Author Archives: SHG

Yes! But That’s Not the Whole Story

The New York Law Journal highlights the report of the The Constitution Project’s National Right to Counsel Committee, which has taken a bold stand, and one that I’ve promoted numerous times, in urging public defenders to refuse to compromise their professional responsibilities by acquiescing to taking on more cases than they can competently handle.


Defense attorneys and defender programs should refuse to compromise their ethical duties and, therefore, should refuse to continue representation or accept new cases for representation when faced with excessive workloads that will lead to a breach of their professional obligations.

When indigent defense systems require attorneys to represent more clients than they can competently represent or otherwise fail to assure legal representation in compliance with the Sixth Amendment, litigation to remedy such deficiencies should be instituted. This litigation should be instituted pretrial on behalf of all or a large class of indigent defendants. And, whenever possible, litigation should be brought by disinterested third parties, such as private law firms or public interest legal organizations willing to serve as pro bono counsel, who are experienced in litigating major, complex lawsuits and accustomed to gathering and presenting detailed factual information.

You betcha!  The promise of Gideon v, Wainwright  doesn’t fall solely on the shoulders of the defense bar, which unfortunately lacks any voice in the legislative halls because our associations are unduly focused on which potential recipient of some “champion of justice award” will bring in the most cash and carry tables to remember why they exist.

In a terrific and very thorough post, Gideon at A Public Defender provides far more depth on the report, which covers far more than just the limited portion I discuss here.

But as much time as I’ve spent promoting the elevation of duty over numbers, the Blind Guy pointed out to me this morning that there remains a bit of a gap that shouldn’t be forgotten. 

The right to have counsel appointed has one very real, very serious condition: That the defendant cannot afford counsel.  In many places, this condition is so ridiculously low that anyone with a 1987 Pinto is considered too rich for a lawyer.  But in other places, say like New York, a person with a house and a job paying $75,000 a year can have a public defender for the asking.  Essentially, there are no qualifications (or review of qualifications) at all.

I support Gideon with all my heart and soul.  I appreciate the working poor, and their need for a free defense, particularly in light of the cost of a private defense.  I’m with you, my brothers.

But you, who can very well afford to retain private counsel but choose not to?  Sorry, pal, but society doesn’t owe you a free ride. 

To the extent that the edge of need is subject to debate, it’s a debate the should be had and the line determined.  But while public defenders are overworked, overburdened, underfunded and at the cusp of professional irresponsibility, the people who take a free lawyer when they have the capability to hire their own are not only stealing from the mouths of every taxpayer, but from the mouths of those truly deserving of Gideon’s aid.  When a poor defendant is denied counsel because a sufficiently well-to-do defendant has taken up the last spot, Gideon has been turned on its head.  This isn’t right.

Some may challenge this assertion by contending that the cost of a private defense will place a hardship on many defendants who, by the numbers, can afford counsel on their own.  This is where the rubber meets the road.  Indeed it will, but who promised every member of this society that they can have a defense in court without suffering any hardship? 

There are financial burdens that are inherent in our criminal justice system, and somebody has to suffer them.  At one point, they were solely on the shoulders of defendants, who could hire counsel at their own expense or suffer the consequences.  That wasn’t an adequate solution.  But the alternative, that society finance defendants who can afford counsel at the expense of the taxpayer and those who truly cannot, is similarly unacceptable.

So let me add one caveat to the call to arms by the Right to Counsel Committee: Before you starting turning away the indigent, be sure you’ve weeded out the free-riders who have the ability to pay for their own defense, even if it means they have to do without cable TV or a mocha latte at Starbucks.  The Constitution promises a right to counsel, but not a pain free ride.

Troy Davis: Bowing to the Streamlined Apple

Via Doug Berman, the 11th Circuit has rejected Troy Davis’ attempt to raise the issue of actual innocence in a second habeas.  While the lengthy per curiam decision mentions the usual suspects, Davis’ prior state appeals and efforts to avoid the executioner, the core of the decision clearly presents the most troubling aspect of the court’s love of procedure as an end in itself.


Indeed, a common theme found throughout the congressional debates was the desire to prevent habeas petitioners from having successive “bites at the apple.” See 141 Cong. Rec. S7803, S7877 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“By imposing filing deadlines on all death row inmates, and by limiting condemned killers convicted in State or Federal court to one Federal habeas petition — one bite of the apple — these landmark reforms will go a long, long way to streamline the lengthy appeals process . . . .”); 141 Cong. Rec. S16892, S16913 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“[T]his bill provides habeas petitioners with ‘one bite at the apple.’ It assures that no one convicted of a capital crime will be barred from seeking habeas relief in Federal court[.]”); 141 Cong. Rec. S7803, S7809 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The proposal to limit inmates to one bite at the apple is sound in principle.”); 141 Cong. Rec. S7803, S7832 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“The vast majority of us . . . want to and have been trying for years to change the old system to limit the time in which a petition can be filed and to limit the number of petitions that can be filed. So essentially you get one bite out of the apple.”).

In other words, we just weren’t putting people to death fast enough to please the politicians.  Streamlining the process became more important than certainty of guilt.  Note the use of the words “certainty of guilt,” rather than certainty of innocence, which is the prerequisite enjoyed by the court in considering the merit of a defendant’s petition. 

Once convicted and sentenced to death, it’s not enough to show that there is a good chance that a verdict of guilt was wrong.  After the word “guilty” is uttered, the world turns on its head and the defendant is guilty.  Why?  Because juries are presumed infallible, and only the heaviest of burdens met can overcome that presumption in a criminal case.  Oddly, civil juries are far dumber than criminal, as they are reversed all the time, not to mention widely ridiculed for their silly and erroneous decisions.  If only civil jurors were as smart as criminal jurors.  But I digress.

The problem isn’t whether Troy Davis’ indictment should be tossed, freed from bondage and given a heartfelt apology.  The problem is that Troy Davis is going to be executed.  Death is different. 

