Author Archives: SHG

Book Review: “Three Felonies A Day,” Or Not

The concept was fabulous.


The average professional in this country wakes up in the morning, goes to work, comes home, eats dinner, and then goes to sleep, unaware the he or she has likely committed several federal crimes that day.  Why” The answer lies in the very nature of modern criminal laws, which have exploded in number but also become impossibly broad and vague.
Wow.  Add to that tease the name Harvey Silverglate, formerly law partner with now Massachusetts District Court Judge Nancy Gertner, as close to defense lawyer royalty as there is, and this is a book you want to read NOW.  So when  Three Felonies a Day, How the Feds Target the innocent, wound up in my mailbox, I put everything else aside to get right to it. A very nice note from Harvey suggesting this might be something I would like, to boot.

All that excitement.  All that promised.  Burned in the first chapter.  The first case Silverglate writes about is that of Cuban-American Hialeah, Florida Mayor Raul Martinez.  It seems the good mayor accepted a plot of land from a developer who concededly sought to ingratiate himself the Mayor for substantially below market value.  Harvey finds this case outrageous, because Martinez gave no particular quid pro quo for the generalized bribe.  The guy wanted to be Martinez’s “friend”.  Martinez wanted to make some walking around money.

Skid to stop.  Harvey, that’s not what this book was supposed to be about.  Sure, it may be questionable whether Martinez’s conduct met the elements of official corruption, but his conduct smelled awfully bad and it certainly isn’t an “average” joe story, unless all your buddies happen to be the Mayor of Hialeah.  And this is Chapter 1?  Are you telling me you couldn’t find a decent story to suit your premise for Chapter 1?  That’s not a good sign.  Where does the book go from here?

It goes down, down, down.  The book goes on to tell war stories about some of Harvey’s old cases and some other well known oddball prosecutions, ranging from physicians overprescribing medications to the Arthur Anderson prosecution to Buffalo’s nutty Professor Steven Kurtz, whose artwork is comprised of shiny but harmless bacteria, raising a ridiculous bioterrorism scare unearthed when the ambulance came for his dying wife.  Bizarre?  Sure.  But related to the premise of the book?  Not even close.  These aren’t your average professionals, and these aren’t your ordinary, everyday activities that landed you in the federal dock. 

Silverglate’s long career as a criminal defense and civil rights lawyer yields some interesting cases, but his lawyerly writing style, formal to a fault, sucks the fun out of his story-telling.  It’s hard to switch from briefs to books, and few people consider briefs fun summer reading.  The shame is that had Harvey offered this book on a bunch of his old cases, and had loosened his tie just a bit as his fingers tapped out each Latin-derived word, this might well be a book a lot of criminal defense lawyers would want to read.  While Harvey Silverglate’s name may not be a house-hold word, he’s done some great work and has great stories to tell.

But the promise of the back flap, the title itself, made the contents disappointing.  As I made my way through the chapters, one problem kept slapping me in the face: In the scheme of unfair, abusive, overreaching prosecutions, Harvey’s cases didn’t even make the first cut.  To the extent I already knew about the cases, they offered no new insight, as if Harvey was cautious not to disclose anything too personal and perhaps covered by privilege.  That’s fine, but if you’re not going to tell more than what’s already publicly available, there’s really not much reason to tell the story again.

More troubling was that the book essentially disproves its thesis, that while the government could use the broad, vague wealth of laws available to it to go after the most innocuous conduct by ordinary people, the book offers nothing to suggest it actually does.  In almost every instance, the conduct involved emitted a sufficient odor to distinguish it from the type of things that ordinary folks do.  While they reflect prosecutions that should never have happened, they aren’t so absurd or off the wall to cause fear amongst the masses or outrage within the bar.  The distinctions often relied on a technical understanding of law that only a legal wonk could appreciate.

Fear not, unless you happen to be a journalist writing the New York Post’s Page Six gossip column.  You’re not?  Then what was done Jared Paul Stern probably won’t make you shake in your boots. In fact, it didn’t move me at all. 

I’ve no doubt that Harvey Silverglate, with his distinguished career as a criminal defense lawyer, would be a great guy to join for a beer and listen to story after story of his storied career.  We all have our war stories, but few have been involved in as many big time cases as Harvey.  A book about them, however, doesn’t necessarily include the critical beer aspect or the camaraderie that comes into play when whispering in a dimly lit pub.  War stories are always better with a chilled mug in hand.

What leaves me feeling cheated is that I still want Harvey to make good on the premise of the book.  Is it three wire frauds from lying to your spouse about why you’ll be late for dinner?  I believe that there’s great stuff out there to show how the breadth and vagary of federal law criminalizes all of us, and I am downright miffed that he teased me so and left me unfulfilled.

If you want to hear the war stories of a lawyer with as much to tell as Harvey Silverglate, Three Felonies provides a quick trip through some of his best work.  But as an indictment of the federal criminal system, the book is barely a parking ticket.  It’s still a great and intriguing premise, and one that I still want to read more about.  But it’s going to take another book to seize upon this great idea and make it happen. 

Battle of the Strawmen

Paul Lippe jumped in head first when he published his challenge to law schools to pull their collective heads out of their butts when it comes to their failure to turn out viable lawyers after three years of mush in the AmLaw Daily.  Comparing the education provided by law schools to that of medical and business schools, Lippe proclaimed that they have failed to adapt and grow.

Law professors didn’t like what Lippe had to say.

Lippe, borrowing from the currently popular lingo, proclaimed it’s time for Law School 4.0, offered some concrete suggestions:


–An accelerated curriculum, with no more than a year of case method, a year of clinical, and then a year of externship with subject area focus, along the lines of medical school.


–More practice orientation in teaching, with far more adjunct faculty who are active practitioners (a random e-mail I received yesterday said, “One of the reasons I chose Northwestern for law school is I believe in the type of changes that Dean Van Zandt is trying to make. My favorite instructors were not academics but adjuncts who were successful practicing attorneys.”)


