Author Archives: SHG

Learned Hand Doesn’t Twit

It was only a matter of time before someone would add two and two and come up with 37.  It’s part of the devolutionary process, striving to reach the lowest common denominator because the voices inside your head tell you it’s the way to go.  And so came the title of this post by Rachel Humphrey Fleet, a Seattle lawyer who attended Avvocating, Advanced Online Marketing Training for Lawyers.  The title is Tweeting the Judge: How Legal Writing is Like Social Media.

Fleet paid attention to what was said, a reminder of how dangerous a little information can be:



I signed up because I find marketing mysterious enough, but when you throw in terms like Search Engine Optimization, Core Web Presence, Organic Search, and Click-Through Rate, I want to crawl back into bed.  Two overarching threads of advice emerged at the conference:


1.  Be authentic.


2.  Engage in a conversation.


This made me feel better. I can do these things.
In plain language, this means to “be yourself” and have a conversation.  She went to a conference to learn this.  She then had an epiphany: “it struck me:  I do these things when I write a brief.”

The rest of Fleet’s post offers some decent thoughts, neither particularly controversial nor novel, about brief writing.  What’s interesting is that she’s conflated separate concepts to place herself clearly on the slippery slope.  From there, it’s all downhill.

There’s no mystery as to how this happened.  The same characteristics that make one persuasive in a brief, or before a jury for that matter, work in social media as well.  But that doesn’t mean that social media and legal writing are, or should be, the same, or that twitting your argument home will win the day.

Now that someone has attempted to breach the gap between legal writing and social media, let me say this as clearly as humanly possible.  They are not the same.  They should not be the same.  If you think they are the same, or try to treat them the same, your client will pay dearly for your insouciance.  Judges don’t want to twit with you, and won’t take kindly to your attempt to twit to them via your brief.

To clear up any confusion that may linger, the underlying ideas that Fleet promotes, authenticity and engagement, are crucial to all communication, regardless of whether it’s technology’s flavor of the day or legal argument.  We’ve often discussed that attempts to adopt the personas that work for others, but which just don’t fit us, invariably fail.  We need to be ourselves, to find the methods that work for us, and then use them to the best of our abilities.  This isn’t anything new.

But the mere fact that these characteristics apply across the board has nothing whatsoever to do with confusing social media with appellate briefing, or any other aspect of lawyering.  Let’s put an end to this nonsense immediately, before the Slackoisie get all excited and start requesting that they be allowed to submit their motions via Facebook.

So be authentic.  Engage in a conversation.  And never, but never, confuse twitting with your legal briefs. 

H/T Venkat

No Secrets Between Friends

That technology has fundamentally altered the means of communication is too obvious for words.  Chatting with your pal across the country is as easy as chatting with your pal in the same room, whether via email, cellphone, instant message, twitter, whatever.  But the miracle may soon die at the hands of police, unless you’re cool with the end of privacy.

Via CNET,


Anyone with an e-mail account likely knows that police can peek inside it if they have a paper search warrant.

But cybercrime investigators are frustrated by the speed of traditional methods of faxing, mailing, or e-mailing companies these documents. They’re pushing for the creation of a national Web interface linking police computers with those of Internet and e-mail providers so requests can be sent and received electronically.

All these communications.  All these juicy opportunities to gather information, maybe evidence, or just enjoy private conversations when business is slow around the precinct.  Law enforcement wants its own special backdoor where it can get anything it wants now, for the mere asking.

The explanation for why this is needed, and justified, requires no great stretch.  There are people out there doing bad stuff, and law enforcement needs access to it to protect us, and particularly our children, from these people.  Who would want to deny police access to information that might save a child?  No one wants to see a child harmed.

But the issue devolves to trust, and law enforcement has proven time and again that its “new professionalism” is a load of malarkey. They can’t be trusted.


But the most controversial element is probably the private Web interface, which raises novel security and privacy concerns, especially in the wake of a recent inspector general’s report (PDF) from the Justice Department. The 289-page report detailed how the FBI obtained Americans’ telephone records by citing nonexistent emergencies and simply asking for the data or writing phone numbers on a sticky note rather than following procedures required by law.

In an incendiary October 2009 essay, however, Kardasz wrote that Internet service providers that do not keep records long enough “are the unwitting facilitators of Internet crimes against children” and called for new laws to “mandate data preservation and reporting.” He predicts that those companies will begin to face civil lawsuits because of their “lethargic investigative process.”

“It sounds very dangerous,” says Lee Tien, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, referring to the police-only Web interface. “Let’s assume you set this sort of thing up. What does that mean in terms of what the law enforcement officer be able to do? Would they be able to fish through transactional information for anyone? I don’t understand how you create a system like this without it.”

