Author Archives: SHG

Will Bernie Be A Crip or Blood?

It would come as no surprise that news of Bernie Madoff being beaten to a pulp at FCC Butner won’t cause a lot of people to lose sleep.  There are a lot of people who remain very angry at Madoff, and a good shellacking is hardly a problem for them.  In fact, some might complain that Bernie’s broken nose was misguided, and the pain should have been felt in a lower portion of his anatomy.

Of course, this is part of the visceral anger toward someone whose crime has harmed so many.  Imprisonment isn’t supposed to include the occasional beating, nor worse.  Initially, the United States Bureau of Prisons claimed that Bernie wasn’t beaten.


Madoff is currently serving a 150-year sentence in Butner, N.C. On Dec. 18, Madoff was moved to the prison’s low-security medical center for treatment. At the time, the Bureau of Prisons said that rumors of an assault were false and that Madoff suffered from dizziness and hypertension.

But the Wall Street Journal says otherwise.



But that wasn’t the case, report Searcey and Efrati. According to an inmate at Butner, Madoff was treated for a broken nose, fractured ribs and cuts to his head and face. Another inmate who recently was released from Butner after serving time on drug charges also confirmed the assault, as did a third person familiar with Madoff’s situation.

The former inmate said the dispute centered on money the assailant thought he was owed by Mr. Madoff.
Not surprisingly, the BOP says that it “investigated” the incident, and Bernie denied that he was assaulted, ending the investigation.  It must have been one of those spontaneous broken noses.  Rare, but they do happen in prison on occasion.  As does denial of assaults, if one wants to survive the return to the population.

Since the BOP can’t protect Bernie Madoff, who will?  Crips? Bloods? White supremacists?  Forget for a moment that we’re talking about Bernie here, and consider what a lesser known prisoner experiences.  Granted, federal correctional facilities are renown as being safer than state and local facilities, but the point remains.  Prisons are not safe places.  It’s hard to rehabilitate people who are more concerned with making it through the day without being beaten or raped.  They tend to be preoccupied.  Safety in groups becomes an imperative when threatened, and survival requires a certain amount of loyalty to the group.

The argument about punishment tends to focus on length of imprisonment rather than the nature of the experience.  That this has happened to Bernie Madoff, regardless of whether your inclined to applaud the beating, abhor the beating or shrug your shoulders, isn’t the point.  Defendants are sentenced to terms of imprisonment, not imprisonment plus beatings and rapes.  It’s hardly “coddling” criminals to expect them to survive their sentence physically intact.  And it’s surely beneficial to have them return to society without a gang tattoo to show for their survival.

No matter how hard you squint your eyes and think happy thoughts, it doesn’t change the fact that prisons can be very dangerous places.  If that doesn’t bother you, it should.  And as judges blithely come up with how many months or years are needed to fulfill the purposes of 18 USC 3553(a), and inquire what facility a defendant would prefer, perhaps they should ask what gang they want to join so they know what color accessories to bring with them that will best match their needs for survival.

Suppressing the Good Faith Search

Over at Volokh Conspiracy, Orin Kerr has done (as of now) a six part series of posts about the why the Good Faith Exception should not apply to a search that is lawful at the time it’s performed but subsequently held to be unconstitutional.  The purpose of this series is to address the apparent conflict between the Supreme Court’s holdings in Herring, which Orin describes as a case with “language suggesting a broad approach to the good faith exception,” and Arizona v. Gant, which put the breaks on the common police practice of securing the defendant first, then performing a search incident after any potential threat is gone.

Before getting to Orin’s argument, a few words about the two cases giving rise to this mess are warranted.  Herring , which approved a search and seizure based upon a negligent error in a warrant database, was characterized as the Barney Fife exception to the warrant clause.  It would be funny, if it wasn’t held constitutional.  The bottom line is that there is no remedial benefit to the exclusionary rule when the error was negligent, so while there may be a 4th Amendment violation, there’s no remedy.  I am not a big fan of the Herring decision.

On the other hand, Arizona v. Gant ended the tyranny of Chimel, a decision that followed the rubric but forgot the rationale, or a search incident to arrest, though it left the door swinging open for an untethered evidentiary search, sans warrant, even though every conceivable basis for a warrantless search ceased to exist.  But we take wins where we find them, and this was a better decision than it could have been.

Orin explains that the Good Faith Exception is misunderstood primarily because the name suggests that it refers to the officer’s subjective good faith.


The error is one of labels:  “good faith.” Although the doctrine is called the “good faith exception,” that is a confusing label: The subjective good faith of the officer is actually irrelevant, as decisions from Leon to Herring have all emphasized. It’s more accurate to think of the so-called “good faith” exception as the “technicality” exception. The exception applies when the police violate the Fourth Amendment but the violation is a sort of technicality — the kind of violation for which exclusion would be an extravagant remedy.