–Better use of technology (both connectivity, like video or Web conferencing, and Web 2.0 social networks) to connect schools and practitioners and clients. Faculty (rightly) hate the notion of students tweeting each other in the classroom, but they can easily rely on professional networking services to connect to actual practitioners who are dealing with the issues discussed in class. In a networked world, the ability to get someone who knows the answer to help you is a far more valuable skill than the ability to hypothesize your own answer.


–-A much more empirical approach to practice, forcing much deeper inquiry, rather than just trotting out hypotheticals and issue-spotting–e.g., if choosing AAA arbitration is the right dispute resolution clause, do we know that a higher percentage of deals with no arbitration clause ended in a contentious dispute?


–A move back to mission-centered management. In a recent meeting with law school deans, I asked, “If you decided the purpose of law school was to maximize the comfort and income of the faculty, what would you do differently?” The answer: “Nothing.” When my wife’s grandfather was a law school dean, it was understood that the law school was there to serve society, the profession, and students–not vice versa.


–A lifetime (or at least ten years) of orientation for skills development for students/alums. While law schools need to figure out how to get graduates out the door faster and for less money, they also are the logical source (although realistically, today, not the most fully competent source) of skills (as well as reputation and network) development for lawyers to become fully functional, especially as firms’ appetite for subsidizing training will decline. Medical schools and business schools make a ton of money at continuing/executive education, so this is a great opportunity to enrich the faculty and student experience, generate an income stream, and engender more alumni loyalty.


You woulda thought Lippe told them they had to dress like they came from New Jersey, the way the lawprofs reacted.  But then Lippe challenges the sacred cow of scholarship, the very soul of academia and the reason why lawprofs reject the pin-striped suit in favor of the tweed jacket with leather elbow-patches.  Lippe would have them create a “trade school,” as the lawprofs denigratingly call it, at the expense of higher order thinking.

J.B. Ruhl, a former Biglaw hiring partner now teaching at FSU Law School (and who, like yours truly, sports a gray beard despite his otherwise youthful looking dark locks), rose to the challenge of ripping Lippe a new one with a post at Jurisdynamics, reposted at PrawfsBlawg.

Ruhl acknowledges that Lippe may not be entirely wrong about the need for some minor tweaking, “meaning law schools must be attentive to the needs of our students to be able to succeed in a transformed professional environment. Nevertheless, let us not get so carried away in laying the blame on law schools as Lippe does.”  I know, this may be the strongest smack across the face I’ve ever seen from a lawprof. 

Setting forth 6 reasons why Paul Lippe is “thoroughly off base,” here’s what Ruhl has to say:

1. Lippe repeatedly suggests that medical and business schools have got it right and law schools provide “inferior training.” Oh really? So, when our nation is in the throes of a debate over the runaway costs of health care and the global economy is in a massive recession due largely to the utter largess and indulgence of our big business and investment industries, law schools should emulate medical and business schools? I think not.


I’m going to jump to an assumption, that Ruhl leads off with what he perceives as his strongest argument, since that’s the way lawyers are taught to present their contentions.  If that’s so, then Ruhl’s in trouble from the start.  Lippe speaks to the training regime, where docs aren’t let loose to hang out a shingle to perform their first appendectomy on the first patient who walks in the door.  Ruhl’s half-baked attempt to connect that to the cost structure issues of health insurance makes no sense at all.

Unfortunately, Ruhl neglects entirely the point that lawyers graduate from school with the ability to proclaim their shop open for business the day after they pass the bar exam, even though they may have never written a motion or walked through a courtroom door.  Is Lippe’s analogy perfect?  No, but not for the reasons asserted by Ruhl.  Score one for Lippe.

2. Lippe goes further, arguing that “law schools will have to produce fully functioning lawyers who can quickly become economically viable–not just proto appellate clerks.” Just like medical and business schools do, right? Wrong. Medical schools do not produce “fully functioning physicians” and business schools do not produce “fully functioning corporate executives.” Medical residencies and corporate ladders are the next training grounds for graduates of those professional schools.

Weelllllll, not exactly.  Perhaps Lippe goes over the top by suggesting that law schools produce “fully functioning” lawyers.  Just functioning lawyers might be more realistic.  But then, law schools don’t even come close to that.  Of course, medical residencies are a requisite part of a medical education, whereas Ruhl contends that the failure is on the part of law firms and their lack of dedication to completing the legal educational process.  Of course, Ruhl assumes (as he claims Lippe does) that every law students goes to work in Biglaw.  What of the majority of law students who find employment outside of Biglaw, or, ahem, fly solo?  The vast majority of lawyers will not be sitting in the library at Cravath for the first five years, soaking up the education that law school neglected.  As for the clients who reasonably expect that lawyers are competent to represent them, Ruhl’s shifting of the burden of a legal education doesn’t provide much comfort.  Score two for Lippe.


3. Nowhere, for that matter, does Lippe define what a “fully functional lawyer” is. What does Lippe expect law schools to produce? Is it a lawyer equipped out of the box to argue a case in the U.S. Supreme Court? To take the deposition of a Fortune 50 CEO? To negotiate the terms of a major corporate acquisition? Of course not.


I see this as a subargument of Ruhl’s second point, but one crafted entirely of straw.  Of course a young lawyer on day 1 isn’t equipped to argue before the Supremes.  But what about arguing before the local yokel magistrate?  He can’t do that either.  What about negotiating the terms of a house closing?  Nope.  At least the deposition of an accounts payable secretary?  Not even that.  But no points for Lippe, since this was already covered by Ruhl’s second argument.


4. Part of the problem with Lippe’s pitch in this respect is that he talks about law schools preparing graduates for the “legal profession” as if the legal profession consists exclusively of private law firms and corporate counsel offices, where, if I understand him correctly, the theory and policy of law are irrelevant.

