Author Archives: SHG

The Time For Talk Is Over

As regular readers know, I’ve been poking GW Law Professor and Concurring Opinions honcho  Dan Solove in the side for a while now to get a reaction out of him,  It’s not that I’ve got a special thing about Dan, but he became the poster boy for what I saw as the insular lawprofs.  This culminated in a back room discussion between Dan and I via email.  Dan asked that I keep the conversation private, and I will respect his wishes.

But since I’ve been my usual noisy self about the lack of discussion between practitioners and professors, it seemed only right to close the loop on the subject.  The bottom line is that Dan disagrees with me that there is a serious divide between the lawprofs and practitioners.  He doesn’t see it.  He tells me that he’s all for vigorous debate and discussion with practitioners as well as professors. 

However, that’s just the beginning, rather than the end, of the issue.  The love of debate notwithstanding, I was told that my tone, and apparently that of my “circle” (the meaning of which is not entirely clear) as well, is too “disrespectful” to the scholars.  I didn’t see it that way, but obviously I’ve offended Dan and that’s how he felt.  The problem, from my side, is that my tone was no different toward Dan (or any other lawprof) than it would be toward anyone else.  Practitioners don’t seem to have a problem with it.  Dan found it unacceptable.

My offer of a truce, coupled with my offer to tone it down so as not to offend academic sensibilities, was appreciated, but rejected.  Dan’s position was clear: I have already “poisoned the well.” 

Needless to say, my views differ from Dan’s, but it’s no longer relevant to explain why.  Regardless of my thoughts about the lawprofs, or their thoughts about me (or my circle, whoever that may be), I have been clearly told that I am persona non grata.  Whether this foreclosure of discussion reflects a failing on their part or mine is no longer a worthy subject of discussion.  Right or wrong, it’s done, and Dan is neither willing nor desirous of engaging in any discussion with me.  Having heard nothing from other lawprofs, I assume his views are an accurate reflection of others.

On the one hand, I suppose that Dan’s decision to put me on permanent ignore is a wise.  I don’t really think I have it in me to express myself in a way that would suit academic sensitivities, even though they deny that they are either sensitive or averse to debate.  I am a trial lawyer, and I express myself like a trial lawyer.  I won’t please everyone, and I’m just going to have to live with that.

On the other hand, however, it’s sad that some within the legal profession, meant in its broadest sense, would rather hide behind being offended than confront the scrutiny of their ideas.  I’ve no doubt this sentence will be seen as highly offensive, but that’s how it goes.  It’s not all hugs and kisses in the real world, and we sometimes duke it out with each other to test our thoughts and beliefs.  We are cavemen to those with refined sensibilities, but we are also the cavemen who actually do the stuff that others just talk about. 

So I have failed to meet Dan’s qualifications.  I am saddened by that, not because I agree that I’m too coarse and vulgar, or that I’m too strident in my expressions, but because I find much of interest and value in the lawprofs’ writings and believe that the divide is huge, and quite dangerous.  Too many of my brethren don’t bother with the academics because they find them clueless, and they are wrong to ignore them.  Unlike me, they want nothing to do with the lawprofs, or their nuanced messages of deep thoughts.  Real disrespect can be found in the fact that practitioners ignore you rather than disagree with you. 

But if the lawprofs won’t engage us unless we change our ways to meet their delicate sensitivities (and yes, they are extremely delicate no matter how much they deny it), then they will continue to pursue their theories and we will continue to suffer lawmakers and courts using their theories to justify bad and dysfunctional law.  If the theories can’t withstand the scrutiny of practitioners, and yet the lawprofs are cool with that, then I guess we’re just stuck with things as they are.  One might ask why we don’t demand that lawprofs get their heads out of the clouds and start expressing themselves more like practitioners.  Of course, that will never happen.

To be clear, I still respect Dan Solove and the rest of his “circle”, as well as those writing at the wealth of other lawprof blawgs.  I may not care for the way they express themselves at times, or how they circle the wagons rather than court controversy, but they offer new ideas that merit attention, whether positive or negative.  And I hold no malice toward Dan or others for feeling as they do.  They’re entitled, whether I agree with it or not.  But I do not regret, and do not apologize, for not meeting with their approval.  That they would rather hide from the brutish Greenfield is their choice, and it’s their theories at stake for their refusal to confront the challenge of at least one real world practitioner.

But no matter.  I’ve been rebuffed and my quest is at an end.  And to the extent that I hadn’t offended every lawprof in the nation before, I’ve probably done so now.  But remember, guy and gals of the Academy, I’m one of the few practitioners who even cared that you existed. 

We Never Figure Things Out First

Now that it’s clear that Cameron Todd Willingham was executed for an arson/murder that wasn’t, there’s a question that demands an answer.  Scott Henson over at Grits for Breakfast asks it.  Bob Herbert at the New York Times asks it too.  Why is it that we convict people first, based on the hyperbolic claims of junk experts, and only put in the effort to vet the truth from the garbage after it’s too late?