Examples of such technical violations are minor defects in a warrant (Leon), knock-and-announce violations (Hudson), and reliance on negligent errors in a police database (Herring). These are minor, technical sorts of violations: Imposing the remedy of suppression is just too much given that the violation isn’t such a huge deal in the overall scheme of things. But the key is the nature of the violation, not the officer’s subjective state of mind.
So far, so good.  But the question that remains unanswered at this point is “why?”  This proves to be more difficult, and Orin goes into a Socratic Q&A to make his point.  Offering examples of subjective bad and good faith conduct by officers, and relying upon his assertion that subjective good faith is irrelevant as a given, he demonstrates that an officers desire or lack thereof to apply existing law creates logical conflicts if the Supremes determine otherwise during the pendency of the case.

While I agree completely with Orin’s outcome, I see two issues arising from his argument.  First, it presents a bit of a problem in court, since federal judges are funny about being presented with an argument, particularly one as prolix as this, that requires them to answer a lawyer’s rhetorical questions.  Second, putting aside an officer’s subjective good faith, searches that adhere to existing precedent at the time performed seem also to comply with objective good faith, and a subsequent change in law doesn’t change that.

Like Orin, the name “good faith exception” is problematic both from an application perspective as well as political perspective.  It attributes a positive characteristic to the cops (good faith) making the idea of punishing them for it seem improper, if not downright disingenuous.  Moreover, if the purpose of the exclusionary rule is limited to those situations where it serves only a deterrent purpose, and at the time of the search and seizure the cop’s conduct conforms with existing law, why would the law seek to deter compliance with precedent?

The better approach, at least from my perspective, is to cut loose the Herring rationale of pure deterrence in favor of reading the 4th Amendment as a right given the citizenry to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, and the exclusionary rule as the remedy due the people for a violation of that right.  The only issue then is whether the courts, yesterday, today or tomorrow, conclude that the 4th Amendment has been violated.  Return to the rule, that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, and tether any exceptions to the rationale giving rise to them, as opposed to sliding down the slippery slope of “it’s just a few baby steps away from lawful search and it makes the cops’ job so much easier.”

Until we stop considering the 4th Amendment only from the perspective of good cop/bad cop, which presupposes that there is some inherent authority to search and that any limitation is the exception rather than the rule, we’re going to struggle with reasons why adherence to bad law is wrong.  We’ve got a ton of bad law already, but it’s hard to blame cops for enjoying its fruits, and harder still to explain why the law would penalize cops for compliance with existing precedent.

The problem, of course, is that my view flies in the face of Herring, where the Supremes ignored the rights of the defendant in favor of limiting the exclusionary rule, and only remedy there is for a 4th Amendment violation, to those situations where the conduct was sufficiently deliberate that the exclusionary rule would serve as deterrent.  In other words, Orin’s approach could be applied given the state of the law, while mine would require a change in the law.  What else is new?

The Cutting Edge

In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.


George Orwell

Chatting with another criminal defense lawyer yesterday, one who has a decade on me in the trenches, we talked about the truth and what’s become of our fellow “gladiators”.  Between spin, sugar-coating and outright lying to avoid a harsh reality, deceit has become essentially a universal norm.  Despite our self-image as tough, hardened to the choices we make daily in the trenches, even criminal defense lawyers have come to cherish deceit in the name of getting along, ruffling no feathers, being liked, offending no one. 

Following a post here yesterday, a reader recommended it, twitting that it was “edgy”.  What made it edgy is that it was blunt and clear, no equivocation or apologies for saying what it was meant to say.  I asked my lawyer friend what happened to us, that makes it edgy to speak one’s mind without trying to soften the blow, or the point.  How did we reach the point that sugar-coating is the norm, and anything else is considered edgy, even harsh?

We’re not very good at hearing the unpleasant news that someone, somewhere, disagrees with us.  Whether it’s that someone doesn’t like us very much, or thinks we’re dead wrong, or merely disagrees, our new-found sensibilities demand that if we express it at all, and many wouldn’t even think of expressing an actual idea for fear that it would boomerang and shine a bad light on them, we are required to do so in a way that makes it palatable.  The idea of just saying so is outrageous. 

I’ve often called the slackoisie “teacups”, too fragile to hear anything critical without cracking into a million shards.  They love to hear how wonderful they are.  They can’t bear anything else.  But this trend isn’t just a slackoisie issue; it’s become increasingly pervasive.  The old maxim, if you can’t say something nice, don’t say anything at all, was taught to every child when engaging in polite conversation.  It was not, however, meant to spell the end of honesty when engaging in substantive commentary on issues of significance.  It was to avoid creating an awkward moment at the tea party.

While dealing with comments in the post yesterday, the two subjects of the post, Jason Falls and Tamar Weinberg, complained that I was being unfair to them.  The issue at hand was whether bloggers owed PR people, who approached them with unsolicited pitches, a duty to be nice and polite to them.  I thought not.  They disagreed, but their complaint was that I was too harsh on them, that  we should all play nice with each other.  Their comments were couched in dulcet tones of peace and reconciliation.  Mine not so much.