It would be one thing if the court has concluded that upon a full review of the submissions and arguments, it could conclusively state that Troy Davis was guilty and that nothing raised, nothing argued, gave anyone pause to question that conclusion.  But that wasn’t what happened.  Instead, the court concluded that Davis had failed to conclusively prove his innocence.  This leaves a huge gap between the certainty of guilt and the uncertainty of innocence.  Absent that certainty of guilt, death is not the solution.

While I, as opposed to others, am not of the view that capital punishment is the answer to anything, it remains the cure for those jurisdictions that just like a good killing.  I can’t change that, at least not here or now.  But when the best answer we can get out of a court is that a death row inmate hasn’t conclusively proven his actual innocence before letting the executioner earn his paycheck, it’s just not nearly good enough.

One bite of the apple is a favorite expression, a rhetorical device for those who take comfort in clichés when hard thought seems too painful.  “Streamlining” is a positive buzzword, enjoyed by politicians and businessfolk alike, as it suggests doing things quicker and more efficiently.  It puts a smiley face on the death penalty, surrounding it in the language of positives that makes it more palatable for the masses.  This rush to execute stemmed from the perception that it took just too darned long to put someone to death.

When it comes to executions, what’s wrong with being so absolutely certain, so definitively clear, that the person being killed is the killer?  What’s the rush?  Death is different.  There are no do-overs.

Wrap-Up on CCR Symposium: The Horse Won the Race (Citron Update)

After the first day of backslapping Danielle Citron’s “thought provoking” article, Cyber Civil Rights, about turning cyber bullying into a civil rights issue and thereby imposing duties and liability on everyone she could get her hand to safeguard the genteel sensibilities of delicate flowers, the Cyber Civil Rights Symposium at Concurring Opinions turned out to be a far more robust discussion of issues than anticipated.

“Robust”, for those of you who don’t know the secret handshake of the Academy, is the nice way of saying that a few bold lawprofs stepped forward to challenge the chorus of the faithful who, by the mere mention of sexist roots of cyber bullying, could not bend over far enough to support Citron’s proposed remedies that would fundamentally alter freedom of speech online to protect the assumptively female victims.  Let me tell you, it isn’t easy keeping to the sweet, collegial tone demanded by the lawprofs, as the simple yet comprehensible language employed by, oh, say litigators for example, is far too brutish for their intellectual eyeballs.  It made some cry, I think.

A few standout points were made during the three days of whine, women and closed comments.  In a triad of posts, David Robinson addressed the technological infirmities of Citron’s proposed “easy” solutions, including IP logging, screening software (filtering) and differentiated expectations for different internet entities.  Robinson points out how the proposed technologies to solve the problem follow “a long and unfortunate tradition of wishful thinkers” who believe that magic software can do anything. 

Orin Kerr and Devan Desai square off over the use of rhetoric to push this agenda, with Desai arguing:


Civil rights has a certain logic and power. So does free speech. As Nathaniel noted, one can nonetheless find aspects of each position that map to the other. Yet, let me be clear, rhetoric is not and cannot be about adopting a frame. That idea makes little sense. Framing reveals some, but it cannot by itself control thoughtful engagement. Put differently, the power of Danielle’s paper is that it challenges. It forces one to ask the questions that have arisen throughout the symposium. It presents a view of the world that for some is quite accurate, but for others seems unfounded. That is the beauty of the endeavor; it makes one think.

But Kerr opens a window and clears the air:


Deven is surely right that rhetoric isn’t necessarily a bad thing. After all, we’re all lawyers here, and every lawyer uses rhetoric to frame arguments. It’s a basic tool of persuasion.

At the same time, rhetoric can be highly audience-dependent.

In this case, I wonder if the”civil rights” rhetoric has a narrower audience than some of us think. The rhetoric may have a great deal of power to some audiences, be more or less neutral to other audiences, and even perhaps have a negative connotation to others.

In other words, the language of sexist victimhood may not play as well in Peoria as it does in the Academy, where lawprofs will trample each other to get to the head of the line of the faithful.

One of my favorite posts in the series was by David Fagundes, which spoke to the far more fundamental separation of approaches argued way back in 1996:


Easterbrook’s essay, “Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse”, came out in 1996, and as the title suggests, the judge took issue with the idea that cyberspace should be treated by lawyers and academics as a sui generis field. Easterbrook argued that regulating cyberspace with extant legal mechanisms was sufficient, and that there was no more need to offer “the law of the internet” course in law school than there was to offer “the law of the horse”.

Lessig’s 1998 response, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberspace Might Teach”, unsurprisingly took a more sanguine view of the internet as a distinct subject for legal study. While Lessig did not call for an entirely separate and distinct body of regulations to govern cyberspace (as some scholars at the time did), he did argue that studying the internet could impart distinct lessons about separation of powers, transparency, and the tailoring of law that any other subject matter (e.g., horses) could not.

This struck a nerve with me given my view that search and seizure law in the cyber age would do better with a sui generis approach, though the horse clearly won the race here.  But Fagundes’ point provides a great paradigm for consideration of issues arising from our beloved new technologies from minds that were way ahead of mine.

Surprisingly, one of the most controversial aspects of the Symp turned out to be the decision of the organizers to close comments, the default for every post requiring individual participants to make the active choice to open comments on their individual posts if that’s what they wanted.  It all turned sour with Michael Froomkin turning his comments on and letting the Philistines have their say.  And “say” they did.  Surprisingly, it turns out that not all lawprofs were afraid to express reservations and disagreements, though they did so in that peculiarly pedagogical way that makes a skunk smell sweet and makes litigators shake their heads. 

Of course, Randazza was front and center, writing with his typical robust clarity, which threw some into a tizzy.  The proposed “better practice” was to cease the rhetoric of “lies and distortions” in preference of “differences of interpretation.”  This generated a retort from Seth Finkelstein :


Well, the problem there is that “differences of interpretation” can cover much rhetorical mischief – in the limit, doesn’t this converge to the absurd, that if someone “feels” a certain way, that’s their interpretation, and hence indisputable? Then isn’t it just making ideologues unfalsifiable?

