Author Archives: SHG

Living On The Slippery Slope

In his Sidebar column, Adam Liptak offers a survey of predictions by Supreme Court justices, both majority and dissent, about the dire consequences of the other side’s improvident decisions.  His point is that the Supremes are notoriously bad at predicting future consequences.


On Wednesday, for instance, it shut down plans to broadcast the same-sex marriage trial in San Francisco partly for fear that witnesses in the case would be harassed if their public testimony were made more public. That conclusion is known in the trade as speculation.

Consider first of all that we are talking about a trial held in open court and subject to intense press coverage. The witnesses are mostly paid experts whose views on the subject are already well known. “They’re not, after all, in the witness protection program testifying against Mafia bosses,” Eva Rodriguez wrote in The Washington Post.

Then add to the analysis that the additional coverage the court forbade was only closed-circuit transmissions to a few other federal courthouses around the country. (There had been talk of posting video on YouTube, but the idea was never approved and so was not before the Supreme Court.)

The people viewing the transmissions in the remote courthouses would have been barred from making recordings of the proceedings. Allowing the transmissions, Eugene Volokh wrote on The Volokh Conspiracy legal blog, was equivalent to “holding the trial in an extra large courtroom.”

“And most of the extra audience would be far from California,” Mr. Volokh added, “and therefore not especially likely to be able to effectively harass the witnesses in ways that turn on seeing the witness’s testimony.”

Not the best example, of course, given that the rationale was merely an excuse for keeping cameras out of the courtroom via the backdoor in a peculiar case, but Liptak goes on to offer some better examples and makes his point.  It’s worth noting, however, that Liptak quotes Eugene Volokh’s well-taken points in support, thus avoiding the responsibility of thoughtful analysis that lawyers-turned-journalists are wont to do.  Can you imagine the risk Liptak would take if he had to actually rely on practicing lawyers for thoughts on practicing law?

While his prescience versus precedent argument bears out, Liptak offers no insight as to why the Supremes are so god-awful at predicting how courts and lawyers will apply their muddled analyses.  Allow me to fill the gap.  There are nine people at One First Street who live such an insulated existence from the very world over which they preside that they have no clue of the wrestling in the gutter that comes of their decisions. 

In the past, I’ve argued that the justices have rendered themselves irrelevant to the legal system.  Not only do we, practicing lawyers, have no clue what their decisions are supposed to mean, but they, being particularly smart people, know as they write them that they are giving no guidance through their muddled language, deliberate ignorance of obvious and unanswered questions and apparent lack of concern for the multitude of people who will suffer for their failure to earn their living by providing clear, complete, comprehensible answers to burning questions. 

Although the words appear nowhere in the column, what Liptak is talking about is the slippery slope.  It’s a very appealing argument, though a logical fallacy, as it simultaneously enrages some while denigrating the opposing point of view.  Since predicting the future is a fool’s game, and can be neither proven nor disproven at the time the prediction is made, it’s immune from facial challenge.  It could happen, so therefore it’s a valid concern.

But Liptak’s comparison, precedent or prescience, fails to capture the full spectrum of options available to the Supremes.  Missing from this choice is the real world comprehension of how its decision are applied, or not applied as was the case with Booker for far too long,  

Ironically, Eugene Volokh (as it happens) posted about some new proposals to provide an increased level of reality in judicial duty, as opposed to the current cult of celebrity that surrounds our Supreme Court justices.  One of the suggestions really strikes home:


Congress should require Justices to serve part of their time on lower federal courts, as they did for the first century of the republic’s existence. Restoring “circuit riding” would give the Justices some on-going experience with playing the role of a modest judge whose decisions are subject to appellate review and who is often required to interpret and apply muddled Supreme Court opinions.
Maybe if they got out more, our Supreme Court justices would have both a better feel for predicting the future, as well as a sense of how much trouble they cause with their incomprehensible decisions.  And I might add, it would be best if they rode the circuit on horseback, just to keep it real. 