Oh no you do-on’t.  Lippe didn’t say the theory and policy of the law are irrelevant, so Ruhl’s again creating the strawman to knock down.  The problem here is that for lawprofs, it only about the “theory and policy of law,” which is the stuff that scholars get excited about.  It’s not that lawyers couldn’t care less about it, or don’t need to know it, but that it’s merely a part of a legal education and, in the scheme of things, a smaller part than the nuts and bolts.  It’s unclear why Ruhl seems to scold Lippe about his focus on law firms and corp counsel offices, since the same holds true for solos and public agencies.  Perhaps this is too deep for a trench lawyer like me to fathom.

Ruhl ends this point by asking, “What happened to thinking about what the law should be, rather than just what it is?”  I’ve got my hand raised!  Pick me! Pick me!  Initially, lawprofs confuse their indoctrinating their students as to what they believe the law should be with as opposed to generating an open marketplace of ideas.  Of course, they think they’re brilliant and scholarly, so this would be a good thing and just in case one of their students winds up on the Supreme Court one day, they can change the course of the law to suit the lawprof’s views. But what makes Ruhl think that thinking and practicing are mutually exclusive?  Few law students are prepared to understand what the “law should be” because they have no experience in it or with real people who suffer for their theories.  Score three for Lippe, by default since Ruhl’s point here is just awful.  I’m almost inclined to take a point away from Ruhl for this one, except he hasn’t won any yet.


5. Lippe’s central objection with law school faculties is that they “have grown more distant from the profession, and the legal academy has come to define itself as primarily engaged in a scholarly pursuit (like, say, literature or history), as opposed to a professional pursuit, like, say, medicine or business.” But if one believes there is any value to ensuring that law students learn to think about the “ought” and not just the “is” of law, there has to be an emphasis on the part of the faculty to exploring the “ought” in order to be able competently to teach their students how to do so.

This is just really bad math if any value to thinking, then emphasis on scholarship.  Come on now, the fact that lawprofs eschew the practical in favor of the scholarly isn’t something to be ashamed of, and certainly not denied.  Lippe’s point is that profession of academic comes at the expense of practitioner, putting scholars in charge of creating practitioners.  Lippe doesn’t argue that lawprofs should eschew scholarship, but that they can’t ignore practice either.  Yet again, Ruhl’s vision of the world as a zero-sum game renders his argument another strawman.  Lippe stand at four.  Ruhl zero.


6. Along with his claim that law schools have “have grown more distant from the profession,” Lippe goes so far as to claim that law professors hold law firms “in low regard.”


This is another subargument, and hence no points are at stake for this one.  Yet, who is Ruhl kidding?  I’ve addressed this at greater length here, but to suggest that academia doesn’t harbor disdain for practitioners is just plain disingenuous.  The support for this position, that FSU has “a plethora of practical and skills oriented courses” that are “taught by adjuncts who are leading practitioners” is just plain vanilla hyperbole. 

Indeed, it gets worse when Ruhl asserts that “[m]any of our faculty members, like those at most law schools, actively participate in local, state, and national legal professional associations such as the American Bar Association and state bar associations–writing for their journals, speaking at conferences, and chairing committees.”  I hate to be the one to break this to Ruhl, but sitting on committees isn’t practicing law.  Law is something that happens in courtrooms and with these people called “clients”.  Committees are something that confound collegial folks, inclined to that believe that a satisfying discussion is a substitute for doing something.

Having reached the end of Ruhl’s arguments, the score is still Lippe 4, Ruhl 0.  But then Ruhl reaches the part where he credits Paul Lippe’s position.


We must get control of the cost of legal education–it is pricing people of modest means out of the profession and making it near impossible for new law grads to enter public service. We must deliver the skill set that will enable our grads to enter the path to becoming a “fully functional lawyer,” a path that is clearly changing at their feet. And we must continue to ensure that law school is about the law student, not the law faculty.

Here, he does a much better job at offering something constructive to the argument, although where Lippe offers solutions, Ruhl just offers outcomes.  It’s easy to say that law schools need to reduce the cost of a legal education, but Ruhl doesn’t offer to take a salary cut.  similarly, ensuring the law school is about the student sounds great, but belies his “emphasis” throughout his argument it’s in the students’ best interests to do all the stuff that’s most appealing to the faculty.  Well, that works our pretty well for Ruhl.

Having given Paul Lippe the slightest tip of the hat, J.B. Ruhl then tries to get in one final dig:


My problem isn’t with those ideals, it’s with how Lippe articulates them and the solutions he offers. Less emphasis on teaching appellate common law decisions and more emphasis on clinical experiences are both part of the mix for legal education reform, but the trade school mentality that permeates Lippe’s vision of legal education would be a giant step into backwardness and the last nail in the coffin of law as a profession.
See, I told you that the lawprofs denigrate the practice of law by calling it a trade school.  But then, what’s a strawman argument without the occasional ad hominem.  It’s not that Paul Lippe’s points, or solutions, are perfect, or perhaps slightly more extreme than would best serve the future of the profession.  Lawyers shouldn’t be mere mechanics, and the ability to construct novel arguments and theories must be part of the mix.  But then, what good is an air conditioning repairman, fully versed in the debate over freon recycling, who has never laid hands on an air conditioner?  Given the current state of legal education, unversally viewed as pathetic by those who are charged with the task of actually representing human beings, J.B. Ruhl’s defensive and illogical arguments fall flat on their face and, ironically, fail the test of intellectual rigor that one would expect of a scholar.

Game, set, match.  Lippe.

A Trophy, A Twinkie and Your Respect

As much as I hoped to never be compelled to use the word “Slackoisie” again, something new comes to me and the little devil on my left shoulder whispers in my ear, “you can’t ignore this.”  I can’t.

Following some of my past posts on the subject of Gen Ys demands and characteristics, I’ve received a wealth of colorful comments informing me in well-chosen expletives of a few salient details, foremost of which is that I am a blithering idiot and have grossly mischaracterized an entire generation.  While I’m not inclined to support the proposition that there are two sides to every story, I do believe that the Millennial should have the chance to defend and explain themselves. 

