secret paid testimony to boot. There is no way that Marrow’s testimony can be used again. She’s now dead as a witness.

Could she have been subpoenaed? Sure she could, though experience is that subpoenaing a reluctant and uncooperative witness isn’t usually the best way to put a case together, especially if the witness ought to be friendly to the side that served her.

Then again, Thomas’ lawyer wouldn’t know of the need to subpoena Marrow, or otherwise address her recalcitrance to do right by her man, unless somebody told him.  Clearly, Zelman has no clue of his client’s impropriety, as reflected in his doing what had to be done by disclosing it to the court.  Remember kids, lawyers are not allowed to be complicit in your wrongdoing.

Had Zelman known, perhaps he could have smoothed the ripples in the love canal, persuading Marrow that her testimony on Thomas’ behalf was the right thing to do, not just to vindicate the harm done to him by the police but because, you know, she had some feelings toward her boyfriend.  But if nobody told him, then what was he to do?

Before anyone else mentions it, one can’t help but have a nagging sense that a very similar sort of wrong happens regularly when the shoe is on the other foot.  After all, don’t prosecutors confer a benefit on cooperating witnesses when they hold out the carrot of a 5K1.1 letter, a plea deal, even cash, for their “truthful” testimony at trial against the defendant?

Sure, said the original panel in United States v. Singleton. Prosecutors are doing exactly what Thomas and Marrow did here by paying for favorable testimony. Nuh uh, said the Tenth Circuit en banc, reversing the panel decision.  It’s entirely different when it’s prosecutors buying testimony. because it would be “a radical departure from the ingrained legal culture of our criminal justice system but would also result in criminalizing historic practice and established law.”  Or in plain English, the government has to be allowed to buy testimony or we couldn’t win.

But that’s the government and this is Sean Thomas, the guy who was never charged with any crime.  And the rules against paying for testimony are clear and certain, even if they don’t apply to the government.  The shame is that there are times when it’s somewhat understandable that a fact witness doesn’t want to be involved, whether due to the hardship of appearing at trial, fear of official retaliation or personal issues. If they have no skin the game, other than doing the right thing, it becomes far more understandable that they aren’t willing to extent themselves too far.

Yet, Marrow was Thomas’ main squeeze, and still she made demands.


“She said, ‘If you don’t sign this, I’m not going to court,’ ” Mr. Thomas said, according to court documents.
Love is a many splendored thing. It’s time for Thomas to find himself a new girlfriend.

Update: Fresh from PACER, it seems that the reason Marrow got a bit miffed at Thomas for taking a loan and not sharing with her, so she sued him in civil court for the performance of his contract with her. With the cat out of the bag by Marrow’s hand, the wisdom of keeping Thomas’ offense confidential wasn’t as big an issue as it might otherwise be.  Having some issues uploading the decision and letter, so bear with me and I’ll get it in here as soon as possible.

Prosecutor Trolls, Because Judges Let Them

In a powerful post,  Jeff Gamso quotes from a 1999 dissent by the late Chief Justice of Ohio, Tom Moyer in the sadly appropriately named State v. Fears :



Time and time again this court has commented on the impropriety of a prosecutor’s argument throughout the course of a capital case. Time and time again we have given prosecutors the benefit of the doubt, declaring their conduct to be nonprejudicial in view of overwhelming evidence of guilt.
However, despite our best efforts to clarify the limits of acceptable advocacy, and our stern warnings to avoid such inappropriate conduct in the future, some prosecutors continue to unabashedly cross the line of vigorous but proper advocacy. In doing so, they taint the fairness of our criminal justice system.
Ohio’s late Chief Justice, Tom Moyer, wrote that in 1999.  Admonition without consequence.  Threats without substance.  Next time.  One of these days.  Just wait.  
The lesson in criminal law is that when wrongs go unrighted, they get rewarded. That courts know it’s wrong and yet decide to excuse it creates an incentive system that encourages wrong. In criminal law, the countervailing argument is that “the evidence of guilt is overwhelming,” and the judges can’t find the mettle to uphold the law if it means a guilty man gets a chance.

The flaw of this argument is twofold, that perhaps the evidence wouldn’t be so overwhelming if misconduct hadn’t permeated the trial, and that even the guilty are entitled to fair trials. But the point isn’t that they don’t know right from wrong; they simply lack the will to make it happen.

