Author Archives: SHG

Was Mommy a Terrorist, or LA Times Full of It? (Update)

This story from the Los Angeles Times was enough to stir ire in the coldest reaches of Dick Cheney’s heart.


Tamera Jo Freeman was on a Frontier Airlines flight to Denver in 2007 when her two children began to quarrel over the window shade and then spilled a Bloody Mary into her lap.

She spanked each of them on the thigh with three swats. It was a small incident, but one that in the heightened anxiety after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks would eventually have enormous ramifications for Freeman and her children.

A flight attendant confronted Freeman, who responded by hurling a few profanities and throwing what remained of a can of tomato juice on the floor.

The incident aboard the Frontier flight ultimately led to Freeman’s arrest and conviction for a federal felony defined as an act of terrorism under the Patriot Act,

At Popehat, Ken smelled a rat.


It would be bad enough if a legally illiterate media merely misinformed the public. But the media’s illiteracy allows it to mislead and frighten the public with various legal chimeras. Case in point: a recent Los Angeles Times article suggesting that the PATRIOT Act has led to people being classified as terrorists for misbehaving on airplanes.

But journalists should be able to separate results of post-9/11 laws from results of previously prevailing legal norms . In its article “In-Flight Confrontations Can Lead To Charges Defined As Terrorism,” the Los Angeles Times utterly fails to make that distinction. In fact, it affirmatively obscures that distinction.

Ken proceeds to parse the Times story, beginning with the claim that


At least 200 passengers have been convicted of felonies under the Patriot Act, often for behavior involving raised voices and profanity. Some experts say airlines are misusing the law.

After stating that this is “substantially misleading,” and then launching into a discussion of the allegations, Ken returns to the Patriot Act angle and states:


But this — like the article’s caption suggesting that people are being convicted “under the PATRIOT Act” — is demonstrably misleading. Ms. Freeman’s indictment charged her under two statutes: Interference with a flight attendant in violation of 49 U.S.C. section 46504 and assault within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 113(a)(5). She was allowed to plead guilty to only the interference charge. The PATRIOT Act only changed one rather minor aspect of the interference statute:


2001 Amendments. Pub.L. 107-56, § 811(i), inserted “or attempts or conspires to do such an act,” before “shall be fined”.

In other words, the PATRIOT Act made it illegal to attempt to do or conspire to do the things already prohibited by the statute.

Two points worthy of note here.  The first is that the USA Patriot Act (note that the name is an acronym, so you have to include the USA part in front of the Patriot part lest be condemned for inexactitude) in many of its prolix and unrelated parts took existing laws, beefed them up, eliminated aspect that might be seen as a hindrance to law enforcement, and did so by aggregating them under the claim of “terrorism”.  In other words, if you can pass a law by justifying it as vital in the war on terrorism, it doesn’t seem too much of a stretch to say that people prosecuted under that law, or a penumbra of it, could be reasonably called a “terrorist”. 

Second, prior to enactment of the USA Patriot Act, flight crews rarely sought law enforcement involvement in matters that didn’t pose a serious threat to safety of the plane, passengers and crew.  It was bad for business (and airlines are, first and foremost, businesses) and stewardesses, later to be known as flight attendants, were not law enforcers.  After 9/11, there was a seismic shift in perspective, where flight crews were expected, no demanded, to ride herd over the mile high club.  Everything from handguns in the cockpit to tasers in the coffee carts was all the rage.  Then, and only then, did flight attendants feel empowered to play Sky Chief and stick their nose into every wrong in the air.  Is this attributable to 9/11 and the USA Patriot Act?  You betcha.

As to the factual allegations, Ken went to Pacer, which he correctly notes the reporter could have done as well (though the 8 cents a page may be more than newspapers can afford these days), to compare the affidavits and plea agreement to the “facts” as set forth in the Times article.


The article’s description of her conduct is somewhat limited, and helps support the article’s theme of a hapless individual who as a result of losing her cool on a bad day gets caught in a web of post-9/11 paranoia. Fortunately, other resources are available to us — and to the journalists who wrote this story. Specifically, there’s the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint against her, available online for pennies to anyone who opens a PACER account. That affidavit shows that witnesses described Ms. Freeman’s conduct as rather more alarming.

