Author Archives: SHG

Zeal Has Its Rewards

When a regular person engages in intentional misconduct, he may well get arrested, prosecuted and sentenced.  When a criminal defense lawyer engages in intentional misconduct, he may be subject to the regular person routine, or just disbarred.  When a prosecutor engages in intentional misconduct, chances are slim that he goes the regular person route, or even the criminal defense lawyer route.  The most likely outcome is that he’s made a judge.

From Radley Balko at Reason comes the post about how Larimer County, Colorado, settled with Tim Masters for $4.1 million for his wrongful murder conviction.  Master’s innocence was proven by DNA, and his conviction was obtained when two prosecutors ignored and withheld exculpatory evidence.  Hey, once you’ve got your target, why bother worrying about whether he’s actually the one who did it?  As long as somebody’s convicted, society is happy.

But what’s become of these two intrepid prosecutors?  Radley lays it out:


Former prosecutors Terry Gilmore and Jolene Blair convicted Masters on flimsy evidence (some drawings he’d made and testimony from an alleged expert on sexual deviants). They were also actually censured by Colorado Supreme Court for not bothering to look into evidence undermining their case against Masters, as well as for withholding exculpatory evidence from Masters’ attorneys. The censure was an unusual reprimand for misbehaving prosecutors. But it was largely symbolic. As noted, Gilmore and Blair won’t have to pay a dime to Masters. And both will get to keep their current jobs: They’ve both since moved on to become judges in Larimer County District Court, where they preside over other criminal cases.
That they were censured, in itself, is quite amazing.  Even a slap on the wrist is more than usually results from prosecutorial misconduct.  That they have no financial accountability is no surprise, since our courts have clearly determined that it would be chilling to the zealous prosecutor to be held responsible for intentional misconduct.  We can’t have prosecutors afraid of engaging in deliberate wrongs if we’re to have them fearless in prosecuting the innocent.

But that they convicted an innocent man, withheld exculpatory evidence, were censured for it and then, after all that, moved on to be judges, is just too much to take.  In fairness, I asked Radley whether judges are elected or appointed in Larimer County, and he informs me that they are appointed and thereafter subject to retention elections.  That means somebody decided that Terry Gilmore and Jolene Blair represent the caliber of person that should sit in judgment of others, and appointed them to the bench.

It’s one thing for prosecutors to get a free pass on misconduct, and let there be no question but that the withholding of evidence from the defense so that they can convict an innocent person is misconduct, it’s another thing entirely to then reward that prosecutor by making him a judge.  That’s too much to take.  To not penalize is bad enough, but to reward prosecutors who engage in misconduct is beyond the pale.

We are constantly bombarded with the lofty platitudes about our system of criminal justice, how it may not be perfect but it’s better than any other.  As if this sweet talk covers a multitude of sins that could well be fixed to make it far less imperfect, far better than others.  That individuals who engage in wrongdoing are placed in a position to judge others is simply unacceptable.  That these individuals invariably come out of the prosecutor’s office isn’t an accident.  The government takes care of its own.

I’m with Radley when he bemoans the fact that prosecutorial misconduct is a cost passed along to taxpayers, who have a right to expect and demand better of those on the payroll.  I’m with Radley when he ridicules the lack of meaningful consequences for prosecutors who abuse their authority to convict the innocent and conceal the evidence.  But when these same prosecutors, who should be tossed out on their butt for what they’ve done, possibly getting free room and board in a special wing of a prison reserved for cops and prosecutors who enjoyed their job a little too much, are instead handed a black robe and told to have fun, mere ridicule isn’t enough for me.  

For me, this goes way over the line of impropriety, to the point of disgust.  I hope Radley’s with me when I say that the elevation of Terry Gilmore and Jolene Blair to the bench is outrageous and an affront to any dignity the judiciary still possesses.  I hope that their fellow judges feel the same way.

When Is A Sentence Ludicrous?

Sentencing is a curious thing.  It’s there to serve certain recognized purposes, yet nothing in 18 USC §3553 tells us what makes one sentence appropriate and another excessive (or inadequate, for that matter).  Whether framed in terms of months or years, it’s all just numbers at the time of sentence.  As it’s served, it’s day after day after day, perhaps for the rest of a person’s natural life.  Who knows what makes a sentence fit a crime?

Doug Berman at Sentencing Law and Policy ponders this when asking whether a guidelines sentence of 30 years for a computer hacker who was caught in possession of 1.8 million bank and credit card numbers is “ludicrous”.