In a New York Times op-ed, Randall Rader, Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, together with lawprofs, Colleen Chien and David Hricik, raise a similar complaint about patent trolls, who they define as:
The onslaught of litigation brought by “patent trolls” — who typically buy up a slew of patents, then sue anyone and everyone who might be using or selling the claimed inventions — has slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses and consumers, and clogged our judicial system.

Their business plan is simple: trolls (intellectual-property lawyers use less evocative terms like “non-practicing entities” and “patent-assertion entities”) make money by threatening companies with expensive lawsuits and then using that cudgel, rather than the merits of a case, to extract a financial settlement. In the apt summary of President Obama, who on Tuesday announced a plan to stave off frivolous patent litigation, trolls just want to “ hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some money .”

President Obama has a plan to deal with this frivolous patent litigation. Why? Because judges, who have always had the authority to stop it, haven’t.
Lost in the debate, however, is that judges already have the authority to curtail these practices: they can make trolls pay for abusive litigation.

Section 285 of the Patent Act, as well as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, give judges the authority they need to shift the cost burden of litigation abuse from the defendant to the troll. But remarkably, judges don’t do so very often: by our count , fees were shifted under Section 285 in only 20 out of nearly 3,000 patent cases filed in 2011.

And if you replace the word “patent” with copyright, you end up with  Righthaven and Prenda, where persistent and aggressive lawyering and judges willing to do their jobs have demonstrated that they have the power to correct and punish vexatious litigation if they choose to use it.

But this rarely happens, and judges do everything in their power to  seize upon excuses to avoid the “harsh” and dirty work of cleaning up our legal system. It’s not that the system comes anywhere near the glory we conveniently attribute to it when deciding what to chisel into the courthouse lintels, but it’s not nearly as bad in theory as it is in practice. As Chief Judge Radar points out, the difficulty lies in men and women in robes doing what they are authorized to do, even if that duty is unpleasant.

As this suggests, the theme of judges taking the path of least resistance, the course that simultaneously requires the least amount of effort (as it’s hard work explaining why an action is frivolous and the recalcitrant party was vexatious sufficient to pass muster with an appellate court) and doesn’t directly outrage the loudest litigant in the courtroom, pervades the system. The carefully conceived incentives, the balance of power if you will, that’s meant to compel all sides to act in accordance with the rules that assure fairness, don’t work when the rules to prevent impropriety aren’t enforced.

So judges don’t want to harsh the mellow of patent trolls, and by doing so allow them to run rampant and trash businesses and individuals?  Is there a reason why they are so much less concerned about the people being harmed than the trolls extorting money?

And in criminal cases, when harsh warnings are given, in Justice Moyer’s words, “time and time again,” they amount to nothing more than empty admonitions. There is never a point when “time again” runs out, as there is an actual rule, harmless error, to protect prosecutorial impropriety from attack. 

If President Obama, or any other president, or senator or representative, wants to fix a problem, there is a huge one staring them in the face that’s ripe for fixing. As with patent trolls, copyright trolls and vexatious litigants, judges have the power to fix the problem. They just don’t have the will. 

And of all these problems in our legal system that do harm and provide incentives for scoundrels to abuse the system, the one which garners the least concern and has the least likelihood of ever being fixed is the one that puts people in prison and sometimes kills them.  Maybe if we added the word “troll” to the end of prosecutor, somebody would give a damn.







The Slippery Swab (Update)

Though it’s been less than 24 hours since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Maryland v. King approving the Maryland law that permits the taking of DNA from presumptively innocent defendants, the blawgosphere is already awash in posts decrying the  intellectually bankrupt rationale of Justice Kennedy,  extolling the bombastic outrage of Justice Scalia and exposing the  constitutional duplicity of Justice Breyer. No one needs me to add to the misery, so I won’t.

But I will take heed of Gerard Magliocci’s post at  Concurring Opinions about slippery slopes.


