Author Archives: SHG

Science and the Law Don’t Mix

The New York Times pre-announcement of the report of the of the National Academy of Sciences report on the junk science used by prosecutors in the courtroom promises a scathing critique.  It’s touted as a “must read” for criminal defense lawyers, and no doubt it will be.  But.


This is not a judicial ruling; it is not a law,” said Michael J. Saks, a psychology and law professor at Arizona State University who presented fundamental weaknesses in forensic evidence to the academy. “But it will be used by others who will make law or will argue cases.”

Legal experts expect that the report will give ammunition to defense lawyers seeking to discredit forensic procedures and expert witnesses in court. Lawyers could also use the findings in their attempts to overturn convictions based on spurious evidence. Judges are likely to use the findings to raise the bar for admissibility of certain types of forensic evidence and to rein in exaggerated expert testimony.

Anyone who tries cases for a living, and has enjoyed the experience of some insane government witness tell a jury, with a look so sincere that you just want to take him home and love him, that it’s impossible to get fingerprints off a nice, shiny chrome pistol, is left to ask one question.

Who’s going to be the one to shut down prosecution witnesses spouting all the traditional junk science nonsense that has put tens of thousands of people in prison for the last few generations?

For those of us who spend a bit of time monitoring the decisions on new “science” in the courtroom, and watch with incredulity as judges shrug and take the word of very official sounding pseudo-experts who proclaim the infallibility of whatever scientific tripe they are selling, writing about or spent the last  months learning at the Government School for Expert Witnesses, one thing is painfully clear.  Judges have no more clue what good science is then we do, and when asked to pass on the accuracy of expert testimony in some scientific endeavor, invariably turn to the research to see if some other judge has already allowed it.  If so, it comes in.  If rejected, it doesn’t.  If truly novel, God help us.

Am I being silly?  Ask any cop who takes the stand to explain that some mope blew a .18 on the Intoxilyser 5000 how the little black box figures that out.  He won’t know.  It’s a box.  It shows a number.  That’s it.  Object and the judge will look at you like you’re nuts.  Everybody knows the Intoxilyser 5000 is admissible.  Why?  Because one judge somewhere held a hearing and said so.  After that, the rest of them go along for the ride.  When the day comes that they figure out that the little black box may not be quite perfect, they will have a new little black box that is “much more accurate.”  But if the new one is much more accurate, doesn’t that mean the old one was inaccurate? 

This report could blow the roof off junk forensic science.  But only if judges across the country chose to care.  The report itself will never find its way before a jury.  Sure, we’ll question witnesses about it, just as we do now to challenge the actual scientific underpinnings of their “expertise”.  And the judges will let these pseudo-experts testify anyway, just as they do now, because they feel that there’s no other choice.  Once one judge opens the gate, it’s open forever.  That’s how science in the courtroom works.

The use of dubious science is so routine in courtrooms that experts are frequently avoided by having a cop testify that he took a course at the Academy and can now testify on all manner of forensics.  The beauty of this testimony is that it’s purely conclusory, the cop either explaining that he doesn’t know why something happens, but that he knows that it’s 100% reliable.  The judge just nods.  That’s all it takes to get something in front of a jury.  I’ve seen judges allow expert testimony from agents with all of 37 minutes of experience come in as if he’s a professor emeritus from MIT.  Over objection, naturally.

The sad fact is that science and law don’t mix.  Lawyers aren’t scientists.  Judges aren’t scientists.  We hear the words that come out of true expert’s mouths and it gives us a headache.  We study up in advance of testimony and become overnight “experts” as best we can, but we are constrained to accept the popular notion about what is and is not real because the literature can’t make us truly understand all the chemistry, physics, biology, etc. needed to bring us from the core science to the junk spoken from the witness stand.

I applaud the National Academy of Sciences for having done this study, and for having overcome the government’s opposition to anyone challenging their self-serving insular control over what constitutes valid scientific evidence.  But this report alone won’t do anything if judges, each and every one of them, won’t take the responsibility to put an end to witnesses spouting nonsense in the name of science and for the goal of convictions in front of a jury. 

CLE, The Career Killer

From the New York Lawyer, presumably because there is no equivalent cyber-rag called the Chicago Lawyer:

CHICAGO — The Illinois commission that tracks attorney registration in the state has dropped nearly 600 lawyers from its list of those qualified to practice in the state, citing their lack of compliance with new continuing legal education requirements.

The Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission, an agency of the Illinois Supreme Court, booted 587 active attorneys from the state’s so-called “master roll” this year when they failed to file the paper work showing they had completed 20 hours of certified legal training between July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2008. The lawyers were officially removed from the roll after being sent three reminder letters late last year.

Unfortunately, there aren’t enough senate openings or cabinet posts to provide full employment for Illinois lawyers suffering from CRS, leaving the 587 to actually comply with this silly, yet basic, requirement to practice law.