The WSJ Finally Appreciates Sexual Predators

When an editorial about “sexual predators,” as those who have completed their criminal sentence are now called to justify their permanent vilification, appears in the Wall Street Journal, the immediate question that comes to mind is whether the call will be for life imprisonment or life plus cancer.  But as today’s editorial demonstrates, this cynical view is just a product of federalist bias.


The question in U.S. v. Comstock is whether sex offenders who have already completed their federal criminal sentences may then see their incarceration extended through a process of “civil commitment” by the federal government. The law in question, the 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection Act, allows the Attorney General to certify a person as a danger to the population and keep him in federal custody. The law tramples on the traditional power of states to protect public health and safety.

Ah. Maybe you thought that the WSJ was coming out; coming out against the use of civil commitment as a back door to imprison people outside of the criminal justice process?  The issue in Comstock is whether the elastic clause provides the federal government authority to imprison people designated by the Attorney General as a danger.  The Supreme already held in Kansas v. Hendricks,1997, that taking off the “criminal” shackles and putting on the “civil” shackles changes everything, allowing a person who has completed a criminal sentence to languish in confinement.  But can the Feds do it?


If the Supreme Court reverses the lower court’s decision, it will sanction the notion that nearly any appealing idea may be justified as necessary and proper. In other countries, loose detention laws give wide latitude to authorities to lock up any number of people who “threaten the public safety,” including political prisoners. Maybe next the feds could force everyone in America to buy health insurance.

What’s quite amazing is how the WSJ has adopted the cause, made the argument against civil confinement, then twisted it to serve its political agenda.  Perhaps they really aren’t deeply concerned with the wrong of civil confinement at all?  After all, as wrong as it may be for the federal government to civilly confine political prisoners, or force everyone in America to buy health insurance, would it be okey dokey if the State of Kansas did so? 

The LA Times editorial today discusses the Comstock case as well, no surprise given how much the two papers have in common.  The take, however, is somewhat different.  It began by noting its erroneous assumption that the Supreme Court’s review of civil commitment should naturally question the propriety of a law confining people after their sentences are completed.


Unfortunately, that wasn’t the case last week when the court heard arguments over the constitutionality of the indefinite detention of “sexually dangerous” prisoners. The justices’ questions mostly focused on whether Washington, as opposed to the states, has the authority to do so — not whether indefinite detention is allowable.

That issue of federalism isn’t unimportant, but the more pressing question is whether civil commitment for a mental condition is being misused to force felons to remain in prison after they’ve completed their legal sentences.
There is no doubt that the federalism question is significant, given that Congress has spent the last 25 years criminalizing everything that doesn’t move, and plenty of things that do.  And perhaps Antonin Scalia’s interpretation of “necessary and proper” will prove to be a critical limitation as states try to take back their constitutional authority to legislate crime from the encroaching federal government.  Scalia can be so Jeffersonian at times.

But it is impossible to consider the implications of Comstock without consideration of the debacle of civil confinement.  If it’s wrong for the feds to do it, per the WSJ, then how can it be acceptable for states to subvert the criminal process by mere semantic change?  Will they applaud if New Hampshire civilly commits conservatives for having a brain abnormality?  Having made the argument, a sound and compelling one at that, how can the brain trust at the Wall Street Journal not carry its argument to its logical conclusion rather than take the hard right fork in the road to bash Obamacare and ignore the very wrong the forms the basis for their complaint?

Both the WSJ and the LAT agree that civil confinement is conceptually wrong and dangerous.  The former, unfortunately, does so only to pursue an unrelated political agenda, rather than accept the obvious premise that if it’s wrong for the feds, if “loose detention laws” give improperly broad discretion to authorities to civilly imprison people they don’t like, its similarly wrong for the states.  If only the WSJ could keep its eye on the ball long enough to arrive at the right rationale for its correct position.

On the bright side, at least the Wall Street Journal has finally found a reason to fight federal civil confinement of post-sentence sex offenders, if only to leave the question open for how high the states should hang them for some other day.