With the . . . ahem . . . annual avalanche of Supreme Court opinions on the way, I thought I’d raise a question about how slippery slope arguments play out.  The reason advocates make this sort of argument is that they want to convince someone not to do something.  If A leads to B and B is seen as unacceptable, then people will be less likely to do A if they are convinced that there is no line between them.  The problem, of course, is that this tactic can backfire.  It might convince people that there is no distinction between A and B when they thought that there was, and thus make B more likely once A happens.
The decision in King, as made brutally clear by Nino, has some serious slippery slope potential. The concern is that seizing DNA under the Maryland law which only allows it for certain serious and violent crimes for example, will lead to a national database of DNA for everyone arrested for anything is the argument against the King decision today, and for the extension of the King decision on the next go-round. And the one after that.

It’s valuable to remember, however, when using analogies to make points that there are other games to play that may serve to stop the downward slide.  For example, the slide down the slippery slope ends when there is a conceptual ledge.  If there is a rational basis to distinguish the current rationale from the feared extension, then it’s not as terrible a decision as some contend.

And that’s why King is awful.

As Scalia properly notes, DNA is collected from people convicted of crimes regardless of this decision, so they are by definition removed from the people affected by it. That leaves only the people who are arrested but not ultimately convicted as the people in play.  The decision is otherwise meaningless.

Given this universe, and the fact that defendants are presumed innocent until convicted, there can be no question as a matter of law that buccal swabs of DNA are being seized from innocent people.  The argument in King is that these are defendants charged with serious offenses.  The purpose of this detail is to distinguish the swabees from people given traffic tickets, from whom DNA is not collected under this law.  This makes Justices Kennedy and Breyer feel better. The other justices in the majority couldn’t care less, but that’s irrelevant.

The problem with this rationale is that the defendants from whom DNA is taken, being innocent, are similarly situated as anyone else, innocent of everything.  They are innocent of traffic infractions and murder, all at the same time. So what if they’re charged with serious offenses? An innocent person charged with murder is still innocent, and indistinguishable from an innocent person charged with any other crime. Or even the innocent person not charged with a crime, for that matter. 

Returning to Magliocci’s warning, that the argument now used against the majority in King is the same argument that will prevail in causing the very slide we seek to avoid, is there a conceptual ledge to prevent it?

The answer seems to be no, there isn’t, and while the warning is appreciated, it’s not as if nobody would have noticed that there is no basis to argue why the slide down the slope can’t be stopped. 

The 5-4 majority in King was predicated on Justice Breyer’s  preference for a balancing approach to the Fourth Amendment, weighing the imposition of the intrusion on the body against the benefits to the government of whatever it seizes. The benefits to the government of having everybody’s DNA for the purpose of identifying who committed a crime are sufficiently obvious to require no in-depth discussion. 

The physical intrusiveness of a cheek swab to collect the DNA isn’t such a big deal either, as far as these things go. It’s hardly as bad as a blood draw to collect evidence to proven intoxication, or worse yet, the insertion of a catheter.  So if balancing suits your fancy, this shouldn’t displease you all that much.

On the other hand, the ramifications for personal privacy are astounding, and still only in its infancy. DNA tells a great deal about a human being, and no doubt will grow more revealing as science progresses. With a well-stocked databank, the implications are off the charts.

But if it’s constitutional to collect DNA from innocent people based on mere accusation, and the only impediment is the required opening of the mouth (whether or not our proud founders would have enjoyed a royal swab in there) to take a swab, then the only remaining question is how long before the government can rent-a-scientist to find the part of our DNA that reveals our propensity to behave in a way that displeases it. 

You see, the slippery slope in this instance goes down a very long way, and now that we’re on it, there is no conceptual place to stop.

Update: A few people have sent me emails asking about the internal statutory protections, mentioned by Kennedy, such as disposal of DNA samples should a person be acquitted, or uses to which DNA may be put with sanctions for violating those uses.  Here’s the problem. The holding is not contingent on these statutory limitations, but they are dicta mentioned only to bolster the holding. The Maryland lege enacted them, and the Maryland lege can modify or eliminate them.

Then what?  The constitutionality remains intact and the limits are gone. Or the next state that enacts a similar law chooses not to enact similar limits. Or the limits are ignored and nobody cares. While they may make the holding more palatable for the moment, they do nothing to stop the slide. And given how beneficial DNA samples are to the government, it’s impossible to conceive of law enforcement not using what they have and wanting more, and that the same arguments in favor of them now will continue to militate for greater collection in the future.

Because She’s Not Wearing Knickers

Unlike the rest of humanity, lawyers never do monumentally stupid, embarrassing and humiliating things. Almost never. Well, maybe just as often as anyone else.