Now comes a report on the case from another noted scientist, Craig Beyler, who was hired by a special commission, established by the state of Texas to investigate errors and misconduct in the handling of forensic evidence.

The report is devastating, the kind of disclosure that should send a tremor through one’s conscience. There was absolutely no scientific basis for determining that the fire was arson, said Beyler. No basis at all. He added that the state fire marshal who investigated the case and testified against Willingham “seems to be wholly without any realistic understanding of fires.” He said the marshal’s approach seemed to lack “rational reasoning” and he likened it to the practices “of mystics or psychics.”
Great.  A devastating report, ripping the prosecution’s theory to shreds, exposing the fire marshal as a fraud.  But only after Willingham, who turned down a plea that would spare his life and protested his innocence to the end, was put to death.  Where the heck was Craig Beylor when Willingham needed him?  Where are all the experts when the time to fight prosecution by voodoo needs to be made?

Let’s not mince words: The defendant’s best chance is at the trial of his case.  Thereafter, the legal presumptions work against him.  He’s no longer presumed innocent after a conviction, and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  Only before trial, before conviction, does he possess the full panoply of rights afforded by the Constitution.  That’s when a defendant needs the help.  After he’s dead, it’s all academic.

The sad fact is that access to the level of interest and scrutiny doesn’t exist when it’s most needed.  There’s no money for the fight, and worse still, even if there was the chances of capturing the interest of world renown experts to debunk the prosecution’s payroll experts is slim to none.  Two points need be made.  At the time of trial, every cop suddenly becomes an expert beyond reproach as far as the prosecution, judge and jury are concerned.  They’ve got their act together and practiced it until it comes off very convincingly.  The only problem is that it’s almost always a lie, even when they have the right defendant and their accusations are accurate.  As the old-time columnist, Murray Kempton, used to say, “there they go again, framing the guilty.”

The second point, however, is the most disturbing.  Try getting an expert, and I mean a real expert, when you need one.  Aside from the cost (and these guys know how to charge, enough so that they make plumbers blush), they just aren’t interested.  They couldn’t care less about your case or your client; you would be lucky to get them on the phone at all.  It’s not until the case hits the front page of the paper that there is a sudden flurry of interest.  Suddenly, experts want to be the one who breaks the case wide open and gets their mug on Page 1.  That motivates them.

So Willingham is dead for an accidental fire.  And absolutely nothing has changed because of it.  Just another blip in the criminal justice system.  After all, it’s not perfect, but it’s the best there is.  I’m sure Willingham takes comfort in knowing this, as do all the other Willinghams who sit in prison because some prosecutorial expert scientifically proved their guilt as well.  But they aren’t front page news.

As The Story Spins: Death Threats Are Not A Positive

As of yesterday, Cy Vance captured the endorsements of all three of New York City’s newspapers, the New York Times, the Daily News and the New York Post.  This is no small feat, given their disparate approaches and politics and the strength of his opponents, Leslie Crocker Snyder and Richard Aborn.  I too endorsed Cy, not that my endorsement is likely to put him over the top.

For reasons that have never been entirely clear, I’ve been on Leslie Crocker Snyder’s campaign email list since her last run four years ago.  I receive her campaign promotions, and read the rhetoric.  I’ve generally avoided commenting on it, both because I’m disinclined to support a candidate based upon their being the least objectionable, and because of a position I took some years back when 60 MInutes did a profile on her, and I was her counterpoint in the segment.

But as the campaign heats up to the boiling point, particularly given that Leslie has been denied the endorsement of the City’s newspapers, there is one disturbing claim that demands correction.


For more than 35 years, Leslie has spent her career standing up to the powerful — whether it be the Old Boys network that told her she couldn’t try a felony case because she was a woman (she was the first to do so), or the gangs that took over New York City streets and threatened the life of her family (she put the violent gang leaders in jail and helped make our City safe again).

Leslie has never pandered or surrendered to the establishment, and has always been unwavering in her fight for what is right, no matter the personal cost.
What’s troubling about this, aside from the fact that Leslie was the establishment in every conceivable way from the moment she hit the bench to the moment she left to challenge Morgenthau for DA four years ago, is the claim that her life, and that of her family, was threatened because of her efforts to “make our City safe again.”  That’s not quite the way I remember it.

When Leslie sat as a judge in Manhattan, first as an Acting Supreme and later as a Court of Claims (she was never elected to her own Supreme Court judgeship), cases were funneled to her because she was the most reliable judge on the bench when it came to assuring that the most serious, or most shaky, cases would result in both convictions and extraordinarily harsh sentences.  For this reason, she presided over some particularly nasty drug gang trials.  And, in fairness, these were indeed some very bad, very violent people.