Could it possibly come as a surprise to anyone that police “unanimously” would want unfettered access to electronic communications?  Why anyone would spend time or money to determine such a thing is beyond me.  Of course they do.  Of course they should.  The arguments in favor of it are clear and forceful, maybe even compelling.  That’s never been the issue.

There is a list, a very long list, of things that law enforcement would like in order to make it more effective in combating crime and identifying criminals.  Every door that blocks their view makes their job more difficult.  Every door that swings open upon command makes their job easier.  Can we stop wasting money to conduct surveys and issue reports about the obvious?

What no report or survey has yet to address is the fact that law enforcement just can’t control itself.  It can’t be trusted.  Every time they promise not to stick their nose in where it doesn’t belong, where they have no business being, they do it anyway.  They just can’t help themselves.

Sure, we want to catch child predators online.  Using children as the justification to gain access to everyone’s electronic communications is clearly their strongest position, since no one will ever argue that children aren’t worth protecting.  You can’t blame them for putting their best foot forward.  But we’ve heard that argument before.  We’ve heard it many times before.  It’s always about the children, hoping that no one notices the breadth and scope of application that includes everyone, from friends to celebrities to neighbors to former spouses. 

If the backdoor is built, and cries for its need are heard about every other year from law enforcement advocates who proclaims that electronic communications are thwarting their efforts to protect us and have become the weapon of choice from pedophiles to terrorists, then the miracle of modern communication will expose our every utterance.  Will we continue to use it knowing that there is no privacy? 

The bottom line is that no one can reasonably question the benefits of unfettered access by law enforcement to electronic communications, but similarly no one has come up with a way to assure that law enforcement won’t take advantage of its power and abuse it.  It always does.  This brings us back to the same old question, which this latest cry for access fails to acknowledge or address.  Are we willing to give up all privacy for the potential of safety? 

Either way, why bother with another report or study or survey.  We know the issues. We know the problems.  Eventually, law enforcement will time it just right so that their demand comes when we’re vulnerable, like a month after terrorists attack the World Trade Center, or a child is kidnapped, raped and murdered, and they will finally get their way.  That’s why they keep asking the same question, hoping that eventually, if the stars align, they’ll get their way.

H/T Ed at Blawgreview

Readers Mailbag, Scratching Chalkboard Edition

In the past, I’ve been  viciously attacked for my refusal to comply with the Rule of Twitter by using the word “twit” rather than “tweet” to describe 140 characters of meaningful thought noise.  It doesn’t bother me that some people adhere to rigidly to moronic protocol, and I’ve got no plans to start calling people “tweeple” or employ any other cute phrases encouraged by today’s technology flavor.

But then I received this email. 


I’ve been reading your blog for the past few days.  It was mentioned in another blog that I read.

Just in case you never hear this from anyone else, I’m writing to tell you that your intentional misspelling of “blog” is so distracting to me that I’m dropping your blog from my RSS reader.  

Intentional or not, accurate or not, that habit comes across to me as your attempt to belittle the idea of blogs in general.  Every time I see it in your postings, it makes me think that you would rather be doing something else – perhaps anything else – besides writing.  For me, it gets in the way of what you’re trying to say.

For whatever reason, it annoys me in the same way that chalk squeaking on a chalkboard does.  I’ll be[t] I’m not the only person who thinks that.

bkg

The email came from Brian K. Gray, Director of Technology, Mercersburg Academy in Pennsylvania.  He’s talking, of course, about my use of the word “blawg” as my chosen descriptor of law blogs.  He’s right that he’s not the only one who finds this unpalatable.  David Giacalone has never accepted it, and in fact refused to use the word “blog” either, insisting instead on using “weblog”, from whence the word blog derives.

My initial reaction was to agree that Brian should immediately absent himself from Simple Justice, and avoid the horror of reading the word “blawg”.  But, since Brian isn’t just your typical Slackoisie sycophant of trendiness or the lack thereof, holding a position of some importance at an educational institution, maybe he was on to something.

Not being a lawyer, and perhaps not being a regular reader of law blogs, perhaps Brian had yet to inure himself to our impious ways.  After all, the use of the word blawg has been common for many years amongst law blogs.  It appears in the names of some, and is a staple of the ever-fashionable ABA Journal.  It’s not like I invented the word.

I receive more than a few emails informing me of what I’m doing wrong at Simple Justice.  Individual readers, almost invariably dear friends complete strangers, offer their thoughts about how I should change my evil ways, upon pain of their never reading SJ again or, as in Brian’s case, about being removed from his RSS reader.  Clearly, it’s meant as a threat.  I ignore them at my peril.