H/T Howard Bashman

Jets Fan in the First Degree

Just despicable conduct by the San Diego police in arresting a Jets fan, apparently for the crime of rooting for the wrong team.  Kudos to the San Diego Chargers fans who stood up for the Jets fan, one to his personal detriment as he was forced to leave by a cop who, to his credit, didn’t taze the guy for the audacity of being noncompliant.

Hope the police apologists show up to “explain” why the cops were right.  And without a video, would you believe this happened?  Would it have the same impact? 



Of course, it’s possible that something happened off-camera which we aren’t aware of, but the fact that Chargers fans are arguing and yelling at the cops that he didn’t do anything seems about as strong a basis as possible to believe that he didn’t do anything.  And I’m a Giants fan.  Unbelievable.

H/T Radley Balko

The Price Is Right

Brian Tannebaum tells an apocryphal tale about the “big money” criminal case.  You know the one, the case that every young criminal defense lawyer dreams about.  The one that will make your rich and bring fame and glory.


It was 6 years ago. I was representing someone under investigation. He paid me a small retainer to communicate with the prosecutor during the investigation and do all the other things criminal defense lawyers do during investigations.

I quoted a mid six figure fee. It was the biggest fee I had ever quoted.

The client hemmed and hawed, and then offered to pay me a substantial amount of money for the bond work, the fee for the case to be solidified after he was released.

I received half of the substantial amount of the fee for the bond work, and was told I would receive the other half “next week.”

But the money is only part of the equation, as Brian found out.


Regardless that there was nothing that could be done on the weekend. The family continued to call, Saturday and Sunday, throughout the day, beginning with my wake up call. I took every call, missing almost all of the conference.

When I came back home, I ran to the jail to see my client. Looking over the sign-in book, I saw another criminal defense lawyer had been to see him. I asked him what this was about, and he told me his family sent this (very good) lawyer to see him. I told him I would get him a bond hearing as soon as possible. He was not happy I went out of town over the weekend.

I called the other lawyer and was told I was probably out. The client’s uncle called and told me the same within the hour. He asked me for money back, and got an earful.
With the big money comes the big problems, the big demands, the big expectations.  Often, the demands are unreasonable, from things that simply cannot be accomplished to the expectation that the client now “owns” you, your every breath being dedicated solely to the client. 

Managing the big case, with the big fee, takes experience.  Understanding what it means to a client to have his expectations dictated by the size of the fee will come from living through an experience like Brian’s, where the quid pro quo for the big fee is total dedication and magic results.

The trick is to manage expectations up front.  The inexperienced lawyer will be so taken with the big case, and the big fee, that he will often promise the world, whether explicitly or implicitly, to make sure he gets it.  This is a recipe for misery and, as happened to Brian, ultimately losing it.

The big fee is not the purchase of your soul, but a reflection of your legal services, the work, effort, costs, associated with providing your client with the best possible defense.  It’s not for babysitting your client and every member of his extended family.  It’s not a guarantee of outcome.  It’s not an assurance that the case will go smoothly, where a smaller fee might have bumps in the road.  And it’s critical that you make all of this absolutely clear from the outset, lest the client misapprehended what he’s paying for.  That can easily happen.

Even the experienced criminal defense lawyer faces a minefield in the big case.  It’s impossible to anticipate every twist and turn, and the client who can pay the big fee may still expect a level of care and control that consumes your every waking moment, not to mention more than a few of your sleeping moments.  That’s part of the deal, and if you’re either unaware of it or unprepared to fulfill it, you aren’t ready to handle the big case.  Or the big fee.

It’s obvious why every young criminal defense lawyer wants to get the big case with the big fee, but be careful what you wish for.  If you aren’t ready, it could be the most difficult case you’ve ever handled, and may well cause you problems and headaches for which no fee is big enough to compensate.  As cool as it may be to finally get the dream case, make sure you’re ready for it or it may turn out to be your worst nightmare.