The conciliatory words in the comments here belied the truth exposed on twitter.  After Falls issued a call to arms to the PR crowd, one responded by twitting :


That’s rich! @ScottGreenfield (A LAWYER!) is questioning the morals & ethics of @Tamar & @JasonFalls on PRs vs Bloggers
Put aside that he completely missed the point of the post, which wasn’t about morals or ethics, since it’s not like PR people can be expected to easily follow language, and note that his thrust was A LAWYER would question a PR person.  Hah!  But then, it’s not like Jason or Tamar have any say over what their followers think, and the mere twit by a third party in no way suggests their agreement.

On the other hand, Tamar’s responsive twit thanked him for the laugh.  Falls twitted back that he was Falls’ new hero.  The twitterer may be a moron, but at least he had the guts to talk straight.  Tamar and Falls, unfortunately, was revealed as cowards and liars.  Though I never questioned their morals and ethics, their own words belied their deceit.  If they hate lawyers, have the guts to say so.  If they want to call me a “twat”, then do it.  But neither had the guts to say what they meant here.  It was all sugar-coated nonsense, concealing what they really thought.

One of the reasons I began Simple Justice was as a vehicle to express ideas.  Not to make anyone love me (or even like me, as the case might be), to “engage” with anyone, to entice potential clients to hire me.  This is about straight talk, even if it means that someone’s feelings are hurt.  It’s not for the purpose of hurting feelings, but for the purpose of speaking the truth as I see it.  Your mileage may differ.  If you find unvarnished commentary too harsh for your sensitive eyes, then this is not the blawg for you.

But if you want to speak out, whether it’s in agreement with me or disagreement, don’t lie.  Don’t feign being conciliatory when you mean something else.  And if I find out that you’re lying, expect me to call you on it.  It was my opinion that Tamar Weinberg and Jason Falls were totally wrong, but I had no reason to question their honesty.  Now, they’ve made it clear that they weren’t being honest.  They might call it being “respectful”.  I call it being deceitful.  Tell the truth, whatever that truth is to you.  It would have been a far more interesting discussion had they told the truth.

And if you can’t take the truth, then shield your eyes, avert your gaze, look elsewhere for something to read.  You will most assuredly find Simple Justice way too edgy.  And don’t urge me to join you on the shelf with the other teacups.

H/T Seth Godin, for the Orwell quote (irony duly noted).

Advice Between Friends

Murray Richmond is the last of the old-time gunslingers.  Back in the days when criminal defense lawyers were divided up as “trial guys” and “law guys,” Murray was the epitome of the trial guy.  I’ve known him for more than a generation, and learned things from Murray that could not have been learned from anyone else.  It’s not that he’s the perfect lawyer; no one is.  But there are some things Murray does better than anyone else.

Over a half century of lawyering in the Bronx, you make a lot of friends (and enemies), and one of the friends he made was Efrain González, a former state senator who found himself on the wrong end of a federal indictment.  Without a pot to piss in, González turned to his dear friend Murray.  That’s where things turned ugly, according to the New York Times.


“Are you pleading guilty to each of these crimes because you are guilty?” the judge asked.

“Yes, your honor,” Mr. González replied.

Asked whether he was satisfied with his lawyer, Mr. González said he was.

But Mr. González later decided that he was neither guilty nor happy with the work of his lawyer, Murray Richman, his close friend for more than 40 years.

After obtaining new counsel, González moved to vacate his guilty plea.  He wanted to go to trial.


Mr. González, 61, who is free on bond, declined to comment through his new lawyer. But he said in an affidavit in support of withdrawing the plea that although he “never wavered” in his desire to prove his innocence, “it was obvious to me that Mr. Richman seemed wholly uninterested in trial preparation, wanted me to plead guilty and was pressuring me to produce this outcome.”

To appreciate the significance, both of the claim and the conflict, you would need to know that there is probably no lawyer in New York City more willing, no, thrilled, to go to trial than Murray.  Murray loves a trial.  Sure, he appreciates a good disposition as much as the next guy, but Murray would never shy away from trial.  It’s his sustenance after 50 years in the well.  Murray can quote every half applicable bible verse on summation from memory, and there isn’t a trick on cross he hasn’t pulled.  Murray loves trial.

But that’s Murray, the gunslinger.  This was Murray, the friend.  Murray defended González gratis, and Murray is more of a capitalist than me.


He agrees that not charging his clients can be especially problematic. He even has a display in his office with one of his favorite sayings, “Three things work for nothing: a mule, a tool and a fool.” But he has been known to violate that maxim where friends are involved.

For Murray to handle a case without fee, especially that of a former senator (meaning that González had nothing to offer, his day in power over), it must have been friendship.  Murray has relished the nickname “Don’t Worry Murray,” along with his collection of screaming loud ties, over the years.  But when it comes to friends, lawyers worry. 


