Like most blawgers, I receive a daily flurry of emails promoting stories, article and reports in a variety of publications, seeking my aid in spreading the word of the greater glory and worth of the particular piece and the publication at large. These come from all the various media outlets, including online media which often charges a hefty fee for access.
Being an unabashed capitalist, I have no issue with media outlets charging for their content, assuming their content is sufficiently worthy that anyone would be willing to pay for it. But I do find it absurd that they send their press release to me to help them promote their wares, but neglect one little detail. I have no greater access to the content than anyone else. That’s right, they want me to promote it but don’t provide me with free access to it.
So here’s the deal, and it goes for all the various commercial enterprises that seek the help of the blawgosphere in spreading news of their brilliance and worthiness. If you expect me to even read whatever it is you’re trying to get me to write about, then give me access. If you expect me to pay for it, then don’t expect me to promote it for you. There isn’t a chance in the world that I’m going to pay to access the story you are asking me to read for your benefit. It’s very simple: If you want my attention, then I want total, free, uninhibited access to whatever it is you’re selling.
If you’re unprepared to do that, then why waste my time and your effort to try to persuade me to write about how wonderful you are. It’s not going to happen. And by the way, for those commercial services I might critique along the way because something foolish came across my radar, don’t complain that I haven’t looked at everything you do if I can’t gain access to the rest of it. It’s your restrictions, not my disinterest, that presents the problem.
And finally, for those who complain to me about my failure to link to your stories when I do a post on a subject you covered, if I can’t get onto your website, I can’t link to your stories. Are you getting the idea here?
I realize that many websites are trying desperately to monetize your content. I appreciate that you need to make money. But when you seek my help or interest in what you’re doing, then don’t expect me to pay for the pleasure of helping you. It’s not going to happen.
Author Archives: SHG
Plea Agreements Online; A Troubling Conundrum
Chief Judge Frederico Moreno, Southern District of Florida, opened a can of worms by ordering that all plea agreements be publicly available on PACER, the federal electronic access system for court filings. On its face, it does nothing more than make documents that are otherwise publicly available at the courthouse now easily and inexpensively available to everyone, no matter where they are. Certainly this opening the door to judicial transparency can’t be bad.
“The sense of the Court is that the public’s interest in access must prevail in this instance and that restricting access to all plea agreements is overly broad,” states Moreno’s order. “Other means are available to the prosecution and defense to insure that the public record does not contain information about cooperation agreements in those instance where the interests of safety or other considerations require different treatment.”
Yet Judge Moreno’s decision raises a bunch of issues that make this facially easy decision troubling, enough so that the Department of Justice strenuously opposed it. While that, almost by definition, should mean that criminal defense lawyers should favor it, the lines aren’t drawn quite the way one would expect.
Doug Berman was the first to post about Judge Moreno’s order, and the comments reflect a diversity of strongly held concerns. On the one side are strong voices in favor of judicial openness, arguing that anything that allows the public greater access into the workings of the system serves to enhance the integrity of the system, and allows public oversight of the shadier dealings by the government. On the other side, easy access to plea agreements risks cooperators and witnesses to intimidation and potential harm. Others point out that agreements with cooperators are routinely sealed, and hence won’t be available anyway while the cooperators are active.
In the old days, the first thing one noticed in trying to figure out who had flipped was who didn’t show up in court for the next appearance. That was the defendant who turned rat. The biggest problem the government faced was how to keep all the rats separate from all the non-rats at the MCC. There just weren’t enough floors or wings. The sealed plea agreement might deny access to details, but is just as much a red-light as to who’s flipped. The cooperators working the streets present a different problem, since one wouldn’t necessarily know to look for a pending case or an open plea agreement. Eventually everyone would know, but by then the damage was done.
There are many permutations of this problem, and they not only touch the government, but also those defense lawyers whose clients have chosen to cooperate and who, by easy access, could well be killed for their choice. Some might argue that this is part of the life they chose, especially when they went from being criminal to snitch, but death is far too harsh a penalty in any event. Not being inclined to represent cooperators, this problem doesn’t touch me directly, but it’s still very real. While some defendants would by angry with cooperators, they would never do anything to hurt them. Others would kill a rat in a blink of an eye.