Is There A Lawyer Tax? Should There Be?

Nathan Koppel at the Wall Street Journal law blog took a look back at Mayer Brown partner Joseph Collins following his sentence to 84 months incarceration for aiding and abetting the $2 billion Refco fraud.


That struck us, frankly, as a whopper of a sentence. Lawyers, a la Marc Dreier, have gotten worse when they have been primary violators in fraud. But we can’t think of another attorney who drew anything like 84 months for aiding and abetting fraud.

A felony conviction alone, after all, costs a lawyer his law license and professional reputation. And in civil fraud cases, lawyers typically have immunity from aiding and abetting liability based on the notion that they’re not inflicting direct harm on injured parties.

Unlike Koppel, I unfortunately can think of another attorney who drew a very similar sentence.  In fact, I wasn’t particularly surprised by the sentence, or that Collins was convicted for his role as attorney in facilitating the fraud.  This is clearly an entirely different situation than Marc Dreier, who was the active source of the crime, but when a lawyer enables decisions and choices that allow a crime to occur, they tend to be far more likely to be prosecuted and sentenced harshly than would many others who have a clearer and more significant role.


“Being a lawyer ups the ante,” Stephen Gillers, an ethics guru at NYU law, told the Chicago Tribune. “The judge understandably expects more from lawyers than from people not trained in the law.”

Gillers is right.  While it’s not quite self-loathing, judges surely raise the bar on one of their own for having disgraced the profession.  The sympathy that might otherwise be shown for a defendant is lost when the defendant is a lawyer.  Expecting more of ourselves means that a greater penalty is needed to meet that expectation.  But that wasn’t quite the way the judge explained it:


At yesterday’s sentencing hearing, Manhattan federal judge Joseph Collins said that Collins, while not motivated by greed, displayed “excessive loyalty to his client.”
This goes far more to the heart of the problem than does anything else.  Lawyers find themselves thrust into the midst of problems created by clients, who then expect their lawyers to both identify the absolute edge to which the envelope can be pushed, as well as provide the explanation to accomplish the desired goal.  That’s the lawyers job.  That’s why we have lawyers, to advise clients.  And it’s not quite wrong for a lawyer, who properly owes a debt of loyalty to his client, to do his best to satisfy his client’s requests and expectations.

The problem arises when the lawyer errs, whether a lot or a little, and goes a step too far.  That’s all it takes to differentiate between a brilliant lawyer, enabling a client to do as he wants without crossing the line from boldness to criminality, and the inchoate prisoner.

The easy answer for the lawyer is never tread too close to the line, and you can avoid finding yourself in the dock.  Good for the lawyer.  Maybe not so good for the client.  The safe answer will keep the lawyer from facing some very harsh consequences, but similarly deprives the client of the lawyer’s fullest advice. 

While it’s impossible to have any real idea whether the 84 month sentence is appropriate, or truly a lawyer tax, for Joseph Collins, it appears that his conviction itself is that price Collins paid for trying to do his job the best he could.  It’s no big deal to ask a lawyer to answer the obvious question; any fool lawyer can do that.  It’s the lawyer reaching the cutting edge who’s at risk, who can’t afford to be wrong without putting himself on the wrong side of the prosecution. 

For the lawyer who is more concerned for his personal safety than serving his client, there’s no problem here.  He will never be at risk, as he will never go anywhere near the edge.  For the lawyer burdened with loyalty to his client, the question will always be how to find the edge, yet stay on the right side of it.  Make the smallest mistake, even one that merely appears to put your toe over the edge, and you can expect to suffer the fate of Joseph Collins.  Or the other lawyers who were sentenced to similar terms of incarceration for having tried a little too hard to do their job.

There is a lawyer tax, and it’s paid by the lawyers who try just a little too hard.