Rarely is any mention of it made here, unless there is some point to be made that illuminates matters for the rest of us. It’s not just offered for its titillating or salacious value, to grab eyeballs of people who can’t get enough of snarky cat memes and who learned about sex on the internet. 

But this post at a UK blog calld  Legal Cheeks disturbed me.  A Brooklyn solo practitioner, Stephanie Hendricks, had a really bad day and ended it drunk and stupid.  Very drunk and very stupid. It had absolutely nothing to do with her being a lawyer, and offers no insight to lawyers other than to avoid getting very drunk and stupid. But this is a message for everyone, not just lawyers.

Why?  Her story appeared in the New York Post, a tabloid known for its hard-hitting, deeply thoughtful content. So let’s spread the word around the blawgosphere in order to free ride off the salaciousness of her having removed certain articles of clothing and uttered some particularly poorly chosen words to police officers.  Like I said, she had a very bad day.

Adding insult to injury, this is the sort of thing likely to appear in Above the Law, where no humiliating moment that happens to a lawyer, without regard to whether it’s of any consequence to her professional responsibilities or performance, is offered to titillate the senses of young lawyers whose own lack of a life is fulfilled by Staci Zaretsky’s posting dirty stories on the internet.  Oops. Too late, it’s already there.

There is an allegation that Hendricks ran off without paying a $6 cab fare before, well, other things happened.  Whether that’s true, and whether that was a by-product of her drunkenness or a deliberate act, might be fair for commentary, but let’s be real here. Had she not been naked from the waist down, and not spoken as she did to cops, nobody would ever care about the $6 cab fare.

It’s one thing to raise and discuss things done by lawyers that provide lessons in what to do, and what not to do, in the conduct of our practices, our representation of clients, our integrity as professionals. Lawyers certainly do plenty to feed the discussion of wrongs that need to be righted.  But this was nothing, a person who got drunk and behaved incredibly poorly. That the person happened to be a lawyer is irrelevant.

When the blawgosphere resorts to spreading stories which serve no purpose other than to humiliate people who happen to be lawyers, stories which offer nothing of value or thought, and are posted merely to titillate, it makes us puny.

Have you never seen a naked person before? Have you never heard rude words? Big deal. Grow up and get over it.  We don’t embarrass people for no reason.  When we do, we embarrass ourselves and our profession.  This was disgraceful, and it’s unbecoming to get your kicks off someone else’s really bad, and wholly irrelevant, day.

Are you proud of yourselves for getting a cheap laugh out of Stephanie Hendricks’ drunken behavior?  If so, you really need to grow up.

Not Quite Free Enough To Go

In a decision that can only be described as weirdly right, the Appellate Division, Second Department vacated the Queens County  convictions of Walter Hurdle for assault 1 and assault on a police officer. It’s not that Hurdle didn’t do it, or that the officer, Sgt. John Pagnotta, wasn’t hurt. According to the decision, he was severely hurt.

And yet, the court held that Hurdle lacked the requisite intent element, in this case depraved indifference pursuant to Penal Law § 120.10(3).


On January 18, 2007, at approximately 8:00 p.m., the defendant was sitting in his legally parked vehicle, a black SUV, when an unmarked police car pulled up to the driver’s side of the SUV, and one of the four uniformed officers in the car, Sergeant John Pagnotta, had a brief conversation with the defendant. Unsatisfied with the defendant’s answers to his questions, the sergeant directed the officer driving the police car to pull in front of the SUV and park at an angle, blocking the defendant from pulling out of his parking space. The officers then exited the police car and approached the SUV. Sergeant Pagnotta opened the door on the driver’s side of the defendant’s vehicle; standing between the door and the door jamb, he continued to question the defendant. When Sergeant Pagnotta ordered him to exit the car, the defendant shifted into drive and pressed his foot down on the gas pedal, crashing the SUV into the police car in front of it and dragging Sergeant Pagnotta, trapped between the door and the door jamb of the SUV. When the SUV pulled away from the police car, Sergeant Pagnotta was released and thrown into the middle of the street, where he was almost hit by an oncoming car. As a result of this incident, Sergeant Pagnotta sustained severe injuries.
There doesn’t appear to be any magic secret behind Pagnotta’s stop of Hurdle. At least from the decision, there was no reason to suspect he had, was or would be committing a crime of any type. Just a guy in his car minding his own business, and fully entitled to be left alone. Pagnotta failed to leave Hurdle alone.