Ken sets out the witness statements in the complaint at length, and he’s absolutely right that they sound “rather more alarming.”  But then, the affidavit was prepared by an AUSA who would be expected to artfully phrase the witnesses statements in a way that makes the mundane sound alarming. That’s part of the job.

If we take a closer look at some of the language, however, it may not be nearly as alarming as it seems. 


Tamera Freeman appeared intoxicated and violent towards her children before she boarded the flight in San Francisco.

“Appeared intoxicated and violent?”  This is conclusory and offers no clue why. If she had, why didn’t this witness say something before the flight?  Post hoc impressions often color prior observations, rendering them a facile reinterpretation of history.  Next.


During the flight, Freeman was observed by several passengers drinking additional alcohol and becoming verbally and physically abusive to her children.

The LA Times story says she cursed and swatted her children for spilling her Bloody Mary.  I see no inconsistency, despite the use of charged language, like “physically abusive.”


When denied further alcohol, Freeman threw a drink on the ground at FA Fleming. At one point, Freeman followed FA Fleming into a common area and began yelling and pointing her finger at FA Fleming. These actions by Freeman threatened FA Fleming to the point that FA Fleming moved into a defensive stance. FA Fleming talked Freeman into returning to her seat.

The story says she threw a drink on the ground and yelled at the flight attendant.  But she “pointed her finger?”  Oh my! The rest has more to do with FA Fleming’s sensitivities.  She “took a defensive stance?”  I have no clue what that means, though it conjures up a Ninja image in my mind.  Did she become a Ninja flight attendant?


Maria Aldeguer observed Freeman drinking alcohol on the flight, cursing and screaming at her children, and hitting the children with open fists on their shoulders and knees.

This statement presents one of my favorite little prosecutor tricks.  She hit the children with “open fists.”  Uh, that would be a slap, right?  Exactly as the article reported?  Calling a slap “open fists” makes it sound so much more violent, doesn’t it?

There are more statements, but each falls into the same categories of being conclusory, rhetorical and unclear or meaningless verbiage.  It’s awfully easy for a prosecutor to describe mundane events in pejorative terms and make it seem “rather more alarming.”  Perhaps it was, but I would be very reluctant to use the language of a complaint, a document whose purpose is to make ordinary acts seem criminal, as a foundation.

Ken then points turns to the plea agreement:


Moreover, even the facts that Freeman admitted to in her plea agreement (which is also available to interested citizens and competent journalists) portray a substantially more volatile situation than the mild “few profanities” described in the article. In her plea agreement, she admitted to the following facts:


On July 16, 2007, the Defendant and her two young children were passengers on Frontier flight #1 08, an airplane in flight between San Francisco, California and Denver, Colorado. During the flight, and within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States, passengers observed the Defendant yelling, cursing, and striking her children. One passenger reported the Defendant’s conduct to flight attendant Amy Fleming. Ms. Fleming attempted to intervene. When she contacted the Defendant, the Defendant began yelling at Ms. Fleming that she wanted another drink because hers had been spilled. Ms. Fleming refused to serve her another alcoholic drink. The Defendant continued to cause a disturbance, cursing at Ms. Fleming, telling her, “You fucking bitch, get away from me.”

Ms. Fleming asked another flight attendant to notify the Captain of the disturbance. When the Defendant got out of her seat to go to the lavatory, Ms. Fleming followed her. When the Defendant left the bathroom, she continued to curse and yell at Ms. Fleming with her hands flying and fingers pointing. Ms. Fleming felt threatened and got into a defensive stance at that point. Flight Attendant Fleming handed the Defendant a “red card” which Ms. Freeman threw back at her. Ms. Fleming then retrieved restraint tape and warned the Defendant she would physically restrain her if she hit the children again. Ms. Fleming also reseated a passenger who worked as a correctional officer across from the Defendant so that he could assist as necessary. Ms. Fleming would testify that the actions of the Defendant intimidated her and interfered with the performance of her assigned duties.

Now let’s hold on here a moment.  The content of the plea agreement is written by the AUSA and has nothing to do with reality.  It’s what the government demands the defendant concede in order to obtain the outcome of the plea.  Defendants would admit to the Lindbergh baby kidnapping if it bought them a level 6 and probation.  The allegations are irrelevant, and nobody takes them seriously.  Defendants couldn’t care less what it says, and they will sign off on anything the government writes as long as they get the deal.