But that’s not why her life was threatened.  Leslie had a bad habit, while wearing the robe, of engaging defendants in a vituperative commentary about their lives, their worthlessness, their evilness, in the course of doing the job one expects of a judge.  It’s not that she imposed harsh sentences.  Other judges imposed harsh sentences.  It’s that she wasn’t satisfied merely imposing sentences, but felt compelled to harangue the defendants, insult them, attack them, emasculate them, in the process.  While imposing a sentence is the job of a judge, using the bench as an opportunity to vent and attack in the process is not.

It was Leslie’s compulsion to make sure that defendants knew what she really thought of them that brought about these threats to her and her family.  When imposing a sentence of 232 years, thus assuring that a defendant would never breath free air again, there isn’t much to be gained by verbally castrating them as well.  But that didn’t stop her.  As long as she had the chance to humiliate a defendant, she did.  And they, being violent, nasty people, didn’t take kindly to it. 

As a result of the threats against her and her family, Leslie was given round the clock police protection, including a car and driver, for protection at a huge cost to the people of New York.  These were cops no longer available on the street, but a full contingent at her beck and call.  They sat inside her courtroom.  They scanned people entering.  They protected Leslie from harm.  All so she could use her bench to harangue and humiliate defendants.

To get a better sense of Leslie’s thoughts about her role as judge, she put them in writing in a book entitled “25 to Life,” a self-serving screed that showed her to be both the avenging angel of the law as well as the savior of New York City.  It’s not to suggest that any judge should be subject to death threats, or that any defendant, no matter what’s said to them, is entitled to threaten the life of a judge.  But if any judge ever begged violent criminals to do so, it was Leslie Crocker Snyder.  To the extent that her life was threatened, she did as much as humanly possible to bring it upon herself.

Lacking the sound discretion and temperament to perform her function as a judge, without giving rise to needless antagonism at the expense of a City is hardly an indication of her strength and fortitude in the face of criminal evil.  It was a clear demonstration, however, of the perversion of power and the inability to control the vitriol that flowed.  As a judge, Leslie went not merely too far, but into places where no judge has any business being.  What does that say about her exercise of discretion should she wield the power of District Attorney?

A Bond Too Big

Nobody is likely to feel particularly sorry for Michail Sorodsky, the 62 year old Brooklyn one-time physician who has just taken the crown, according to the New York Post, for the highest bail ever imposed.  What exactly he did isn’t quite clear from the Post story, shocking given the Post’s reputation for accuracy and thoroughness.


Attorney General Andrew Cuomo said Sorodsky, 62, was practicing without a license since at least 1995, administering “treatments” out of his Emmons Avenue office in Sheepshead Bay that may have been harmful, and sexually abusing at least eight female patients.

Despite the painful lack of detail, the story clearly suggests that Sorodsky’s the sort of fellow who should not be allowed to play doctor or get his hands on female patients while the case proceeds.  Fair enough. But protecting the public isn’t the purpose of bail, and he really isn’t that much of a threat to others under the circumstances anyway.  Nonetheless, high bail was set.


When he was first charged, in 2008, Judge Cassandra Mullen set a more modest $1 million cash or $3 million bond.

Another judge, Gustin Reichbach, reduced it to $500,000 bond if the alleged perv wore a monitoring bracelet.

Just for the record, neither $1 million, nor $500,000, is what a reasonable person would consider a lightweight bail.  These are some very big numbers in the first place, given that their purpose is limited to assuring the defendants return to court or loss of the bail.  Notably, there are no factors offered to suggest that the defendant was attempting to flee the jurisdiction, and as bad as the allegations might be, we’re not talking a capital murder charge here.  Nonetheless, matters worsened.


“I got a call from the bracelet company numerous times that the bracelet had been tampered with,” said the bail bondsman, Ira Judelson. The original conditions were restored.

Knowing Ira well, Ira being the only bail bondsman I would want to have a beer with, I am confident that he wouldn’t have raised the bracelet issue if he wasn’t seriously concerned about the situation.  Bear in mind, if the defendant is in the wind, Ira ends up having to pay the full bond amount.  Ira’s a sweetheart, but not stupid.

As if that wasn’t enough, then more alleged victims came out of the woodwork, giving rise to the prosecution adding additional charges.  Sorodsky was arraigned again, and this time bought the big one:



At the re-arraignment, Justice Vincent Del Giudice set $10 million cash or $30 million bond on the new case, which added to the original bail comes to $11 million cash or $33 million bond.
It would appear that the new charges were leveled separately, meaning that Sorodsky now had two indictments against him, or else there would be no way in which the two bails would be added together.  That said, it’s a bit hard to understand how $1 million was sufficient to assure his return to court on the first indictment, but $10 million was deemed necessary on the second.  Two thoughts come to mind.  First, that the amount of bail is so staggeringly high as to be intentionally prohibitive.  Second, that everyone was angry enough with Sorodsky that they wanted to make sure he got a good, hard smack.  As bad as Sorodsky might be, this isn’t the way to deal with it.