Another concern that arises from the easy access to criminal information is its use and abuse by those who want to “help the public” know about all the criminals living near them, using access to information to create websites and databases to shame people in perpetuity or create danger zones around them that will haunt defendants forever. This is particularly troubling with sex offenders, who are already the subject of impossible living restrictions and potential harm and derision following the completion of their sentences. The greater the dissemination of people’s wrongs, the greater the likelihood that no sentence will ever end and no convict will ever have a chance of reentering society as a law-abiding citizen. No one will be able to leave their wrongdoing in the past.
For those who argue the straight public information line, that transparency is an end in itself, the use of sealed plea agreements and redacted filings tends to undermine the concept while leaving those the government doesn’t wish to protect fully exposed. On the other hand, all of this information exists already, and the only real change is its easy availability. But it’s the easy availability that will lend to some of the mischief to which this information is put, such as mass listings of “criminals” that have become the rage.
Ultimately, I suspect that we will be better off with plea agreements being treated no differently than any other court filing, subject to availability on PACER and readily available to anyone for the asking. Either way, however, there will be problems and some will suffer for this change. I feel far less concerned for the cooperating defendant, who has chosen his lot, than the defendant who can never escape his criminal record and whose future will be forever tarred.
This is a far more complex and difficult question than the discussion has yet recognized, and problematic consequences will be felt by all sides in the discussion. I’ve barely scratched the surface in the few thoughts written here, and have been troubled by the possibilities since Doug first raised the question. But none of the discussion nor thoughts have clarified the relative balance of good and bad on the bread array of problems fixed or caused by plea agreements being available on PACER. I’m sure that every lawyer, prosecutor and defense, can add a dozen experiences where this will help/hurt someone in a unique way, and we can argue ad naseum over which side outweighs the other.
Ultimately, it comes down to a policy choice, and the systemic benefits of transparency tips the scales in favor of Judge Moreno’s order, even though many will suffer negative consequences as a result. But this issue is anything but simple.
Addendum: Doug Berman has posted again on this subject, but it occurs to me that he has yet to do anything more than quote other sources. I would hope that Doug would have a thought on the topic, and perhaps might use his blog to add a little value to his posts rather than just reiterate other people’s posts.
If it’s worthy of multiple posts, isn’t it worthy of some level of analysis and perhaps even an opinion?
An Injudicious Act? (Update)
District of Connecticut Judge Alan Nevas has announced that he’s leaving the bench over money.
A federal judge in Connecticut who oversaw political corruption cases and swore in Gov. M. Jodi Rell in 2007 has stepped down after 23 years, saying he’s frustrated Congress didn’t give judges pay raises.
Judge Alan Nevas says it’s unfair that members of Congress rejected cost-of-living increases for federal judges in December after having approved such raises for themselves and every other federal employee.
While everyone knows that the Connecticut economy is different than the rest of the nation, with almost every retirement account loaded to the gills in Gin futures, does this not strike one as incredibly poor timing? Granted, federal judges don’t feel the declining economic conditions, considering that their dockets are always full and their paycheck arrives one way or another. But they guy has to read a newspaper every once in a while, no? He’s heard something about a recession? He reads Above the Law?
We can all appreciate how difficult it is to survive on $169,300 a year. And it was just plain wrong for everyone in the federal government to get a cost of living adjustment except judges. It really was. But this isn’t the time to resign in disgust if you want people to either get a message or feel sorry for you.
And what does Judge Nevas plan to do with himself now that he flown the coop, in the era of Biglaw downsizing?
Nevas hung up his robe for good in Bridgeport federal court on Friday. He was to begin a new job in the private sector Monday, helping resolve disputes before they reach the courts.
So you took a gig with JAMS, as if that’s going to provide you with either a steady or decent living? What could you possibly have been thinking?
H/T Gideon
Update: The word is that Judge Nevas is leaving the bench for health reasons, and figured that he ought not waste the opportunity to make a statement about judicial salaries. This clears up the smell that surrounded the story, and you can’t blame him for trying to use his retirement to promote a worthwhile agenda, even if it doesn’t play out as well as he might have hoped. Best wishes to Judge Nevas on his retirement and health, and sorry for making fun of your effort.
Cruelty to Children
Perhaps the most overused, and most effective, mantra in criminal law is “do it for the children.” Yet concern for our children is forgotten when they are on the wrong end of the deal. The child as defendant is no less a child as defendant, despite the inability of so many to accept this premise.