Mr. Richman explained to the judge that their disagreement centered on how they viewed the evidence. Mr. González felt it proved his innocence, Mr. Richman said, adding, “I am of the opinion that, frankly speaking, that it does not.”
In other circumstances, the lawyer would likely take a long, hard look at his client and tell him, it’s your life.  I will fight my heart out for you, but I think you’re going to lose.  I think you’re dead wrong.  The call is yours.  This comes from honesty combined with the detached perspective of the case that a lawyer brings, and is supposed to bring, to the case.  Friends aren’t detached.  Friends want friends to do what’s best for them.  No longer is the lawyer detached, but a participant in the decision making process, even if it means overcoming the defendant’s decision making authority when it comes to the rest of his life.

Almost any criminal defense lawyer would be there for a friend.  Most won’t charge a friend, money almost always being a complicating factor, even when they happily offer to pay.  We just want to help. 

There’s a lesson here, naturally.  Some might attribute what happened here to money, to González’s fear that Murray’s advice was tainted by the lack of a payment to take the case to trial, to spend the time necessary to prepare and lose that time to paying customers.  It doesn’t seem likely to me, Murray having made a ton of money in his career and being at an age where the marginal dollar doesn’t mean very much in his life.

It strikes me that the conflict arose from familiarity and the lack of detachment.  From González’s perspective, Murray was a friend who happened to be a gunslinging criminal defense lawyer, and his familiarity with his buddy Murray caused him to discount Murray’s advice.  From Murray’s perspective, he wanted what he believed to be the best outcome for his buddy González, and pushed it beyond the limits that would ordinarily constrain a detached lawyer. 

It’s a problem to represent a friend.  And yet, how could you say no to a friend in need?

H/T Andrew Bluestone

PR to Bloggers: You’re Ugly and You Dress Funny, You Idiots

About a week or two after you start a blawg, you start receiving emails from public relations people.  They announce important things, like the law firm of Smith & Smith has finally gotten a retained case, or just purchased a new scanner, and ask you to write about it because they are sure that your readers will be fascinated.  You delete the emails, but the PR people just keep sending them, often the same ones with a note attached that they didn’t see your post on this critical news to the legal community and you’re not doing your job.

There are plenty of permutations on this theme, from announcing the new movie on William Kunstler (but no offer to provide a copy for review) to a symposium on the fertile octogenarian rule (but no offer to attend).  What they want is simple: Promote their stuff.  They get paid by somebody to try to interest you in whatever they’re selling.  There’s nothing in it for you, but that’s what they do for a living.

It’s been interesting to follow the efforts of the PR gang in attempting to coax me into becoming a cog in their marketing wheel.  I marvel at the chutzpah, that my purpose (as far as they’re concerned) is to be their free advertiser.  What I neglected to give sufficient consideration to is how they feel about the subject.  Two posts from publicists have changed all that, and I now correct my misguided understanding.

At Social Media Explorer, Jason Falls posts about What Bloggers Should Know About PR and Advertising.


I was dumbfounded when I read a recent New York Times article about mommy bloggers that indicated a conference session topic at an event called Bloggy Bootcamp was how to let public relations firms know you don’t work for free. A few months ago, I reached out to a prominent mommy blogger on Twitter to let her know that I had a client whose products she might be interested in – not a pitch, just a light toss that indicated I may pitch her down the road. She responded by saying, “I’ll be happy to work with your client. My fee is $125 per hour.” I was stunned.

It seems that some bloggers (not just the mommy kind) have a vast misunderstanding of what public relations professionals are supposed to do or be used for. It also seems that some think receiving a pitch for a product somehow entitles them to call themselves consultants and charge hourly rates to someone else for writing content for their own website. Far be it from me to criticize a blogger’s ability to make money, but these attitudes deeply concern me. While the media landscape is evolving to account for new media roles, blogger ignorance to how traditional communications and marketing works may forever ruin the notion of an unbiased media.

Do you think that Jason, maybe, missed the point entirely?  Is it possible that the mommy blogger wasn’t really trying to get paid, as much as send a message that her blog doesn’t exist so that Jason can get his client, for which Jason is getting a fee, some free publicity?  Nah.  Bloggers are ignorant.  It can’t be the myopia of self-serving public relations people.  After all, they are professionals, and the mommy blogger is just, well, a mommy. 

He goes on to acknowledge that bloggers are under “no obligation” to go along with their pitches (very kind of him to say so), but they are obliged to treat public relations people like the “professionals” they are.  After all, what possible reason would a blogger, receiving an unsolicited pitch from an unknown flak seeking to get some free publicity for their paying client on some nonsense issue have in not owing the flak a duty of being nice to them?  Bloggers.  What a bunch of dolts.

And then we have Tamar Weinberg at Techipedia who has graciously provided a Miss Manners-type resource for blogger etiquette.  No, Tamar is not a blogger, but a public relations person who, no doubt as a public service, created rules for bloggers to be nicer to public relations people.  She explains the purpose of her rules, oh the pain of being a professional PR person forced to deal with those evil, nasty bloggers.



What if you were involved in the task of blogger outreach? Let’s say you worked with a client to give away a freebie to readers of specific blogs. The client approves the pitch, which you targeted to the blogger, and you send it off to the chosen bloggers.