On the practical side, Continuing Legal Education is one of those brilliant ideas dreamed up by a committee, whose groupthink allowed them to ignore every practical precept that might have saved the bar from another do-gooder burden.  In a perfect world, it would be wonderful for lawyers of all levels of experience to have a chance to tune-up their skills, catch up on the law and get current on the stuff they use daily to serve their clients.  Ah, what a wonderful world it would be.  If only…

CLE has turned into another crass business, with half the bar teaching basic skills to lawyers who were supposed to learn them before trying their hand at ruining the lives of real people.  Not that many CLE instructors are any better at it than they are, but we know more people so we can get our numbers up by catching a few CLE gigs rather than having to pay to be bored in the audience. An hour of CLE generally consists of one axiom and 12 war stories.  What a thrill, to listen to some old coot’s tales of doing the exact same thing everyone else does.

Yes, there are a few really good CLEs, with top notch speakers providing exceptionally useful information.  But they are few indeed, The vast majority are a total waste of time, the commercial marketers sales pitch notwithstanding.  Same for the specialty bar associations, for which CLE is a primary fund raiser.

All that said, lawyers could certainly use CLE.  Most haven’t the time or inclination to keep abreast of the law, being too busy trying to put food on the table and keep clients out of the clink to browse the law journals, parse the intricacies of 700 page decisions or read blawgs.  This was one of the original goals of the CLE mafia, though no one ever considered the likelihood of anyone actually providing the fodder for CLE utility.  And you can’t force people to put on, or go to, something that’s good for them.

But the true test of the right to practice law is the ability to correctly and timely fill out forms.  That 587 Illinois lawyers failed to file, or even respond, to registration notices demonstrates the inability to perform basic legal skills.  Not for their failure to satisfy the CLE requirements, but for their failure to send in their attorney registration forms (and presumably the accompanying check).  Epic fail.


There were about 2,000 lawyers out of compliance as of December, but the commission made phone calls to many of the lawyers to remind them about meeting the new CLE requirement, even after the letters were sent, said Jim Grogan, who is chief counsel for the commission. About 1,400 lawyers immediately came into compliance, but the remaining 587 probably include some lawyers who are still practicing while others may have moved, died or retired, he said.

“We were really wanting to be very careful this first go-around,” Grogan said.

Imagine all those lawyers missing the opportunity to hear Chief Counsel Grogan say brilliant things like “we were really wanting to…”  Yup, a true shame that such erudition was not imparted to the many lawyers in clear need of Grogan’s thoughts.

Of course, this being Illinois, there’s a strong possibility that all the 587 lawyers all long dead.  Then again, this being Illinois, the mere detail of death shouldn’t stand in their way of a long and profitable ongoing career in the law.  If they had only completed the forms.

Lawprof Mud Wrestling: Why Teach Crimlaw Via the Model Penal Code?

A somewhat interesting question arose when Denver lawprof Sam Kamin asked, in a post at PrawfsBlawg, whether law schools are doing the right thing by teaching criminal law theory rather than practice.  Coy Kamin opened up with this teaser:


Not to name drop, but I was having dinner last week with a fairly famous law professor closely associated with the Law and Society movement.  [Name withheld only because I haven’t asked his permission to blog this.] We were discussing teaching criminal law and he said that he tried it once and couldn’t bear it because he didn’t feel like what was taught in criminal law bore any relationship to reality.

The issue grew legs when Orin Kerr and Doug Berman chimed in about their own social circles.  First Kerr, who is clearly better situated to make the rounds of really cool people in the law:


I was having dinner last week with Chief Justice Roberts, Learned Hand, and Moses, and the four of us agreed that studying the MPC is excellent training for a career in criminal law. Indeed, Learned Hand was particularly exercised about it — he kept saying that Herb Wechsler had made him serve on the MPC advisory committee because it was so impossible to teach the common law of criminal law. I thought that was a fair point: I have a bunch of pre-MPC criminal law casebooks, and it is quite hard to understand the law from them given the absence of a common statutory basis.

But Berman, as if to prove that Ohio isn’t the backwater of the legal nation, responds:


I am amazed to learn, Orin, that Hand was more vocal than Moses in this conversation. After all, Moses got to carry around the very first draft of the MPC (though, according to Mel Brooks, he dropped a big part of it).

In any event, when I was having coffee recently with Roger Clemens, Plaxico Buress and Michael Phelps, I was pleasantly surprised by how interested they all were in the MPC’s definition of “knowingly.”

While we were talking, Ted Stevens came over and asked who else was planning to visit Michael Vick once he was transferred to a halfway house. I used the question as an excuse to launch into a long lecture about how the MPC’s sentencing provisions are being revised by the ALI. Everyone seems to find the lecture very pertinent, but nobody offered to buy me a second cup of coffee.

Yeah, right Doug.  Like Plaxico doesn’t have travel restrictions. Actually, I can’t tell you how good it is to know what a bunch of cut-ups these lawprofs turn out to be.  I hope to go to the next AALS beer bash and watch them dance with lampshades on their heads.