After some deep contemplation, and being a person of generous spirit, I’ve decided that I shall no longer respond to these threats by telling them to bite me.  After all, it’s their right to not read Simple Justice, and I would be remiss to not honor their rights and heed their concerns.  On the other hand, I’m not inclined to alter my word choices, either for a particular word or against, because some person informs me that I either comply with his demand or the kitten gets it they will never read SJ again.

Accordingly, Brian Gray has spurred me to introduce a new policy.  If I use a word, whether regularly or even in a single instance, that bothers, annoys, troubles or disturbs you, such that you can no longer read Simple Justice without hearing the sound of chalk squeaking, I will refund the full amount you’ve paid to subscribe.  Fair enough?

If not, you can bite me.

A Hearing in Maricopa County

Lost in translation following Judge Gary Donahoe’s order that Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s disciple, Adam Stoddard, spend some paid time at the Mesa Hilton, was that the other fine court officers in Maricopa County came down with a mystery disease that prevented them from transporting prisoners to court.  Sickness can be so unpredictable.

The judges of Maricopa County, apparently, decided that they would no longer let the sheriff control their dockets.  From the Arizona Republic:


And a sheriff’s deputy chief, who last fall was held in contempt of court for the office’s failure to follow the law, will appear before a judge on Friday to answer nearly 200 new counts.


More than half the contempt citations stem from Dec. 2, 2009, when 19 court transportation and security officers called in sick. One day earlier, a colleague of theirs in the Sheriff’s Office was found in contempt and ordered to jail for refusing to apologize to a judge for going through an attorney’s case files. Sheriff’s officials have insisted the high volume of sick deputies was a coincidence.

This apparently goes far beyond the Stoddard sick out, and has been a perpetual problem in Maricopa County.

The Sheriff’s Office has struggled to get inmates in court on time since last summer, and a series of steps that court and sheriff’s administrators took to alleviate the strain has done little to help.

From Sept. 24, 2009, to Jan. 20, there were at least 198 incidents in which inmates were not brought to court on time or at all, and 19 Maricopa County Superior Court judicial officers filed paperwork to have sheriff’s Deputy Chief Dave Trombi, the person in charge of transporting inmates, held in contempt.


This has given rise to a hearing to be conducted in Yavapai County before Superior Court Judge Robert Brutinel.  Apparently, it was decided (by whom is unclear) that the judges of Maricopa County might be somewhat biased, and consequently the matter was sent out to be decided by an “impartial” judge.



Ordinarily, judges handle their own contempt cases. And contrary to most court hearings, the terminology “ordered to show cause why you should not be held in contempt” implies that the defendant must prove he is not guilty, instead of a prosecutor proving he is guilty.

Because these cases have been sent to a judge unfamiliar with the facts of the specific cases, Mundell has appointed Phoenix attorney Jeffrey Messing as a special prosecutor in the matter. Messing is a commercial litigator from the law firm Poli & Ball.
While it’s heartening to see that there’s anyone left in Maricopa County willing to take on Crazy Joe Arpaio on any subject, it’s frankly incredible that the sheriff’s failure to produce defendants for court requires that a hearing be staged outside Maricopa County to remove any allegations of taint or prejudice. 

Of course it’s prejudiced, since its derives from the contempt power which means that he starts from the position of being in violation of a court order.  For the Maricopa judges to give up their inherent authority to control their own courtrooms, even to the extent of having an outside judge pass on their contempt order, is almost laughable.  They can’t even handle their own contempts, for crying out loud.

Of course, given that the rest of the county personnel lives in fear of having Sheriff Joe’s starship troopers knock on their doors in the middle of the night, it appears that a crumb from a loaf is better than nothing.

H/T  Powell Gammill

The Hard Work of “White Collar” Legal Fees

Wayne State Lawprof Peter Henning wrote a piece for the New York Times DealBook on the fee “dispute” by R. Allen Stanford, left high and dry by the government, who now seeks to collect on a Lloyds of London insurance policy.  The policy would provide $100 million to cover his defense. 


Judge David Hittner has ruled in Federal District Court in Houston that under a company insurance policy Lloyd’s of London is responsible for paying up to nearly $100 million for the defense of Mr. Stanford and the other officers. While that should go a long way toward paying the legal fees of the defendants, don’t be surprised if the total legal bills exceed even that seemingly generous pool of money.

A generous pool of money indeed, but as Henning explains, it’s not an inexpensive type of case to defend.


White-collar crime prosecutions and related civil actions are enormously expensive to defend, and defense costs can reach the tens of millions of dollars fairly quickly. One reason is the complexity of the cases, which require defense lawyers to spend months digging through piles of documents while trying to interview dozens of witnesses. It is fairly common for cases to come to trial a year or more after the criminal indictment, and there are often dozens of pretrial motions that will have been briefed and argued in that time.