Now let’s assume one of the bloggers responds with, “I have read your email carefully and it would appear that you have omitted the part where you request my advertising rate card.”

(Yes, forget about organic promotion. The money is where it’s at for some bloggers, and story tips or ideas are unwanted. I bet you’d wonder what the FTC would say, especially given that this particular blogger has a disclaimer stating that they will never post sponsored or content where money exchanges hands.)

Instead, you decide to clarify your specific role in this initiative. You say, “this is merely a story idea as there’s no advertising budget. Would you like to run with the story?”

The blogger responds with something that goes along the lines of, “they could pay you to email me, maybe they should pay me to blog about it.”

They then write two nasty tweets about a poor approach that they likely thought you never saw.
Tamar is so right.  I never thought about it that way.  They’re just trying to make a living, pitching their client’s promotional stories just in case we’ve got nothing else to write about.  Is that so bad?  Why do we take offense at their efforts to turn our blog into their promotion machine? 

Seriously, they are right to some extent.  Blog and you’re going to get pitched, for stories, products, whatever.  To the extent you have readers, other people want to get their message before them, and that’s how they roll.  If you’re not interested, there’s always the delete button.  The PR people know that it’s a shot in the dark that you’re going to take them up on their offer, and that’s the nature of their job.

But this, like most things, is a two-way street.  When some PR firm decides to target you, it may well result in a dozen emails a day for things that hold no interest whatsoever.  And the emails inform you that you are receiving them because you requested them, shifting the burden to you to “unsubscribe”.  A wee bit disingenuous?  Then there are the ones that want you to promote a product or the movie, but don’t want to let you use the product or see the movie.  A wee bit disingenuous?

Then there are the overly aggressive flaks, who email over and over because “you didn’t respond to my last email,” until you get the email telling you what a jerk you are for not showing them the respect of responding. 

The problem with PR people demanding respect in return is that nobody asked for them in the first place.   They assume, as one would expect from a job (no, it’s not a profession) demanding thick skin and facile rationales, that they are doing the blogger a favor.  As both Tamar and Jason argue, bloggers are going to need them one day.  Don’t be too sure of that.  You may be giving yourselves way too much credit.  Somehow, I suspect I’ll manage just fine without you.  When you show up unwanted and unneeded, you really don’t get to demand much of anything.

Bloggers don’t really expect you to pay them to promote your wares.  Jason said he was “stunned” by the mommy blogger.  He apparently stuns easily.  Rather, bloggers are trying to make it clear that they are not your freebie promoters, and they are not interested in being your freebie promoters.  It’s not that they might be against the idea of making a little pocket change on their blogs, and yes, we are all aware of the FTC rules and are happy to comply (do you really think nobody knows anything about anything except you?), but we similarly know that you’re trolling for free publicity.  For somebody who thinks they are a “professional” in sending messages, you’re not very good at receiving them.

I’m just trying to be friendly and helpful, in a Miss Manners type of way.

18-B Lawyers Ready For Battle

The New York Law Journal reports that the City’s 18-B lawyers aren’t going down without a fight.



[A] joint resolution issued by five county bar associations last week raised legal issues that could provide ammunition to 18-B lawyers should they sue to block the plan and raised the possibility that the bar groups themselves might sue.

The resolution expressed sympathy for the plight of the city’s 1,100 18-B lawyers, saying the proposed change would make “an immediate and far reaching overhaul” in the system for representing indigent criminal defendants by “virtually eliminating” the work of 18-B lawyers.

The resolution was approved by the New York County Lawyers’ Association and the Bronx County, Brooklyn, Queens County and Richmond County bar associations.

The subject of 18-B, the representation of indigent defendants by private lawyers assigned by the court, has long been controversial for many reasons, last seen during the fight for reasonable compensation (now $75 per hour for felonies, $60 for misdemeanors).  Some are just awful lawyers incapable of maintaining a real private practice due to the inability to provide the level of representation and service that would enable them to get real clients.  Some are lawyers starting out who have yet to establish a reputation.  Some are lawyers who use 18-B to fill the gaps and down-time. 

It’s long been my position that 18-B should not be used as “welfare for lawyers,” where those who can’t maintain a viable practice believe they are entitled to earn a living off the backs of the indigent.  I would have a limitation on 18-B so that no lawyer can depend largely, or worse still entirely, on 18-B to survive.  But this is different.  This is the evisceration of 18-B, and with it, the end of the road for many lawyers who needed the added boost of 18-B revenue to make their nut and feed their kids.  These are people with real practices, real clients, real skills. These are real lawyers, and they will go down with the ship.

[Addendum: It has already been pointed out to me that the paragraph above might give the impression that 18-B lawyers are second-stringers. Some of the best criminal defense lawyers in New York are on the 18-B panel and take on 18-B assignments. I took this for granted, but thought it best to point this out lest anyone either misperceive my meaning or take offense.  The same, by the way, is true of lawyers who work for institutional defenders.  There are some great lawyers involved in each of these areas, and by no means do I suggest otherwise.]

