Much interest has been raised by the intersection of Donald Trump’s “complaint” about United States District Judge Gonzalo Curiel’s “bias,” and the efficacy of seeking the judge’s recusal not because there is any legitimacy to the bias argument itself, but that Trump’s making a stink about Judge Curiel’s heritage and associations creates a new level of antagonism. This, of course, gives rise to no legal basis to seek recusal.
There are two points to be made: first, that behaving like a jerk (whether you think Trump was racist or had a legit beef) cannot give rise to demanding recusal based upon the jerk behavior. Second, that there may well be actual antagonism as a result of such behavior, such that the judge is, in fact, biased against a litigant, doesn’t change the fact that it would be legally untenable to allow this to serve as a basis for recusal. After all, if that were allowed, anybody could create a rift with a judge they didn’t want by calling the judge a name, thus accomplishing by being offensive that which they couldn’t accomplish otherwise.
That the judge might now really hate the litigant because of his actions has nothing to do with it. And that’s how legal doctrine works, as it should.
So why then is it entirely different when the government seeks to separate a defendant from his lawyer? Say hi to the Curcio hearing, which was held after United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, prevailed in compelling two defense lawyers to appear before a grand jury to reveal their client’s confidences. Continue reading