There being no basis for the initial approach, or Pagnotta ordering the cruiser to block Hurdle’s SUV, the court refused to conclude that Hurdle’s hitting the gas, crashing into the police cruiser and dragging Pagnotta who was positioned between the car door and jamb, constituted depraved indifference. 


In fact, not only was the evidence insufficient to establish that the police had an objective, credible reason for approaching the defendant in the first place but, also, Sergeant Pagnotta’s testimony indicated that the initial approach was a mistake, since Sergeant Pagnotta had intended for the officer driving the police car to pull up to a grey car parked behind the defendant’s vehicle. Furthermore, neither the defendant’s startled demeanor nor his responses to the police inquiry provided the officers with “the quantum of knowledge to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe criminal activity [was] at hand.”
If the initial approach was a mistake, then it’s rather self-evident that the police lacked probable cause for the stop and seizure, and obviously what happened subsequently can’t serve to justify the initial stop. But still, Hurdle, knowing that a cop car was blocking him and a cop standing within his car door, hit the gas and went.  He hit the cruiser and went. He trapped the cop in his door and went. Was this just a matter of his “startled demeanor”?

Regardless of whether the initial stop was lawful, what of “attenuation,” that the time between Hurdle being stopped and his decision to hit the gas, smash into the cruiser, trap the sergeant and drive away made his subsequent actions an independent assault?  The court simply dismisses the argument.


The People’s attenuation argument is unpreserved for consideration upon appeal (see People v Hunter, 17 NY3d 725, 728; People v Nieves, 67 NY2d 125, 135-136) and, in any event, is without merit.
Trying to make sense of this decision isn’t easy, given the bizarre description of the facts and what appears to be some glaring holes in the narrative. So why was Hurdle stopped? A mistake? A way to kill some time by the police? For no reason whatsoever?  Then why did Hurdle, whose SUV was boxed in, hit the gas with apparent knowledge that at the very least, he was going to hit the police car and, most likely, do some serious harm to Sgt. Pagnotta?

The outcome seems to be a quite remarkable result based upon the absence, for whatever reason, of any lawful justification for Hurdle’s stop and seizure. It’s almost as if the police, having violated Hurdle’s constitutional right to be left alone, brought about whatever damage resulted from Hurdle’s effort to escape his wrongful seizure.  As the police were not exercising any “lawful duty,” they could not avail themselves of the concomitant duty not to cause harm to an officer.

But the gravamen of the decision rests on the view that Hurdle’s conduct did not amount to depraved indifference:


“‘Reflecting wickedness, evil or inhumanity, as manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable acts, depraved indifference is embodied in conduct that is so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to render the actor as culpable as one whose conscious objective is to kill [or to cause serious physical injury to another person]’” (People v McMillon, 31 AD3d 136, 139, quoting People v Suarez, 6 NY3d 202, 214). “The element of depraved indifference to human life comprises both depravity and indifference, and has meaning independent of recklessness and the gravity of the risk created”
When the reaction to unlawful police action causes what appears to be inevitable harm, it seems that the court is holding that it fails to rise to the level of “wickedness” necessary to suffice for depraved indifference. Not only is this a remarkable appreciation of the right of a citizen to not be constrained by unlawful police conduct, but a clear message to police that their failure to respect the rights of citizens strips them of the protections they would otherwise have for the performance of their lawful duty.

Lest anyone think this is  too huge a vindication of Hurdle’s rights, while the decision vacates his convictions for first degree assault and assault on a police officer, including the sentence of 17 to 20 years, he remains convicted of the lesser offenses of second degree assault and reckless driving and still has a seven-year sentence to serve. 

H/T Jill McMahon






 



 


 


 

Plea Bargaining with a side of Judge

Via Doug Berman, a new  law review article from University of Texas lawprof Susan Klein suggests that Gideon, having failed to deliver on its promise, the criminal justice system has been turned into the plea bargaining system.