The nature of the charges against Sorodsky, presumed innocent still having yet to be convicted of anything, precludes the court from remanding him.  The typical plan B is to set bail beyond his means, thus being able to say with the straight face that he has bail, but he just didn’t make it.  Bear in mind, this happens regularly at the low end of the spectrum, with impoverished defendants being held in lieu of bail of $500, because they don’t have $20 to their name.  Bail isn’t really relative to the crime so much as relative to the defendant’s means.  Whatever amount is out of reach is sufficient to keep a person in jail pending trial.

But the issue of exorbitant bail, as the Constitution prohibits, is invariably tested at the high end of the spectrum.  And as one would suspect, it’s usually tested by ugly defendants under ugly circumstances like Sorodsky’s.  While there’s too little information on what is meant by tampering with the bracelets, whether this was an effort to remove them or just somehow adjust them for greater comfort, to comprehend whether this reflects a threat of flight, it’s not really a critical point.  First, the bracelet was imposed for the reduction of bail from $1 million to half a mil, and even if the bracelet condition was changed, the bail would have reverted back to its original amount. 

Moreover, Ira Judelson is a bail bondsman.  If he was no longer comfortable bonding out this defendant, he simply could pull the bond and go home.  Ira was under no duty to bond out Sorodsky once the rules of the game were changed.  In essence, the bail bondsman is a secondary check on the reliability of a defendant to comply with the conditions of his release, to return to court as directed and to commit no crimes while out.  After all, the last thing a bondsman wants to do is pay the bond.  He’s more inclined to scrutinize the defendant’s compliance than a judge, since he’s the one who pays the freight.

That additional victims appeared is similarly a difference without a distinction.  There were eight alleged victims in the initial indictment.  That’s more than enough to make a fellow flee if that’s his intention.  Whether it’s eight or more (and the story neglects to mention how many additional victims showed up), the numbers reach the point of icing on the cake, not a new or different cake.  Moreover, while the Post also neglects to mention what sort of “abuse” Sorodsky is alleged to have committed, it seems fair to suspect that it was a touching rather than rape. This isn’t mention to trivialize the conduct, but to consider the risk of his presence in the community and the penalty for the crime.

By upping the bail to the astronomical number of $11 million, Judge Del Giudice has brought the issue to the fore:  Should Michail Sorodsky be denied bail, because imposition of bail of this magnitude is, without a doubt, a sham and effectively remand under circumstances where remand is facially inappropriate? 

No matter what your feelings about the allegations against Sorodsky, the answer must be no.  Excessive bail is no bail, whether for the impoverished defendant or the nasty former Brooklyn doctor. 

H/T Turley

Will Handwriting Be The New Polygraph?

Yet another claim has arisen to reveal the secrets of liars and deceivers.  Will this be the Holy Grail of lying liars? From an email press release (embargoed until August 28th, as if we’re all just chomping at the bit to promote the next piece of junk science to come down the pike).





Handwriting-based Tool Offers Alternate Lie Detection Method


MOUNT CARMEL, HAIFA, ISRAEL—August 26, 2009—For ages experts and laymen have been analyzing and trying to crack the code of handwriting characteristics, in order to detect an individual’s personality traits, or in most cases, gauge their innocence in the case of a crime. Although this science has often gone the way of pseudoscience, researchers are now discovering that with the aid of a computerized tool, handwriting characteristics can be measured more effectively.

The research, headed by Gil Luria and Sara Rosenblum at the University of Haifa, is published in an upcoming issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology. The researchers utilized a computerized tablet that measured the physical properties of the subject’s handwriting, which are difficult to consciously control (for example: the duration of time that the pen is on paper versus in the air, the length height and width of each writing stroke, the pressure implemented on the writing surface). They have found that these handwriting characteristics differ when an individual is in the process of writing deceptive sentences as opposed to truthful sentences.

The handwriting tool has the potential to replace, or work in tandem, with popular, verbal-based lie detection technology such as the polygraph to ensure greater accuracy and objectivity in law enforcement deception detection. Additionally, polygraphs are often intrusive to the subject and sometimes inconclusive. The handwriting tool therefore provides ease and increased accuracy over common, verbal-based methods.


Announcements of the latest and greatest tool for detecting deception have become relatively routine,  Indeed, I received another email just yesterday from a psychologist asking “whether body language, voice stress analysis, and layered voice analysis are accepted in criminal trials as methods that are reliable and valid ways to determine “deception” or “lying?”  The concern here was about the media coverage of an investigator using layered voice analysis on HaLeigh Cumming’s step-mom, and the media’s public promotion of the idea that there are valid methods of determining deception.  The suggestion, I guess, is that it’s lawyers who are preventing valid scientific method from being used in the courtroom.