The Square n00b Answer

Ever wonder how all the old-time lawyers jump online and screw it all up overnight?  It could be those bar association CLEs teaching how to be a blogger in 30 seconds or less, taught by lawyers who have never been closer to a computer than when they stop at the secretary’s desk to ask for a coffee refill.  Or maybe it’s reading something like this Corporate Counsel post at Law.com by Doug Wood from Reed Smith.

Yes, that Doug Wood, the man who launched a thousand twits and blogs with his thorough, yet persuasive, explication of why corp counsel need to “Get With It … or Get Burned.”  He offers such gems as


Everyone is familiar with the plethora of Internet offerings—Facebook, YouTube, MySpace, Twitter, Digg, Yammer, and LinkedIn—to name just a few. There are more than one hundred active social media sites with millions participating in conversations every minute of the day, all over the world. Multinational companies and their CEOs are blogging, populating their walls on Facebook, and tweeting. It’s an epidemic.

Epidemic, of course, generally refers to the unchecked spread of disease, and that would make Doug Wood something of an internet Typhoid Mary.  This leads Wood to urge appropriate personal hygiene.


On the one hand, companies want to capture the attention of potential customers roaming the social media space. On the other hand, conversations in the blogosphere are largely uncontrollable, and raise a myriad of risks—labor and employment, privacy and data security, defamation, intellectual property, attorney-client privilege, securities, trade secrets, advertising, marketing and promotion, regulated industries, product liability, and more.

All these conversations are breeding regulation and litigation. Social media can cause serious losses if not handled correctly.

This leads, inexorably, to the Big Question: How does your basic corp counsel handle social media correctly?


Empower Your Social Media Guru. Social media present the rare opportunity to appoint someone just a few years out of law school as the point person on the issue. Today’s law school graduates have lived in the social media space throughout college and law school. They understand it and know how to maneuver though it. Then monitor them!
There’s the ticket.  For all you old guys (like me) who find all these funky words and charmingly colorful names confusing and annoying, relax.  Find the youngest kid in the building with too little to do, and make him or her your social media guru.  If you’re uncertain that you’ve tagged the right person, check his top desk drawer for a GameBoy.  If it’s there, he’s your man.  As all of us squares know, every kid is a social media maven and knows everything there is to know about using social media.  It’s in their DNA, so no need to worry.  Kids just know this stuff.

Once you’ve identified your guru, turn over the keys to the kingdom, because “[t]hey understand it and know how to maneuver though it.”  They just do, because, hey, all kids just do. No need to do anything foolish like determine whether their posting naked drunken photos of themselves with farm animals on their MySpace page might be the wrong image for your corporation.  Us old guys wouldn’t know cool if it jumped up and bit us in the butt.  But as every old timer knows, we can trust a kid to exercise exemplary judgment and discretion on our behalf, at least when it comes to social media.  They are all just that savvy.

But Doug Wood is hardly an imprudent man.  As he specifically notes, “monitor them.”  Because if you don’t have a clue from the outset what all this internet stuff is about, you will certainly be in a great position to know exactly what your empowered social media guru should be doing after you’ve turned your livelihood over to them. 

With all the nonsense, lies, manipulation and snake oil going ’round the internet, isn’t it great that you can learn exactly how to get your corporation right into the middle of things, on the cutting edge, by reading such useful posts at Corporate Counsel.  And you n00bs thought it was hard to become an overnight success on the internet. Now jump right in and have fun!

H/T Venkat Balasubramani

The Coakley Condition

Over at Volokh Conspiracy, Kenneth Anderson questions whether it is ethical for a prosecutor, as part of a deal to reduce a sentence for one defendant, to condition an agreement on a criminal defense lawyer’s concluding his representation of another related defendant.  A bit too dry, maybe professorial, to interest you?  What if the prosecutor was Martha Coakley, and the case was Amirault.

The Wall Street Journal’s Dorothy Rabinowitz has an op-ed today reminding readers of the inglorious role that Martha Coakley played in one of — certainly in my view — the greatest miscarriages of justice of the past twenty years in the United States, the persecution in Massachusetts of the Amirault family on prosecutor-contrived charges of child abuse.