I too don’t understand why so many people are gushing over warmed-over Mackinnon-Dworkin with “cyber” tacked on to it. And let’s put it this way – inasmuch as someone might grant there is such a thing as objective reality, the paper has disturbing variances from it (if you don’t believe such a thing exists, then it’s kind of pointless to talk about scholarship in the first place).

But even lawprofs outside the selected participants found the closed circle on such a controversial subject disturbing. At PrawfsBlawg, Paul Horwitz called the closed circle out:


Of course, much commentary can be unhelpful and unduly emotional.  But that has not usually been a particular problem on CoOp, and I don’t think the comments on the posts that have left the comment option enabled have suggested otherwise.  And of course the fact that some skeptical writers have been included in the symposium means some contrary points of view are aired even if no commenters are invited to the party.  But the whole thing leaves me feeling quite odd, for few reasons.  First, I think it weakens the quality of the public discussion of the symposium, in a way that’s at odds with the usual norms of CoOp.  One of the original posts in the symposium argues that the editors thought that, “for this topic in particular,” the costs of allowing comments would outweigh the benefits.  I don’t think the results have borne that out; whether or not it was intended, the posts that don’t allow comments have an air of ipse dixit, and a kind of “shut up, he explained” attitude toward readers who might disagree, while the posts that allow comments have provided for a more thorough and sensitive airing of the issues.

So what were they so afraid of?


Those people who are most worried about the potential for “abusive” disagreement have also been, in my view, the symposiasts who have made the most sweeping, tendentious, and unsupported claims, both empirical and normative, in support of their arguments.  That makes their “arguments” more like assertions.  It not only prevents their arguments from being as strong as they could be — for, in saying they are making the most tendentious and unsupported arguments, I am not saying they are necessarily making bad arguments — but it also suggests, ironically enough given the topic, that those individuals who are making the claims that most demand heated disagreement are the same people who, on the one hand, fear being openly and heatedly (or “abusively”) contradicted, and on the other would enforce this fear through legal means.  

The easiest way to protect “sweeping, tendentious and unsupported” assertions is to preclude anyone from challenging them.  Ironically, in the comments to Horwitz’s post some of the participants who chose to close comments wrote in their own defense:

James Gimmelman explained that he kept comments closed because of “a small but significant chance that the trolls will descend.”  Trolls on Concurring Opinions?  It’s like someone from Iowa in the 80s refusing to go to New York because of all the muggings he heard about on TV. 

Bruce Boyden explained:


We’re talking about the AutoAdmit crowd here. I think it’s pretty easy to say that someone else should subject themselves to such abuse. If they want to, fine, but I don’t think there’s any obligation.

No obligation indeed, but that does little to either explain why the feared “Auto-Admit” crowd would know about or could care about what the symposium.  Like the bogeyman trolls, this bizarrely far-fetched fear of attack offered more rationalization than rationale, particularly when it devolved into the strawman “obligation” argument.  No one claimed a duty to allow comments, but rather the refusal to do so demonstrated that the sound of the chorus couldn’t survive Simon Cowell.

Former Feral Child cum Popehatter Patrick then spoke the obvious, when he noted that moderation of comments was always available, should things get out of hand.  But Dave Hoffman jumped in with both feet to save the day:


It’s not clear to me why I ought to waste my time responding to such childish, insecure, nonsense. But I guess that some people (Paul?) would find all commentators to be constructive & useful dissenters, and the symposium poorer for not universally welcoming them. My view is that it’s a large internet. We invited a cross-spectrum of voices to post, but we didn’t – and never have – opened our blog up as a public forum. I’ve always moderated my comment threads, pruning them of fools.

Perhaps it has something to do with the possibility, even greater than a horde of trolls, that some comments might be constructive and informative? So much for lawprofs avoiding ad hominems at all costs.  While I am painfully aware of my inability to employ the tactful language of the Academy, falling into the wasteland of practitioners who clumsily struggles to find words to express my simplistic pedestrian thoughts, I still would like to pretend that I have something to add to the intellectual oligarchy that has resigned itself to curing all ills by converting them into sacred cows and thereby justifying their placing the burden of their favorite values on my back.  But I’m just a Luddite lawyer (with a love of alliteration), so what could I possibly add?

In the end, the symposium was quite enlightening, with a handful of “mild dissenters” doing yeoman’s work in countering the arguments that would largely have flown unsupported had there been no skeptical voices.  In the post where comments were permitted, some vigorous and well-justified challenges were raised that would never have been heard otherwise, and those who had no fear of scrutiny demonstrated why a full public vetting of such controversial proposals as Citron’s is necessary.

There was, alas, one huge disappointment.  As readers will recall, Ann Bartow promised on day 1 that she would explain “in her next post” why “the Internet is setting back the cause of women’s equality.”  Bartow was never heard from again.  I hope she wasn’t kidnapped by some sexist Auto-Admit troll.  That would be horrible.  But it may be the case, since I otherwise couldn’t imagine that wild horses would drag her away.

Update:  Danielle Citron, erstwhile proprietor of Cyber Civil Rights, has emerged from an undisclosed location to express her thoughts on the symosium.


In the late 1970s, society made a judgment that threats of sexual violence and comments reducing women to sexual objects in the workplace constituted a pernicious form of sex discrimination, one that unacceptably interfered with women’s employment opportunities in a manner that the First Amendment does not privilege. That normative and doctrinal judgment remains true today and it has much to teach us about the harassment of vulnerable individuals online, especially women. Just as the harassment of female employees with pornographic images in the workplace and sexual taunts inflicts serious economic and social costs, so, too, does the flooding of a female blogger’s income-generating site with pornography (and/or rape threats) and shutting the site down with denial of service attacks. This, I believe, must be part of our thinking about the problem of cyber harassment of individuals from traditionally subordinated groups.