Not having done 18-B work in more than 25 years, I’ve got no personal horse in this race.  Being a criminal defense lawyer, I do.  It might behoove me to watch from the sidelines as my brethren are crushed by the City’s desire to save money, itself a fair goal for the welfare of the taxpayers, which would mean less competition for the increasingly scarce animal of retained criminal cases.  But that’s not where I see my interests or the interests of the criminal defense bar.  I fear that this will give government far too much control over the criminal defense function, and I fear that those private criminal defense lawyers who remain will have insufficient clout to push back against the tide of law and order, the courts’ inherent presumption of regularity in the arrest and prosecution of individuals.

No doubt, the institutional defenders who will pick up the cases that were once served by 18-B lawyers will hate me for saying this, but the very real fear is that they won’t pick up the slack.  The 18-B lawyers were 17 times more likely to take a case to trial than the institutional defenders.  Seventeen times.  That’s a mind-blowing number.  And they can praise their lawyers to high heaven, puff out their chest as far as possible, dare the rest of the bar to call them names to their faces (no one wants to call them out, as they too are an important part of the defense side of the equation), but it won’t mean a thing to all those defendants who will never go to trial.  Seventeen times.  There’s no getting around that number.

They’ve put together a war chest of $100,000.  Whether there is a viable basis to challenge the City’s RFP to give almost all indigent defense work to institutional defenders remains unclear.  The money will go toward lobbying as well.  Whether it will work has yet to be seen, but they aren’t going down without a fight.  The continued existence of a viable private criminal defense bar depends on winning this fight.  

Real criminal defense lawyers know right from wrong, and don’t fear doing what’s right.  Real criminal defense lawyers have the guts to fight.  The five criminal defense bar associations for New York City have done themselves proud by standing up for the criminal defense bar.

It’s Not Punishment If It’s Regulatory

Via Doug Berman by way of Howard Bashman from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (whew), the Georgia Supreme Court upheld sex offender registration for people convicted of non-sex related offenses in Rainer v. Georgia.


Writing for a 5-2 majority, Justice Harold Melton rejected arguments that the provision, as applied to Rainer, was cruel and unusual punishment. Sex offender registry laws, Melton wrote, “are regulatory, not punitive, in nature.” “Because the registration requirements themselves do not constitute punishment, it is of no consequence whether or not one has committed an offense that is ‘sexual’ in nature before being required to register,” Melton wrote….

No consequence?  It’s likely of a great deal of consequence to anyone who’s required to comply with the SORA requirements, not to mention be held out to the world, and more importantly his neighbors, as a sex offender when he isn’t.

Once again, legal fiction overtakes reality.  By calling sex offender registration regulatory rather than punitive, the court was able to sidestep the issue and pretend that something which is patently punitive is benignly regulatory.  It’s a miracle, like calling a forfeiture civil and thus removing all the rights that go along with criminal sanctions. 

This detail did not go unnoticed in the dissent:



Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Carol Hunstein said that although registration as a sex offender may not be considered punishment, “it is no mere administrative formality or minor inconvenience.” Hunstein added that an offender who commits a sex crime while kidnapping or falsely imprisoning a victim “would clearly be covered” by other provisions of the registry law.
Unfortunately, the Chief Justice obviously lacked the ability to sway the majority and, perhaps in an effort to avoid being seen as overly brazen, was somewhat underwhelming in her criticism.  To say it is “no mere administrative formality” hardly clarifies the impact of being placed on a list of the most hated people in this nation, forbidden from living in most places, largely incapable of obtaining lawful employment, tainted for years if not life as someone to be reviled.  No mere inconvenience indeed.

The problem isn’t so much the legal analysis, as the willingness of courts to ignore the punitive aspect of legislation by defining down the obvious impact, or simply ignoring it altogether, and pigeon-holing laws to avoid acknowledging the punitive consequences.  Without regard to how one feels about real sex offenders, the point here is that the law swallows non-sex-offenders whole, reducing whatever rationale existed for its inception to a farce.  If they aren’t “really” sex offenders, than what justification is there for including them on a sex-offender registry?  Instead, the court considers the law from the far side, where it concludes that since inclusion in the registry is “merely regulatory,” it need not consider whether the rationale justifies the rubric.

Should this trend continue, and states come to realize that they can get plenty of mileage out of increasing the inclusion of people convicted of general crimes in sex offender registries, this could be the growth segment of political grandstanding for the future.  After all, so what if jaywalkers are included in the sex offender registry.  It’s only regulatory.

Hanging At The Spamalot General Store (LOLCat Update)

Come on by.  Play checkers.  Have a nice cold cola, and enjoy life in Spamalot.  Despite my annoyance at the first thousand spam comments received from “just people” who are trying to game Google by getting backlinks at my expense, I’ve come to appreciate the next thousand, most of which you haven’t seen as I’ve not let them make it to the screen.