There’s no reason to explain, yet again, the dangers of junk science.  There’s no reason to explain why methodologies that are less than accurate are inherently dangerous.  But there’s good reason to be aware of the fact that there are many out there promoting the notion that the tools for “greater accuracy and objectivity in law enforcement deception detection (note that it’s to benefit law enforcement, not justice)”  exist. 

My concern is it’s just a matter of time before the next round of junk science infiltrates the courtroom.  As lie detection methodologies are developed and promoted, as with this press release, combined with such popular nonsense as the TV shows like  Lie to Me* and CSI, some judge somewhere is going to hold a Daubert hearing and announce that the Holy Grail has been found. 

Science is a wonderful thing.  Unfortunately, junk science is far more pervasive.  And as we are painfully aware, its employment to remove the burden from a jury of having to decide issues of fact and providing them with what facially appears to be conclusive proof has done enormous harm to many innocent people.  And yet it keeps coming.

The Second String First Amendment

It goes without saying that we all love the first amendment.  Free speech.  Who doesn’t love free speech? Unless, that is, it conflicts with something else we love, in which case free speech is the first thing to go.  Isn’t love fickle?

Over at Concurring Opinions, there has been debate over the order compelling Google’s disclosure of the anonymous blogger at Skanks in NYC.  As I noted when Liskula Gentile Cohen, the target of the blog, began her quest for the identity of her detractor, our right to free speech always seems to fall to the lowest scuzzball around.  The anonymity argument, likened to Publius by default, strains the bounds of tolerance.  The Skank blogger, now disclosed to be 29 year old Rosemary Port, who believed that Cohen had bad-mouthed her to Port’s boyfriend, was outed by Google per court order.

The debate began when Dan Solove challenged the court’s reliance on too low a standard for disclosure:


I believe that the court used too low a standard in revealing the blogger’s identity.  The court ordered Google to reveal the anonymous blogger because “a strong showing that a cause of action exists.”  This standard appears to be little more than requiring the plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss.  While I’m very sympathetic to people who have been injured through online defamation and invasions of privacy, I’m also wary of courts being too quick to reveal the identities of bloggers.  I believe that in order to reveal a blogger’s identity, plaintiffs must meet the summary judgment standard, as set forth in Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).

Then Kaimipono Wenger jumped in, noting the obvious: that Rosemary Port ain’t no James Madison.  That’s for sure. But does it matter?


Because, of course, the flip side of anonymity is that it can open the door to uniquely problematic personal attacks. This problem is set out in Danielle’s article Cyber Civil Rights, where she examines cases where anonymity was used as a shield to allow malicious online mobs to harass innocent victims, who tend to be disproportionately female. (And of course, the privacy sword cuts both ways here as well — it is a rather egregious invasion of privacy for a normal person to have their private life attacked on a blog.)

Frankly, Skanks in NYC doesn’t look like a set of Publius-esque words that deserves protection for anonymity. It does not match any of CyberSLAPP’s examples of helpful anonymity. Instead, it looks exactly like the many cases of anonymous and gendered personal attacks, like Autoadmit and Kathy Sierra attacks, which Danielle rightly labels destructive: Online attacks, often sexually framed, which targeted the personal well-being and careers of their disproportionately female victims.

As is clear from this quick slide from the beloved first amendment to the sacred cow of gender discrimination, Wenger has little difficulty deciding that worthiness of constitutional protection quickly dissolves when the content either isn’t deemed sufficiently “Publius-esque” or, more significantly, when the victim is female.  For anyone who didn’t think that the Cyber Civil Rights debate wasn’t worth your time, there’s a strong likelihood that you will come to regret that decision. 

Naturally, Danielle Citron then took up arms in the Skanks debate.


Some have asked whether this case warrants treatment as a cyber civil rights issue since it “is just a girl cat fight.”  To be sure, women can deprive other women of their right to be free of unequal treatment on the basis of their gender.  But the larger concern is, for me, convincing skeptics to see the blog attacks on Ms. Cohen as more than just an interpersonal disagreement between two women, something that tort law can handily address on its own, but rather as gender discrimination. 

Much like sexual harassment in the workplace, the blog suggested that Ms. Cohen constitutes an object of sexual derision, not a person worthy of respect.  Moreover, they interfered with Ms. Cohen’s right to work as an equal.  According to Ms. Cohen, potential employers asked her about the blog, which quite possibly deterred them and others from hiring her.  In a world filled with aspiring models, employers might chose to work with someone who comes with less baggage, even if they do not believe the postings a wit.  And the blog postings harm women as a group and a society as a whole by entrenching gender hierarchy in cyberspace.  Whether current law would support such a claim is certainly in dispute, but such a law could be crafted.  Such a law would play an important expressive role–it would change the social meaning of such harassment of women.
It’s critical to bear in mind that the issue here is not whether Cohen would have a cause of action, or what cause she would have, against Port for her Skanks blog.  The issue is what the standard should be to compel disclosure of an anonymous blogger.  As an aside, Cohen immediately dropped her claim after learning the identity of Port, which of course makes clear that learning the identity and outing her detractor was her goal all along. 