But back to important matters, such as Sam’s initial inquiry.  Complete the first year criminal law curriculum, ace the final, and a law student is competent to do . . . another course in third year.  But as Larry Rosenthal argues,


Professor Kamin’s post assumes a dichotomy between “analytical rigor” and practical skills that I reject. Analytical rigor is required of lawyers who practice at the highest level, but that does not mean that law school should reject skills training. After all, law school is preprofessional education — students spend all that time and money in order to obtain a marketable skill. Being able to talk about what the law “ought to be,” or to navigate the Model Penal Code, turns out not to be an especially marketable skill, even though “analytical rigor” is, at least when accompanied by the other skills required to succeed in practice.

The failure to focus on skills training has had little effect to date on elite law firms. They often prefer to do their own skills training. For public interest and government law firms on tight budgets, however, this approach has been a disaster. These firms lack the resources to train new lawyers — who too often know little of the skills needed to survive in practice. As the economy deteriorates, the failure of most law schools to prepare their graduates for practice will, however, likely have ramifications throughout the legal profession, as the resources available to train new lawyers shrink everywhere. Perhaps the pendulum is about to swing.

The “analytical rigor” aspect is no different for crim law than any other area; We need to be able to dissect the statutory and case law just like any other lawyer.  Actually, better than other lawyers since the consequences of our incapacity to think tend to be more severe.  But this doesn’t require that it be grounded in the theoretical Model Penal Code for the convenience of textbook authors or fungibility of jurisdictions.

There’s a real world out there.  One can learn analytical rigor by beating the real ground just as well as a Code that no one anywhere uses.  If it so happens that you pick up some actual useful information, would that be a crime?

The whole “national law school” and “elite law firm” dichotomy is simply institutional arrogance.  Harvard is much too important to teach some snot-nosed law student Massachusetts law, since its “best and brightest” students will span out across the nation to be “thought leaders,” far above the mundane workings of night court in Boston.  Is this true?  Well, probably.  But what harm comes from teaching Massachusetts reality in lieu of Model Penal Code unreality? 

Since no jurisdiction uses the MPC, and since they can test their mettle with real law and practice in a real court that affects real people in their own neighborhood, why not?  That some smart aleck will end up in the Manhattan DAs office changes nothing, since she will have to learn New York criminal law either way.  That MPC nonsense isn’t going to help her one iota more than Massachusetts law.

As for the “elite law firms,” this discussion is just plain silly.  First, they don’t actually practice criminal law, white collar or otherwise.  Second, to the extent they claim to have a white collar criminal law practice, it’s on the shoulders of some recent emigre from the US Attorney’s office, whose never defended a case anyway.  They don’t hire first year associates to do criminal law when they can get them out of St. Andrews Plaza, with a brand new oil change and lube.  You guys are fooling yourselves.

A comment by a recent Suffolk law school grad, George, injects a dose of reality into the academy:


Further, don’t law schools as institutions have obligations to (1) “the legal profession” and (2) the “public” that the profession allegedly serves? Are not the profession and the public best served when law students are given a fair shake? And if not, would it not be in the interest of honesty and good conscience to let prospective students know that when they graduate they will have little marketable skill.

Between the post, the comments, and my own experience, I can only conclude that law schools, and their professors are a part of a system that takes advantage of people for a lot of money knowing full well they are not giving their clients, students, or customers the “benefit of the bargain”. I went to law school to become a lawyer. I paid 112k directly to a group of attorneys to be trained as a lawyer. I am not a lawyer. Great system.

I can hear that smack all the way in New York. Ouch.

I discussed George’s comment during dinner last night with Clarence Darrow, William O. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall.  We all agreed that the rarified world of the Supreme Court really isn’t all that different from the dirty, smelly world in the trenches of a criminal court in any city in America, where Justices with law clerks who are smarter than they are try to remember how exactly things play out in courtrooms and on streets, where theory is discussed at the end of a gun and hungry babies cry while waiting for their daddies to be brought out in leg irons. 

We all agreed that the lust for theory in the quest for analytical rigor was better taught in a bar around the corner from the law school, since the real work of lawyers, save the handful who ever get the chance to argue at the Big Show, happens in the dirty, smelly trenches.  And Wild Bill and Thurgood then guffawed, agreeing that even at the Supreme Court, the justices are just trying to figure out the real life implications of a case while the litigants are arguing pie-in-the-sky theory.  “If it wasn’t for law clerks from Harvard,” Thurgood said, “I wouldn’t have a clue what half of them are talking about.”

Subject law students to analytical rigor, but do it by way of real law.  If the lawprof lacks the background to know anything about real law, relying instead on whatever textbook is most popular at the moment, find a new lawprof.  Do it, just in case they don’t get that first year associate job at Biglaw.  Maybe then, come graduation day, you will have trained someone to be a lawyer.

My 250th Call Through Avvo!