Flooding a female blogger’s income generating site with pornography?  Say what?  Glad she doesn’t just make stuff up.  And as for the process:


The probing discussion of website operators’ standard of care and anonymity were illuminating and important as were the critiques of the expressive value that law can play in combating cyber gender harassment, the subject of my current work. These insights will no doubt have an indelible mark on my future endeavors. And I also wanted to thank those who gave me feedback via email and comments: it was open-source academics at its best.

I am thankful I have no clue what she would mean by closed-source academics.  And there you have it, straight from the horse’s mouth.

Learned in the Law; An Alternative Route

Howard O. Kieffer did some federal time between 1989 and 1992 for theft and filing false tax returns.  By my calculations, that’s three years, say about the same amount of time some of us spent in law school.  From the Duluth News Tribune :



Howard O. Kieffer never attended law school, a federal prosecutor says. But three attorneys testified Tuesday that they thought Kieffer was a lawyer because of his expertise in federal court matters and because they saw him at attorney training seminars.


Kieffer, 54, of Duluth is charged with mail fraud and making false statements in impersonating a lawyer. Authorities say he worked on federal cases in at least 10 states, but North Dakota is the first state to prosecute him.


Not only did Kieffer practice law in the federal courts, but he managed to get some interesting clients and make himself available for speaking engagements.


Authorities said Kieffer lied on his application to practice law in federal court and worked on federal cases in at least 10 states. His clients include a former St. Louis Blues hockey player who pleaded guilty to plotting to kill his agent and a Colorado woman who was convicted of soliciting the killing of her former husband.

Kieffer also led an Internet discussion group on federal prison issues and appeared at seminars throughout the U.S. to speak about federal sentencing, authorities said.

Now I really hate to draw any overbroad comparisons (just because that’s the kinda guy I am), but do any of you see an issue with the many kind and pleasant folks who are busily promoting themselves over the internet, in blawgs and websites, and as consultants available for speaking engagements, who just may not be all they claim to be?

Here’s the rub: It’s not all that hard for someone of reasonable intelligence, who has spent a bit of time carefully observing life in and around the trenches, to demonstrate sufficient proficiency to lay claim to professional qualifications.  If a scammer like Kieffer can do it to federal judges in no less than 10 states, what makes you think they can’t do it under the controlled and easily manipulated environment of the internet?

There’s really nothing funny about what Kieffer did, considering that real people’s lives were on the line when he impersonated a lawyer before a wide swathe of courts.  Who knows what he screwed up, while putting on a sufficiently good show to get away with it.  Of course, there are many real lawyers who don’t do much, so the bar isn’t set particularly high.  But still…

The point remains that everyone online needs to remove the rose-colored glasses, parse the sweet-sounding vagaries that so many pass off as substance, and start looking skeptically at the magical mystery claims of many self-annointed saviors of the law.  Are you sure you know who you are listening to?  Are you sure it’s not a pile of dog poop wrapped up in a pretty bow?  Are you sure?

And if there was ever a secondary means of learning how to be a lawyer in federal court, a few years in federal custody would be it.  So it would behoove you to consider, if the online Svengalis aren’t who they say they are, did they at least do something meaningful and verifiable, like federal time?

Spitzer, Unarmed

When Eliot Spitzer, former marauding attorney general and horny Governor of the Empire State, was handed a slot at Slate to speak unfettered by the political chains that bound his future potential, I hoped he would prove that beneath that snarling out shell would be a razor-sharp mind, filled with incisive thoughts that might be enlightening.  No such luck.

In his second appearance as cyberpundit, Spitzer takes on Judge Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit Posners in a battle of wits. 


In an opinion dissenting from the “denial of rehearing en banc“—a sequence of words only a lawyer could love—Posner wrote that there are growing indications that CEO compensation “is excessive because of the feeble incentives of board of directors to police compensation. … Directors are often CEOs of other companies and naturally think that CEOs should be well paid. And often they are picked by the CEO.” He then examined the conflicts inherent in the process of CEO compensation determination, concluding that “[c]ompetition … can’t be counted on to solve the problem because the same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations and similar entities, including mutual funds” [emphasis added].

Chiding Judge Posner for what would appear to be his sudden and inexplicable liberal impulses, Spitzer views Posner’s dissent as saying


that the market is arguably incapable of either setting CEO compensation . . . , my first reaction was to put the document down, rub my eyes, and check the authorship again. Then I read on, with increasing incredulity—and pleasure.

That would be something,considering Spitzer characterization of Judge Posner as “one of the most respected and prolific conservative intellectuals. As a founder of the “Chicago School,” he is both a creator and defender of the free-market theory that has guided deregulation for the past 30 years.”  At least one of the participants in this battle of wits can be called “respected” and “intellectual”.

The problem is that my former head of state has completely misread the dissent.  The quotes employed about “excessive compensation” and “competition . . . can’t be counted” relate not to Judge Posners views, but rather to the three judge panel that originally decided the case in the 7th Circuit.  In other words, Spitzer got it backwards.  Judge Posner was describing the decision that he believed should be subject to en banc review, noting that his writing was in dissent to the refusal to rehear the case.

To the extent one can discern a judge’s position from a dissent on a rejection of a rehearing petition, Judge Posner appears to be concerned about the potential breach of fiduciary duty on the part of top executives in obtaining compensation packages that bear no relation to the services rendered.


This case merits the attention of the full court. The panel rejected the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982), to deciding whether a mutual fund adviser has breached his fiduciary duty to the fund, the duty created by section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. Gartenberg permits a court to consider, as a factor in determining such a breach, whether the fee is “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” 694 F.2d at 928.

As a courtesy to my former governor, I feel compelled to explain that arm’s-length bargaining is a component of a free market.  Posner was concerned that executive compensation decisions were set by conflicted members of Boards of Directors, and therefore not subject to market forces.