Yet fifty years later, indigent defendants, (who comprise 80% of total defendants), often get substandard counsel, and innocent individuals are rarely, but sometimes convicted or plead guilty. Some of the blame falls squarely on the Court for settling on the contours of our current two-pronged test in Strickland versus Washington, that determines when counsel is ineffective and the defendant is accordingly prejudiced. Some blame falls on legislators for failing to adequately fund defense counsel. Our criminal justice evolved from an adversarial system to what Judge Lynch calls, “a defacto administrative regime”. The criminal justice system is the plea bargaining system.
A good thing? Hardly, Klein submits.


In this essay, the author posits that last term’s Lafler versus Cooper and Missouri versus Frye gave us another chance to both police equality of sentences for the guilty, and to mandate better investigation of the underlying offense to ferret out the innocent. Information and resource disparity skews the system. The defense bar cannot buck a system stacked so heavily against them. Large-scale structural reform such as legislation or proper funding for defense is equally unlikely. Plea bargaining has failed.
So if the adversarial system has failed, and plea bargaining has failed, what to do?


Professor Klein suggests that our most politically feasible hope for reform is for federal and state judges to amend the rules of criminal procedure in order to monitor and record the discovery and plea negotiation process via nonwaivable conferences.

Judges? Because judges have invariably demonstrated fairness, thoughtfulness, concern and intellectual honesty in the performance of their duties. I wonder…wait a second. Judges? The same ones who deny motions when the cop gives the same ridiculously perfect testimony about furtive gestures and combat stances, shirk off responsibility for violations of the Constitution because, you know, the guy is guilty anyway? Those judges?

There is an inexplicable, nearly religious belief in the inherent propriety of the judicial system. It’s reflected in the adoration of the judiciary, as if they’re some higher breed of organism, inherently possessed of qualities to which mere mortals can only aspire. Smart. Fair. Neutral. 

Has anyone who can think this every been in a trial level court?  Have they ever tried a case, argued a motion, sat for hours on a hard bench awaiting their 30 seconds of face time with the robed jurist who takes three second to carefully read the papers you spent a week preparing before uttering the word “denied”?

Granted, clearing the calendar is a strong motivator for judges. No one gives them a bonus for not agreeing to put innocent people in prison, but they are well-regarded for getting bodies off their docket. 

If the judges who we turn to in our hard-fought effort to get the one in a hundred, maybe a thousand, ruling that might save a life are engaged in the plea bargaining process, then we reveal a soft underbelly in advance.  If we’re actively interested in a plea, how then can we authoritatively argue that the same person is innocent, or even less guilty than the prosecution suggests? 

While there are most assuredly lawyers who want only a plea, and they want it now so they too can clear their overwhelmed calendar or save themselves from another appearance for which there will be no additional compensation, should we reinvent the system for their benefit?

But if her trust the judges idea doesn’t pan out, Klein has a plan B:


A second proposal is for the Department of Justice and local District Attorneys’ Offices to implement internal guidelines to regulate the timing and content of plea negotiations and discovery procedures. Though the Court imposed its new Sixth Amendment duties on the defense bar, it is prosecutors who have the incentive to ensure the finality of guilty pleas and to stave off potentially harsher legislative or judicial action in this area.
Trust the prosecutors. After all, they don’t want bad pleas to drive “potentially harsher legislation,” since legislators and judges are deeply concerned with whether plea bargains, once accepted, are improper because of defense counsel’s ineffective assistance.  And like judges, prosecutors are smart, honest and fair, if properly motivated.

What is striking is that Susan Klein has essentially wiped the role of criminal defense lawyers out of the process, as they are the ones providing “substandard counsel” who have put innocent defendants in prison. She contends there is no point in expecting defense lawyers to do their job, or to get legislatures to properly fund indigent defense, or to get judges to formulate a more viable standard for ineffective assistance than Strickland v. Washington.  Mind you, those would be the same judges who can be entrusted with overseeing plea bargaining to assure that innocent defendants don’t cop out.

But Klein’s premise is wrong. It is an adversary system. It is a deeply flawed system, but it is and must remain adversarial.  Even plea bargains, the blight that they are, rely on its being an adversarial system, for there is no incentive to offer a defendant a reasonable plea if there is no meaningful threat of trial and possible acquittal.

But what of all those defendants, real or imagined, who get railroaded into guilty pleas when they are innocent or overcharged?  Consider that the forces that push people to do this, whether as lawyers or defendants, are under the control of prosecutors and judges. They are causing the problems that Klein seeks to fix by overcharging, concealing Brady, knee-jerk denials, knee-jerk crediting police testimony, cattle call calendars, ever-increasing criminalization, ever-increasing sentences. And the list goes on. 