I don’t think that Mark Britton, Avvo’s CEO, likes me a lot anymore.  He never invites me to parties.  I didn’t get a Christmas card from him (of Avvo, for that matter).  He never calls to chat like his partner Paul used to do.  Plus, he makes fun of me on twitter, even when he knows I’m right.  I can’t be positive, but it’s likely because he thinks I say “irrational” things about Avvo.  CEOs can be so hypersensitive.

It’s not that I want to be critical of Avvo.  I really don’t.  It’s that Mark retwits stuff from lawyers who exclaim “Just got my first client from Avvo.com! Answered a question yesterday, he called today & is coming in tomorrow.”  I can’t help but wonder if a lawyer getting their first call from Avvo is really worthy of broadcast throughout the twittersphere.  Is it that rare an event?

I get lots of calls from Avvo.  Why this very morning, I received my 250th (rough count) call.  I sure hope Mark twits about it.

What I haven’t gotten is a single case that I would even consider taking, whether because they aren’t within my practice area, they aren’t within a thousand miles of where I practice, they don’t actually have a case or they don’t have any intention of paying for legal services.  They are, for the most part, nice enough folks.  They just aren’t the folks I represent.

What these calls, usually taking up about 15 minutes of my time despite my efforts to get the caller to sum up the salient details in a few words so I can figure out whether they’ve called the right lawyer, are about is answers.  The callers don’t really want to retain a lawyer, but they want answers from a lawyer.  They callers don’t have any intention of paying a lawyer, but they expect answers for free. 

Why should this be so?  Because Avvo tells them that good lawyers, nice lawyers, answer questions for free.  That’s why there is Avvo Answers.  Except Avvo Answers lacks the immediacy that some people expect, thus compelling them to find a name and phone number and call for their free answer by phone.  Hey, I just came up with a new Avvo promotion, Avvo Free Phone Answers!  If you use that, Mark, I want credit.

Another type of caller I get from Avvo is the one who has exhausted all the local lawyers, who have each, in seriatim, told the caller that they have no case, and so the caller has decided to branch out to other fields of law and regions of the country.  After all, if the local lawyers won’t have them, there has to be some lawyer somewhere who will take their case.  It’s a great case, they all tell me.  It’s just that the local lawyers all suck and don’t recognize how important it is.  My guess is that someone may ultimately be right in this assessment, but that person has yet to call me.

If I were more accommodating, I’m sure that most, if not all, would love to come in and meet with me.  They would be happy to have an hour long free consultation.  They might even be happy for a longer consultation.  They aren’t happy when I explain on the phone that I can’t answer their questions and can’t take their case.  Some can be downright hostile, though most are merely dejected.

In fairness, I know other criminal defense lawyers who tell me that they have gotten cases from Avvo.  Cases they wanted and have taken.  My experience may not be your experience, but then we may not practice in the same niche or market.

For those who feel I might be a little too picky, I would be more than happy to refer my calls to you.  If you’re interested in an accused wife-beater from Queens who “only slapped her a few times” and doesn’t see why he should have to pay a lawyer since he’s innocent, please send me your number.  It would be my pleasure to send them your way.

So Mark Britton, are we friends again? 

Making a Federal Case of It

In curious juxtaposition to the recent pronouncement by Gage County, Nebraska Attorney, Randall Ritnour, that he will no longer plea bargain, comes this post from Doug Berman quoting the Iowa City Press Citizen.

Sgt. Mike Brotherton, who leads Iowa City’s gang and drug team, said he sees the same disparity between charges and plea deals. While it is frustrating for officers, Brotherton said there are further reaching implications.  “What you don’t see is what the consequences are,” Brotherton said. “What’s the end result? Very, very few go to prison.”…

Brotherton has found at least one way to avoid this issue — he takes cases to the federal court system.  However, it’s not easy to elevate a case to that level, he said.  In drug cases, there must be sizable quantities of drugs involved.  If a weapon is involved, the case can possibly go to the federal level as well.

These criteria are based on guidelines for crimes that are indictable at the federal level and ensure that the federal courts only get cases that are appropriate for their jurisdiction.  All types of robberies are prosecuted at the state level, but bank robberies often are prosecuted federally because of their federal protection.

There was a time when the notion of an overlap between federal and state jurisdictions would cause nothing but laughter.  The feds didn’t dirty their hands with the sort of petty, common crime handled in night court.  Federal criminal practice was very limited, addressing only those offenses that went far beyond local jurisdiction and dealt with true issues affecting interstate commerce.  Over time, however, the commerce clause was forgotten and the chaos theory of cause and effect prevailed. 

Congress, seeing the virtue of campaigning on “tough on crime” issues, refused to let only the local politicians get media play, and voted for law after law that poaches on local criminal territory until the two are essentially indistinguishable.  Granted, the feds still limit their interest to cases with more zeros involved, but that’s only because there aren’t enough judges to handle people who spit in the subway.  If there were, Congress would pass a law about it too.