Directors are often CEOs of other companies and naturally think that CEOs should be well paid. And often they are picked by the CEO. Compensation consulting firms, which provide cover for generous compensation packages voted by boards of directors, have a conflict of interest because they are paid not only for their compensation advice but for other services to the firm—services for which they are hired by the officers whose compensation they advised on.

If I may offer an analogy to assist my gaunt yet combative former leader along, it’s as if young certain ladies had a steady stream of chief state executives to pleasure with huge sums of their daddies cash to spend for whatever relieved the tension of their high office, and thus ignored the pleas of the common man for the occasional street encounter for $20 and the price of a ribbed condom.  Okay, that might not be a perfect analogy, but I would be remiss if I failed to note that Spitzer is a disingenuous, hypocritical slimebag.

On the other hand, I must agree with Eliot S. that the winds of change that have blown in a new regime have brought a smile to my face as well.  It is not that Judge Posner has abandoned his Chicago ways, but rather that New York has abandoned Eliot Spitzer’s ways.  One would think that former ADA, former Attorney General, former Governor, Eliot Spitzer could read a short dissent with sufficient care to figure out which side was which before going public in an attempt to take on a circuit judge in a battle of wits.

But Spitzer showed up for a battle of wits unarmed.

The Stupidest Thing Ever

I’ve stayed out of the sexting discussion, as others have already admirably discussed the lunacy of prosecuting the young women for sending out photographs of themselves as kiddie porn, and the recipients and disseminators as sex offenders.  There’s a reason we call them children: they exercise childish judgment and do stupid things.  They think nothing of consequences and only of the moment.  They do themselves harm in a million different ways without the slightest clue that it’s harm at all.  Because they are children.

But as Randazza at the Legal Satyricon notes, the compulsion to “do something” about sexting is picking up traction,  This morning, a “town hall” type meeting was held on Good Morning America, with Cynthia Logan front and center.  She is a particularly sympathetic mother, as her daughter committed suicide after a nude photo sent to her boyfriend was widely disseminated.  It is the most horrible outcome for a parent there can be.

But not every problem demands a criminal solution.

The GMA town hall had a young woman, who sent a nude photo of herself to her boyfriend who subsequently spread it around following their breakup.  She said it was the stupidest thing the ever did.  Then her mother, crying, explained that she had no idea that this would be a problem, the sort of thing that she should have discussed with her daughter and warned her against.

A young man was then asked to speak.  He had sent around a photo of his former girlfriend, and he paid dearly for it.  He was forced to leave college, prosecuted and sentenced to probation, and required to register as a sex offender.

At this moment, Cynthia Logan, sitting in the front row of the meeting, spoke out in a very official voice.  She first asked the young man for his name, which he foolishly gave up on national television, and then told him that it would have been her choice that he be placed on probation and forced to appear in front of his peers to warn them of the consequences of committing his crime.

When the young woman spoke, Logan sat mute.  When the mother of the young woman spoke, Logan sat mute.  When the young man spoke, Logan went into action.  As it happens, to criticize the young woman for her incredibly stupid deed would have been to criticize her own daughter.  To criticize the mother for her failure to exercise parental influence, if not control, over her daughter would have been to criticize herself.  But to criticize the young man removed all blame from Logan’s side of the equation and find the perfect target, one that imposed no fault that touched Cynthia Logan’s world.

I will not blame Cynthia Logan for seeking to blame someone outside her sphere.  But I cannot silently accept her position that blame falls only one stupid child and no one else.  Everyone involved in this monumentally stupid trend shares blame.  And of the blameworthy, we need to bear in mind that two parts of the triad are children.  Stupid children.  Foolish children.  Children who exercise incredibly childish judgment.  But children.

At the same time, it’s hard to place too much blame on the parents.  Teenagers share little of their world with parents.  Despite their best, most attentive efforts, parents are given little access to the secret world of teenagers.  They can discuss, lecture, cajole, implore, their children to use their heads, to do nothing that will come back to harm them.  Children sit there but don’t necessarily listen.  Even if they listen, they don’t necessarily believe.  And even if they believe, they don’t necessarily accept that any harm will ever come to them.  Every child believes that he or she is immune.  They are teenage superheroes, to whom no harm can come.

There is no doubt that sexting is simply an absurdly bad, dangerous, foolish thing to do.  There is similarly no doubt that forwarding inappropriate pictures to others is terribly wrong.  But turning foolish children into criminals, whether the young woman or young man, only adds to the body count.

Aggressively educating all children as to the harm that befalls foolish, childish conduct will help, though if my memory of my teenage years serves me, there is nothing a parent or school official can say that would have a conclusive impact.  Even the learned wisdom of those who made, and suffered for, the mistake will present only a marginal remedy, since they obviously aren’t superheroes like those who have yet to suffer.  But it’s better than nothing, and will help at least some young people to not do something so unbearably stupid.

We are thus left without a magic bullet.  Some problems are like that, defying an easy answer and denying a singular culprit.  This isn’t the message that Cynthia Logan wants us to believe, and is inconsistent with well-meaning prosecutors around the country who feel compelled to do something about this problem by shooting wildly.  The knee-jerk solution of proclaiming some child a criminal and unleashing society’s anger on them, however, is a horrible response.  It may make the mother of a teenage girl who committed suicide feel as if she’s accomplished something, but it is a false solution.

We can’t stop children from being childish.  But we can stop ourselves from imposing childish solutions on them for being stupid.

Cyber Civil Rights Takes on the Internet

Over at Concurring Opinions, a fascinating “symposium” is taking place to discuss Danielle Citron’s proposal to change the “wild west” of the internet in defense of Cyber Civil Rights, the proposition that anonymous attacks online disproportionately harm women and minorities, and therefore require alternative means of controlling free expression online. 