Then there’s one final element of proof that Ken offers, relating to the aspect of the Times article that suggests that Mommy Freeman spent 3 months in the hoosegow because of 9/11:


That basic research also allowed me to determine why Ms. Freeman spent three months in jail. The article implies that this was a result of post-9/11 paranoia and legal overreaching. In fact, documents available to the public show that Ms. Freeman did not contest the government’s request that she be detained:


Defendant is not contesting detention. Defendant reserves the right to address detention at a later date.

Freeman was later released on bond after she filed a motion for reconsideration of detention, a motion that strongly suggests that she had not been able to secure the family support necessary after her initial arrest.

First, there is a question as to why bond was demanded by the government in this first place.  I guess Freeman was “a flight risk,” (get it?).  But it is standard operating procedure for defense lawyers to defer a detention hearing when the defendant lacks the financial ability to make bond, and when they need an opportunity to put together a bail package that might be acceptable.  This hardly suggests that Freeman was fine about being detained, and lacking information about her financial or family situation, I can’t see how anyone can jump to the conclusion that she had no “family support.”  Maybe she has no family?  Maybe they don’t have 2 nickels to rub together? 

The one thing we know to be a fact is that she was held for 3 months before copping a plea to the Lindbergh baby kidnapping.  Was this necessary for the safety of the United States of America?  I guess it might be, considering she was a “terrorist”.  Personally, I’m not worried.  If she cursed at me, threw a drink at my feet, and tried to slap my thigh, I think I could take her.

Shortly after Ken posted his expose, two other blogs jumped on the bandwagon.  First, Mark Bennett at Defending People proclaimed that Ken kicked “journalistic butt.”  Then Walter Olson at Overlawyered took note, with a special shout out to Ken Obermann.  Talk about strange bedfellows.  My respect for both Ken, Mark and Walter aside, I wasn’t ready to join the party.

While Ken may well be correct in his shredding of the Los Angeles Times story, he may also be totally wrong.  It’s impossible to say based on the available information, and indeed much of the court record upon which Ken relies has the musty, stale smell of typical, prosecutorial, one-sided, adversarial hyperbole.  I don’t blame Ken for deciding to stand on the dubious side of the road, but I’m not convinced that I’m ready to join him.

And I note that Freeman isn’t my choice for mother of the year.  She sounds pretty awful, frankly, both as mother as well as effective terrorist.  But do I want flight attendants making federal cases over crappy parenting?  No.  No I don’t. 

Update:  It seems that Patterico’s jumped on the bandwagon, as seen here and in the comment below.  A wee bit of cheerleading involved in this, bolstered by the logical fallacy of an anecdotal claim that the LA Times messed up another airline passenger story.  So the LA Times has an agenda on the subject?  Apparently, they aren’t the only one.

A Categorical Problem with Spears

In a per curiam summary reversal, the United States Supreme Court held in Spears v. United States that individual sentencing judges have the authority to categorically decide that an aspect of the United States Sentencing Guidelines is wrong, and to refuse to apply it.  Sentencing maven Doug Berman sought Lawprof/Counsel for the Appellant, Mark Osler’s reaction to the decision and here’s the response:

While today’s Spears opinion at times reads like a WWE Sentencing Smack-down hosted on the Food Network, with the majority’s description of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion as “a smuggled-in dish that is indigestible” and the dissent’s reference to the “bitter medicine” of summary reversal, the Court’s clarification of Kimbrough may end up having real significance.

Fundamentally, the Court’s opinion makes very clear that Booker requires that judges be allowed to categorically reject sentencing guidelines with which they disagree on policy grounds. In so doing, the Spears majority encourages judges to articulate personal sentencing guidelines in a sense, by concretely defining the alternatives they are choosing. The Court properly and succinctly recognized that unless sentencing judges are allowed to define their alternative scorings categorically and honestly, there are only two possible outcomes: Either the guidelines are essentially mandatory, or judges lie about their reasoning, which is “institutional subterfuge.”  As the Court asserted, “Neither is an acceptable sentencing practice.”

As a criminal defense lawyer, I should be thrilled by this.  Yet I’m not.  My spidey sense tells me there’s something wrong.  

My concern stems from having lived through the old, pre-guidelines days, when judges sentenced on their own and were responsible for the sentenced they imposed.  Some judges were known as harsh, while others less so, much as they are today.  But then, there were no guidelines behind which judges could hide. 