And white-collar trials are usually measured in weeks, if not months, and that only compounds the expenses. Mr. Stanford’s trial is set to begin in January 2011, and don’t be surprised if the trial requires three months (or more) to complete.


What Henning may not realize is that these “reasons” for the astoundingly high legal fees aren’t really that much different from the defense demanded in many criminal cases, white collar or otherwise, where the lawyers labor with equal if not more dedication, provide equal if not more services, and do so for a fraction of the fee.  And these aren’t inconsequential lawyers, but highly experience, highly dedicated, highly skilled criminal defense lawyers. 

Here’s the difference:


The lawyers who work high-profile white-collar cases come from some of the leading firms in New York, Washington and elsewhere, charging steep hourly rates — there are no contingent fees in criminal matters — and staffing them with a phalanx of partners, associates and paralegals. While it was almost unknown for leading Wall Street law firms to do criminal work 30 years ago, white-collar defense is now a major source of fees and one that appears to be largely immune to the recession that has hit the firms over the past two years. When was the last time you heard about layoffs in the white-collar department?

When Henning speaks of “leading firms,” what he means is white shoe firms. Big Law firms.   These are firms that can charge for five people doing the work of one, and getting away with it.  These are firms that can’t send out a one page fax for less than a grand.  Somebody has to pay for the marble waiting room. 

While I hate the characterization of “white collar,” as it evokes the image of plea negotiations over tea served in cups and saucers rather than hard-fighting to keep a defendant from going to prison, Henning is right that they almost invariably require an enormous amount of work, both mundane and sophisticated, to defend.  Missing from his description is that these cases, even if they don’t involve someone as notorious as Allen Stanford, suck up time and focus to the preclusion of other work. 

Take on the case and forget about being available for much of anything else for the next year or two.  They become your life.  They become your sole source of income.  If you’re not prepared for that, you’re going to be very unhappy (and hungry).

But that doesn’t mean that $100 million makes sense.  As the old joke goes, “I could have lost that case for half the amount.”  when news of the plea and 5K1.1 letter hit the papers.  It’s still an astronomical amount of money, and it’s still a criminal defense, no matter how many motions need be made. 

In many of these cases, defendants’ legal fees are indemnified by their corporate employers, with the begrudging help of insurers.  But that’s no panacea either.



Corporations are usually not very happy about paying to defend former officers accused of misconduct that has dragged the corporate brand through the mud. Often, such cases result in companies agreeing to a deferred or nonprosecution agreement for the ex-officers’ wrongdoing. And what insurer has ever jumped at the chance to pay out on claims for misconduct under a directors and officers insurance policy.

It seems to be more common lately for companies and insurers to resist paying for the lawyers because there is little prospect of recovering those fees if a corporate officer is found guilty. Companies usually include in their articles of incorporation or bylaws a provision requiring them to advance attorney’s fees to directors, officers and employees who are caught up in investigations or charged in criminal or civil actions. Although the companies and insurers may balk, the courts — especially those in Delaware where so many large companies are incorporated — have been particularly protective of the right to advancement of legal expenses.

That doesn’t mean that corporations won’t try to screw with payment of fees, challenging them, trying to renegotiate or cut them, seeking to stick their nose into the attorney/client relationship to “ascertain” the fairness of fees.  It’s hardly uncommon for some assistant in-house counsel, the kind who has never seen the inside of a courtroom, to “opine” that particular fees are unreasonable or unnecessary.  In-house counsel are a peculiar breed, who issue opinions from behind a desk to people who normally view their word as gospel.  They don’t mesh well with trial lawyers, who tend not to be as impressed with their putative legal prowess as in-house counsel expect and are used to.

It seems lately that no matter how reasonable the fees may be, or how clearly the letter of engagement sets out how fees are set or payments made, the indemnifying corporations will do everything in their power to make the defense lawyer have to fight for his fee.  Ironically, it’s got nothing to do with their representation, which may be brilliant or awful, but rather with their bottom line and proclivity to love budgets.  It’s just about cutting costs.

As a result, criminal defense lawyers have two jobs when taking on white collar cases.  The first is the hard work of defending the client.  The second is the annoying work of dealing with the corporate monster.  The second, which isn’t openly accounted for in the fee structure, can suck up an enormous amount of time as well, often with greater regularity than the defense aspect of the representation.  Plus, dealing with grocery clerks in corporations can be a very unpleasant experience, their having no sense of responsibility for their representations that “the check is in the mail” being accurate and honest.  Unlike lawyers, honesty plays no role in the Accounts Payable Department clerk’s job review.

As much as “white collar” work allows the lawyer far greater latitude to provide everything needed to defend, unlike cases where we defend on a shoestring and fear making a phone call to an expert will break the bank, it comes with its own set of problems and issues that can turn the best of defenses into years of misery.  And not surprisingly, given the nature of the offenses and people involved, it’s almost invariably because of money. 