And yet she thinks the solution is to put even greater trust in the fairness and integrity of judges and prosecutors?  Pass.

Or as my pal  Charon QC might put lawprof Susan Klein’s quest to save plea bargaining:






District Attorneys Learn to Lose

A letter to the editor appeared in the  New York Times from former New York County District Attorney, Robert M. Morgenthau. Morgy is old now, and out of office, but in his day he was the most powerful politician in New York.  Not up front, giving speeches or kissing babies, but a word from Morgenthau could change the political landscape. 

And now, he wrote a letter to the editor, not to extol the virtues of the system he carried for decades, but to complain of its failure.  This is an extraordinary thing.

On Tuesday [May 28th], the United States Supreme Court declined the opportunity to correct an egregious Brady violation that put William E. Kuenzel on Alabama’s death row 25 years ago.

Mr. Kuenzel was convicted in 1988 of killing a convenience store clerk. During the trial, the prosecutors assured Mr. Kuenzel’s lawyer that, in accordance with the Brady rule, they had turned over all potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense.

Twenty-two years passed before Mr. Kuenzel discovered that the prosecutors had concealed revealing police notes and grand jury testimony that supported his unwavering claim of innocence.

A brief description of the Brady violation follows. A rather pedestrian concealment of details that would have given Kuenzel the tools to fight the charges. There was no DNA to scientifically prove anything, but a basic Brady violation.


Mr. Kuenzel asked the Supreme Court for the chance to present this obvious Brady violation in federal court. The Supreme Court could have cut through the legal thicket of procedural impediments and held the state government accountable for flouting Brady.

But the court refused. As a result, the unthinkable consequence of the toothless Brady rule will be that an innocent man is executed and the prosecutor goes unpunished for his misconduct.

Remarkable words coming from a man who was DA for 34 years, and U.S Attorney before that.  Morgy was part of a trio who put their names to an amicus brief in support of certiorari, along with former Los Angeles DA Gil Garcetti and Milwaukee DA E. Michael McCann.  As they make clear up front, they are not people to be trifled with.


Indeed, one of those baby prosecutors Morgy trained who went on to serve in a judicial capacity was none other than Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Of course, there was no need to mention this detail, and she knew where she came from.

They go on to concede the “truism that prosecutors’ offices and juries occasionally make mistakes, even if ever so rarely.” (My italics.)  And this case, the three former prosecutors contend, is that ever so rare mistake.

The gist of their amicus argument is that the procedurally-defaulted first-time habeas petitioner shouldn’t be saddled with the additional burden of Schlup v. Delo, presuming guilt and requiring him to show the probability of innocence before being entitled to a hearing.  They argue such a clarification of the burden will “ensure the fairness and accuracy of convictions,” and thus the integrity of convictions and imposition of the death penalty.

That a petition for cert by a death row inmate is denied is routine. That a petition with the support of Morgenthau, Garcetti and McCann as amicus is denied is ever so rare.  Claims of innocence by death row defendants with DNA to back them up have become something of the darling of innocence, having both the ability to meet the burden with scientific evidence that takes the burden off the courts. 

Even so, they don’t always succeed.  They still provide that painful glimpse into the working of a machine that convicts the innocent through the same ordinary, reliable methods that are adored by prosecutors, juries and judges, even though the ever so rare event that an innocent person is wrongfully convicted happens. It makes it increasingly hard to mouth the word integrity, knowing that in the absence of scientific evidence, there would be nothing to slow down the plunge of the needle.

The irony here, of course, is that when the sentence is death, even former prosecutors demonstrate an elevated concern for the integrity of the conviction.  Remember those 7,000,000 criminal proceeding for which these three former prosecutors are responsible? How many of those convicted innocent defendants?  There must be some, by their measure, even if mistakes are ever so rare.

Yet, no one can fault Morgenthau, Garcetti and McCann for signing on as amicus in support of William Kuenzel, who was convicted upon a failure of the “toothless Brady” and will now be put to death.  That they stood up for innocence, for Brady, is worthy of respect.