My young friend Adrian Dayton has sought to carry the water for his generation, establishing himself as the voice of reason for the unreasonable.  There is now some competition for the job, Meet Edmund Scanlan. 

He’s 32 years old and views his purpose in life to tell American CEOs how to do their job.  He “strongly believes” (as in lawyers who “strenuously object”) that all CEOs should all be on twitter, for example.  He used to believe that everything sounded way cooler if you put 2.0 after it, but no longer believes that since Obama used it to describe the Whitehouse (which makes it uncool by definition). But foremost, he explains why it’s necessary for all of us to “reinvent” the day job.



In case you’re wondering, “hey, is this guy available to take control of my firm and guide us successfully into the future,” the answer unfortunately is no.  He already has a company, called Total Attorneys, dedicated to selling lawyers the road map to work/life balance.  He offers this Slackoisie manifesto:


A new generation is starting to establish leadership positions in companies all of this country. They are driving change. They are driving innovation. You should want them driving in your company!


This generation wants work to be in balance with outside interests, like playing in band, acting, family time, traveling, and maybe all of those. Working 70 hours a week is not acceptable. Hyper productivity in 38 hours, perfect!

They want the company they work for to be fun.

They want the company they work for to be different.

They want the company they work for to have integrity.

They want the company they work for to treat them like an individual and not with a one sized fits all HR policy.

They want to be enabled to make decisions and impact rapid change. The way something was done yesterday is rather boring to this generation.
Well, there ya go.  Don’t blame me.  I didn’t make this stuff up.  I couldn’t.  Not in my wildest dreams.

I want my firm to be fun too.  Now if all my clients would just send me money and stop calling me and telling me all those depressing stories about how miserable they are because of being prosecuted.  Or expecting me to show up in court every single time they are required to be there, or worse still, when that mean man in the black robe says something about trial and prison.  Seriously, doesn’t he understand that sometimes you just want to sleep late?  Like he’s not going to be there the next day?  Sheesh.

And for all you Biglaw managing partners, open your minds to the idea of our newest, youngest, neediest brethren, who only want the right to tell you how the firm should be run.  Is that too much to ask?  Just because you are the managing partner doesn’t mean you get to tell them what to do.  Just because clients pay the freight doesn’t mean that they have to jump every time a partner tells them to work on the client’s case.  You guys just don’t get it.

And if you just change everything you do to make these emerging leaders happy, like paying them even thought they aren’t working or the work they produce is incomprehensible crap, you will WIN!  Scanlan “strongly believes” so, and isn’t that good enough for you?

Now some of my fellow curmudgeons might challenge the lack of logic, intellectual depth and rank immaturity of Scanlan’s ideas, just as they do with Adrian, who ask how a kid who’s total work legal work experience can fit in a thimble believes that he’s entitled to tell the world it’s wrong.  Do we “just not get it 2.0” as Scanlan asserts?  Isn’t it enough that this is what the Slackoisie wants and demands?  Don’t we have to change everything because they say so?

Tough questions all from these future leaders.  And if you don’t answer them immediately, they’re going to whine, stamp their feet and stay down in the basement and refuse to come up for dinner.  Maybe they’ll even hold their breath until they’re blue in the face.  How would that make you feel?

Dollars to donuts, one of our future leaders is going to respond by saying, “I know you are but what am I.”  They think I’m a very mean old man. 

H/T Venkat

When Mayberry Lays Off Andy and Barney

There was once a time when the small town police force was the norm.  The local fathers (there were no local mothers back then, as they were home baking cherry pies) believed that they were every bit as entitled to control their own destiny as any big city, and part of that control was to make sure that life in their bucolic burg stayed just the way it had always been.

But times change.  And cops cost money.  Relative to other local concerns, cops cost quite a bit of money, as they carry quite a bit of baggage with them, like cars, guns, uniforms, new comfy shoes, black leather belts and communications equipment.  Even the occasional taser on their shiny black leather belts.  Someone has to pay for all this.



For those of a certain age, the memory of Andy Griffith and his aide-de-camp, Barney Fife, reflect both the best and worst of small town police.  On the one hand, they weren’t exactly the paradigm of professionalism, the mere sight of a gun on Barney’s hip being enough to make one wince.  This was not a person who should be allowed within a mile of a weapon, for his own sake if not the rest of us.

On the other hand, the small town police force had the enormous virtue of personal responsibility.  The disconnect between police officer and the community she serves didn’t exist.  Cops were our neighbors and friends.  We talked to them over the barbecue on a warm summer night, just like they were real people.  Because they are, once the uniform comes off and they have a beer in their hand.

It’s far harder to shoot a taser at the 14 year old daughter of the fellow you shared a burger with the day before.  Everyone in town is a person.  You know them.  They know you.  The anonymity that allows a police officer to dehumanize his perp so that he feels neither concern nor remorse for his conduct, whether it’s a show of force or just a lousy attitude, is almost non-existent in the small town police force.  Do something to someone and everyone knows it.  And they will remember it for a long, long time.

This didn’t help the transient passing through a small town, who suffered the twin maladies of being suspect by cop and local alike, and having no humanizing connection to prevent the police from seizing the opportunity to enjoy his authority unconstrained by either humanizing connection or adequate training and oversight.  The tourist passing through might as well have a bulls-eye painted on his back, and did well to mosey along quietly, attracting as little interest as possible.

The small town police force was an important piece of Americana, and will be missed in many ways as they fade into oblivion.  Whether their demise means that we’ve finally come to grips with economies of scale, or the “new professionalism” that Nino keeps dreaming about, I don’t know.  But many will miss the fact that they know they names of their local cops.  And more importantly, that the cops know their names and the names of their children as well.

To the new kids in town, we’re all going to be tourists.

Ineffective at Plea? Then What?