It’s a curious symposium at the outset, as the issue had earlier been joined in a rather robust debate on NPR with Citron, Marc Randazza and David Margolick.  But the participants in this debate were handpicked to avoid the fracas that challenged the underpinnings of Citron’s theory, leaving out the more vocal critics and including mostly those voices that produce a beautiful four part harmony.  A few squeaky voices did find their way into the choir, notably Orin Kerr (who realized off the top that he was included to offer “mild dissent”) and Michael Froomkin (who fears “I may have been set up to be the pig at the garden party”).  Still, the tone remains sweet and mild, consistent with the academic need to remain collegial.

For the most part, the symposium neither seeks, nor permits, dialogue outside of the selected few.  Most of the posts at Co-Op do not permit comments,  Ever the evil genius, Ann Bartow of Feminist Law Profs, who I’m sure comes to this symposium with an open mind, makes a pre-emptive attack in her opening post:


Many participatory sectors of the Internet are dominated by aggressive bullies, nasty haters and monetizing opportunists. It’s hard to tell whether they constitute a numeric majority, but the geography of the Internet allows a small number of people to scorch vast swaths of earth with surprisingly little effort. There is no currently such thing as the “safe spaces on the web where those with unpopular views can exchange ideas without fear of retribution” that Frank Pasquale calls for. Not even here. The folks running this symposium decided not to facilitate comments on CCR related posts here at Concurring Opinions, but they have no control over the conversations that take place other places, which may be intractably linked to this blog via hyperlinks and search engine results. I’m doubtful that the architecture of the Internet can be changed to provide the benefits of connectivity without simultaneously facilitating engagement or intervention by bad actors.

By the mere act of linking to the CCR posts, others (myself included) are “aggressive bullies, nasty haters and monetizing opportunists.”  Bartow’s never been one to tolerate any opinions other than hers, and she is well rehearsed in the art of simultaneously painting herself the victim even as she lashes out.

The gist of Danielle Citron’s theory begins with the proposition that woman and minorities are disproportionately victimized by vicious anonymous online attacks and threats of real world harm, which both extends beyond mere bad speech into a metaphysical punch in the face and the inhibition of free expression by the victims due to the excess of free expression by the attackers. This is supported by anecdotal evidence and studies of dubious value, though most of the symposium participants have accepted this part of the proposition without any critical thought, since it’s consistent with their sensibilities and academic orthodoxy.  It’s a value judgment, and few in the Academy are inclined to be naysayers whenever women’s victimization is at stake.

The proposed remedies are summarized by Foomkin :


Prof. Citron begins her remedies discussion with the suggestion that ISPs be stripped of § 230 immunity for postings by others, in the hopes that this will force them to police their customers. She proposes that they be subject to distributor liability – that we move to the takedown regime we have come to know and love under the DMCA. To which one can only reply…huh?

But never mind that: The core proposal is to set the duty of care for ISPs seeking not to be held responsible for their customers’ writings at a level that will required them – by law – to keep records of users’ IP numbers. In short, in order to serve the goals of deterrence and enforcement, Prof. Citron proposes the complete elimination of anonymity on the US portion of the Internet in order to root out hateful speech.

Let me repeat: Professor Citron proposes the complete elimination of anonymity on the US portion of the Internet in order to root out hateful speech.

Since the only method of identifying and reaching the anonymous bullu is through the intermediary, Citron proposes that duties be imposed on the rest of us, websites, blogs, whatever, that would require us to police the internet, maintain records of our anonymous commenters, upon pain of liability to those who believe they have suffered a rhetorical “punch in the face” by the bully’s comment.

As might be expected, much of the commentary at Co-Op consists of effusive praise of the decorations on their own bandwagon, with little desire to question the underpinning of Citron’s assumptions.  Indeed, many posters begin their thoughtful appraisal with statements like:


Danielle Citron presents compelling reasons for applying civil rights laws to online conduct.

Professor Citron’s Cyber Civil Rights makes several important contributions to our understanding of the relationship between speech and equality.

Danielle Citron’s article does a great job of reframing the question of online anonymous speech into an appropriate broader context.

For the most part, Danielle Citron’s work on cyber harassment has me convinced.

For me, the most important part of Danielle Citron’s paper is right there in the title: the way she frames online harassment specifically as a civil rights problem.


In contrast, Orin Kerr has swiftly pointed out the obvious, that this is a Battle Royale of rhetoric, with its warriors simply reserving their devotion for the value they hold most dear.

[I]sn’t Danielle’s article trying to use rhetoric against rhetoric? It seems to be that one side of this debate makes its case (rightly or wrongly) using the rhetoric of free speech. Danielle’s article tries to make its case (rightly or wrongly) by countering this rhetoric using the rhetoric of civil rights. Or to put it another way, one side of this debate sees free speech under assault; the other side sees civil rights as under assault. Or so it seems to me.

So the problem devolves to which threat is predominent in the hierarchy of academic concerns.  It also explains why the participants were so carefully selected.

This symposium will be going forward for the next couple of days, and it’s quite possible that despite the effort to muzzle nasty outside voices (like those of us who would bear the consequences of Citron’s concern for womenhood), the “mild dissenter” or even the “pig at the garden party” may be pushed by the gushing acceptance of unproven assumption to firm up their positions and challenge the chorus.  If nothing else, it should be interesting, particularly given Ann Bartow’s closing salvo from her first post:

In my view, the Internet is setting back the cause of women’s equality. I’ll explain this further in my next Symposium post.

I’ve no doubt she will, and I can’t wait to find out why.

Who’s Your Lawyer-Daddy?

Since the Supreme Court’s Upjohn decision, it’s an article of faith for any real white collar criminal defense lawyer that the stiff working for the corporation will sell out the individual at their first opportunity.  Of course, that’s what they are getting paid to do, but they just seem to enjoy it so darn much. 

For the individual employee of a corporate target, on the other hand, the dynamic of legal representation, loyalty and advice is a minefield.  From the WSJ Law Blog (with it’s new chief, Ashby Jones, firmly grasping the helm):


The issue has come up recently in two separate high-profile instances. Earlier this month, Los Angeles federal district court judge Cormac Carney — who just might be the only federal judge to have ever played in the old United States Football League — threw out portion’s of the government’s criminal stock-options backdating case against a former Broadcom executive after ruling that lawyers from Irell & Manella failed to explain clearly to the executive that it was representing the company, not the executive.