New Guys Don’t Make The Rules

Only about 15 minutes after posting The Bully Line did it dawn on me that I had omitted an entire aspect of the discussion that also needed to be aired.  When I opened up shop here at Simple Justice, I wandered around the blawgosphere to get the lay of the land.  I learned the ropes.  I learned the rules. I understood that when I put my opinions on the page, chances were good that someone would come along and start shooting at me.  Perhaps it would be small caliber, or maybe nuclear, but it was open season.

I knew the risk.  I took the risk.  I had no cause to complain.

Jamison Koehler argues for a different view.  Before getting there, I want to note that I’ve read through Jamison’s blog, and I like it and him.  His perspective is more theoretical than practical.  No one has challenged his conduct or ethics, and his role in this discussion isn’t generated by defending how he blawgs, but rather what he thinks about the way the blawgosphere works. 

The problem is that Jamison Koehler is new to the blawgosphere.  His blog, though the content is pretty good, appears to be a marketing blog, lacking a name and heavy enough on self-promotion in the sidebar to keep him off the blogroll.  I can’t speak to what gave rise to his decision to blog, but it would appear from the outside that he’s joined the blawgosphere based upon the omnipresent voice of marketers telling lawyers that it’s the “thing to do” to promote one’s legal services.

But that gives rise to the next question:  Does the new kid on the block get to jump into the blawgosphere and expect us to change the rules?

The blawgosphere is changing in that many newcomers have significantly different motivations than those of us who came here merely a few years ago.  We came to write and exchange ideas.  The new guys come to market.  It’s understandable, given the vast industry of marketers telling lawyers it’s the thing to do, but then what happened to learning the lay of the land before jumping in?  I guess they took the marketers at their word, and never considered that they might be less than completely forthright.

The point is that the blawgosphere was here before the marketing crowd came along and figured out a way to scam lawyers into using it as a pure marketing vehicle.  You came to us, not the other way around.  Having done so, you don’t get to demand that the blawgosphere reform its evil ways to accommodate your carefully crafted marketing schemes.  The rest of us aren’t here to make you look good, or even to leave you alone.  Speak out all you want, but expect others to talk back.

The rules of the game were here for anyone to see before you set up shop.  Don’t complain now that you don’t like the rules, or that your marketing guru neglected to mention that it wasn’t going to be a free ride to fame and fortune.  Welcome to the blawgosphere, and watch out.

The Bully Line

Over the past few days, a debate about ghostblawging has been raging (though it was started by David Giacalone in 2004), beginning with Mark Bennett’s Social Media Tyro, through new blawger Jamison Koehler (whose blawg will be an orphan until he gives it a name and tones down the marketing), to Carolyn Elefant at My Shingle.  In the course of the debate, a secondary issue arose, and one that deserves a separate airing.

In the course of discussion, Amy Derby expressed her view that calling out those who promoted the use of ghostbloggers were “cyberbullies”.  Koehler picked up on this, following the suggestion that his failure to see an ethical problem with ghostblogging might be due to his being new to the blawgosphere:


And, yes, I am a newcomer.  But I am against this type of public humiliation, or “cyberbullying” as someone has termed it.  I also do not agree with Bennett and Greenfield that using a ghostwriter is necessarily dishonest or unethical.  For one thing, I think they underestimate the sophistication of most people using the Internet.  Most people visiting a lawyer’s website will be able to distinguish between the canned language of a hired writer and the distinctive voice of a lawyer, such as Bennett or Greenfield, writing for himself.


Thus, the question is squarely raised, where the line is drawn between fair criticism and cyberbullying, or “public humiliation” as Koehler would dubiously define it,   Both Tannebaum and Bennett (and me too) take Koehler to task in the comments to his post, but Bennett said it best:



When you have had people steal your intellectual property to build their own credibility, when you realize that lawyers are paying people to pollute your comments with spam, when you have (most importantly) had clients’ mommas tearfully tell you that they trust you because they have read everything you ever wrote on your blog, I suspect that you may come around to my way of thinking, ethically and aesthetically. Meanwhile, I’m secure in my assessment of the ethics of using a ghostblogger, and unrepentant.

Whether lawyers should publicly call out other lawyers who are cheating (ethical violations) or polluting (aesthetic violations) on line is a question that wouldn’t suffer from public discussion (five-word answer: general deterrence requires hurting feelings). I’m sure that Scott Greenfield, Brian Tannebaum, Eric Turkewitz, and the bloggers named in Eric’s post can easily defend their positions against all comers, as can I.