Max Ray Vision, who legally changed his last name from Butler, had pleaded guilty in June to his role in an online clearinghouse where identity thieves shared stolen information.  A self-taught computer whiz who fell in love with the devices as an 8-year-old boy in his father’s computer store, Vision told Senior U.S. District Judge Maurice B. Cohill Jr. that he was mesmerized by “the thrill of hacking, being addicted to it.”

Bespectacled, soft-spoken and articulate, the 37-year-old Vision told the judge he had changed and realizes what he did was wrong. “You probably hear that a lot, but it’s absolutely true,” he said.

Cohill’s sentence was based on a joint recommendation by federal prosecutors and Vision’s public defender, Michael Novara.  Federal sentencing guidelines suggested a sentence of 30 years to life, which Novara called “ludicrous.”

Is it “ludicrous”?  Prosecutors claimed a loss of $27.5 million, based on a calculation of $25 per number cost to banks for each stolen number.  There was $86 million in fraudulent purchases traced to the numbers on the computer, and Vision netted about $1 million from selling numbers.  Aside from restitution, the sentence imposed was 13 years. due in some part to Vision’s cooperation.

Doug doesn’t find the 30 year guidelines sentence nearly as ludicrous as Vision’s lawyer.


Given the facts of this case and the reality that, in the words of the prosecutor here, the “amount of damage a person can cause with a keyboard in this day and age is astronomical,” I am not so ready or eager to assert that the guideline-recommended sentence of 30 to life really was “ludicrous.”  Let me explain.

First, though maybe it is unfair to compare Max Ray Vision to Bernie Madoff, I do think it is reasonable to suppose that Vision may be among the “worst of the worst” financial hackers.  If the “worst of the worst” Ponzi schemer earned himself 150 years in prison, is 30 years for the “worst of the worst” financial hacker really so out of whack?  Moreover, I think the need for, and potential value of, general deterrence in this setting is pretty strong, especially with respect to others who may be inclined to join an “online clearinghouse where identity thieves shared stolen information.” 

Finally, and perhaps most important, the threat of decades in prison no doubt was a primary reason Max Ray Vision was willing to plead guilty and has “continued to work with the government” to help bring down other financial hackers and identity thieves.  Though few are eager to either admit or endorse the value of extreme guideline sentences to induce pleas and cooperation, the threat of extreme sentences always serves to grease the wheels of the criminal justice system.
While I often find it difficult to put a finger on Doug’s sentencing philosophy, he’s made his position clear in this case.  In the extreme case, extreme sentences are an acceptable fit.  The general deterrence value of 30 years serves its purpose, as does the fist in the velvet glove to “gently persuade” the defendant to cooperate.

From my perspective, the guidelines sentence should be measured differently.  Initially, Bernie Madoff’s sentence should never be the bar by which others are measured, taking for granted that it was an appropriate sentence.  Nothing has skewed the relationship between financial crime and sentence worse than the Madoff sentence, and it is the dangerous new constant in sentencing.  This is not to trivialize what Madoff did, but to rationalize financial crime with other types of crime.  Being the “worst of the worst” Ponzi Schemer still isn’t the equivalent of mass murder.  We’ve run out of years when we start accepting the Madoff sentence as appropriate.  The only sentence left is life plus cancer (h/t Jeralyn Merritt)

This was a financial crime.  Certainly, it causes suffering by its victims, and it most assuredly has victims beyond the financial institutions that make stealing numbers easier than taking candy from a baby.  But it isn’t murder. It isn’t rape.  There has to be a differential of culpability between financial crime and violent crime.  Without it, proportionality is lost.  It’s not that a financial crime isn’t serious; it’s that it isn’t as serious as blowing up a building and killing a few hundred people.  It isn’t as serious as a serial child rapist murderer.  It’s just not as heinous, and yet we’ve compacted sentences to leave no room to distinguish between crimes of a very different nature.  As I’ve suggested half-jokingly, the Ponzi schemers might as well as knocked off a few people along the way, since it wouldn’t have had any real impact on their sentence.  There’s something very wrong with the fact that my joke smacks of reality.

As for the threat of excessive sentence serving what Doug finds to be the salutary purpose of inducing pleas and cooperation, the gap between our views widens exponentially.  Pleas and cooperation are not inherently a good thing, particularly when coerced by a potential sentence that is so excessive that it will push a theoretically innocent defendant to forego trial rather than risk an adverse verdict, or say anything to cooperate and get the beloved 5K1.1 letter.  The more excessive the sentence, the worse the impact on the exercise of rights and the adherence to the truth. 