A similar issue recently arose during the government investigation of R. Allen Stanford. The Justice Department filed criminal obstruction-of-justice charges against Stanford’s chief investment officer, Laura Pendergest-Holt, based on statements she made in sworn testimony to the SEC. Present during the testimony was Proskauer Rose lawyer Thomas Sjoblom, who said during the testimony he represented Stanford and officers and directors of his affiliated companies.


But Pendergest-Holt says in her suit that she believed he represented her personally. Click here for Monday’s story on the issue, from the WSJ’s Kara Scannell. Click here for Judge Carney’s ruling, and here for the LB take on the Pendergest-Holt suit.


There is no question but that the attorneys are obliged to advise the individuals that they represent the corporation, not the individual personally.  This advice is humorously called the “corporate Miranda warnings,” in that they are expected to clarify the lawyer’s loyalty and advice, so that the individual isn’t inclined to do something particularly stupid in the course of being a good corporate cog.

But then, there are so many conflicts of interest wrapped up representing corporations and corporate officers, and so much money at stake in legal fees and legal control, that the expectation that firms whose “expertise” is more directed at corporate litigation than anything remotely resembling criminal defense, will fulfill their Upjohn duty seems hard to swallow.  At least cops get a card with the rights spelled out for them.

As Judge Carney notes, essentially right off the top, Irell & Manella had a pretty good gig going at Broadcom, representing the corporation internally in a stock options investigation, as well as CFO William Ruehle in a couple of lawsuits,   It seemed like such a good time to order the new Ferrari.  But as Ruehle found out, it wasn’t like he could actually say things to “his” lawyers, given that they served Broadcom first and his words to his trusted advisers could seal his fate.

The problem is that corporations are legal fictions, and legal fictions can do no wrong as long as they don’t stonewall the government.  While every cog in the wheel, particularly as they get closer to the hub, is of course critical to the financial well-being of the whole, it is sometimes necessary to excise a very important cog to keep the entity alive, if not thriving.  What all this gook means is that as important as any executive may be to the corporation, the rest of the folks in the executive suite will happily offer up her head on a platter if it saves their own butts.  Hey, that’s corporate life.

What’s terribly problematic is communicating the idea to executives that the very lawyers they loved and trusted yesterday will be the ones who rat them out tomorrow in a blink of the eye.  There are a variety of reasons for this communication breakdown, some from the side of the lawyers who at most give a perfunctory “corporate Miranda warning” while blinking and winking so much that their eyes hurt, to the hubris clogging the executive’s hearing that makes it impossible for her to understand that they really mean it when they say that they do not represent the individual.  What works so poorly to the poor and downtrodden works even worse for the mighty and self-important.

There are solutions to this dilemma, though no one really likes them very much.  For one thing, the lawyers representing the corporation could be absolutely prohibited from representing the individual, such that no waiver of conflict was possible and would subject the lawyer to serious disciplinary consequences (like loss of legal fees).  This would remove the profit motive from doing a half-baked job of conflicted representation, and save the lawyers from a lot of opthamologist visits.

Another possibility would be for executives to display a modicum of intelligence by retaining competent independent counsel to represent them whenever they were the subject of inquiry in an internal corporate investigation.  This option, however, flies in the face of the good corporate cog theory, since the executive always wants to believe that after a nice, cooperative interview, everyone will smile, shake hands and life will go back to normal, with bonuses paid timely.  No executive wants to be unpleasant, or worse yet defensive, toward his fellow golfing partners. 

This all goes to the never-ending dilemma in the defense of white collar causes: No one ever believes that they’ve done anything that could seriously subject them to criminal liability.  They just can’t accept the concept, and because it all seems so ridiculously outlandish, no one ever treats an inquiry or investigation as if they could end up getting fried.  Protecting oneself from becoming the corporate scapegoat, whether deserved or not, is beyond the pale for most executives until it’s too late and the damage has been done.

The fact that corporations are inclined to use attorneys who are less than scrupulous in their admonishment to individuals that anything they say will come back to bite them in their finely-clad butt doesn’t forgive these seemingly intelligent men and women from knowing when to lawyer up.  Real criminal defense lawyers have a name for very important executives who firmly believe that they could never be held criminally accountable for their actions.  The name is “prisoner”, followed by some numbers.

It might not make you the most popular exec at the club if you retain your own competent counsel and protect yourself from shouldering the corporate risk, but there is no golf course at Club Fed. 

Biglaw Learns New Math

My first question was where do I apply.  After all, I could really use a year abroad.  Really.  Going café to cabaret sounds like a dream come true.  So when I read in the New York Times about the Skadden Arps offer to associates to take a year off for a third of their salary, I felt envy of Biglaw associates for the first time ever. 


Only in a financial world turned upside down would an arrangement like this one make sense. Looking to cut costs like everyone else, but not prepared to lay off associates, Skadden has chosen instead to offer all of its associates — about 1,300 worldwide — the option of accepting a third of their base pay to not show up for work for a year. (So far, the partners have no equivalent arrangement.)

In the case of the lawyer profiled in the article, a 6th year associate, the pay for her year off would be $80,000.  Naturally, she will have to leave New York City to survive, as no one can make it here on such a pittance.  Seriously, that’s pin money for those of you in Kansas who won’t understand the prior sentence.

But once I got past my whimsical dream of a never-ending carafe in Aix-en-Provence, a realization hit home.  It’s financially better for Skadden to pay $80 grand to be rid of its associates for a year than to have them working.  After all, with layoffs aplenty around Biglaw, it’s not like Skadden couldn’t tell its youngins’ that they can work for a third of their salary for a year, or until the revenues justified otherwise, or take a hike.  Given the options, particularly that a third of a Biglaw associate’s salary is still more than they would earn doing pretty much anything else they’re qualified to do, they’ve got them by the ‘nads.  Since when is Biglaw afraid to squeeze?