That a judge can, without any doubt following Spears, categorically reject the 100 to 1 guideline for crack versus powdered cocaine is certainly good.  That judges can similarly accept the 100 to 1 guideline for crack because they chose not to categorically reject it is wrong.  In the path of turning the once mandatory guidelines into advisory, and creating clarity as to what exactly that means and how seriously a circuit should take a district judge’s sentence, we are left with the residue of the guidelines still stinking up the courtroom.  It means that a judge so inclined can smile benignly as he imposes a guidelines sentence while being held unaccountable for explaining why he thinks a 100 to 1 ratio bears any nexus to reality. 

The sentencing judge must explain her reasoning when she exercises her authority to impose a sentence that falls outside the sentencing guidelines.  The sentencing judge who imposes a guidelines sentence need merely incant that it is the sentence necessary to satisfy 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and no more.  The guidelines remain the refuge of the harsh judge.

But if one judge has held that an aspect of the guidelines are “categorically” wrong, there is a logical inconsistency that another judge can conclude exactly the opposite and leave the rest of us hanging without hope of a determination one way of the other.  How do we explain to a defendant that in courtroom A, he will get half the sentence that he would in courtroom B, simply because one categorically subscribes to the guidelines while the other categorically does not?  Does this not smack of arbitrariness?

As I write this, I can’t believe that it sounds like I have come full circle and am arguing for guidelines, for consistency, but for a set of guidelines that suit my vision of sentencing as opposed to the one that the United States Sentencing Guidelines Commission propounded.  This is not what I propose or support.

My best explanation is that the irrationality of the sentencing guidelines, the arbitrary imposition of such ratios as crack to powdered cocaine, the rejection of family circumstances as a sentencing factor, the attempt to homogenize all defendants when each and everyone is an individual human being worthy of a sentence imposed based upon the specifics of each case and each person, makes me fearful of any approval of “categorical” approaches.

While Spears approval, given the underlying case, is certainly consistent with my views of a proper outcome, I cannot help but fear that a categorical approach will go the opposite direction with some other judge, who perhaps feels that a 100 to 1 ratio is insufficient, and a 200 to 1 would be better.  Perhaps it’s just a wish to return to the good old days, where there were no guidelines at all and each judge decided on a sentence based on the specifics of the case before him.  And yes, for better or worse.

The Defendant’s Children

Mark Bennett’s post at Defending People, the best criminal law blawg around, on prosecutors concern for children, but only when it suits their purpose, struck a cord as I prepare for a federal sentence.  Mark writes:

Prosecutors seem so proud of themselves when they argue, “ Don’t show me photos of the defendant’s kids. He had those kids when he committed the crime and he didn’t think about them then.” The particular quote is from Jane Starnes, a former Harris County prosecutor (and Bellaire neighbor of ours) who now prosecutes in John Bradley’s office and apparently got some award from MADD recently. But they all say it, and every one of them acts like she thought it up herself.

Rephrased, the argument is this: the defendant didn’t think about his kids when he committed the offense, so I shouldn’t have to think about them now.

This is the pat response of all prosecutors, everywhere. Ask any criminal defense lawyer and they’ll tell you that they have received this reaction, no matter what permutation of words, a thousand times.  It’s one of the first things a young prosecutor learns when being taught to relinquish his humanity.  Unfortunately, many judges share this simplistic mantra as well.  Some judges don’t find it sufficient to ignore the existence of children, but feel compelled to admonish the defendant for the harm his criminal conduct has caused them.  Of course, there’s nothing like kicking a man when he’s down.

But truth be told, the pat response isn’t without some degree of merit, which is why it has such longstanding, albeit superficial, appeal.  Like the religious conversions brought about by the slamming of a cell door, it smacks of convenience.  The epiphany of concern for one’s children far too often comes after the deed, and the facile use of an infant’s photograph flies in the face of the selfishness demonstrated by a defendant before the cops slapped the cuffs on.

As letters of support from friends and family of my client roll in, I see that each talks about what a wonderful family man he is, and how deeply he loves his children.  They speak to what wonderful children they are, and how much they need their father.  They note that the children will suffer his sentence with him, and that they, the children, have done no wrong to be punished this way.