According to Rabinowitz’s account, before agreeing under great pressure from judges and the public to agree to reduce Cheryl Amirault’s sentence to time served, Coakley asked the Amiraults’ attorney, James Sultan, to pledge—in exchange—that he would stop representing Gerald and undertake no further legal action on his behalf. She had evidently concluded that with Sultan gone—Sultan, whose mastery of the case was complete—any further effort by Gerald to win freedom would be doomed. Mr. Sultan, of course, refused.

As provided by a commenter to the post, the Massachusetts’s rules of professional responsibility provides:

RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy.

It further provides at MRPC 8.6(a) that any lawyer who seeks to induce another to violate the rules is also in violation.  So from the technical perspective, it would appear that Coakley’s demand would be an ethical violation, though the rule is primarily directed toward civil cases where a lawyer would trade-off one client’s recovery for another.

As another of Anderson’s commenters note, this problem arises not only from Coakley, but from Sultan’s representation of multiple defendants, post appeal, and thus implicates Bennett’s conflict of interest point, that even defendants with apparently aligned interests may well face a conflict.  The distinction here is that Coakley’s condition arises in 1999, years after the 1986 conviction.

From a harshly practical perspective, Sultan’s willingness to pursue freeing his clients, conflicts notwithstanding, years later was a huge benefit to the defendants.  Rarely can a defendant find a lawyer willing to serve his or her cause after conviction and appeal, no less continue to do so for years afterward.  That Sultan was willing to push the case was itself something of a miracle, and to suggest that he should have limited his service to one while leaving the others on their own is pragmatic lunacy.

It strikes me that Coakley’s demand doesn’t fall easily into the ethical rules paradigm, but rather a deliberate effort to undermine the constitutional right to counsel.  Her goal was to take the one lawyer willing, and clearly capable, of undermining the conviction out of the mix in order to limit the bleeding to the prosecution.  Her goal was to deprive Gerald Amirault of his right to counsel.

By asking whether Coakley’s condition is unethical, Anderson trivializes the problem she sought to create.  The ethical rules are replete with conflicts and are frequently a matter of balancing cost and benefit.  This is particularly true when one tries to apply them to criminal matters, and even more so when applied to the prosecution.  As Dick Thornburgh  informed us, there are no ethical rules that apply to federal prosecutors.

The bigger, and more fundamental, issue is that Coakley took an affirmative stance designed to facially undermine a defendant’s constitutional right.  While waiver of constitutional rights is a common occurrence, this was instead a trade-off of rights, a benefit for Cheryl Amirault at the expense of Gerald.  This way, at least one innocent person would remain imprisoned and the government wouldn’t look completely ridiculous.

What emerges from Anderson’s question goes well beyond a balancing of ethical interests by Martha Coakley, but the use of state power to coerce a constitutional deprivation.  Is that ethical?

Schools Have Rules: Better Safe Than Sorry Edition

For the most part, over-reactions by school administrators tend to be based on some bizarrely misguided application of a zero-tolerance rule that was initially born from a well-intended cause.  At the very least, we can attribute the harm done by some grocery clerk with a checklist to something concrete, like strip-searching a teenage girl for killer Ibuprofen to prevent a heroin epidemic.

But the mindless harm caused by school administrators veers off the beaten path when the basis for the over-reaction is . . . mere ignorance, as happened in San Diego’s Millennial Tech Magnet Middle School.



Students were evacuated from Millennial Tech Magnet Middle School in the Chollas View neighborhood Friday afternoon after an 11-year-old student brought a personal science project that he had been making at home to school, authorities said.