But Rent-A-Brain is a strange place to start the discussion of whether those funding unethical marketing should be named and shamed. In that post I didn’t name any of the lawyers responsible for the ghostblogging; I merely linked to the page where they unabashedly named themselves as having paid someone to “increase their credibility.” Anyone who thinks linking to a page of testimonials is “cyberbullying” is—with all due respect—a damn fool.
The real problem, I suspect, has far less to do with the definition of cyberbullying than it does with the concept of blawging itself.  For lawyers who believe that the primary purpose of a blawg is marketing, the idea that their effort to enjoy self-promotion, to garner public attention, to achieve business success via a blawg, is a two-way street is deeply disturbing.  They want to be able to gain the benefit without any risk of peer review, or peer criticism.

Jamison Koehler calls is “public humiliation,” which is quite revealing.  Is it humiliation to be questioned, challenged or disputed?  Once you put your voice and reputation online for all to see, you invite others to question your statements and conduct.  No one makes you go public, but having made the choice to do so, you cannot cry foul when you’re subjected to scrutiny.

The question hinges on whether the challenge is a fair one.  It’s not merely a question of right or wrong, meaning that those who disagree with Bennett (or Tannebaum or Turkewitz or me) can claim victim status.  Indeed, we disagree with each other all the time, challenging each other’s positions and questioning everything from paternity to the need for psychotropic drugs. And these challenges are what make for great discussions, and add enormous value to the blawgosphere.

The reason behind this is that our blawgs do not exist to market, and hence we have no fear of being questioned, challenged or disputed.  Our blawgosphere is one of ideas and community, not marketing and self-promotion.  The idea that someone will read what we write, what we put out for public consumption, how we conduct ourselves for the world to see, and call us out if we’ve behaved poorly.  Our ethics, integrity and intelligence is on display, just waiting for some wag to “publicly humiliate” us.  It’s how we keep each other honest.

Most real blawgers have been told, at one point or another, that we’re mean people for writing negative posts about others.  The others believe that they are entitled to puff themselves and their thoughts free of criticism, whether because they are of the view that lawyers owe each other a free ride or because they never understood that by going public, they opened themselves up. 

As Bennett pointed out in his response to Koehler, there’s a lot of bad stuff happening in the blawgosphere.  It’s a tough place to function, and not for the faint of heart.  To the extent that calling people out, naming names, arguing that it’s wrong to deceive even in the name of marketing, puts the breaks on some of the bad stuff, then it serves the greater good.  To the extent that those who want to be able to promote themselves without peer scrutiny call this public humiliation or cyberbullying, tough nuggies. 

There’s no right to enjoy the benefits of public self-promotion, assuming there are any, with impunity.  When you put yourself out there, you invite scrutiny.  If you can’t take it, then you’ve come to the wrong place.  Your peers may adore you or think you’re dumb as dirt, not to mention unethical, deceptive and scummy.  That’s the risk of going public.  

If you don’t believe you deserve the negative reaction, then engage the criticism, fight back and let your ideas win the day.  That’s how we survive in the blawgosphere.  That’s how we survive as lawyers.  That’s how peer review works. That’s how it should be.

Relative Worth

Congress mandated that the victims of crime be given restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence.  In many instances, the amount of restitution can be ascertained with some precision, even with some squabbling around the edges.  But as the definition of victim expands, and as victims become more aggressive in seeking restitution, the question muddies significantly.  Such is the case for “Misty”.

“Misty” is the victim of child pornography, appearing in still photographs and videos.  That she suffered as no child should is not in issue.  But Congress has made those who possess child pornography responsible for paying restitution to the children who appeared.  The concept behind it is that without people who want to see the pornography, there would be no market to create it.  Hence, they are responsible for the crime, and to the victim, as are the people who create the pornography in the first place.  The possessors may never know, meet, recognize the children victimized in the creation of the images they “enjoy”, but they are the audience for it, the consumers. It’s consumer demand that drives the victimization of children.

From the Pioneer Press, a Duluth man pleaded guilty to possession of kiddie porn.  He was quite the consumer.


When Brandon Arthur Buchanan pleaded guilty in federal court in May and was sentenced in November to 7 1/2 years in prison, prosecutors didn’t ask that he pay restitution to any of the children depicted in any of the 16,339 photos and 877 video files he had on his computers.

The problem wasn’t that the government took the view that he shouldn’t have to pay restitution, but that they couldn’t arrive at an amount.  U.S. District Judge Patrick Schiltz was not satisfied with the excuse.


“Given the clear congressional mandate that those convicted of child-pornography offenses pay restitution to their victims, the court will no longer accept silence from the government when an identified victim of a child-pornography offense seeks restitution,” Schiltz, of St. Paul, wrote in a Jan. 4 order.

“If the government declines to seek restitution,” the judge wrote, “the government will have to give the court some explanation for its decision.”