Via Doug Berman, the Williams v. Jones habeas decision out of the 10th Circuit raises a bunch of interesting issues about ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as the cure for the disease.  The set up is that Michael Joe Williams, charged in Oklahoma with first degree murder, is offered a 10 year sentence on a plea to second degree murder before trial. 

Williams wants to cut his losses, but his lawyer, believing Williams to be innocent, refuses to be party to the deal.  The lawyer tells Williams that he will withdraw from the case if Williams wants to pursue the plea.  Williams goes to trial, loses and is sentenced to life without parole.

There was no question as far as either side was concerned that Williams’ lawyer was ineffective, which may come as a surprise for those of you SCOTUS wonks who are thinking to themselves, but what about the Arave v. Hoffman case, with cert granted in 2007??  I know!  Me too!  For those of you who are more wank than wonk, that case was about the defendant being ill-advised by counsel to reject a plea based upon a mistaken interpretation of precedent, who then went to trial and lost.  Unfortunately, the defendant withdrew his IAC claim and it won’t be coming to the Supreme Court.  Bummer.

Here, there was no discussion of the integrity of the attorney’s position, or the potential that the defendant may in fact have been innocent of murder.  The court goes to great length to note that the only question before it is remedy for a conceded IAC claim, even though the IAC claim itself raises some fascinating ethical challenges. 

I’ve addressed these issues in a variety of cases in the past, with the lawyer put to the test of standing idly by while an innocent person lies under oath to admit commission of a crime just to get the deal, and they remain as vexing as ever.  Ultimately, the decision to accept a plea offer belongs exclusively to the defendant, regardless of what the lawyer thinks.  While we are duty-bound to advice the client, as fully and honestly as humanly possible, and without resort to manipulating the client to reach the conclusion we believe to be correct, the decision must always rest with the client, painful as that may be. 

Others, of course, have disagreed with me, and believe that they, as counsel, should exercise a level of control to save the client from themselves.  While conceding that the decision is the defendants by law and ethical proscription, they feel that there is a moral duty to steer the client toward the decision they believe best.  As it’s the defendant, not the lawyer, who lives with the consequences of this crucial decision, I cannot agree that anything beyond the fullest and fairest explanation of the consequences is an appropriate exercise of our persuasive powers.  It’s not our life, and not our choice.

The 9th Circuit, however, limited its decision to the question of whether the remedy provided for the ineffective assistance, reducing the sentence from life without parole to the lowest possible sentence available for the crime for which the defendant stood convicted, life with parole, was proper.  It said no.


In fashioning the appropriate remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel, the remedy “should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.” We think it axiomatic that the remedy for a properly presented constitutional violation should not be frustrated by the sentencing options available under state law, but rather should be consistent with federal law.

The deficient performance was counsel’s advice concerning the plea agreement—advising Mr. Williams he would be committing perjury by accepting the plea offer and insisting that Mr. Williams proceed to trial or find new counsel if he wanted to accept it. As the OCCA no doubt recognized, the prejudice Mr. Williams identified was that, had he been adequately counseled, there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer and limited his exposure to ten years.

The court held that a constitutional violation mandated a constitutional remedy, in this case returning the defendant to the status he would have enjoyed had the violation not occurred. 

In dissent, Judge Neil Gorsuch took the position that the defendant, having received a fair trial, is screwed (and deservedly so).


The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is an instrumental right designed to ensure a fair trial.  By his own admission, Michael Williams received just such a trial, at the end of which he was convicted of first degree murder by a jury of his peers.  We have no authority to disturb this outcome.  The majority says that counsel’s deficient performance in the plea bargain process denied Mr. Williams a lesser second degree murder conviction, and that this justifies voiding the result of Mr. Williams’s fair trial.  But the due process clauses of the Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not encompass a right to receive or accept plea offers.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, plea bargains are matters of executive discretion, not judicially enforceable entitlement; due process guarantees a fair trial, not a good bargain.
This position, echoing that of  Kent Scheidegger  at Crime & Consequences, relegates the right to effective assistance of counsel subservient to the jury verdict.  After a fair trial, there’s no going back, no matter what.  Given how we pretend that this is all a search for justice, as opposed to a system designed to move people into prison as efficiently as possible, there’s a certain sense to this position.

But Judge Gorsuch, and obviously Kent Scheidegger, are misguided.  Our criminal justice system makes sausage, not objects of art.  The right to effective assistance of counsel is one of the few constants in the system, that the defendant be provided competent counsel throughout so that he both knows and appreciates the sausage-making process, and doesn’t find himself unnecessarily in the grinder.  To the extent this is viewed as a windfall, an easy and undeserved way out of his dilemma by the backdoor, it’s time to grow up.  There’s no magic in a fair jury trial, anymore than a plea bargain is a gift.  If it makes one feel better, consider the trial penalty, given that the offer of ten years to Williams obviously was deemed sufficient by someone in the prosecutor’s office who knew the allegations against him.

Without a doubt, the majority (even though it;’s a per curiam opinion) got it right.  It’s too bad, however, that the court took for granted whether the attorney’s position, that he would not allow his client to perjure himself by admitting guilt to a murder he didn’t commit, was ineffective.  But at least they got the remedy right.

Blogging For Dollars

Jim Beck and Mark Herrmann have a blog called Drug and Device Law.  I note this because many readers here won’t be familiar with it, since their interests are more attuned to criminal law issues, although those who appreciate a fine curmudgeon will know the Herrmann name from his excellent book, The Curmudgeon’s Guide to Practicing Law. 

As it happens, they’re also Biglaw guys, and bring the Biglaw perspective to the blawgosphere whereas I can only add my snarky and somewhat worthless outside observations about what Biglaw has in mind.  On the other hand, if I was in Chicago, and if they would let me anywhere near the Jones Day offices, I would make Herrmann buy me a beer.  Probably one of those expensive foreign beers with the odd names too.  He can afford it.  He’s Biglaw.