Maurice Luque, spokesman for the San Diego Fire-Rescue Department, said the student had been making the device in his home garage. A vice principal saw the student showing it to other students at school about 11:40 a.m. Friday and was concerned that it might be harmful, and San Diego police were notified.

danger will robinsonWhat was this potentially dangerous thingy?  No clue.  Why was it potentially dangerous?  No clue.  The key to the grocery clerk’s fear was the total absence of knowledge.  So naturally, in came the Metro Arson Strike Team

[T}he project was made of an empty half-liter Gatorade bottle with some wires and other electrical components attached. There was no substance inside.

A MAST robot took pictures of the device and X-rays were evaluated. About 3 p.m., the device was determined to be harmless, Luque said.

Had it dawned on the grocery clerk to just ask the student about the bottle before calling in the SWAT team?  The school was locked down. The rest of the students were taken to a playing field for their protection. Parents were called to come pick up their students.  And the really cool robot, likely purchased with Homeland Protection funding to safeguard middle schools from terrorist attacks, was finally used, one 11 year old found out that the academic tolerance for scientific curiosity is limited to the grasp of a grocery clerk.

Now one might suspect, after the finest minds in protecting the safety of our children were sufficiently calmed by the pronouncement that there would be no Gatorade massacre, that a sheepish grocery clerk would be satisfied that he caused enough trouble for one day.  But that would be to ignore the nature of educators, who are never wrong, even in total ignorance.


The student will not be prosecuted, but authorities were recommending that he and his parents get counseling, the spokesman said. The student violated school policies, but there was no criminal intent, Luque said.
That would likely be the policy against making assistant principals look like grocery clerks.  Apparently, there’s now counseling for that.  After all, we can’t have middle school students engaged in independent scientific endeavors that befuddle school administrators. 

H/T Walter Olson

All Talk, No Responsibility

A couple of my favorite blawgers, Houston criminal defense lawyer Mark Bennett and corporate litigation wunderkind and Deliverance body double, Dan Hull, have chosen to ban anonymous comments from their blawgs.  Their rationale is simple.  Either take responsibility for your words or get lost.  The issue is similarly clear in Doe v. Reed, a case in which the Supremes granted cert.

Liptak at the New York Times provides the overview:


The new case arose from an effort to overturn a Washington State domestic partnership law known as the “everything but marriage” act. Opponents of the law gathered more than 130,000 signatures, enough to place a referendum on the November ballot.

Several groups asked the state to turn over the names, under its public records law, and two groups said they intended to post the names on the Internet. Their goal, according to a news release, was to encourage conversations among friends, relatives and neighbors that “can be uncomfortable for both parties.”

Protect Marriage Washington, a group that supports traditional marriage, sued to block release of the names, saying disclosure would probably result in “threats, harassment and reprisal.”

The district court enjoined. The 9th Circuit reversed. The Supremes stayed and granted cert.  The argument in favor of blocking disclosure of the names on the petition are summed up succinctly.



James Bopp Jr., a lawyer for Protect Marriage Washington, said in a statement that the Ninth Circuit’s decision infringed “the rights of citizens who support a traditional definition of marriage to speak freely and without fear.”

“No citizen,” Mr. Bopp added, “should ever worry that they will be threatened or injured because they have exercised their right to engage in the political process.”
Putting aside the purely speculative nature of the fear of threats or injuries, Bopp is just plain wrong.  We should fear that our public statements will bring public approbation, anger, disagreement, and all the possibly negative consequences that can flow from it.  This is what prevents people from indulging our worst nature, our deepest prejudices, our angriest hatred.

Signing a petition is clearly endorsement of a political position, a statement intended for public use.  No one signs anticipating that the petition will be hidden away in a shoebox in the garage, but to be handed over and distributed to someone, usually in government, to make a political statement.  While some signers feel pressured into it and don’t actually agree, or perhaps even care, with the position, that’s a separate problem of spineless courtesy.  The only solution for such signers is learn how to just say no. 

For those who sign because they agree with the position, believe that it reflects their views and that its worthy of letting someone with the power to redress their grievances know, tough nuggies.  They can’t have it both way, amass political clout via a petition yet conceal with identities so that they face no consequences for their actions.  Actions have consequences.  Actions are supposed to have consequences, which is what prevents the other disinhibited from behaving like a blithering idiot.  Most of us have a blithering idiot inside yearning to get out, if only we wouldn’t be held responsible.