Some people assume that every guilty plea is legitimate and every cooperator is telling the truth and serving a societal interest.  I do not.  I know from experience that people plead guilty when they aren’t, or aren’t as guilty as the prosecution claims.  They do so out of fear of consequences.  This is fundamentally wrong, and an integral part of our system.  It’s the natural by-product of excessive sentences, making it too risky to fight for those whose tolerance can’t take it.

It’s similarly true that people will cooperate, whether to lie about others or manufacture crimes so that they can “solve” them and get the prosecution to need them, to love them, to cut them a break.  Why do young AUSAs believe that yesterday’s criminal is today’s totally honest cooperator?  It may be enlightened self-interest, but that doesn’t make it truthful. 

When a potential sentence serves as an incentive for the innocent to plead guilty, or liars to cooperate, then the system has failed.

By using the word “ludicrous” as the bar, Doug has set up the question in a way that makes it nearly impossible to dispute.  Ludicrous is a very vague, very extreme bar to reach.  If the question is whether a 30 year sentence for Vision is extreme under the criteria set forth in §3553, my answer is absolutely.  Ten years is a lifetime to Vision, and any other hacker inclined to do what he did.  Deterence will be achieved.

If the question is whether the sentence is so extreme as to shock the conscience, then I’m afraid not.  Not because it shouldn’t be, but because extreme sentences have become so commonplace, so normal, that it’s almost impossible to find a sentence for a serious financial crime shocking anymore.  And this, I fear, is what is truly ludicrous.

Colin Samuel’s Other Blawg Review

While I rarely find it difficult to write a post here, the one thing that’s proven painful for me to do is write a blawg review.  I’ve done so twice, and both sucked.  Big time.  They were just awful.  Whether you enjoy posts at Simple Justice otherwise or not, these two blawg reviews were both nightmares to write as well as read. 

But there are a few people whose skill at writing blawg reviews is remarkably.  These include Turk (who is currently the source for the motherlode of Scalia curiosity after his brother Dan received a letter back from the Associate Justice on the topic of secession, which has gone viral throughout the blawgosphere) and this year’s Blawg Review of the Year winner, Kevin Thompson at Cyberlaw Central.  But the Undisputed King of Blawg Review is none other than Colin Samuel at Infamy or Praise.  After winning BR of the Year for three years running, Colin was banned from ever winning again so that someone else would have a chance.  Colin was that good.

Which finally brings me to the point of this post.  Quietly, Colin posts his own mini-blawg review every Wednesday, called A Round Tuit,.  They open with the same weekly introduction:


A Round Tuit

When it comes to legal blogging, there seems to be no shortage of writing worth reading once one gets around to it.

What’s that? You have no round tuit? My friend, you are fortunate indeed, for never before in human history have round tuits been so readily available. If you need one, Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. has them in stock.

While you place your order, I’ll share a few posts which are worth your attention.

From there, Colin goes on a journey through the blawgosphere, not merely providing links to posts that interest him, but juxtaposing the posts from various blawgs to show debates raging in the blawgosphere, different perspectives and his two cents on the subject.  A Round Tuit is like a master class in blawg review, a one-post survey of the most interesting stuff being written in the blawgosphere.

Colin is already up to A Round Tuit 19, and I never miss one. But I have been remiss in showing Colin some appreciation for this effort in putting this together, week after week, for the benefit of the rest of us.  If you haven’t take a look, you should.  If you don’t read it weekly, you’re missing something great.

Thank you, Colin, for showing the rest of us how a master does a blawg review.  You are the best.

Structural Deficiencies

While criminal defense lawyers are better at some things than most other lawyers, one thing that we do not tend to do particularly well is embrace structure.  At What About Clients?, former Olympic ice dancing costume designer Dan Hull praises the virtues of structure.



I mean structure–a real standard for working–and “practicing structure” every day. It’s the discipline of: (1) having a plan or strategy for any one project (client or non-client), (2) meeting internal project deadlines (not just “jurisdictional” ones) no matter what, and (3) insisting that everyone in your shop “buy into” the discipline of keeping to that overall plan or strategy and timetable.

“Structure” is not just the hard process of getting things done. It’s a frame of mind and a value which must be sold to others in your shop–like the importance of making that 5 minute call to a client about a loose end at the end of the worst day you can remember, even while you could do it the next morning at 8:00. It’s realizing that letting anything but emergency tasks “slide” makes you inefficient, unlikely to meet your real goals, and tired.
Some men dream of glory.  Others dream of structure.  Want to bet who wins the prize?