Every once in a while Beck/Herrmann (they are actually connected at the hip, which is why they sign every post Beck/Herrmann, and which makes it very hard for them to work at competing firms), take a foray into the wild world of blawgospheric dynamics, and it brings out a whole ‘nuther side that the rest of us neither see nor know.  Darn that Herrmann did it again, and it’s a reminder of just how far apart the solo thought process is from that of Biglaw, and how similar we really are as well.

Want to get noticed in the legal blogosphere?

Blog about legal blogging!

Herrmann went off on a frolic and detour (from drug and device law) in a couple of recent posts, first noting that none of the ten firms with the highest profits per partner sponsored blogs and then speculating about why that’s so.

The blogosphere lit up like a Christmas tree!

Oh, brother.  Been there.  Nothing lights the fire of bloggers like something provocative about their love-child.


Zach Lowe, over at AmLawDaily, did the kind of thing that reporters do: He called the managing partners of the high profits-per-partner firms and asked why they didn’t sponsor blogs. Jonathan Schiller, managing partner of Boies Schiller, was blunt: “I think the lawyers here are just too busy,” he says. “I’m too old to blog. I’d rather play golf if I have a bit of free time.”

That’s strange.  No one from AmLawDaily ever calls me.  I wonder why that is?   I’m American.  I’m a lawyer.  I’m old. I’m busy.  I play golf.  I am almost exactly the same as Jonathon Schiller.  Except I don’t run the most profitable firm in the country.  Not that I’m complaining.

So Beck/Herrmann challenged Schiller’s little dis of the blawgosphere,  Is it that blawging is just beneath the dignity of someone as important and consequential as Schiller?  Obviously, he doesn’t view blawging as intrinsically worthwhile, given that it falls somewhere between golf and  flossing as a good way to spend his time.  But even if he doesn’t feel the urge to write and/or opine, does he not need to concern himself with business development?  Would Schiller also turn down a chance to give the keynote speech to the General Counsels of America?

Oddly, I know the answer to this question, since his partner, David Boies, did exactly that at SuperConference in Chicago last may.  I was there.  I saw it.  Boies was as calm as any lawyer I’ve ever seen when he addressed the room of GCs from across the country.  I don’t know whether it’s Zen or Zoloft, but there is a tranquility about him that was amazing.

Clearly, David Boies has nothing against business development.  So that means that they don’t consider blawgs a worthy weapon in the “hypercompetitive” Biglaw market.  Beck/Herrmann therefore developed a test to determine whether blogging, assuming your purpose is raking in the dough, is the right vehicle for business development for you.

Here’s a blogging self-assessment quiz:

You’ve just gotten a phone call from a new client who wants to retain you for a new matter that is likely to generate $10,000 in fees. What’s your reaction?

A. “Thank God! Now I have something to do!”

B. “Eureka! If I score another dozen just like this one, it’ll be a banner year!”

C. “Refer it out. It’s not worth doing a conflict check for 10 grand in fees.”

If you answered A or B, blogging may be a great business development tool for you. If you answered C, blogging may yield a far less attractive return on investment.

And that, ladies and germs, is the difference between Biglaw and us little solo guys.  Lest you think that Beck/Herrmann are just two uppity Biglaw guys who look down their collective nose at honest lawyers who work for a living, they don’t blawg for cash.


As for us, we continue to think that blogging yields many benefits — personal satisfaction, a raised professional profile, participating in the public debate, becoming a central clearinghouse for information, and the like — but its value as a business development tool for lawyers at large firms remains unproven.

The two of us blog for love, not for money.
See.  They really aren’t all that different from the rest of us.  They have their personal valets help them to put on their custom made $2,000 trousers one leg at a time, just like us.

And if Boies Schiller ever finds the time to start a blawg, chances are that I’m not going to rush to add them to my blawgroll.  Unless they start referring their throwaways to me, in which case I’ll give it serious consideration. 



Dreier and The Bernie Scale

In the past, the fight was with the Sentencing Guidelines in white collar criminal sentencing.  Not any more.  Henceforth, all white collar sentences will be measured on the Bernie Scale.  You knew this would happen, right?

From the New York Times Citydesk :


The government has recommended that a federal judge in Manhattan impose a 145-year sentence on Marc S. Dreier, the prominent New York lawyer who has pleaded guilty to a fraud scheme that bilked hedge funds and other investors out of at least $400 million.

Dreier is scheduled for sentence this coming Monday, and both sides have submitted their sentencing memos.  Gerry Shargel offers this argument :


In seeking some measure of leniency we appeal not to sympathy but to reason.  We request a sentence that is both rational and proportionate. As colossal frauds capture national headlines, sentences for while collar offenders must not become disproportionately long.  In many ways, the goals of sentencing as embodied in 18 U.S.C. 3553 (a) have suffered collateral damage in the war on white collar crime.

Sound familiar? How about the defense request for a 10 to 12½  year sentence?  Familiar now?

And how does the government explain its 145 year sentence?


There are thousands of lawyers in this and other jurisdictions, who are surrounded by the wealth and lifestyles of the clients they serve. Imposing a long term of imprisonment in this case will serve to deter other lawyers who are tempted to steal, cheat or otherwise dishonor their profession to achieve personal wealth.

In the eyes of our friendly brethren at the prosecution table, the rest of us lawyers wouldn’t possibly be deterred from attempting to glom the “wealth and lifestyles” of our clients for less than 145 years.  A sentence of 130 wouldn’t do it for lawyers.  Not even 131.

But to make matters more clear, lest their be any confusion on where the bar now stands, see footnote number 4 to the government’s memo:


In any event, recent, long-lasting and substantial fraud cases prosecuted in this District – for example, Bernard Madoff (150 years), Bernard Ebbers (WorldCom; 25 years), John and Timothy Rigas (Adelphia; 12 and 17 years, respectively, on re-sentencing), Phillip Bennett (Refco; 16 years), and Samuel Israel (Bayou; 20 years) – support a lengthy sentence in this case.