In the late 1980s, if memory serves, federal day began in the Southern District of New York.  That was the one day a week that drug cases made by city cops would be taken over by the United States Attorney’s office.  The same case that on Tuesday would be arraigned on the lobster shift at 100 Centre Street went instead before a Magistrate Judge a mere 3 doors down Foley Square, for no better reason than it was Wednesday.  The poor schmuck’s life was altered forever by the fortuitous day of the week.  And there was nothing we could do about it.

For those who believe that the sentencing guidelines provided some level of rationality to the criminal justice system, pay attention to Sgt. Mike Brotherton of the Iowa City Brothertons.  He knows better.  He knows that passing through the door of one courthouse versus another will have a huge impact on whether, and how many, years are spent in prison.  If he wants to “get” somebody, he tries to turn it into a federal case.  Hey district court judges, did you know that your dockets were so heavy because your sentences were heavy too?  Do you care?  Is the sheer negative kismet of winding up in federal court really a good reason for an additional 121 months in prison?

Where there used to be a system based on jurisdictional distinctions, there is now one based on sentencing disparities.  Only the most trivial offenses, barely crimes at all, can’t find a way through into the federal courthouse.  The only limitation is whether a conviction will bring the United States Attorney enough glory (or cash at forfeiture) to make it worth his while.  So whose idea was it to “rationalize” sentencing across the nation, when we can’t even rationalize it down the street?

The cops know this.  The criminal defense lawyers know this.  The prosecutors know this.  Now you know too.

Capping the Filthy Rich

It could be chalked up to lawyer’s revenge, given how the Titans of Finance dwarfed even the most Dreier-ish lawyers in their overt show of fabulous wealth.  After all, the new measure of propriety amongst the rich is decided by the merely comfortable lawyers of Ward Three. 

Yes, it was a struggle to hold your chin up at a charity cocktail party when you didn’t fly in on your own Lear jet.  The blow to dignity was painful when you’re struggling to pay the Exeter tuition while the others discuss proper jib size for varying winds.  But all bets are off as they tighten their alligator belts.

President Obama wants to cap executive salaries at $500,000 for companies who take a bail out. 


“We don’t disparage wealth. We don’t begrudge anybody for achieving success. And we believe that success should be rewarded,” Obama said. “But what gets people upset — and rightfully so — are executives being rewarded for failure, especially when those rewards are subsidized by U.S. taxpayers.”

As one wag said, that’s not a salary; that’s a rounding error. Haha.  The old attitude of greed and selfishness.  That was so last year.  Frugality and modesty are the new black.

Some respond that they aren’t using bailout money for executive salaries.  They’re using their “other money.”  Incredible as it may seem, some people find this argument compelling.  I think it’s utterly brilliant.

Others respond that they need to pay executives far, far more to retain them.  Because there is a huge market for executives who have driven their companies into effective bankruptcy and demand deca-million dollar compensation?  If someone has a list of all the highly profitable companies who can’t seem to find a CEO and are awaiting a failed executive to jump ship, please feel free to post it. 

Oddly, it’s all a tempest in a teapot.  It’s not like these poor souls will struggle after their $18 billion bonuses from fiscal 2008.  They probably socked a few spare dollars away for a rainy day.  And it’s not like this cap will actually put the kibosh on the more imaginative corporate compensation packages, with details like stock options and deferred compensation, loans and a few of the necessary perks of Executivehood.  After all, who’s going to provide Daschle with a spare limo if a corporate executive doesn’t have enough for his own use?

If the ostentatious show of wealth was a badge of honor before, the threadbare suit will be the indicia of fiscally-sensitive importance over the next few years.  My bet is that Versace will make threadbare suits in a variety of colors, and executives will somehow find a way to buy them.

The Lawyer Rat Exposed

About a week ago, the blawgosphere met one of the lowest scoundrels to ever call himself a criminal defense lawyer, Frank Pignatelli.  Pignatelli, you may recall, was the lawyer who flipped on his clients to save his own scummy butt, and then took the train from Ohio (where his services as a lawyer rat had apparently come to a conclusion) to Colorado so that he could start fresh and find new clients to rat out.

Some lawyers here, you may recall, sought to play the role of apologist and find excuses that would make Pignatelli somewhat less slug-like and despicable.  Many criminal defense lawyers are inclined to find ways to explain away wrongdoing, even when it involves someone as disgraceful as Pignatelli.  Other of us know when to draw the line.  Even the WSJ Law Blog got into the fray.  Ironically, Jeralyn Merritt at Talkleft, a Colorado lawyer herself, demurred.  You never know who has the balls to say what needs to be said until they’re tested.

Thankfully, someone in Colorado reads posts the practical blawgosphere, because the fine state has suddenly come to realize that they have a scoundrel in their midst.  Via Bennett/Hall comes a press release from the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation:

DENVER – The Colorado Supreme Court Office of Attorney Regulation today announced that it has filed a petition to immediately suspend Colorado lawyer Francis (Frank) M. Pignatelli from the practice of law. The petition is now pending before Supreme Court Presiding Disciplinary Judge William Lucero.