But Skanks highlights two of the most significant threats to first amendment law.  First, that it is almost invariably the oddball, and often disgusting, scenario where the line is decided.  Second, that the naturally allies of free speech will flee the ship as soon as another of their sacred cows are threatened. 

And it’s not just the Cyber Civil Rights adherents.  As Liptak pointed out in his New York Times article about the Supreme Court’s reargument of the Hillary, The Movie case, pitting free speech against the power of corporate money to unduly influence popular political belief, free speech has been quickly abandoned by many of its natural allies.  Notably, the ACLU is one of the few who has maintained its position that this fundamental constitutional right shouldn’t sway in the wind whenever some other liberal sacred cow is at risk.

Bottom lining this dilemma, first amendment rights are either fundamental, and thus deserving of protection even when it’s inconvenient or contrary to other irksome interests, or the sacred cow du jour trumps the first amendment.  For those who prefer that constitutional rights not be subject to whatever wind blows at the moment, we may be in for a bumpy ride.  And for those who don’t think that it’s worth their time to follow the lawprofs debates, this is an awfully good reason to rethink their position.  It’s not just Rosemary Port’s rights at stake here.

Shocking Memphis

From Turley, Memphis has rejected a request by Police Chief Elena Danishevskaya to arm her police officers with Tasers.  From the Voice News :



At their most recent meeting the council revisited the controversial topic and, after airing opposing opinions, once again shunned the electroshock weapons – capable of immobilizing subjects via a 50,000-volt discharge – as an option for the city’s officers.

“My feeling, still, is that Tasers for this department is not for us,” Mayor Charles Garber said.

“I just think that it is too risky. How many times have you had, in the last two years, any kind of problem?” Mayor Garber inquired of Danishevskaya who answered that on two occasions Tasers could have been effective – the first involving a suspect who reportedly had a gun, and the second a suicidal subject who was brandishing a knife.
Interestingly, the most compelling factor that militated against arming the Memphis police with Tasers appeared to be liability.  Newspaper stories and lawsuits struck fear in the hearts of the city council, and left them believing that having their cops tazing wasn’t worth the risk.

But Mayor Garber’s question really hit the nail on the head.  In two years, Chief Danishevskaya came up with only two incidents where the use of a Taser would have been truly appropriate.  Anybody want to bet that if Memphis police officers carried Tasers over that same two year period, they would have used them a few thousand times?

That’s the point.  Next to donuts, nothing has made a cops’ job better than the Taser.

Lori Drew Appreciates Lawprofs. Do We? (Update)

Following my efforts to draw out shy and reticent lawprofs, like Dan Solove, to join in a broader conversation that will do little to enhance tenure opportunities but may well result in a benefit by advancing legal thought (yes, I haven’t given up yet on this topic despite Dan’s reluctance to jump into the trenches), comes Judge George Wu’s decision in the Lori Drew case, officially dismissing the misdemeanor conviction under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Judge Wu’s decision goes to great lengths to parse the language of the CFAA, and does so with reference to a number of law review articles, foremost of which is Orin Kerr’s Cybercrime’s Scope, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1596 (2003).  Notably, Judge Wu finds many of the older decisions unhelpful, and perhaps out of touch, when it comes to figuring out what the future of cybercrime ought to be, as noted in footnote 21:


Commentators have criticized the legislatures’ understandings of computers and the accessing of computers as “simplistic” and based upon the technology in existence in the 1970’s and 1980’s (e.g. pre-Internet) rather than upon what currently exists. See, e.g., Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1640-41.

As one reads the decision, particularly in the context of the developing caselaw relating to computer searches and crimes, it’s impossible not to appreciate how true this is.  Judges are, to be blunt, the last people one would want defining the parameters of the law relative to technology or the internet, given how limited their understanding of it is.  The corollary is that they are constrained to rely on law review articles in this developing area, and the law is being crafted by judges who can’t tell Youtube from Twitter and lawprofs. 

Judge Wu held that using a websites clickwrap terms of service as the basis for a crime is unconstitutionally vague, both from the public notice side (since no one must, or wants to, read the clickthrough terms) and from the objective limits on law enforcement side.  Enter Dan Solove, who posts that this has been his position as well:


The Lori Drew case has finally been decided.  Background about the case is here.  In previous posts ( here and here), I argued that the CFAA should be held to be unconstitutionally vague.

In an opinion released on August 28, Judge George Wu struck down, on unconstitutional vagueness grounds, the prosecution’s attempt to enforce violations of website terms of service as crimes under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA):



[I]f any conscious breach of a website’s terms of service is held to be sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization, the result will be that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law “that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].” City of Chicago [v. Morales], 527 U.S. [41] at 64 [(1999)].