It’s quite the fascinating study, seeing what the nice folks who are trying to sell you everything from diet pills to SEO to electrician services in Bismark have to say.  Some put in quite a bit of effort to their comments, clearly having read the posts and trying desperately to offer enough to the conversation to make it past my scrutiny.  Others, of course, insert links to dog grooming services.  Still others think they’ll make it past the guard house with comments like “nice post,” or “I agree” or “this is so interesting.”

What I’ve learned from this experience is two things.  First, the sheer numbers of people who are trying to game the system, get their business on page 1, make a living off the internet by doing anything they have to do, is unbelievable.  They’ve been coming at me in numbers that blow my mind, and they’re still coming.  Waves of them.  A Tsunami of them.  A lot of people.

Second is that even when they try, they are running on empty.  Their best efforts at trying to get a comment with staying power are just absolutely awful.  It’s not just that their ideas are worthless, but that they don’t really have ideas.  Of course, it may be that this is a by-product of the fact that their real purpose is to spam me, to get me to allow them to comment so that they can get the backlink, but I suspect that the ones that write lengthy comments, with at least the appearance of effort, are actually doing their best to contribute to the conversation even as they try to get their backlink in there.  But they’re empty. 

I let one go (after deleting the backlink, natch) yesterday just because I was feeling generous and saw the amount of effort the spammer put into the comment.  And it sucked.

I still spend about an hour every morning cleaning up the mess that the spammers leave behind from the night before.  It’s a monumental waste of my time, and it interferes with my posting.  It was my hope that after a few thousand comments deleted, they would get the message and go elsewhere.  I thought they would realize that they are not welcome here, and that their time was wasted since I wasn’t going to let them get the link love they crave.  And still they come.

This crazy thing called the internet is filled with these people, hoping desperately that you, and I, will succumb to their charms and pay them money for eyebrow braiding, or whatever it is they have to sell.  Next time you click on a link on page 1 of Google, say hi to them for me.  They are the folks hanging out at the Spamalot general store. 



From the mind of Amy Derby

Let’s Play “Where’s The Flaw?”

Michael Seringhaus, a student at Yale Law School, had an op-ed in the New York Times that bugged the heck out of me.  He advocates for a national DNA database, as President Obama appeared to support during his appearance on John Walsh’s America’s Most Wanted television gameshow.


In truth, however, this is an issue where both sides are partly right. The president was correct in saying that we need a more robust DNA database, available to law enforcement in every state, to “continue to tighten the grip around folks who have perpetrated these crimes.” But critics have a point that genetic police work, like the sampling of arrestees, is fraught with bias. A better solution: to keep every American’s DNA profile on file.

Like many others, I have my laundry list of reasons why this is a bad idea at the ready.  But Seringhaus didn’t come unprepared.



Your sensitive genetic information would be safe. A DNA profile distills a person’s complex genomic information down to a set of 26 numerical values, each characterizing the length of a certain repeated sequence of “junk” DNA that differs from person to person. Although these genetic differences are biologically meaningless — they don’t correlate with any observable characteristics — tabulating the number of repeats creates a unique identifier, a DNA “fingerprint.”

The genetic privacy risk from such profiling is virtually nil, because these records include none of the health and biological data present in one’s genome as a whole. Aside from the ability in some cases to determine whether two individuals are closely related, DNA profiles have nothing sensitive to disclose.

Is this true?  If the DNA database was limited to genetic profiles, would it eliminate all personal information risks and limit the information to which the government has access to matching the identity of a person?  Seriously, I don’t know.

My problem is that if Seringhaus is correct, then my arguments against the creation of a nationwide DNA database fail.  Sure, there’s the genetic Big Brother position, but we’ve already lost that battle with social security numbers and the wealth of other information we regularly provide the government about ourselves in order to keep the monster well fed and happy.

There is no right to commit a crime and demand that the government not be able to identify the criminal.  We leave our DNA all over the place, so it’s not like we’re giving up some deep, dark, personal secret.  If the information in the government’s hands does no more than provide a basis for personal identification, without giving up the private aspects of our being contained in our DNA, then I’m having some difficulty in finding a decent argument against this.  It’s not that I’m for it, but in arguing against it, am I shooting blanks?

This doesn’t alter the flaws that otherwise exist with DNA identification, from partial or decayed DNA to the grossly exaggerated claims of one in a trillion chance of it being wrong when the real number is more like one in twelve.  But these, as courts love to say, go to weight and sufficiency.

What am I missing here?  If there’s a flaw, I’m not seeing it.  And I want to.

Seizing Emails, 36 Ways To Lose

Despite my admiration for Orin Kerr’s mix of scholarship and practicality, one area where I disagree strongly with him is his “technology neutral” approach to search and seizure, where he essentially seeks to apply the law developed over the years to deal with brick and mortar, car chases and snail mail, to the digital world by analogy. 