The petition alleges that Mr. Pignatelli committed fraud when applying to the Colorado Bar in 2006. It is alleged that Mr. Pignatelli failed to disclose that he was subject of a federal criminal investigation in Ohio and that the federal authorities had informed him that they had sufficient information to charge him with federal crimes. Further, that Mr. Pignatelli had agreed to act as a confidential informant against individuals who believed that they had an attorney-client relationship with him.

Mr. Pignatelli will be served with the petition and if a show cause order is issued by Judge Lucero he will have 10 days within which to respond.

The Office of Attorney Regulation is proceeding with attorney discipline charges related to the petition.

Bummer, Frank.  You’ve been outed.

Bennett, after he took off his Pollyanna wig, did some legwork and came up with Pignatelli papers showing that he’s not only a rat, but a garbage lawyer to boot.  I don’t blame him for being so criminal defense lawyer-like, though there are times to take the rose-colored glasses off and face the painful reality.  This is especially true when basic integrity is on the  line.

Does anybody still want to argue that Pignatelli isn’t the poster boy for lawyer scum?  Anybody?

Things Not to Say After Verdict

The verdict is in on the Ryan Frederick’s once-murder now-manslaughter case.  Oops. I guess I just blew the surprise.

Radley Balko has followed this case of a young man who shot through a door and killed a cop while inside a marijuana grow house in great detail, and I won’t even begin to try to match his level of detail, and WindyPundit already has a good synopsis if you need it.  Suffice it to say that this turned into a dirty trial, with widely disparate allegations, lying jail-house snitches and, as the jury ultimately concluded, incredible police testimony designed to sanitize their conduct and railroad Frederick.  It didn’t come down that way.

A manslaughter verdict, in light of all that was thrown at Frederick and under the circumstances (a marijuana grow house, a search warrant, a gun, a dead cop) is quite a coup.  There are plenty of good reasons why the jury rejected the capital murder charge, not the least of which was jail-house snitch Jamaal Skeeter’s history as a rat, but any trial lawyer knows that even lying witnesses are no guarantee of winning. 

Following the verdict, Frederick’s lawyer, James Broccoletti, spoke to the press, as expected.  What isn’t expected is what he said, as reported by Radley.


“I think it’s a very fair and very rational verdict by the jury. I think it demonstrates that they applied reason, thought and common sense and sound judgment in what was a very emotional case.”

This was a perfect thing to say.  If Ryan had been acquitted of everything.  Even if Ryan had been convicted only of misdemeanor possession of marijuana.  Absolutely appropriate.  Except when Ryan Frederick had just been convicted of manslaughter with a jury recommendation of the maximum sentence, 10 years in prison.

Broccoletti apparently realizes that there is much left to do in this case.


Frederick’s attorney, James Broccoletti, though grateful his client didn’t get a capital murder conviction, agreed that this was not a “heat of passion” killing.

He vowed to appeal, saying the 10-year maximum sentence reflected the jury’s “outrage and emotion” but ignored his client’s clean record and character.

“This case isn’t over by a long shot,” he said.

But by asserting publicly that the verdict was “very fair and very rational,” he has precluded any number of otherwise credible arguments that the verdict was legally insufficient or against the weight of the evidence.  What was he possibly thinking?

No doubt he was caught up in the joy of the moment, the thrill that he beat a capital murder charge.  It’s big, and it’s a heady experience to get the big win, especially in a high profile murder case like this.  Trust me, it is far more pleasant to talk to the throng of reporters when you come out the victor than the loser.  When the verdict is bad, and you see a phalanx of reporters between you and the cold, empty air, you want to shrivel up and die.  But when you’re the golden boy, you embrace the hungry crowd and regale them with stories of your greatness.  It’s as good as winning the Academy Award.

Broccoletti was feeling good, and he deserved to.  True, it wasn’t a total victory, but it was still a big win.  Professionalism requires, however, that you keep your wits about you even in moments of euphoria.  The easy answer is that he would have done better to say nothing, but march out of the courtroom in silence, head held high, confident in the knowledge that he put in a good day’s work.  Strong and silent.  But few can, or would, do such a thing at this moment of glory.  Few ever have.

What you cannot do is let emotions get the best of you and have sounds emit from your mouth that you later regret.  Broccoletti will regret these words.  He’s quite a good lawyer, better than one who would say something this foolhearty.  Radley asks how this statement “serves his client.”  It doesn’t.  It harms his client.  Lawyers do not have the right to say something that harms their client.  Not even when you’re the golden boy of the moment.

At some point in the future, an appeal will be prepared for Ryan Frederick challenging his conviction for manslaughter, and not merely the 10 year sentence.  These words will be thrown in the face of whoever does the appeal, whether it’s Broccoletti or another lawyer.  These words will bolster any challenge to sufficiency or weight.  These words will bolster a claim of harmless error.  The appellant’s lawyer will try to spin his way around these words, attributing them to a misunderstanding or context or the emotional catharsis of a trial lawyer who just scored a huge win. 