From the New York Times, Joe Sullivan, now 33, asks the Supreme Court whether his conviction for a crime that occurred when he was 13 should put him in prison forever.
According to court papers and a report from the Equal Justice Initiative, which now represents Mr. Sullivan, only eight people in the world are serving sentences of life without parole for crimes they committed when they were 13. All are in the United States.
And there are only two people in that group whose crimes did not involve a killing. Both are in Florida, and both are black.
Joe Sullivan is one
While the Times’ article suggests that Sullivan might, in fact, be innocent of the crime, that ship has long since sailed. The trial, which lasted a day, produced highly equivocal evidence. His lawyer, who didn’t bother to open, gave a summation that runs for a mere 3 double-spaced pages of transcript. But the only question remaining is whether a 13 year old, particularly one whose crime falls short of murder, should be thrown away forever.
We recognize that children are not like adults in almost every aspect of our society. “They are less mature, more impulsive, more susceptible to peer pressure and more likely to change for the better over time.”
Juveniles “are not permitted to vote, to contract, to purchase alcoholic beverages or to marry without the consent of their parents,” the court said. “It seems inconsistent that one be denied the fruits of the tree of the law, yet subjected to all of its thorns.”
Yet the judge who sentenced Joe Sullivan to a life in prison at age 13 took little issue with the severity of his punishment.
“I’m going to send him away for as long as I can,” Judge Geeker said.
It’s that simple for a judge to say the words that put a child in prison forever. And I would expect many to feel no concern about it, despite the fact that these are the same folks who care so deeply about children under any other circumstances. Our society’s love of children seems to stop at the “broken” ones, unworthy or incapable of repair. When did we grow so hard and cold that even children became dispensable?
The point is not whether a child should be allowed to commit a crime, to harm another, without consequence. It is all about the proportionality of consequence, particularly when there are judges like Geeker who appear bent on tossing away the bad kids. Championing this lack of proportionality across the spectrum is none other than sentencing maven Doug Berman.
Douglas A. Berman, an authority on sentencing law at Ohio State, said it was time for the Supreme Court and the legal system to widen its relentless focus on capital cases and to look at other severe sentences as well. Cases involving the death penalty receive careful review at multiple levels, he said. Life sentences can receive almost none.
For obvious reasons, we focus long and hard on the death sentence, given it’s abject finality. But that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t have enough zeal left in us to show concern for children sentenced to spend the rest of their lives in prison. We can and we should do so. We should “do it for the children.”
Pathetic Smear of Marc Dreier
It’s not like there isn’t a huge inventory of bad things to say about Marc Dreier. He destroyed his firm, raided its escrow, is under indictment and sits in a cell. But as if that’s not enough, Noeleen Walder forces the issue with one of most pathetic smears imaginable in the New York Lawyer, purportedly describing how Dreier’s “Luxurious Life” Was on Display at Firm.
Legal secretary Brad Lowary went to Dreier LLP for the money. Mr. Lowary said he earned $95,000 a year, which was $35,000 above market rate, during his 18 months at the firm.
Mr. Lowary, a legal secretary for 15 years, said he always “thought it was a little odd” that the firm’s founder and sole equity partner, Marc S. Dreier “was living such a luxurious life” even for a litigator at the top of his game.
That’s right. The “luxurious life” is through the eyes of a legal secretary at the firm. After all, if one wants to know the parameters of propriety, certainly the sensibilities of a legal secretary provide the proper measure.
So what are these outlandish luxuries displaying the evil Dreier’s misuse of client and firm funds?
Mr. Lowary, 35, said there was “so much waste” at the now bankrupt firm – huge bouquets of fresh flowers on every floor, secretaries making “well over $100,000, plus overtime” and overstaffed departments.
He recalled one “lavish” party in the Hamptons, at which Mr. Dreier actually hired a plane to fly overhead with the message “Dreier lawyers rock.”
Flowers and well-paid staff? The man is an animal! As for the flyover, it doesn’t actually cost very much, though it might seem extravagant to a legal secretary. But what else does Lowary have to say about his terrible former employer, who paid him far more than he thinks he was worth.
“He would fire people on the spot if he didn’t like you,” Mr. Lowary said
At parties, Mr. Dreier morphed from the “stern” and “bitter” boss into a completely different person, Mr. Lowary said.
After a few drinks, a red-faced Mr. Dreier would become “sloppy” and “jovial.”