The problem for CDLs is that we tend to be solos, small firm at best, and have no one watching over us at every moment to make us feel guilty for letting something slide to tomorrow.  Of course, something new arises tomorrow, and things just get pushed down the road until it’s too late.  I’ve seen so many instances of criminal defense lawyers trying desperately to get critical work done at the last minute because they neglected it when it first came in the door.  And more than a few end up explaining this to the grievance committee when they miss the deadline.

My approach is that of the obsessive-compulsive.  I feel the desire, even need, to do work as soon as it’s on my plate.  If a motion schedule is set in court, with motions due in a month, you can bet that I’m working on that motion today.  Not tomorrow. Not next week. Certainly not in a month. Today.  Do it now, get it done. 

Others do not appreciate my approach.  Because it’s essentially anal, I expect others to have their work done ASAP, regardless of whether it’s urgent or not.  It’s just how things should be done.  Those who adhere to a different philosophy find people like me irritating.

Not learning the value of pushing non-urgent but important things along at a steady pace has cost us dearly. As motivated as lawyers often are, our discipline for sticking to anything and seeing it through is often poor; again, unless it’s urgent, we just don’t see its value. Do our best clients run their businesses that way?

This attitude is the norm, and we lawyers–who rarely innovate or take a leadership position on anything in commerce–are just fine, thank you, with it. After all, “all the other law firms” are mediocre on the discipline of getting things done, and have “crisis-only” mentalities. “Why shouldn’t we be that way?”

So we waste time blowing off important, but longer-term projects. Worst of all, we send to others in our firms, and especially to younger lawyers, the message:



“No worries–just work on a barely adequate level; don’t do things until you have to; and if it’s not urgent, let it slide.”


It makes me feel better to know I’m not the only lawyer who works this way.  And it explains why ice dancing costumes by Hull always had that “finished” look.

The Deal on Cop Interrogation

Mark Draughn at WindyPundit was surprised.  I bet many others will be as well, having likely read stories about it over and over, and wondered why police officers get a better deal out of the 5th Amendment than anybody else.  Radley Balko has been chronicling the flotsam of cops doing wrong, yet suffering no apparent ill consequences, for quite a while.  It’s nearly a daily event over at the Agitator.


I’ve always known that police officers get special treatment when accused of a crime, but I always assumed it was just a good deal that the cops gave to other cops. I never knew there was an official court ruling about it.
It’s not just a perk of the job.  It’s the law.


Radley Balko points to a St. Louis Post-Dispatch article about the Garrity Rule :



In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved it with what came to be known as the Garrity Rule. It says a public employee can be compelled by threat of discipline to admit criminal activity, but the information cannot be used for prosecution.


Wikipedia puts it a slightly different way:



The Garrity warning is an advisement of rights usually administered by US federal agents to federal employees and contractors in internal investigations. The Garrity warning advises suspects of their criminal and administrative liability for any statements they may make, but also advises suspects of their right to remain silent on any issues that tend to implicate them in a crime. It was promulgated by the US Supreme Court in Garrity v. New Jersey (1967). In that case, a police officer was compelled to make a statement or be fired, and then criminally prosecuted for his statement. The Supreme Court found that the officer had been deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to silence.


Mark reacts by saying he doesn’t understand the rule.  My guess is that he understands Garrity v. New Jersey perfectly; what he doesn’t understand is why cops get a completely different rule than everybody else. The irony is that the Garrity Rule is based on the rationale that police officers don’t lose their 5th Amendment right by virtue of being cops, when the point of the rule is give cops a level of protection that no one but cops enjoy.  Essentially, while the rest of us can be questioned after an arrest, provided we’ve been given Miranda warnings, not cops.  What’s really going to make Mark’s head explode is that the Garrity Rule isn’t the only problem.  It gets worse.

Police officers are invariably represented by a union, and invariably, the union contract provides that an officer cannot be interrogated after arrest without either a cooling off period or a union representative present.  The ability to investigate a crime, when the suspect is a cop, is thus controlled by a union contract.  What a deal! Welcome to NLRB v. Weingarten, which applies in a special way for cops than it does for any other union employee since the cops would be interrogated by their own.