What this offer reveals is an astounding lack of value associates bring to the practice of law.  The myth is busted.  They are worth more to Biglaw out of the office than they are there. 

The real joke isn’t on Biglaw, but its clients.  You remember them, the folks who pay the freight for the two partners and six associates assigned to every matter, bearing in mind that the first perk of partnership is never having to carry a bag again.  Not that there isn’t real heavy lifting to do.

Assuming that Skadden’s program doesn’t take into account the profit motive that some larger law firms consider when making decisions such as this, we are now informed that at least a third of the cost of an associate is utterly, needlessly and totally wasted.  My bet is that it costs firms at least that much to keep them in redwelds with gold-leaf monograms and Starbucks.  It’s a cost saver to toss a third of their salary down the toilet rather than have them show up.  What a smack in the face.

Still, if it will get me to the continent and keep me in lattes for a year, I could learn to suffer.  And to all my buddies at Skadden, there’s little that will bruise my ego anymore, so I can take the insult with no hard feelings.  Plus, I assure you that I will never want to return to the grind for my shot at your corner office.  It’s a win-win.  Think about it.

Clinging to Power

Duke lawprof Paul Carrington, a “veteran observer” of the Supreme Court, argued in a New York Times op-ed that we’ve had at least a couple of justices who held on to their post just a wee bit past their expiration date.


It is said that Supreme Court justices used to direct a junior colleague to notify a dotty justice that it was time to resign. But as the influence of the court expanded in the second half of the 20th century, that practice seemed to disappear. Some justices, even those seriously unfit, have held on to their awesome power and status long beyond what was reasonable. William Rehnquist, who continued to work on cases in 2005 even as he was dying of cancer, is the most recent example. The celebrated Thurgood Marshall, who was 82 when he retired in 1991, was another.

Lucky for Carrington that dotty-dom isn’t limited to any particular philosophical view, though I don’t see why someone dying of cancer can’t think straight or why terminal mumbling is a certain sign of incompetence.  Of course, if there was a competency test for holders of “awesome power” in government, I hesitate to think of what that would do to the other two branches of government as well.  Thankfully, it wouldn’t apply to the quasi-awesome power of voters.

Having not been anywhere near as observant at the writer, I demur on the subject of who was dotty or incompetent, and note instead a tangential aspect of Carrington’s argument.


One reason justices are able to cling to power is that they have made their jobs relatively easy. For more than 80 years, they have been empowered to choose the cases they decide, and to leave many matters to lower courts without close oversight. When Congress largely eliminated the automatic right to a Supreme Court hearing as part of the Judiciary Act of 1925, it was assured that the court would continue to decide about 300 cases every year. That promise was soon forgotten. The justices are now down to about 75 cases a year. And the vital task of selecting those few cases is substantially delegated to young law clerks who also help write the justices’ opinions.

The reduction in caseload of 300 to 75 has it’s pluses and minuses.  While it means that the number of cases reviewed as absolutely minimal, it also limits the amount of damage the Supremes can do in any given term.  Given the clarity, scope and decisiveness of decisions recently, some of us wish they would be included in the Skadden sabbatical program.  It seems to me that Chief Justice Roberts could really use a year in the south of France.  No, really.

But the lines that grabbed me is the one about the “vital task of selecting those few cases is substantially delegated to young law clerks.”  Somebody has to go through the thousand upon thousand of cert petitions to handicap which cases get to the Sweet 75.  Why not leave the fate of the law in the hands of bunch of kids with this worldly experience of fruit flies?

The Supremes can’t decide it if their child-gatekeepers “ding” it.  What are the pressing issues in real life for real people?  Certainly 24 year olds know.  Mind you, these are the best and the brightest, coming from the tippy-top law schools, with sterling grades and law review editorship feathers in their propeller caps (which makes it very hard for the propellers to spin freely).  Yet it’s left to them, by virtue of weighty necessity, to vet the efforts of seasoned advocates to persuade the court that their cause is worthy of review.

What does the legal world look like through the eyes of the privileged few?  Do they understand the significance in the gap of legal representation for the poor?  Do they feel the sense of humiliation when a police officer takes liberties with a few salient details surrounding a stop that reveals an otherwise good person’s most embarrassing moment?  Legal issues span the gamut of human experience.  What do 24 year olds know about human experience?

I remember what I thought of myself when I was 24.  I was much smarter then.  I understood so much more then.  I was not inclined to believe that others might disagree with me and not be wrong.  It takes a few decent kicks in the teeth to come to the realization that my experience in life wasn’t share by all.  I still believed that there was something called “common sense,” and it was whatever I believed it to be.  Life at 24 was much clearer than it is now.

Perhaps the privileged few who obtain a Supreme Court clerkship are truly that much better, smarter, more worldly, than the rest of us.  After all, so many go on to greatness afterward, though there remains a cause and effect problem that makes a survey somewhat difficult to interpret.  When a legal career starts in hallowed halls, chances are slim that the privileged few will spend much time on the street or in the trenches like the rest of us, and will ultimately achieve their greatness with a narrow view of the world.  Some might argue that such a wondrous start in the law should prove a hindrance to their breadth of experience, critical to their future growth.  Yet it doesn’t seem to work that way at all.

As even a casual Supreme Court observer knows, there are issues surrounding a justice’s retirement that go beyond their being at the top of their game.  When you’re one of only nine votes, it matters that your replacement might shift the balance of power in a way that will undo your entire life’s work.  I can forgive dotty justice, whether Rehnquist or Marshall, for clinging, both to the job as well as the belief system they reflected.

But it’s the decision-makers without life tenure, with a mere year or two to change the world, who are subject to no scrutiny at all, who scare me.  After all, I was the only 24 year old who knew everything.  If only I still did.