“I’ve never known a managing partner to behave in such a strange and opposite way in and out of the office,” Mr. Lowary remarked.
It sure makes me feel better about being able to hold my liquor, provided I don’t have more than one drink, lest some legal secretary spill my secret “sloppy” and “jovial” lifestyle. Hoo boy. And I bet that Lowary had a close and loving relationship with many managing partners, since we know how managing partners flock around legal secretaries to gain their approval.
There is much about Marc Dreier worthy of concern and comment, such as what became of client funds and what one man did to a firm of hard-working and responsible lawyers. But this attempt to personally smear him, based upon a low level employee whose perspective at its absolute best is essentially meaningless, is simply pathetic. It’s outrageous that a reputable legal publisher would print such a story, or that anyone claiming to be a journalist would have written it. Absolutely pathetic.
The Battle for Scraps
When the commercial began, it was clear in the first 5 seconds that it would be a tear-jerker. The nurse in scrubs asking why he would cut nurses. The blind man asking how he could do this to him. The mother with children asking how he could do this to them. Who would deny people health care? S.E.I.U. 1199 wants to know.
Granted, it’s the same formula they use when they are in contract negotiations, frightening the public about the death of patient care while settling for a 5% raise. But it’s always been a very effective formula, which is why it gets pulled out whenever needed.
As Governor David Paterson tries to figure out a way to keep New York State afloat this year, lobbying groups will spend their war chest on convincing the public that cutting their members, or their members income, will cause grievous harm. Even the New York Times isn’t biting this time around. But now that the battle has commenced, the other players will either have to get in the game or be left out in the cold. The teachers will be fighting for educational dollars, which means that students are better educated when they are paid more. Cops are a perpetual player, with Willie Horton raping your mother unless they receive fully paid health benefits.
Whenever scarce resources are allocated, someone has to come up short. For the citizenry, it usually doesn’t have a great deal of meaning since we pay for it regardless and get less than we are due because that’s how government delivers services. If the private sector can’t deliver well, the public will always deliver worse.
But necessity is the mother of invention, and situations are rarely as static as everyone predicts. Something will likely emerge to alter the landscape over the next year, even though we don’t know yet whether it will be for better or worse. For example, the unions might decide to plow their war chest back into their members’ pockets, giving them back the money they took from them to help them through this upcoming hard year.
Or the public, for the first time ever, will see through the television commercials intended to strike fear into our hearts and make us believe that we will die, our children will go uneducated and our mothers will be raped, lest we underfund the union members pensions.
State governors, big city mayors, county supervisors, all look to the big guy above them for a bailout. But the money always comes from the same source, the only difference being whose hand is in the taxpayers pocket. Every politician would prefer it be someone else’s hand, as that makes them less culpable for the pain. The rationale is that the big guy above them is the one demanding that they do something, and therefore should pay for it. Whether the mandates make sense today, given our circumstances, requires far more time and thought, as well as a very good understanding of competing priorities. The public isn’t really in much of a position to make a reasoned decision, and most really don’t want to think that hard.
The unions know this. They are well aware that they can protect their turf by manipulating our desire for basic necessities. Health care, education and public safety will tug at our heart strings. More esoteric interests, like providing defendants with lawyers, won’t cause many tears to be shed, even if there was a lobbying group prepared to go to bat for them.
As you watch these TV commercials, don’t expect anyone to champion the cause of justice. The accused have no union and only evoke sympathy from a very small and enlightened segment of the population. Think instead that it will be left to us to keep the defense going through hard times, particularly the public defenders who will carry the bulk of our system on their shoulders. They will be overwhelmed, and few will care. No priorities will be shifted from hospitals to indigent defense.
As you watch television, and as the union commercials air to create an atmosphere of support for their members, never forget that whatever they gain comes at a cost to someone else. It’s not that healthcare is unimportant, but that the same freedom worth dying for in foreign lands is important in our own country as well. But we won’t have any commercials to remind people. It’s up to us.
No Harm, No Foul Is A One-Way Street
In 2007, the 8th Circuit approved of a search warrant in United States v. Kattaria based upon “reasonable suspicion” rather than the requisite probable cause because the search sanctioned by the warrant was merely thermal imaging rather than a full-blown, physical entry. The 8th Circuit, en banc, issued a decision allowing the evidence without relying on the lower standard search warrant, thus removing the old decision from the books.