Clearly, the stage is set.  As the dollars get bigger, the sentences get longer, until we’ve reached the point of absurdity.  Welcome to absurdity.

It’s not like the government lacks any sense of proportionality.  After all, they took 5 years off of Bernie’s sentence to reflect the fact that Dreier only stole $400 million rather than $12 billion, ignoring that the former is a minute fraction of the latter.  The problem, it would appear, isn’t that the sentence urged by the government for Dreier is too high, but that the Bernie Bar is still set too low.

There is no doubt that Marc Dreier is going to get slammed by Judge Rakoff at sentence, and Shargel as much as concedes this point up front.  Then again, it would be offensive and foolish for him to do otherwise.  But how much of a slamming does a financial crime, even a huge one, deserve for the legitimate purpose of sentence?  It’s impossible to say anymore, after the 150 years given Madoff on an open plea.  Nothing makes sense.  The incentive structures mean nothing anymore.  The distinction between violent and white collar crime is gone.  The notion that there is some benefit to not doing ever greater harm has been lost. 

At what point does a white collar defendant say to himself, I’m getting my lifetime plus a few others if they catch me, so there’s no reason to constrain myself at all anymore? 

In the early years of this Century, people were outraged that huge financial crimes were being perpetrated and the offenders were getting what was perceived as a slap on the wrist.  The government responded by multiplying the sentences to meet the public’s demand for retribution.  Okay, we got that.

But as with so many reactions to public outrage, it’s overshot the mark until it reaches the point of total irrationality.  This happened with Madoff, the only potential saving grace being that Madoff was supposed to be a one-off case, never again to be repeated.  It didn’t take long to put that myth to rest.

Welcome to the Bernie Scale.  How many lifetimes will it take before the craziness stops.

If You Can’t Spank ‘Em, There’s Always The Taser

From both Balko and Turley, Tucumcari, New Mexico Police Chief Roger Hatcher did what he had to do.  He just had to.  It brought him no pleasure.  It was for the her own good. 

Hatcher shot a taser dart into the head of a 14 year old girl who just wouldn’t stay still.



Hatcher said be believed he had no other option.

“There’s a lot of issues,” Hatcher said. “She committed a delinquent act. She was running from police across traffic without looking.”

Hatcher said he chased her, ordered her to stop and “then did what I had to do.”
The problem begins not with Hatcher, but with the mother of this 14 year old, Stacy Akin, who brought her daughter to the police because they were having an argument over a cellphone.  When they arrived at the police station, the daughter walked away, prompting Hatcher to go and find her.  When he did, he chased the young woman and ran from him.  According to Hatcher, this left him with no choice but to shoot.

The stories are unclear as to what this 14 year old girl did that was so terrible, so out of control, that it compelled her mother to bring her to the police.  The mother somehow had enough control to get her in the car and take her to the station.  One might anticipate that when the  heat of the argument subsided, the mother still planned to serve her dinner (buy it at McDonalds?) that evening.  So what deed of delinquency demanded detention?  No one’s saying.

Mothers (and fathers), we understand that children can be difficult.  We appreciate that some are more difficult than others, and that it be frustrating, tiring and wearing.  No one said parenting would be easy.  But shifting the burden to the cops to straighten out your kid probably isn’t the best way to deal with your frustration.  Especially if you love your child, or even kinda like her.  The police really aren’t well suited for substitute parenting.  It’s not that they don’t love children, but that they don’t love yours. 

Now, a thought for Chief Roger Hatcher.  If you want to be a celebrity, try America’s got talent.  Shooting 14 year old girls in the head with a taser guarantees you at least two things.  Lots of people will quickly learn your name and you will be branded by this singular act of idiocy for life.  Consider plan B.  Let the kid run and, eventually, she will stop. Problem solved.  A kid running really isn’t nearly as horrific a crime as you believe. 

As for the much-maligned Taser, there remains a police policy problem that seems highly under-recognized.  The constant theme of policy approving of the use of a Taser when there’s no justification for the use of force at all misses a big-picture problem; just because you have a Taser doesn’t mean you have to use it.  It has become abundantly clear that the use of force is being left to the discretion of police on a totally ad hoc basis, and that discretion, particularly with the use of Tasers, is terribly lacking.

It’s bad enough that a mother was so incapable of handling her child that she felt the police would provide a better option than a stern talk.  At least Stacy Akin didn’t spank her daughter first, thereby subjecting both mother and daughter to prosecution and potential tasing. 

Brady Violations: Not Just A “Rules” Issue

Of the many aspects of criminal practice that sounds far better on paper than in practice, disclosure of Brady material is high on the list.  Perhaps even the highest, given the critical nature of information exculpatory to the defense that never seems to find its way from the cop’s pocket to the prosecutor’s file to the defense lawyer’s table.  Odd how Brady is so much more difficult to get out than, say, a confession or murder weapon.  They so rarely lose those.

Over at PrawfsBlawg, Miriam Baer notes that efforts are underway to change how Brady is delivered:


Today, the Blog of the Legal Times reports that, “Amending the rules of criminal procedure to require prosecutors to disclose any exculpatory information to the defense will be considered during the October meeting of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure,” which will no doubt spur the DOJ to step up whatever training and internal review it already had planned. 

Last April, our trusted friends at the DOJ, embarrassed by its massive public failings to disclose Brady in cases big and small (like Alaska Senator Ted Stevens), decided to form a working group to find lasting ways to improve fulfillment of its Brady obligation.  The judicial conference, on the other hand, pushed by Judge Emmet Sullivan who wasn’t satisfied with the idea of leaving it all in the hands of the DOJ, urged a change to Rule 16 to include Brady within its disclosure requirements, a move the DOJ argued was “unnecessary”.


Judge Emmet Sullivan of U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia wrote the committee in April urging it to re-examine amending Rule 16 to require the disclosure of any exculpatory information. In 2006, the Justice Department opposed the amendment, according to Sullivan’s letter. Justice lawyers argued then that modifying the U.S. Attorney’s Manual—to include a section on disclosure obligations—was sufficient.