So why are police given special treatment?  Is a crime committed by a police officer less of a crime, less harmful, less significant than a crime committed by anyone else?  Is the harm to the victim less painful?  Is the harm to society less worthy of prosecution?  It might well be argued that a crime committed by a cop is more significant, more blameworthy.  After all, we give cops an enormous amount of power and authority, and if they can’t be trusted to conduct themselves lawfully, it’s a far bigger problem than crime in general.  If anything, cops should be held to a higher standard of behavior by virtue of their oath and position.

But it’s just not the way things flesh out.  The rationale in favor of protecting a police officer’s privilege against self-incrimination is fine, even laudable.  It’s just that the same rationale doesn’t apply to everyone else.  Cops are allowed to use any weapon to get us to confess, short of ignoring our invocation of the right to remain silent and counsel.  Even these qualifications are mangled, subject to the greatest precision lest the invocation be deemed equivocal.  It’s a trap for the unwary.

So while the Garrity Rule is wrapped up with a nice ribbon by the typical lofty love language of the Constitution, it’s a gift only for police.  Mark’s initial reaction, that it’s just a perk of the job, was right.  The only aspect he misunderstood is that it’s not a gift from one cop to another, but a gift from an appreciative court to the police.  It’s tough to be a cop.  Don’t they deserve those great rights that they happily ignore when it comes to the rest of us?

A Contemptible Baptism

What made Joseph Reyes decide that he had to baptize his daughter at that moment?  He’s got his explanations, all of which fall flat, but he ignores one really important reason to hold up.  The judge ordered him not to.  From GMA :



Joseph Reyes pleaded not guilty for allegedly violating a court order issued by Chicago family law Judge Edward R. Jordan who had barred Reyes from taking his 3-year-old daughter to church following a dispute over religion with his estranged wife. Reyes’ wife, Rebecca Reyes, is Jewish.


Reyes and his wife are in a bitter divorce battle, and the question of what faith their child should be raised in is pushing the boundaries of child custody arrangements.

Reyes’ decision to baptize his daughter without his wife’s permission resulted in what some are calling an extraordinary court order: Jordan in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., imposed a 30-day restraining order forbidding Joseph Reyes from, according to the document, “exposing his daughter to any other religion than the Jewish religion. …”

When Joseph and Rebecca Reyes married, he converted to Judaism to please his wife’s family.  Not a good reason to change religions, but people do things for love.  The couple had a child, who (not surprisingly given Joseph’s conversion) they parents decided would be raised Jewish.  Still, the marriage failed (also not a surprise, given the depth of religious antipathy), and the divorce is an unpleasant one.

When Joseph Reyes decided that he was going to expose his daughter to his religion, Catholicism, and have her baptized, Rebecca sought injunctive relief.  The court ordered a 30 day TRO, usually issued pending determination of the motion to maintain the status quo ante.  Naturally, Joseph, had to bring her to church while the TRO was in effect.  And brought a TV camera crew along for the personal religious experience.

Reyes had his explanations at the ready.  He never stopped being Catholic despite the conversion.  He was deeply religious.  He didn’t really violate the court order.


“Going to church, I don’t think I violated the order,” he told “Good Morning America.” “In terms of Judaism, based on the information I was given, Catholicism falls right under the umbrella of Judaism.”

In a YouTube video of the subsequent visit to church, Joseph Reyes says, “I am taking her to hear the teachings of perhaps the most prominent Jewish rabbi in the history of this great planet of ours.”

Somehow, I doubt this argument is going to fly.  It couldn’t be more clear that Joseph’s actions were deliberately times to flout the court order and create this controversy.  After three years of raising his daughter Jewish, 30 days wouldn’t break him. 

Yet the question remains, should the court have issued the TRO?  Eugene Volokh thinks not.



Eugene Volokh, a professor at the UCLA School of Law, said a parent who has visitation rights “usually has the right to expose the child to his religious beliefs, teach the child his religion, to take the child to religious services, unless there seems to be likely psychological or physical harm stemming from that exposure.”

That’s not to say the Eugene suggests it’s acceptable to violate a TRO, even if the underlying order may be unconstitutional.  While my reaction to the TRO was a shrug, seeing it as the usual course of maintaining the status quo pending determination, Eugene saw it as an improper prior restraint on speech/religion.  Via email, Eugene explained:


Where First Amendment rights are involved, TROs aimed at preserving the status quo may well be improper.  That’s certainly so in a typical free speech case; for instance, even if one can get a permanent injunction against a libel after a trial at which it’s proved to be a libel – and some states allow this – one generally can’t get a TRO or a preliminary injunction, even if that’s necessary to preserve the status quo by minimizing the damage to the target’s reputation.  See generally Lemley & Volokh, http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/copyinj.htm . 