Orin Kerr dissects the concurrence by Chief Judge Loken, which includes this line despite his joining the majority to circumvent his prior panel decisions:
On further reflection, I have concluded that the panel was unwise to borrow the concept of “reasonable suspicion” to reflect the quantum of probable cause that should be required in this situation. Reasonable suspicion is not focused to the task at hand, and it has never been applied to the warrant-issuing process. Rather, the question for the issuing magistrate (and reviewing courts) when considering an application like Agent Perry’s initial warrant affidavit should be whether there is probable cause to believe that search of specific property — the heat being emitted from a home — in a specific manner — by exterior thermal imaging — for purely investigative purposes will uncover evidence of on-going criminal activity. Utility records showing abnormally high electric power usage are strong evidence supporting such an application but, without more, are unlikely to establish probable cause because of the many innocent uses of electricity. Cf. United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 888 (1994). But the “something more” should simply be enough particularized suspicion to justify the minimal intrusion caused by the exterior thermal imaging of heat emissions, without regard to whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant to conduct a full physical search.
The notion that there should be sliding scale of proof relative to the degree of intrusiveness still has some legs. I can’t help but wonder why intrusions never feel the same to federal judges as to the family whose home is the target. But under the facts of Kattaria, relating to the use of thermal imagine which is certainly unintrusive, the rationale finds comfort under a rule of life rather than a rule of law: No harm, no foul.
After completing a plea allocution in the Eastern District of New York the other day, the Magistrate Judge looked at me as he walked off the bench and mumbled, “whatever happened to no harm, no foul?” As if it was my choice that my client was being prosecuted.
The plea was extraordinarily good from a criminal law point of view, the defendant facing a few lifetimes in prison based on a loss valuation of a few billion dollars. Instead, the deal (which came after rejecting the government’s “unbelievably great deal that couldn’t be rejected”) was for a plea to a hypertechnical regulatory violation involving no loss to any person anywhere anytime ever. Even with the joys of the Sentencing Guidelines taken into account, this was as close to a guarantee of probation as federal courts allow.
But as the defendant stumbled through the allocution, each word burning in his throat as he spoke it, the “sweet” deal tasted horribly bitter. It’s not that the defendant hadn’t committed the hypertechnical violation, though the statute was unclear how exactly one would violate it with felonious intent since it was one of those malum prohibitum laws that bore no moral culpability absent certain circumstances that didn’t exist here. But more importantly, no one was harmed and no one could have been harmed by the defendant’s conduct. Similarly, there was no gain to the defendant. It simply happened that way, and that was enough.
The Magistrate’s statement as he left the bench was directed at me, but sought an answer that only the government could give. Why demand that the defendant plead guilty to this ridiculous offense or go to trial? If the defendant was so evil and dangerous that a conviction after trial warranted decades in prison, the government would never have agreed to a plea that allowed him to walk out of the courtroom. But why, then, demand a plea at all? Why can’t the government, having obtained an indictment of a person who, upon reflection, was not part of the conspiracy, concede a mistake and let it go?
The easy answer is that the government does so because it can. I was ready, willing and able to try the case, and had every intention of doing so. My client, on the other hand, was less thrilled at the prospect. He had a prior conviction after trial, with another lawyer, and harbored little faith in the system. He knew too well that juries convict. He was confident in his innocence. He had no confidence in the jury. The potential costs of a trial, emotional, financial and practical, overwhelmed him.
Why is it that the original 8th Circuit panel in Kattaria felt so comfortable applying a sliding scale to search warrants based upon minimal circumstantial intrusiveness due to “no harm,” while defendants are convicted nonetheless? I have every expectation that the absence of harm will put the defendant in good stead at time of sentence, but it begs the question of why there need be a sentence at all?
The answer is one of the fundamental failings of the criminal justice system, having reared its ugly head lately too many times to ignore. Our courts, and to the extent they reflect our sensibilities, our society, have such low expectations of our government that they will forgive them all but their most egregious transgressions. Incompetence in both law enforcement and prosecution is now a protected governmental function. Can anyone imagine Thomas Jefferson approving of this?
Yet citizens are given no latitude whatsoever once they are brought into the system. There is no conduct so harmless, so trivial, so hypertechnical, that the government decides to give them a pass. We have a law criminalizing just about everything, and to the extent some variation on human conduct was missed along the way, we have imaginative prosecutors prepared to twist laws into pretzels to make them work, lest someone escape punishment when their conduct doesn’t “feel right.”