One of Dan’s scholarly foci is internet privacy, which puts this right up his alley.  Indeed, his book, The Future of Reputation, which received a very positive review here, will be the standard upon which much understanding of the impact of online privacy will be determined for a long time, and will likely have a significant impact on the developing law as well. 

See where this is going?  For fellow trench lawyers, we cannot afford to ignore the lawprofs because we see them as being too theoretical, too disconnected from the real practice of law.  It is their writings, their thoughts, that will provide the bases upon which our efforts will be judged.  Judge Wu did, and other judges will as well, look to their writings to determine the future of the law as it relates to computers, the internet, and all technological advancements, because these are areas so far outside the courts’ ken that they are finally becoming aware that it can’t be decided using horse and buggy law.

And the problem for us is that the lawprofs are developing their theories, their thoughts, the very foundation that will later come back to bite us in the butt, without us.  It doesn’t matter whether we think they’re brilliant and fascinating, or unrealistic and disconnected.  The fact remains that judges have, and will continue, to look to their work to decide our work.  In the meantime, it would behoove all of us to remember that legal scholarship is not just a game to be played with the winner receiving tenure or perhaps an endowed chair.  It eventually filters down to real life and real people, and impractical or misguided scholarship can do a great deal of harm to many, even if created with the best of intentions.

It’s time that peer review in the area of law be broadened beyond the practical and theoretical camps, and include everyone interested in the subject.  I suspect that Orin came to realize how some of his theories came back to haunt him during his work on behalf of the defense in this case, and perhaps might now wish somebody had challenged his thoughts at the time.  Regardless, we would all do better to hash it out now rather than end up with fascinating theories that put people in prison for the wrong reasons.

And just because things worked out for Lori Drew this time doesn’t mean everything will be fine the next time.  Technology is still developing, and judges are still judges.  Those of us in the practical blawgosphere need to engage with the lawprofs.  And those shy lawprofs need to come out of hiding.

Update: I’ve received a private email from Dan Solove, which will put to rest my poking him on the subject of cross-discussion.  Suffice it to say that Dan doesn’t see the divide between practitioner and professor that I do, and in any event feels that my tone has been so disrespectful that he doesn’t care to engage in further discussion with me.  That being the case, I will respect his wishes and leave this issue behind.

A Cautionary Tale for Non-Lawyer Readers (and Lawyers too)

During my relative absence from the blawgosphere, I noticed some action in an old post about window tint, a sore spot for many New York drivers who learned that a foolish law, enforced for dubious reasons that bore little relation to any legitimate purpose, received some interest.  It gave rise to some concerns.

The comments reflect the anger of regular folk to this ill-conceived law and its even worse-conceived application, and offer the ideas of commenters on how to address them.  They are bad ideas.  Some extremely bad, to the point of being dangerously foolhearty.  At the time they were posted, I chose to allow people the catharsis of expressing their frustration.  Everybody needs an opportunity to vent, and this was as good a place as any.  But it struck me that some readers, and this post still gets quite a few hits on a regular basis, will perhaps wrongly assume that because this is a law blog, that the content of the comments has some merit.  They don’t.

This is not a concern about any potential liability I may have for providing space for bad advice.  I have none, thanks to Section 230, but I am still concerned for the welfare of readers who misapprehend comments left by people who have no greater clue what they are talking about than they do.  Under no circumstances should any reader assume that the “trick” offered by some commenter has any validity whatsoever. 

Indeed, no one should assume that any claims of a successful defense are truthful or accurate.  Comments are not vetted for lies.  It’s awfully easy for someone to write about their stroke of genius and good fortune, and leave others to think they have something to offer.  While they might, they similarly might not.  You can’t tell from the comment, and to accept someone’s claim is to invite disaster.

On a side note, there is an additional concern that merits mention coming from the Window Tint post.  Readers sometimes misapprehend what a blog is.  To the outsider, it’s a public space available via the internet where they are entitled to stake a claim.  It compelled me to remind a reader that she had no proprietary interest in SJ, after she invited another commenter to keep “us” abreast of his situation, and noted that all “we” have is this blog.  I informed her that she has nothing but the opportunity to comment for as long as I allow.  She responded with a typically angry comment about how mean and jealous I am to say such a thing, which I deleted and thereupon banned her from further commenting.

This is not a public square.  You are not entitled to set up your soap box where you want and talk to the gathering throng.  No matter how close you begin to feel with others who share your angst, you do not get to rule the roost around here.  Unless I allow it.  This is not a democracy.  I may be arbitrary and capricious.  I may be unfair.  You may disagree with my decisions with all your heart and soul.  But it’s my choice anyway. 

It’s not my way to delete or ban someone because they disagree with me.  In fact, disagreements are some of the most interesting discussions around.  However, there are things I won’t tolerate, which include (at my discretion and leisure) hijacking comments for readers to go off on a tangent about their personal experiences.  If you want to talk about yourself, start your own blog.  Don’t assume that people read SJ so learn about your personal war stories. 