Regardless of how the effort to disavow these words is made, they will haunt Ryan Frederick.  The day was otherwise a very good one for both Frederick and Broccoletti.  If only a few less words were spoken, it would have been a great one.

Value Added Blawging in the Age of Twitter (Update)

Up until a few weeks ago, certain readers would send me stories from their local papers about police conduct, court decisions and general news items that they thought would interest me and end up in a post. They often did.  Lately, this has slowed down significantly, and some are now posting their news stories on twitter instead, with a short blurb like “another isolated incident” and a link.

What’s missing?  There’s no analysis, no opinion, no depth of thought or connection to the larger issues surrounding the piece.  It slips onto, and off of, the radar so quickly as to be relegated to the big pile of things that happen that gets shrugged off as just another “bad thing.”

Around the blawgosphere, I’ve noticed that many blawgers are posting about stories and decision, providing quotes or descriptions, and then moving to the next story.  What happened to the analysis?  Have blawgers decided that it’s enough to be another aggregator of news on a particular area of the law, without adding any value to their posts?  So it seems.

We already have aggregators in the blawgosphere, places we go to see what’s new in the world and to find links to new decisions and news stories.  We don’t need 50 blawgs doing the same thing.  What is disappearing is the depth of thought and experience that blawgers bring to these stories and decisions, the “value-added” part of blawging that makes a post worth reading.  If you aren’t bringing something new to the table, then why bother?

Is this another by-product of twitter, whether because it’s too easy for everybody to toss links around with any substance added, or because there’s no longer a benefit to be had by putting in the time and effort to think about news and decisions when one can “network” and “enhance one’s reputation” via the far easier route of tossing out flotsam and jetsam to a community that likely doesn’t care that much about the substance anyway, and only cares that you follow them like they follow you. 

Regardless of the impetus for this trend, it’s unhealthy for the blawgosphere.  These are good blawgers, people who have brought much to the discussion that has made us better, more thoughtful and intelligent lawyers, who are now doing as little as possible to keep up their posts without adding anything beyond the basic information.  That’s not good enough.

If you have something thoughtful to add to a story or decision, then do so.  If not, then why bother posting at all?  And if all the blawgosphere/twittersphere means to you is a link to an interesting story without any further thought, then why are you reading Simple Justice?  At 140 characters, I’m sure that twitter will more than satisfy the depths of your curiosity and interest.

Update:  Mike at Crime & Federalism has “responded” to this post by writing:


Finding the “right stuff” to blog about turned a fun hobby into a bothersome endeavor.  I used ask myself whether a post was “on topic,” or whether something was “serious” enough.  I stopped blogging for a couple of months because the blog had turned into a another job – except one for which I did not get paid.  The hour I spend on blogging is less money.  Blogging is, for me, a leisure activity.  I don’t factor opportunity costs when I go to the movie.  And I no longer factor opportunity costs when I blog.

I think Mike was just using my post as an opportunity to make his point, that he’ll post on whatever topic interests him and that its value is to him, not to please anyone else.  I assume this since Mike’s point has nothing to do with my point.  Obviously, it’s up to any blawger to post on whatever topic he chooses. Or no topic.  And Mike, despite his disavowal, finds some fascinating stuff to post about that you won’t find elsewhere, and almost invariably adds value even when he’s not trying.  It may not always be on the law, and it may not always be your cup of tea, but there’s nothing wrong with that. 

Court Rejects Drunken Depraved Indifference

In a seminal decision that may spell the end of murder indictments as the weapon of choice for drunk drivers, the Appellate Division, Second Department, with one justice dissenting, reversed and dismissed a first degree assault conviction in People v. Valencia.  The charge was predicated on a “depraved indifference” theory, alleging that the defendant’s state of mind at the time he chose to drink alcohol, knowing that he would later be driving a car, was sufficient proof.


We agree with the defendant that the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620), was legally insufficient to establish that he acted with the culpable mental state of depraved indifference to human life at the time he collided with the complainants’ vehicles and, thus, did not support his conviction of assault in the first degree (see Penal Law § 120.10[3]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288; People v Palmer, 34 AD3d 701). In this regard, we find unpersuasive the prosecution’s contention that the mens rea component of depraved indifference assault may be satisfied by considering the defendant’s state of mind at a point much earlier in time than the accident, when the defendant allegedly made a conscious decision to consume an excessive amount of alcohol with the awareness that he subsequently would be operating a motor vehicle. Assuming arguendo that the evidence would support such a finding, and that such a state of mind would otherwise satisfy the culpable mental state of depraved indifference to human life, we conclude that the defendant’s state of mind at the time he consumed the alcohol was too temporally remote from his operation of the vehicle to support a conviction for depraved indifference assault in this case.

This foreshadows the case of Robert Heidgen and others, charged with second degree murder under a depraved indifference theory, and is a serious blow to Nassau District Attorney Kathleen Rice’s efforts to obtain murder convictions against drunk drivers.