A victim did come forward seeking restitution.  It was “Misty”, by her lawyer.  The amount sought was $3.4 million.  This was not her first request.


Schiltz said he couldn’t order restitution of nearly $3.5 million without some explanation from the government, but he couldn’t deny restitution “without some explanation of why the victim is not entitled to even a single penny.”


In the memorandum filed Friday, [U.S. Attorney Erika] Mozangue noted that “Misty” had submitted restitution requests in almost 90 cases in at least 30 judicial districts across the nation.

One defendant in Florida had about a dozen images of “Misty” on his computer, and after hearing evidence about how the child had been harmed by her abuse, the judge ordered the defendant to pay more than $3.2 million in restitution.

A federal judge in Iowa, however, ordered a defendant to pay “Misty” $5,000, and a federal judge in Connecticut ordered a defendant to pay her $500.
This is a tough one.  While it’s hardly clear that the connection between possessors of child porn and the children who appear in the images is sufficiently direct to rationally justify restitution, as opposed to an imposition of a fine that might fund a trust for their benefit, since restitution relates to a direct loss attributable to the wrongful conduct, Congress has spoken and the issue, for better or worse, is off the table for the moment.

But the same problem in justifying restitution per se remains in attempting to arrive at a rational amount.  Since there is no attributable loss, the numbers are essentially arbitrary.  Are they a product of the totality of harm to the child, and then ascribed to every defendant who might possess an image?  If the harm to the child is determined to be $3.4 million, and the image has been spread to 1,000 defendants, should each bear restitution in that amount?  Granted, it will never be paid in full, but it will do enough to make sure that the defendant, and his family, are under water financially for the rest of his life.

And who cares?  Who feels sorry for the defendant who possesses kiddie porn?  Clearly, the victim is worthy of great sympathy, but does $3.4 million in harm explain $3.4 trillion in restitution?  And how does one court award $500 while another $3.2 million in restitution for the same offense?  How does any court arrive at a rational amount, and yet the court is required to provide restitution.  There seems to be no consideration of proportionality involved, but proportionality has never been Congress’ strong suit.

While there is little sympathy for the defendant, per se, there is a substantial issue as to whether restitution is the proper framework for compensating the victims of child pornography.  The award, whether large or small, seems wholly arbitrary, and this stems from the fact that Congress has decoupled victimization from the specific conduct of, and harm cause by, the defendant.  It’s never going to make any sense or give rise to a rational basis for an award for restitution.  Yet Congress says it must be awarded.

What’s curious in the Buchanan case  is that Judge Schiltz first directed the government to explain why “Misty” should receive no restitution, if that was its position, but then directed that the government explain why the amount of $3.4 million was proper.  It appears that the government was incapable of doing either.  At least the judge didn’t put the burden on the defendant to explain why it shouldn’t order the latter.

Rights, Wrongs and A Decapitated Head

As far as I’m aware, nobody has come out in support of the actions of two California Highway Patrol officers responsible for the posting of crime scene photographs of Nikki Catsouras’ decapitated body on the internet. I could be wrong about this, given how many sick people there are, but if so, I’m not aware of it. 

The family’s suit against CHP, however, had some stumbling blocks.  The right to privacy is personal, and is extinguished upon death.  That leaves the dead fair game, but it was the law.  But as ugly cases make for ugly decisions, the California Supreme Court 4th District Court of Appeals ruled against the two CHP officers’  argument that they had a First Amendment right to disseminate the photographs.  As described by Mike at Crime & Federalism,

Recognizing that the CHP officers forwarded unaltered photographs, the Court of Appeal still ignores their First Amendment defense.  The Court acted as a super-censor: “Here, the picture painted by the second amended complaint is one of pure morbidity and sensationalism without legitimate public interest or law enforcement purpose.”  Slip op. at 17.

Mike takes a dim view of this rationale.


Where is the “sensationalism” exception to the First Amendment?  The First Amendment provides that “Congress [and the States, vis-a-vis the Fourteenth Amendment] shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech [].”  Even morbid and sensational speech is protected.

He’s right.  As disgusting as these photographs, and the actions of the CHP officers may be, there is no First Amendment exception that precludes them from protection.

But that’s not the end of the story, as far as I’m concerned.  In my past discussion of this case, I urged a snarky test to determine whether the conduct was acceptable.


My brightline test would be simple: If it makes you want to puke, then liability exists. 

But now that the California Supremes have ruled, a more useful analysis seems appropriate. 

The officers involved possess a First Amendment right to free speech in their individual capacity.  They are human beings, and as such have all the rights and protections the Constitution provides to each of us.  This is true even if they don’t happen to afford other human beings the full panoply of rights in the course of their employment, an issue for another day.