The Bopps argue that people must be allowed to “exercise their right to engage in the political process.”  Absolutely.  But he argues that they need not worry that they will be accountable for exercising that right.  Oh no.  With rights come responsibilities.  If his signers fear that their neighbors will hate them for asserting their views, a risk they’re unwilling to accept, then that’s good.  It’s what stops people from doing things they secretly want but fear would be otherwise embarrassing, or mean, or evil.

We are becoming a nation of cowards, where cowardice is not merely a common attribute but one to be celebrated and protected.  We embrace our right to be cowards, to assert our worst nature and bear no responsibility for it.  Believe what you want, no matter how foolish or wrong it may be.  That’s your right.  But when you choose to assert it, own it.  If the price is too high, then you can’t afford it. 

This was meant to be the Land of the Brave.  It’s time to knock cowards off the pedestal.

Haiti: No Call For Lawyers

The people of Haiti need many things now.  Water. Food. Medicine. Heavy equipment.  It’s a long list.  Lawyers aren’t on it.  Yesterday, I tried to make my point via twit :


Notice how important Doctors Without Borders is in a disaster. Notice there is no Lawyers Without Borders?
Naturally, there were numerous responses that there are indeed organizations bearing the name Lawyers Without Borders.  Even in French, there is a group of that name.  It wasn’t about the name. Anyone who repeats their responses here will be banned for life.  Similarly, anyone who wants to inform me that it’s called a “tweet” rather than “twit” will be banned for life.  You are slaves to the banal and lack the ability to see beyond the literal. 

The point is that emergent desperation calls for certain abilities.  Think Abraham Maslow.  It breaks my heart that I, as a lawyer, cannot offer the help that people need in their desperation.  I cannot ease their pain.  I cannot feed the hungry children.  I cannot build them shelter.  I cannot even capture the suffering on film so that the rest of the world can see the pain.  I am but a lawyer.  There are times when my limitations are manifest.  This is such a time.

Criminal defense lawyers, by and large, feel that we bring something critically important to a functioning society, protecting the least powerful from the most.  We do this because we feel a desire, a need, to contribute to others.  Transactional lawyers don’t share this feeling.  To close a big multinational billion dollar deal rarely involves any desire to serve their fellow man.  It’s just about money.  Money doesn’t motivate criminal defense lawyers.  If that’s what motivates you, then criminal defense is not likely to be your best field of endeavor.  You will be disappointed.

While my arms and legs still work to some extent, I could offer the people of Haiti no more than a helping hand to life the rubble off buried bodies.  It’s something, but no different than what any other laborer could offer.  My specialization adds nothing at the moment.  There are times, in emerging nations, when lawyers can assist in the higher order function of bringing a rational legal system, a means of justice or dispute resolution, together.  But when people are suffering in pain, thirst and hunger, this seems trivial.  The needs are so basic and critical, and I have nothing to offer.

In the early years of my career, I pumped myself up by thinking of the platitudes that support the existence of the legal system and the value of the law.  It took a while before I had been around long enough to be able to turn around and look back at my legacy.  I saw piles of paper.  There were, of course, people whose lives I had saved, and I felt good about it.  There was law that came about as a result of my efforts, and I felt good about it.  There were bad cops taken off the street because of me, and I felt good about it.  It wasn’t a wasted life by any means.

But as I look at the devastation in Haiti, it reminds me of a long-standing, nagging doubt about my choice of career.  I cannot jump into the suffering and do anything meaningful to help. 

Obviously, lawyers serve an important function.  No need for some kid lawyer to be so presumptuous as to explain to me what we do and its value.  But when there are people in pain who need help, I want to be capable of providing it.  I want to be able to do whatever is needed to help others.  No one in Haiti is calling for the United States to send over its lawyers.