Dealing with search and seizure in the digital age is one of Orin’s primary areas of scholarship, and (unfortunately, to the extent he disagrees with me) his thoughts carry far more weight than mine.  It’s a problem if we have any hope that the disastrous development of 4th Amendment law over the past century, you know, where the courts have developed a half dozen exceptions to every platitude about our being secure in our persons and effects so that pretty much every warrantless search is okey-dokey, won’t serve as our baseline for the future.

Case in point, Orin writes about an 11th Circuit decision last week, Rehberg v. Paulk :


The Eleventh Circuit held that constitutional protection in stored copies of e-mail held by third parties disappears as soon as any copy of the communication is delivered.    Under this new decision, if the government wants get your e-mails, the Fourth Amendment lets the government go to your ISP, wait the seconds it normally takes for the e-mail to be delivered, and then run off copies of your messages.

Orin strongly disagrees with the decision.  Not, mind you, because emails are the techno equivalent of what we would like to believe is a private communication, but because of the rationale employed.


I think the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is wrong. To see why, let’s start by considering Rehberg’s outgoing e-mails, which seem to be the focus of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. It is true that when information is disclosed to a third party, the Fourth Amendment no longer protects the information disclosed. That’s the teaching of Miller and Smith (and, for what it’s worth, and I think those teachings are correct). But when many copies of information are made, you have to treat different copies differently. As a result, the fact that one copy of the communication has been received does not mean that all copies lose Fourth Amendment protection.

Got a headache yet?  Can you imagine how far into the argument about how different copies of emails have to be treated differently before the judge said, “get to your point, counselor?”


For these reasons, the court should have analyzed access to the e-mails stored with the ISP based on whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in that remotely stored copy accessed, independently of delivery of another copy. Given that we’re only at the 12(b)(6) stage, and we don’t yet know all the facts, I don’t think we have any basis to conclude that Rehberg did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mails obtained.
Orin then goes into the alternative rationales, however, that would allow the same result under different theories, not that he necessarily agrees with them but that there are numerous approaches to emails that have been employed by the courts, all of which end up with the same result.  The government gets them, provided they serve the right paper to the right party.  His points are highly nuanced and not easily captured in brief here.  Read Orin’s post if you want to have a firm handle on his arguments, as I’ve done a poor job of explaining them, and despite my good intentions, can’t figure out a better way without incorporating his entire post into this one.

All of these legal shenanigans are caused by the fortuitous mechanics of our digital life, that my email to you goes through something called an ISP, that has something called a server, where my email is stored along with a gazillion other emails both between sending and receiving and afterward.  Even though in my dinosaur brain, the email is between the two of us, the reality is that it’s between and us and my ISP as well.  If you have a different ISP, then we’ve got another intermediary and another server involved.  According to how our ISPs work, there could be more intermediaries that we don’t know anything about. 

There is a bottom line question to all of this, ignored almost entirely by the elegant, sophisticated and, in my view, ultimately irrelevant arguments made in trying to jam the round email peg into the square search and seizure hole.  Should any of the mechanics of email transmission have anything whatsoever to do with our right to be secure in our persons and effects? 

We’ve been offered a plethora of new techie means of communicating, and particularly problematic is that the means by which they fly through the air changes hourly, rendering any court decision based upon the particular means employed outdated by the time the hard copy opinion is issued.  But none of this is floating through our heads as we hunt and peck our email, of DM, or whatever means of seemingly private communication is devised tomorrow.  We believe that our communications are private.  We want to believe this.  We are, unfortunately, gravely wrong to believe this.

Throughout Orin’s post, he analogizes his theory to real world application, such as the arguments applicable to snail mail.  Given how technology has changed the behind the scenes mechanics, we will ultimately, and invariably, lose the battle for privacy.  There will always be a ton of other people’s fingers in our communications pie going forward, and to the extent that we perceive our communication as existing only on our little computer and our recipients, it will never be so again. 

Indeed, given the nature of digital communications, there could be a million copies of every email we send floating around servers all over the world, and we would never really know it.  Is it hard to imagine the government getting our friendly neighborhood ISP to route everything through a server in Latvia so that it can access anything it wants over there?  On a less conspiratorial note, if a mere subpoena is all that’s needed for the government to get its hands on our communications in the hands of third parties,

Here’s the point: Given that emails and other electronic communications are our future, and given that the means by which they are transmitted will never eliminate the involvement of third parties and the maintenance of copies on somebody’s equipment somewhere, are we satisfied to be arguing over the arrangement of deck chairs on the Titanic (see, I can use analogies too)?  Unless we develop a brand new approach to the future of communications, that does not rely on hard copy precedent and recognizes that people want to have a secure means of communication available to them in the future (and the future is a very long time), we’re watching the death of privacy in our own communications happen before our eyes.

This does not meet my reasonable expectation of privacy.  We need to rethink the approach, start to finish, to deal with the digital world and whether we will have any privacy whatsoever in our future communications.  How about a simple new rule: Emails are private communications and require a warrant upon probable cause as determined by a neutral magistrate?  Who cares about ISPs and servers, multiple copies stored on servers worldwide.  We are people, not merely the end of technological pipelines.