It’s obviously disingenuous for our government to argue that it should be allowed to make mistakes, when those same mistakes by a citizen would bring an indictment down on their heads. Saying I’m sorry and I’ll do better next time isn’t an option for defendants. Of course, government justifies it by proclaiming that it acts for the public good, and is therefore more deserving than the public whose good it protects. But it’s different for the defendant who has done no one any harm.
Whatever happened to no harm, no foul? It’s alive and well, but only for our government.
New Jersey: Just Leave Herring to Us
From Adam Liptak at the New York Times, it didn’t take long for a district judge in New Jersey to answer the aching question of what Herring meant to search and seizure law going forward.
In one of the first trial court decisions to interpret Herring, a federal judge in New Jersey took the broader view, refusing to suppress evidence obtained from computer hard drives under a search warrant based on false information supplied by a Secret Service agent. The agent had told the judge that DVDs found during an earlier search contained child pornography.
This was false: other law enforcement officials had reviewed the DVDs and had found no child pornography. The agent, who was leading the investigation, testified that he did not know of that review when he made his statement.
“This conduct,” Judge Stanley R. Chesler wrote a week after Herring was decided, “while hardly qualifying as a model of efficient, careful and cooperative law enforcement, does not rise to the level of culpability that the Supreme Court held in Herring must be apparent for the exclusionary rule to serve its deterrent purpose and outweigh the cost of suppressing evidence.”
So while we were squabbling in the blawgosphere about whether Herring spelled the end of the 4th Amendment or was just another bump on the road toward the end, Judge Chesler took less than a week to weigh in with his view.
Notwithstanding all the detailed parsing and analysis that went into the opinions as to Herring’s significance, Judge Chesler went right for the throat, holding that seizure pursuant to a warrant issued on a totally false representation didn’t require suppression. The language used by Judge Chesler couldn’t possibly be worse: The police conduct “does not rise to the level of culpability.” While Herring spoke to attenuated negligence, Chesler wants none of it. The exclusionary rule only applies when the police engage in culpable conduct.
The bad news is that it didn’t take long for the rationale of Herring to get turned on its head, shifting the focus away from violations of the 4th Amendment and onto the degree of culpable conduct by police, a grand vision of the good faith exception without any of those nasty little details that might put the brakes on the total evisceration of any penalty for violating the Constitution. Judge Chesler had no interest in sliding down the slope. He took a running leap to get right to the bottom.
To the extent that I surmised that no rationale judge could do exactly what Judge Chesler did here, I sure missed the boat (presuming, as I do, that Stanley R. Chesler is a rational judge). On the other hand, this is from the District of New Jersey, not exactly a leading court when it comes to constitutional interpretation. Sure, the rest of the country takes note of Jersey when it comes to critical things like haute couture and cutting edge chemical refineries, but not the law.
While this decision may not be of such consequence as to lead the rest of the nation down the path to perdition, it is certainly not the direction one would hope to go just a week after Herring. And as for Judge Chesler, perhaps he might consider the deterrent benefits of search warrant applicants providing courts with accurate information? Even in Jersey, minimal competence might be considered a good thing.
Side Note: Norm Pattis posts about this article as well, noting that Liptak is no Linda Greenhouse.
I miss Linda Greenhouse’s reporting on the law in The New York Times. She has been replaced by a fellow named Adam Liptak. Liptak writes well enough for the Times, but his analysis rarely rises above the obvious, and he sometimes misses nuances that are important.
I think Norm’s just being nice to Liptak. Given that Liptak’s job is to be the Times’ eyes and ears at the Supreme Court, having previously been the general legal columnist for the paper, it wouldn’t be too much to expect him to have a working knowledge of the substantive legal issues and the ability to discern the details and nuances that make a decision consequential. Writing “well enough” isn’t good enough.
On a good day, Liptak barely scratches the surface. On a bad day, he misses the point altogether. That’s just not good enough, and there are a lot of people who get their information on the law via the New York Times, and assume that the Times wouldn’t screw it all up. That’s a lot of ill-informed people.