The majority relied upon the time lapse between the act of drinking excessive amounts of alcohol, when the prosecution claimed the defendant’s mental state met the depraved indifference standard, and the time when the act of drunk driving cause harm, when there was no evidence as to defendant’s mental state.  This “temporal remoteness” between intent and act resulted in a failure ot proof.  The court also left open the question of whether voluntary intoxication negates the mens rea of depraved indifference.

Justice Mark Dillon, dissenting, saw this as a distinction without a difference, since this was a chain of events that began with the defendant’s excessive drinking and ended in a drunk driving crash. 


While a defendant’s mens rea is typically present at the time of the actus reus, the physical component of the crime (see e.g. People v Rosas, 8 NY3d 493, 499), the mens rea and actus reus in depraved indifference circumstances need not necessarily be simultaneous (see generally People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407; People v Galle, 77 NY2d 953 [criminally negligent homicide]). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 624), the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction of assault in the first degree based on depraved indifference to human life (see Penal Law § 120.10[3]). The evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant’s culpable mental state at the time of his excessive drinking. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, his voluntary intoxication by alcohol did not, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, negate, as a matter of law, the requisite elements of depraved indifference to human life, or prevent the People from proving the elements of depraved indifference assault beyond a reasonable doubt (cf. People v Castellano, 41 AD3d 184, 185; People v Carter, 40 AD3d 1310, 1312). The fact that the defendant was found to be “oblivious” in the moments leading up to the accidents underscores the People’s argument that the defendant’s conduct, at the time of his drinking while intending to drive a motor vehicle thereafter, evinces an “utter disregard for the value of human life” (People v Feingold, 7 NY3d at 296).

While this decision is surprisingly cursory given the depth of the issues involved, the dissent has a point about the reliance on the temporal remoteness between intent and act as a hard rationale for disapproving the use of a depraved indifference theory to elevate a harm resulting from drunk driving to a far more serious crime.  It’s true that the “intent” element must, under general principles, exist at the time the act is committed, but it’s unclear in situations involving drunk driving what exactly the bad acts are, and when they occur.  Are they discrete acts, as the majority concludes, or a course of conduct, as argued in dissent?

What remains unaddressed is whether getting drunk, anticipating that at some point the person will get into a car and drive, rises to the level of “the culpable mental state of depraved indifference to human life.”  It appears that no court is yet willing to take on the Mommy Forces by holding that getting drunk does not rise to the level of depraved indifference.  While courts approvingly invoke the classic examples of depraved indifference, “shooting into a crowd, placing a time bomb in a public place, or opening the door of the lions’ cage in the zoo,” they fail miserably to compare with drinking alcohol.  No one wants to openly state that it’s just not the same thing.

There are two monumental distinctions that courts have been reluctant to recognize, that drinking alcohol has no inherent correlation with being indifferent to someone being harmed.  It is a commonplace, lawful act, engaged in daily by millions of people.  That some of these millions will have an extra drink, and then another, their judgment impaired the first lawful drink and each drink thereafter, does not give rise to any point in time when it dawns on the drinker that he is about to do something which has a grave risk of death of another person, and then makes an intelligent decision to ignore this risk and engages in the act nonetheless.  This never happens.

The second element is the grave risk of death caused by drunk drivers.  Relative to the number of people who drink to excess and drive, the chances of someone causing the death of another are quite small.  If the risk was grave, there should be dozens of deaths every day from drunk driving, but there isn’t.  The reality that no one wants to admit is that most drunk drivers make it home without incident, to sleep it off and do it again another day.  This isn’t a good thing, but it is the reality.  Only a small fraction end up in an accident, and an even smaller fraction end up causing serious harm or death.  There’s no “grave risk” of anything, which may explain why people never see themselves as the next defendant in a drunk driving murder case.

This has nothing to do with excusing the harm caused, or rationalizing it away as inconsequential.  It’s neither, and no one should die due to a drunk driving accident.  It’s not a right or wrong issue, but a proportionality issue.  Drunk driving is not the equivalent of shooting a gun at people.  It’s just not even close in terms of moral culpability or likelihood of harm, and shouldn’t be treated alike.

What this means is that drunk drivers should not be prosecuted under a depraved indifference theory, elevating the crime to levels equivalent to those who make a knowing decision to ignore the grave risk of death they cause.  As to the moral culpability of drunk drivers, the only difference between the drunk who makes it home to sleep it off and the one who kills another human being is pure luck.  Being a loser in a game of chance provides no rationale for elevating the charges to murder levels.

So while the decision in Valencia foretells the Second Department’s view of using depraved indifference to charge Heidgen with murder, the rational appears suspect and subject to attack.  It would be far better if the Court would address the heart of the matter and openly state that getting drunk is nothing like shooting a gun into a crowd.   But such an obviously true yet  politically unpopular holding will have to wait for another day.