And now these three former District Attorneys know what it feels like to be a criminal defense lawyer, when despite their power, their bona fides, their more than 100 years of combined prosecutorial experience, the Supreme Court denied the petition without a word.  Perhaps Morgenthau trained his prosecutors too well.

Capped Guns, Cap Guns, Guns

After the recent spate of stories about grade schoolers violating zero tolerance policies with lego guns, pastry guns, itty-bitty sized guns, a  Hello Kitty gun that blows bubbles and unloaded fingers pointed in a gun-like shape, there is relatively unanimous agreement that this reflects a inane over-reaction to gun violence in schools, with the notable exception of school administrators.

But is there a line to be drawn below that of actual weapons?  It’s easy to ridicule the utterly absurd application of these zero tolerance rules as applied to pop tarts, but what about a toy gun that wasn’t created by teeth?  Via The Washington Post :

A kindergartner who brought a cowboy-style cap gun onto his Calvert County school bus was suspended for 10 days after showing a friend the orange-tipped toy, which he had tucked inside his backpack on his way to school, according to his family and a lawyer.

The child was questioned for more than two hours before his mother was called, she said, adding that he uncharacteristically wet his pants during the episode. The boy is 5 — “all bugs and frogs and cowboys,” his mother said.

Many will find this similarly ridiculous, as it was just a toy, notably with the required orange tip so that no reasonably intelligent person would confuse it with a real gun.  When I was a child, playing cowboys and Indians (and cops and robbers, for that matter) was de rigueur for little boys. You may find this sexist (not to mention offensive to native Americans, two words that had yet to meet) and needlessly fostering the violent and aggressive tendencies of children, but that’s how it was. And we had loads of fun.

While everyone can agree that no child should bring a real gun to school, and all rational people can agree that any gun that will cease to be a gun with one additional bite isn’t a threat, what of the traditional American cap gun?

It doesn’t strike me as a good idea that parents allow their children to bring a toy gun to school under any circumstances, but failing to adhere to best practices should produce an explanation and seizure of the toy until the end of the school day, whereupon a reminder to parents that this isn’t really show-and-tell type material.  What, however, could school officials have been doing for two hours as they questioned this 5-year-old about his toy gun?

“I have no problem that he had a consequence to his behavior,” said the mother, who asked that her name be withheld to protect her son’s privacy.


“What I have a problem with is the severity,” she said, and the way it was handled.

Not only did this kindergartner endure a two-hour grilling, sufficiently stern that he peed in his pants, but he was suspended.


If the punishment stands, it would become part of the boy’s permanent school record and keep him out of classes the rest of the school year, the family said. He would miss his end-of-year kindergarten program at Dowell Elementary School in Lusby.

Is this to fulfill a needed general deterrent, that this child must be sacrificed so that others will fear the consequences of bringing a toy gun to school?  Not to harp on the obvious, but while such a reaction to a lego gun is ludicrous, does an actual toy gun mandate this response?

Yet, this response tells only a piece of the story, as this 5-year-old was “fortunate” that he brought only the gun, and not the red string of caps that make it really fun.


The mother said the principal told her that if the cap gun had been loaded with caps, it would have been deemed an explosive and police would have been called in.
Clearly, there are depths still to be plumbed when it comes to how zero the zero tolerance can be. It could be that a cap exploding would cause another child to fear, and the severity of wrongs are deemed exacerbated not only by conduct but by the sensitivities of those who experience it.  More likely, however, the screams for blood would come not from the child whose feelings might be affected, but from the parents who watched in horror as a real person did horrible things to real children.


The case comes at a time of heightened sensitivity about guns in schools across the country.

I get it. You get it. We all share the horror of real tragedies. Dr. SJ despises guns, and refused to allow me to give my son a toy gun to play with. So instead, he became a fencer and we had a half dozen swords in the house. That worked out well.

The question isn’t whether it’s wrong to be concerned about the welfare and safety of children, even though the risk of a crazed gunman shooting up a school remains minuscule.  The question is whether fear, blind emotion, dictates the creation and application of rules that work absurd results when we have the intellectual capacity to distinguish between real and imagined threats.

And the other question, of course, given our deep, abiding concern for the welfare of children, is why we are inflicting harm on 5-year-olds to vindicate unduly emotional adult fears. We have the capacity to think, and thus not engage in this insanity.  Do it for the children.

H/T Jonathan Turley