Lawyers, Media and Twitteratti
Every once in a while, a variety of admonitions, seemingly unrelated, come together in one place to make a very good point. It happened yesterday. In the morning, I received an email from the Turk informing me that I was quoted in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Odd, I thought to myself. I didn’t speak with anyone from Cleveland lately. Was it on Miranda, Heller, police misconduct?
Nope. Of all the subjects in the world, it was on twitter. It seems that somebody picked up on a post I wrote a few weeks earlier about how lawyers in the blawgosphere have embraced twitter.
“I now twit,” criminal defense lawyer Scott Greenfield wrote recently. “I do it because many of my friends in the blawgosphere spend more time twitting than blogging. They comment about blog posts on Twitter, and if you don’t read Twitter, then you won’t see their comments. In the process, Twitter has become incredibly mainstream for lawyers.”
Greenfield went on to bemoan what he said was a reduction in thoughtful conversation as Twitter siphoned off users from law blogs.
Inexplicably, Debra Cassens Weiss at the ABA Journal picked up on this critical story and wrote one of their own yesterday, entitled Twitter Becoming ‘Incredibly Mainstream for Lawyers.’
Law blogger Robert Ambrogi calls Twitter a “virtual watercooler,” a place where professionals can talk and exchange ideas. Another legal blogger, Scott Greenfield, wrote on his blog that he has to read Twitter because all his blogging friends use it to comment. “Twitter has become incredibly mainstream for lawyers,” he writes.
While the Cleveland Plain Dealer story included the same quote as the ABA Journal, it was done in context, though perhaps the context was less helpful for the readers of a dead tree paper than for the blawgosphere. The ABA Journal, on the other hand, repeated the quote with only paraphrased context.
Later, a couple of twits come across the screen from @BruceCarton and @DougCornelius :
@scottgreenfield in ABA Journal saying “Twitter has become incredibly mainstream for lawyers.” Really? I bet less than 1% of lawyers use.
@brucecarton @scottgreenfield An increased use of Twitter by lawyers, but not mainstream. Way less than 1% (there are lots of lawyers)
The point had come full circle. Perfect. Moreover, it ties in with my longstanding admonition to young lawyers who think that there is nothing cooler than getting their name in the paper or the mug on TV. So many lessons from just one silly post of mine. It doesn’t get much better than this.
Obviously, my original post was about lawyers in the blawgosphere, which is hardly the same as lawyers in general. Had I known that some yahoo from Cleveland would pick it up, I probably would have been more explicit on the point, but then I’m writing in the blawgosphere about the blawgosphere, and that degree of detail would have been redundant.
One would have thought the point to be better understood by the ABA Journal, but that would have taken all the zing out of their story, which took it to yet a different place. Lesson: When you write or say something, expect it to be used by others to serve their purposes. Remember, lawyers are just the lunch meat of the media. They are happy to use our quotes, but only because it serves their ends.
Ironically, my point about discussion moving from blawg comments to twitter, the subject of another post, was proven by Doug’s and Bruce’s twits. Their point, that twitter barely touches lawyers in the general population, is obviously true and a proper commentary on the ABA Journal’s insinuation. It had nothing to do with my point, of course, since I was talking about lawyers in the blawgosphere, but having assumed that the quote in the ABA Journal accurately reflected my quote, and having not read the post from which the original quote was taken, it’s understandable.
But this shows how lawyers need to be careful what they wish for, because they just might get it. I had no idea someone from Cleveland had lifted a quote from my blawg post. Not that there’s anything wrong with that, but usually reporters call me up to ask me questions about it rather than just pull a quote. So I had no clue that it happened. Similarly, Weiss at the ABA Journal never called either, but lifted the story third hand. Then Bruce and Doug took the ABA story, certainly a credible source, and pointed out the fallacy that twitter was mainstream for lawyers everywhere.
Now had this been on a subject that mattered, it could have been a potential problem. After all, it’s ludicrous to suggest that twitter is mainstream for lawyers in general, while it’s perfectly accurate to say that it’s mainstream for lawyers in the blawgosphere. Heck, even Turk, who just posted about what a worthless distraction twitter is, gave up and signed on. You can follow him @Turkewitz, as he could use a few more followers just to save him from abject embarrassment.
And, of course, the confusion would have been avoided had Bruce and Doug not twitted their comments to the ABA Journal story but commented here to the original post, where I would have cleared up the extension of the quote from lawyers in the blawgosphere to lawyers in general. But they twitted the comments instead, And that was the point.