One commenter, a while back, took issue with my shutting down his unbearably lengthy comments about his own negligible experience touching some tangential point of my posts and expressing his somewhat extreme political views.  After numerous warnings, I tossed him.  He did, however, take my advice to start his own blog where he could write whatever he wished.  He learned that he was talking to an empty room.  It’s a tough lesson to learn that no one really cares what color your boxer shorts are, or how a lawyer who has never tried a case thinks voir dire should be conducted.  Some opinions just aren’t that fascinating or worthwhile.

I am also very intolerant of a commenter who makes nasty comments about other readers or blawgers, particularly those I’ve come to know and like.  Day trippers (people who rarely or never comment) don’t get nearly as much slack as regulars.  This happened over the past two weeks as well, and upset me.  As smart as the commenter thought he was, his bizarre string of comments demonstrated a significant lack of appreciation of how snide he was and how little he was appreciated by others.  Shoot at me all you want, but do not make snide comments about other commenters.  You aren’t special enough to do that.

And a new addition to this list is the commenter who mistakenly thinks that he’s in charge of a post and thread.  No one is entitled to issue invitations or give orders around here but me.  I’ve invited your into my house for a chat.  I ask that you remember that it’s my house.  If you want to control the discussion, you can always start your own blog.  But remember, that doesn’t mean anyone cares what you think or will want to read you.

He’s Baa-aack

For the handful who noticed that my posting has been sporadic, it’s because I’ve been off in a far away land, where they speak an unfamiliar language and eat strange and exotic foods.  Most noticeable to me was that all of the children wore white clothing and black masks, and held swords of a particular type and thrust them at each other with great regularity and vigor, while older men yelled things at them in even odder sounding tongues.

But now I’m back.  After swearing a blood oath to never fly Delta Airlines internationally again, losing one of the wheels off the traveling fencing hardshell case, as did everyone who flew Delta, eating the meal of one infinitesimally small piece of amorphous chicken covered in a concealing red sauce with a side of potatoes, all of which was deemed sufficient to cover two independent ordinary meal periods, and a seat distance in front of me that required me to wear my reading glasses to see the seatback movie screen 3 inches from my eyes, I was allowed to touch American soil again.  It’s fun to leave.  It’s good to come home.

Spain is a wonderful country.  The people we met were enormously friendly and welcoming.  No, they service staff were not particularly geared toward service, their primary reaction to all issues being “oh”.  But after a bit, you realize that by reducing ones American-style expectations a bit, on an hourly basis, one reaches European equilibrium and a zone of familiarity.  Then, one can appreciate their charm.

Outside of the hotel, the food was fabulous.  Inside, it was bewildering, as in “what is that?”  When one can’t distinguish fish from lamb, cooked to a savory medium gray, it adds a certain mystery to meals.  But a drink called tinto de verano, the wine of spring, smooths over many culinary issues and produces a joyous celebration of flowing cheap rioja, improved by a lemon and soda water, or as often happened, 7-Up instead when they are moving quickly.

For anyone wondering, there were fencers from Spain, Ukraine, France and the good ol’ US of A at the former World Cup venue in Almeria.  After mixing and matching for ten days, a two day tournament concluded the trip.  The tournament divided the groups into two age groups, akin to what we call cadet and junior here, as well as a world class group made up of national team fencers.   While they all fenced together prior to the tournament, and I was surprised and delighted by how competitive bouts were between national team fencers and some of the younger fencers, the tournament divisions, which of course included separating fencers by gender as well, were intended to fit the normal international competition mold.

After the first day of the tournament, my own tax dedication was the first seed, having demolished his competition by winning every bout and not allowing more than one touche by any fencer against him.  But of course, when things are going too well, it naturally means that they should screech to an immediate halt until the next day.  And so the wind blew.

In his quarterfinal bout on day 2, a fencer named Sasha from the Ukraine cranked up his game above and beyond anything he had shown previously.  With his coach screaming unfamiliar words, which we believed to mean that if he lost he would be sent to the gulag, and his little dog too, Sasha fenced his heart out and the score was tied at the end of regulation time, 12-12.  In overtime, Sasha caught a slight fold in the jacket just enough to compress his tip, and the battle was done.  Mine ended the day in 5th place, which was good but fell short of his hopes.  It was particularly difficult to watch first and second, Sasha having been eliminated in the semifinals when he fell to the floor in exhaustion, both Spanish fencers from Burgos, who mine had beaten handily the day before.

It was a long time to spend away, but a wonderful experience.  Now I have a remarkably long list of things to do, and given that few people will take calls from me at 9 in the morning on Malaga time, only limited time to do them until my clock readjusts.  So for those who kept abreast of my personal details, thank you.  And for those who also followed loftier matters, like law, so much has happened in my absence (which is very wrong, since it was the end of August) and I appreciate how many others posted about these far more significant issue so that I could keep abreast, even from Spain.

And now I’m back.