Brooklyn Lawprof and former SDNY prosecutor Miriam Baer’s idea is that the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility should somehow beef up its efforts to improve compliance internally.  But consider her notion of the problem :


You could conclude that professional misconduct rarely occurs among federal prosecutors, but that when it does occur, it is a doozy and the outcome is devastating for both the government and prosecutors alike.  That’s why these Brady-type violations get so much press.  
Pop Quiz:  What missing from every aspect of the discussion of both this problem and its cure?  That’s right, the defense.  Ironic that Baer considers this a PR problem for the government, demonstrating neither concern for, nor acknowledgment of, the fact that defendants are actually being denied disclosure of Brady material. 

Baer assumes it’s rare because the failure rarely comes to light.  Is that because the government does, in most instances, fulfill its obligations, or because nobody knows when it doesn’t since the defense has no access to the government’s files.  The point is akin to DNA exonerations, ignoring the 99% of cases where there’s no DNA involved to suggest that no innocent defendant is ever convicted in non-DNA cases as proved by the absence of proof of innocence. 

The solutions to the Brady problem fall into two categories.  Trust the DOJ or create a new rule that requires courts to trust the DOJ.  While the new Rule 16 proposal has certain virtue, foremost of which is that it resolves the long-standing problem of when the government must disclose Brady, which it now holds to the very last second if it’s to be disclosed at all, rendering the defense incapable of investigating or making good use of the information.  But it still doesn’t address the core issue:  The determination of what is Brady is left to the discretion of the prosecution, and the duty to disclose it at all remains the decision of the prosecutor.

The proposed “solutions” are thus dependent on the answer to this question: Do you trust the prosecutor?

If we can’t trust the prosecutor, each and every prosecutor in every district throughout the country, to disclose Brady, to err on the side of disclosure, to disclose timely, then neither new rules nor procedures that continue to rely on the discretion of prosecutors will solve the problem.  Clearly, former prosecutors and even judges who’ve been burned still seem to put their faith in the integrity of the government.  Somehow, I don’t find this satisfying, but then nobody engaged in this discussion seems to think that the defense side of the courtroom should have any say in the matter.

Why does this remind me of an old joke? 

Fair is Fair: Avvo Did Me Right (Update)

I’ve been tough on Avvo in the past, expressing my distaste for the vulgar Avvo Answers and bashing the time suck of callers and emails seeking free advice on a DUI in Phoenix.  Oh yes, I’ve been tough on Avvo, which is why my fingers are in pain as I hunt and peck my way through this post.

Lunch with Avvo CEO Mark Britton was scheduled for 12:30 pm.  At 12:14 pm, certified funds arrived at my office.  I was retained.  I was retained by a client who contacted me because he found me on Avvo.  Oh, the shame.  The humiliation.  After all the things I had written about Avvo, all the hours wasted telling callers that I couldn’t represent them for free no matter what Avvo promised, here I was, retained by an client via Avvo.  And lunch with Mark Britton mere minutes away.  The shame.

Thoughts raced through my head as a made my way through the midday throngs.  I could just keep my big mouth shut and say nothing.  I could pretend my mouth was full should Mark ask me the “question”, or politely excuse myself and head to the men’s room.  But no.  No, it was a matter of integrity.  If I am man enough to bash Avvo, I am man enough to own up to the truth.  I got a client through Avvo.

That didn’t mean, of course, that I couldn’t have a little fun with it.  So a plan developed, where I would whip out the check at the end of the meal as I adeptly grabbed the bill, and explain that lunch was on him.  Ha! Wouldn’t I be the card, the funny fellow?  I had visions of Oscar Wilde, wit running over. 

Lunch with Mark was quite an interesting time.  We talked frankly about the many of the Avvo issues that have been bandied back and forth.  We talked about how Mark ended up as Avvo CEO, and what he was trying to accomplish.  We talked about television interviews, and how the anchor asks a prolix 7 minutes question and gives 12 second for the brilliant answer.  He was a great guy, and I enjoyed talking to him very much.

And then, out of the blue, I said it.  I just came right out and told him.  My feet shifting nervously, my lip twitching, I told him.  I got a client from Avvo. 

Mark smiled triumphantly.  “Was it worth it?” he asked.  “Was what worth it?”  “The time you spend on the phone and answering emails.”  Mark told me that if I think I got calls and emails, I should see what he gets.  He suffers by a magnitude of ten, at least. 

“No”, I finally told him, “it wasn’t worth it.”  But it was just a fact of life.  It’s not like these problems didn’t exist before Avvo, or that I was satisfied trading off the one case I took with the 250 that held no interest for me whatsoever.  But it didn’t change anything.  I got a case through Avvo.  There’s no denying it.  For all my criticism, I actually got one.

Fair is fair.  I didn’t hesitate to write when I had something negative to say, and I won’t hesitate to admit that I gained from my relationship with Avvo.  Yes, I got a case from Avvo.  A good one, too.

Lunch was over too soon.  Mark grabbed the check when it arrived and said, “this is on me.”  Thanks for lunch, Mark.

Update:  Shortly after posting, the social media-crities and twitter-bells went nuts, with @adriandayton leading the way with this twit:


What? Social media works to find legal clients? @ScottGreenfield eats his words http://tinyurl.com/nqhmre

Now I have no doubt that Adrian was trying to have some fun messing with me, and I can’t blame him for that, given how little opportunity he has to crack a half-decent joke.  But for those who may think that he’s serious, let’s bear one thing in mind.  This is one client out of hundreds of telephone calls by people seeking free advice and free representation. 

One case does not a practice make.  One case is no big deal.  Hundreds of phone calls and hours of wasted time is a much bigger deal.  So if you’re keeping score, it’s Good Avvo 1, Bad Avvo 1000. 

I hope that puts things in perspective.  Now to all the social media acolytes, go find a real job and get to work.