The status quo, per the story, was that the parents had agreed to raise the child Jewish, thus raising the question of whether that altered the calculus as to the enforcement ot the status quo pending decision.  Eugene responded:


As to the prior agreement, I’ve seen no evidence that there was a binding contract to raise the child Jewish for the rest of the child’s childhood.  There was an agreement that the child will be raised Jewish, but such agreements are generally intended as agreements to go along with something so long as one thinks that’s the right thing.  An analogy:  Say you agree with your wife that you’ll take a particular high-paying but potentially unpleasant job; I take it we wouldn’t see this as a binding contract with her that you will continue to work at that company so long as they’ll have you, but rather a tentative agreement to go to work there and to stay working there so long as you yourself think is right for you and for the family.  Likewise, an agreement not to tell your child about sex until he hits puberty would probably not be a binding contract not to say such things, but just a statement of your intentions (plus perhaps some modest moral obligation), subject to change if circumstances or even your attitudes change.

It’s not entirely clear to me that this agreement wasn’t binding, even though it may not have been in writing with the usual formalities.  There was reliance, perhaps detrimental estoppel, at the time and the parents acted upon it by having a child and raising the child Jewish.  Moreover, it seems fairly clear that Joseph’s finding religion has more to do with the bitter divorce than any love of a prominent Jewish rabbi, making his change of mind disingenuous and intentionally antagonistic. 

That said, it seems that the wife, Rebecca, is similarly making a mountain out of a molehill.  If her daughter is Jewish, then a baptism is nothing more than a quick bath without soap.  That it holds religious significance for Catholics doesn’t change its lack of religious significance to her.  Nor will a three year old suffer any harm from the experience, any more than a visit to church will fundamentally alter the child’s life.

So the parents are locked in a bitter divorce and are acting out of spite for each other by using the daughter as a weapon.  What else is new?  If this was truly a clash of religious beliefs, the legal aspect might well present a truly difficult conundrum.  But since religion is secondary to spitefulness, and since there was a court order in effect at the time that, and no harm would have been suffered had Joseph waited it out and argued his position as to a permanent injunction, I find it difficult to imagine how he could prevail.  The rule, comply now, appeal later, seems fully applicable, Eugene’s prior restraint argument notwithstanding.

For those who think criminal cases are ugly, they are nothing compared to the anger and bitterness of a divorce.

That’s Why You Get To Sit On The Big Bench

That our Constitution has come to be regularly defined by a single vote is bad enough.  But when the Supreme Court Justice who casts that deciding vote, Anthony Kennedy, speaks out against the very evil that he voted to maintain, it reduces the notion of constitutionality to a farce.  That’s worse.

Today’s New York Times editorial addresses a speech given by Justice Kennedy at Pepperdine University law school, where he was critical of California’s absurd three-strikes law.



Justice Anthony Kennedy spoke out against excessive prison sentences this month in California, criticizing the state’s deeply misguided three-strikes law. It was a welcome message, delivered with unusual force. Much of the blame for the law, however, lies with the Supreme Court, which upheld it in a decision on which Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote.

He turned more serious, however, on the subject of incarceration. Sentences in the United States are eight times longer than those handed out in Europe, Justice Kennedy said. California has 185,000 people in prison at a cost of $32,500 each per year, he said. He urged voters and elected officials to compare taxpayer spending on prisons with spending on elementary education.


Justice Kennedy took special aim at the three-strikes law, which puts people behind bars for 25 years to life if they commit a third felony, even a nonviolent one. The law’s sponsor, he said, is the correctional officers’ union, “and that is sick.”

This would be the same Justice Kennedy who held that a life sentence for shoplifting, as a third felony, did not violate the 8th Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause based on its glaring disproportionality.  We’re not talking about mere incrementally increased punishment, but dropping the atom bomb. 

When a Supreme Court Justice states, “that’s sick,” might we think that it’s bad enough to violate the 8th Amendment? 

As the editorial properly notes, Justice Kennedy’s speech clearly gets it right.  So why then is the 5th vote in favor of its constitutionality?  Judicial modesty perhaps?  Is “sick” not sick enough?  Mind you, this was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Kennedy casting the deciding vote.  It’s not like he would have been going out on a limb, all crazy and such, to make it a 5-4 decision the other way. 