But when they put on the uniform, the shield and strap on the weapon, they do not do so in their individual capacity, but by authorization of the State.  They take on a separate and distinct role, that of a police officer, a government official serving in a delineated capacity.  Just as they can’t pull out their gun and shoot someone who personally annoys them, their ordinary human actions are constrained by their official authorization and limitations.  Each police officer may only have one physical body, but there are in essence two people there, one of which is a State actor.

The officers came into possession of the crime scene photographs of Nikki Catsouras in their capacity as officials of the State, not because they were regular guys cruising the highway on motorcycles.  Their possession, and their subsequent conduct in disseminating the photographs, was not an exercise of their individual First Amendment right to free speech, but an exercise of their official duty as police officers, as officials of the State of California.  While the First Amendment may safeguard their personal rights as human beings, it doesn’t protect them as officials of the State to express themselves.  Indeed, there is no “themselves” when crossing the line from badge-wearers to regular guys.

Mike’s fear, that some reduced value “sensationalist” speech will come back to haunt all of us, blawgers included, strikes me as very real.  It opens the door to enormous mischief, where it may be left to judges to decide whether speech is sufficiently “important” to be worthy of protection as balanced against something as amorphous as good taste.  Sensationalism is rampant, often used to grab attention to make a point. 

But then, do people who come into possession of such sensationalist and morbid photographs as those of the decapitated Nikki Catsouras solely because of their official capacity as police officers get to switch hats at will and enjoy the right free speech that exists to protect us from the government?  That’s a very different question.  I would distinguish the roles, and hence the protection, offered by the First Amendment, leaving individuals with the full protection they were meant to have while stripping the government, and its officials, of protection for abusing their positions.  The government doesn’t need free speech protection.  It has the guns.

There was no need to craft an exception for sensationalist speech that will likely inure to our detriment eventually just to find a way to make these two CHP miscreants liable.  There was a better way.

A Trial For Years

Much has been made of the Obama Administration’s direction to Justice to move the Khalid Shaikh Mohammed trial out of the Southern District of New York due to the onerous burdens it would impose on lower Manhattan.



As a practical matter, holding the trial in New York posed the specter of a dizzying security lockdown — with roadblocks, checkpoints and rooftop sharpshooters — in the financial district and Chinatown.
No one, of course, has spoken out to question whether these burdens are really necessary or appropriate.  Obviously, locking down the better part of lower Manhattan, from Chinatown to Wall Street, involves making life a misery, if not an impossibility, for millions of people.  Does it really have to be that bad?  Perhaps, if you want to be absolutely, totally, completely, 110% certain that no harm will occur.  Or maybe there’s no way to be certain, and it’s just a big show.  Not being a security analyst, I defer, though I suspect that there’s no way to ever be certain of complete safety.

There’s a secondary aspect to the security measures that hasn’t received a great deal of attention, but should.  It’s not merely that the lockdown will affect a huge number of New Yorkers, but that the trial is anticipated to go on for years.  Years.  If the lockdown was only for a couple of weeks, it’s unlikely that there would much complaining.  By and large, New Yorkers are more than willing to suffer some annoyance to bring closure to the attack on the World Trade Center.  We suffered the attack and we’ll suffer the trial.

But years?

What possible reason could there be for this trial to take years.  KSM has admitted his role.  Indeed, he’s bragged about it.  Putting aside the “intelligence” garnered from waterboarding and they government still have a case that should be makable with three witnesses in a day or two.  Jury selection should take longer than this trial.  Years?

One rationale for denying KSM a civilian trial, an open trial using the American system of criminal justice, was that he would turn it into a circus to espouse his political views.  Does the United States Attorney’s office plan to do the job for him?  If this was meant to be a criminal trial, then it would be limited to the evidence necessary to convict the defendant of the charges against him. 

While I’m sure imaginative prosecutors can come up with a few thousand counts against KSM in an indictment that would require two people to carry, they only need one provable capital offense to finish this up.  They can’t execute him twice, no less a few thousand times.  By growing this trial to epic proportions, they opportunities for KSM to pitch his views become innumerable.  To what end?

Would it be unfulfilling to the American public for this trial to be based upon a single terrorism murder count?  Would that leave a void about what happened, what the government knows, what the people want to hear?  No doubt some will feel this way, but that’s not the point of a criminal trial.  It’s not an opportunity to put on the passion play, to serve as a national catharsis. 

If the government persists in the notion of making this trial a lifetime endeavor, tying up a courthouse as well as a judge, not even considering the unlikelihood of finding a jury plus about 500 alternates willing to sit for the rest of their natural lives, there is a strong potential of this trial turning into the most monumental disaster in American law ever. 

And after the first few months, we’ll get bored with it anyway. We always do.