Of the gazillion lawyers out there, only a smattering have a meaningful presence in the blawgosphere. Sure, many now wish they had jumped on board, and others still have tried only to get smacked in the head when they realize that it’s not as simple as the marketers would tell them. Is it 1% or 5? Who knows, but it’s clearly still a tiny fraction of lawyers. Of those who toil in the blawgosphere, however, twitter has most assuredly became mainstream, and with it has come a number of issues, not the least of which is the movement of comments off the blawgs and into the twittersphere.
So for all those young bucks who would be so thrilled to see themselves in a paper in Cleveland, or better yet in the ABA Journal, consider this apocryphal tale of how public information moves about, and gets a little more twisted in each reincarnation. The big ego boost you desire can lead to post-coital depression when you feel like you got screwed.
I rest my case.
Long Island Cuts to the Tape
No one can say that Long Island isn’t on the cutting edge anymore. Not that anyone cared much before, but Newsday announced that the Nassau County Police Department, with Suffolk County taking up the rear, has jumped on the videotape bandwagon. As anticipated, the simplistic assumptions brought smiles to the editorial board’s faces:
For suspects, it will most certainly help ensure that the wrong person isn’t convicted while the guilty one slips away. And for those who are wrongdoers, the documentary evidence will enhance the chances of conviction, because jurors are less likely to be swayed by false claims of police misconduct if they can see what actually took place.
That this will “most certainly” prevent the wrong person from being convicted is a very strong statement. And no doubt it will help in some cases, where the existing method of telling the jury “what really happened” is the cop’s memory of what a defendant said. Assuming the best of cops, memories can be flawed. Assuming the worst, words can be change, or even fabricated from whole cloth.
A common complaint of defendants is that “I never said that.” Well, now we may know. But “may” is the operative word, as cops will tell you that suspects say things all the time in all different places, some of which will still lack the video camera to record the Hallmark moment. Whether it’s at a crime scene, or where the cops first confront the suspect, or in the back seat of a cruiser, those statements will still be admissible in evidence because it’s not the cops’ fault that the suspect spilled his guts at a time when there was no camera available.
But the trick will be capturing statements from the defendant who enjoyed a little speech while riding to the precinct. Remember the Christian Burial case? When the suspect arrives at the station, having already spilled the beans upon artful questioning in the cruiser, the videotaped confession will appear pristine and overwhelming. No need to persuade the defendant to talk in front of the camera when he’s already let the cat out of the bag when there was no camera around.
From the lawyer’s point of view, there’s little we can do with a videotaped confession. It’s all there in living color. There will be nothing left to say. When it was the cop’s word against the defendant’s, we had options. With a video, there are none.
Is the idea a terrible one? No. It will likely work well in some case, and when defendants either fall short of confession, police overreach or the words spoken are in question, a videotape could spell the difference between a jury having to choose between a cop’s memory of the statement and a definitive video of the statement.
Does this put an end to the problems with statements? No. There will still be a list of problems, ranging from coercion outside the camera’s view to videotaping of only a portion of significant communications between police and suspects, to creating conclusive proof of guilt while concealing the methodology of how a defendant was moved to speak. There will still be problems.
But no experienced lawyer doubts the impact of a video, especially in our TV society when we put absolute faith in what we can see and hear for ourselves, and discount anything that might have happened off-camera. Some will point to the occasions when it helps to prove this is a great idea. Some will point to the occasions when it hurts to prove otherwise. Some, like me, will see it as a new toy in the arsenal of law enforcement, and believe that it’s only a matter of time before law enforcement perfects its manipulation of this new weapon to turn it on its head whenever it can.
While some call me a pessimist, and argue that I would rather curse the darkness than try new technologies which, while imperfect, hold great potential to do better than we are doing now, you’re not entirely wrong. Taping statements likely can and will help more than it will hurt, and for that reason it is worth a try. Still, I feel compelled to pound the table a bit to remind people that this is not a magic bullet and will create new problems while simultaneously creating irrefutable proof against defendants.
As long as the imperfections remain part of the discussion, and people aren’t sold, as the Newsday editors apparently are, on this new toy being the panacea, then I support the idea. But when I read an editorial so clearly misapprehending this imperfect tool, I can’t help but harbor fears that the public will deem these videos indisputable, and that will be the end of the discussion, and the case.