It’s wonderful to hear a Supreme speak his mind outside of the parameters of a decision.  It certainly provides a far greater feel, maybe even a meaningful understanding, of who this person is who holds such vast power over our law.  But there is similarly no way to reconcile such public pronouncements with the failure to use the power entrusted to a justice of the Supreme Court to make decisions consistent with this belief. 

Of course it would be easier for the justices if voters and elected officials would rid the courts of the burden of having to pass judgment on bad laws.  It takes the onus off the justices and they won’t be responsible for making the tough decisions.  But that’s what the job is, whether they like it or not.  It’s making tough calls when the public and politicians stray from the Constitution to sate whatever blood lust arises from the issue of the day.  This is the job of being a Supreme Court Justice.  You’ve got the power to do something about it, and you’re expected to have the guts to use it.

That Justice Anthony Kennedy believes this to be so fundamentally wrong that he would call it “sick”, yet votes to uphold its constitutionality.  Now that’s sick.

Universal Public Defender and The War Council

As the debate continues on whether Norm Pattis’ radical idea for a Universal Public Defender system that would cover those who are neither indigent nor financially capable of a meaningful defense, an email came in from the New York Criminal Bar Association.  This is the New York City, primarily Manhattan, flavor of the criminal bar, and they will be holding a war council this Wednesday to decide whether, and how, to challenge the City’s RFP that would likely spell the death of 18B in the City.  For those outside, 18B is the system of private lawyers being assigned indigent defense.

In response to my concerns about a UPD system, Norm argues that my fears are overblown.

Having a universal public defender service does not mean conscripting all members of the bar and making them government employees. It means that all members of the bar can apply to be appointed off a list of qualified defenders. It also means that making your way onto that list, and remaining there, requires demonstrating minimal competence in the difficult work of defending the accused.

Not all lawyers will seek such appointment. Those who don’t want strings attached to what they do can compete for the private dollars swirling in the wake of the arrests of the affluent. But the middle class, those folks not indigent but without the means to hire a full defense team, won’t be facing the resources of the state armed only with the wits of the lawyer they could afford.

I see this statement as marginally accurate but quite naive.  Gideon has a better take, noting that the vast number of case are already covered by public defense, leaving only a slice between the rich and everyone else to be addressed:


Which brings us to the one category that would really benefit from some modification of the public defender system: the poor-by-everyone-else’s-standards-but-not-poor-enough-to-get-a-pd.

This is the class of defendants who make a little too much to fall below the artificially low income threshold and don’t make nearly enough to realistically hire a lawyer and fund the tools of an adequate defense.  It is these people that we need to be worried about. Several times have I expressed disgust at the indigency cutoff and the arbitrary enforcement of these “guidelines”. What might get you counsel in one court, county or state may not get you counsel in another. There needs to be an honest and serious rethinking of the guidelines.
While moving the bar of indigency upward would alter the calculus somewhat, and rid us of the assumption that poor means dirt poor, and anyone who isn’t dirt poor is wealthy enough to afford to pay for a criminal defense, it reduces the number of people who fall into the no-man’s-land of criminal defense but does not eliminate the problem.  People who are solidly middle class, maybe even upper middle class, really aren’t equipped to handle a serious criminal defense.

I think Gid might be surprised to learn how many people appear to be doing fine but, when pressed to come up with a substantial amount of money quickly, find themselves wholly unable to do so.  As a public defender, Gid probably doesn’t have to deal with this often.  As a private criminal defense lawyer, I probably see this more regularly.  I suspect this is what Norm is talking about, rather than the guy with a 3 year old car and nothing else.

Norm’s dismissal of my concerns, however, may be a bit premature.  Witness the NYCBA war council.  While 18B only covers indigent defendants under the current system, meaning that we’re talking about the really indigent rather than the mere house-poor indigent, and lawyers are preparing to go to war.  They know.  Without the income derived from 18B assignments, it’s unlikely that they will survive.  This is the bread and butter of many a law practice.  This is how they pay the bills and feed the family.  Without it, they’re toast.

There will be a handful of lawyers who have no need to participate in a UPD system, and will opt out.  The vast majority will have no choice but to take whatever the government gives.  Without this work, their practice cannot survive.  They cannot survive.  Sure, some may switch to real estate closings and wills, and dabble in criminal defense when the odd retained case comes their way, but most will never see a criminal case again.  Not every lawyer has a practice base in the filthy rich, and, frankly, the rich don’t get arrested all that often.  That’s why it makes the papers whenever they do.

My best guess is that such a system will virtually eliminate the existence of a private criminal defense bar.  For the vast majority of private criminal defense lawyers, who aren’t the short list for the prosecuted rich, the choice will be sign up or find some other way to earn a living.  There simply won’t be enough regular retained criminal cases for them to maintain a practice.  At that point, the government will control the purse strings of, say, 98% of the criminal defense bar. 

Whether it’s someday decided that people no longer deserve a defense, should a conservative Supreme Court issue a 5-4 decision overruling Gideon v. Wainwright as being one of those wacky liberal penumbras, or whether they just choke lawyers by tightening the purse strings should money get tight (it could happen) or the decision be made to allocate scarce resources elsewhere, like bombs, criminal defense will be at the mercy of the State.

It’s not that I disagree with Norm, Gideon, Bennett or Kindley about the problem.  It’s a real problem, and like them, I both see it and feel for those who suffer for the inability to be able to afford a meaningful defense.  I’m just not ready to hand over the control of the criminal defense bar to the compassion of the government or the American people.  With a UPD system, that’s precisely what I see happening.  And so do the lawyers who will attend the NYCBA war council, who have good reason to fear that this spells the end of their private criminal defense practice.

Working For The Man

Of the handful of questions that criminal defense lawyers are asked regularly, “why do I have to pay if I’m innocent?” is right up there. And it’s a good question.  Defendants don’t ask to be prosecuted.  Defendants, not to mention their families, may well be rendered destitute by the cost of defending themselves against spurious accusations.  Who needs that?

A move is afoot to shift the cost of prosecution, which includes the cost of defense, to the government.  Norm Pattis has started a blog dedicated to the idea.  Mark Bennett is one board following an idea promoted by John Kinley.  As they note, it’s not merely the cost of the lawyer, but the ancillary costs, most notably costs for experts witnesses, that can kill you.  It’s a problem we all face.

While poor defendants are given lawyers, as well as some basic level of access to experts, it’s not all it’s cracked up to be with defense lawyers carrying enormous caseloads, often far beyond the ability of any lawyer to adequately handle.  But even the defendant who can afford a lawyer is tapped beyond the ability to pay when it comes to handling the cost for all the elements that go into a good defense (not a great defense, but merely a good one).  When it reaches the point of losing a house to pay for a witness, and with no guarantee of either success or efficacy, hard choices often dictate that the kids need a roof over their head.

The problem is clarified by the asymmetry of the defense that can be mounted by the wealthy from that of everyone else.  Why should the wealthy get “more” justice than others?  Why should the non-wealthy be denied the ability to defend themselves fully?  Good questions.

But this Utopian ideal, free criminal defense for all, may not be the panacea desired.  Just as the defense provided poor people falls short of that which the wealthy purchase now, for reasons wholly outside the control of their lawyers, it smacks of a race to mediocrity for all.  Too many defendants, too much need, not enough money, would plague the system.  Price control over the costs would chase many away from the practice, from lawyers to experts who won’t work for state dictated rates.  Just because a bureaucrat thinks that $27 an hour is plenty doesn’t mean the rest of us have to go with the program.

More than that, I fear giving the government this much control over the criminal defense bar.  Some will sign up because it’s welfare for lawyers, diminishing the need for lawyers to perform their best to satisfy their client’s needs.  When clients don’t pay, lawyers don’t perform.  It happens.

If the criminal defense bar becomes dependent on the government for its livelihood, we likewise become dependent on the government for our existence.  One day, somebody gets it into their heads that they don’t like us anymore and, poof, we’re done.  One bad Supreme Court decision and Gideon is toast.  A vital private bar, beyond the reach of the government, must continue to exist if we’re going to be positioned to fight for the accused.  If our children’s next meal depends on government largesse, we have sold our independence for good.  We’re just another cog in the government wheel.

Put us on the government payroll and we work for the Man.  Do we really want to serve the Man?  Not me.  I serve my client, no one else.

3 Years Ago Today

The first post on Simple Justice was published February 13, 2007, a day when I didn’t have enough to do.  It seems like only yesterday, though 3092 posts have since seen the light of day.

I’ve made a lot of friends. And more than a few enemies.  But it’s always been interesting. I’ve learned a lot and hope some of you feel the same way.  And I’ve never run out of things I want to write about.  It may happen some day, but not yet.

Thanks to everyone, friends and foes alike, for reading.