In a federal sentencing, the guidelines had long precluded consideration of the children as a basis to depart from the sentencing grid.  Now that Booker, Gall and Kimbrough have made clear that these guidelines are merely advisory, and now that the summary Spears reversal tells us that judges can categorically reject the guidelines refusal to acknowledge that consideration of children in determining the proper sentence, judges have it within their power to accommodate the impact of their sentence on a defendant’s family.

But this doesn’t mean that holding up some photographs of kids is going to persuade a judge to impose a different sentence then she would otherwise.  Nor does it mean that she should.  It seems appropriate that we start from the premise that a defendant, as a father or mother of a child, should have considered the impact of their criminal conduct on their family, and thus they should not be allowed to “hide behind their children” to avoid sentence.  From there, it’s up to the defense to show that the individual circumstances of any particular human being, any particular family, take it outside the norm and provide compelling reasons to reduce the sentence.

An interesting alternative way of thinking about this might be to consider whether we believe that defendants without children should be categorically sentenced to higher sentences than defendants with children.  The obvious answer is that this would be wrong, as not having children certainly is not a rationale for imposing a more severe sentence.  For this reason, we need to be careful about asserting the opposite, that merely having children is cause to impose a reduced sentence, as it would take us to the exact same place.

I’ve known defendants whose connection to their children was tenuous at best.  Indeed, some barely knew their names.  I’ve known defendants who were unbelievably wonderful, loving parents, integral in the lives of their children and, their criminal conduct notwithstanding, truly critical to their children’s welfare.  While I will argue sentence on behalf of every client with zeal and passion, the truth is that my rhetoric is no substitute for the love and need a child has for a parent.  When it’s real and deep, it shows.  It shows because it permeates the family structure, and it is so clear and overwhelming that it cannot be denied.

Whenever a parent stands before a court ready for sentence, a child will suffer.  The hardened attitude toward the child reflected in the knee-jerk prosecutorial reaction is always wrong.  These are innocent children, and they have done nothing to suffer the consequence of their parent’s conduct.  Yet that doesn’t mean that a parent is absolved of responsibility for his own conduct because his children will pay the price with him.  It does mean that it should always be taken into consideration in fashioning the right sentence, even though such consideration may not necessarily result in much of a reduction if any at all.

The removal of family impact from consideration under the sentencing guidelines is categorically wrong.

When The Buck Stops With You

William & Mary Lawprof Nate Oman has more juice than you or me.  This is why he sat close to Barack Obama during the inauguration, and tells his thoughts as he experienced the spectacle of our peaceful transition of power.


I thought that Obama gave a good speech but not a great one. As usual, I found his rhetoric compelling, and I am hopeful for what he may be able to accomplish. Any president, I figure, is entitled to euphoria on his inauguration day, but gazing out over the sea of humanity inundating the Mall, I wondered what such an experience does for a person. It can’t be good, psychologically,

A very significant observation.  How does it feel to be adored?  Does it embolden someone to believe that he’s superman?  Does it strike fear in his heart that they may realize that he’s not?  Will he feel compelled to make decisions to pander to the crowd, to maintain the adoration by pleasing them?  Few of us will ever know, though I suspect the same psychology applies in microcosmic applications, and rarely do they result in any positive.  Of course, lesser officials aren’t the President of the United States, and perhaps someone who has reached the pinnacle of government is built better than the rest?

This story from Nate’s post at Concurring Opinions shines some light:


During the waning days of World War II, Sam Rayburn, the plain-talking Texan Speaker of the House, invited VP Harry S. Truman over for a visit. “Nobody ever tells Harry what is going on,” he said. During the course of their meeting (or in some versions, shortly before the meeting) word came that FDR had died, making Truman president. Rayburn then said to him:


Harry, this is the last time I am going to call you ‘Harry.’ From now on I will only call you ‘Mr. President’ out of respect for the office. You are going to go to the White House, where you are going to be surrounded by people who will tell you that you are the smartest son of a bitch on earth. Harry, both you and I know that isn’t true.

I don’t think anyone doubts that Obama is a very smart man.  But no one is that smart.  Some will spout stupidity like “I hope he fails,” rendering any further thoughts unworthy of note.  Many hope he succeeds, but that doesn’t mean that he will always be right, or that the President won’t benefit from a loyal, but dubious, following. 

Our last administration took comfort in the absolute knowledge that their choices were right, no matter what anybody said.  It didn’t work out very well for the nation.  This is not a reflection of conservative versus liberal politics, but a matter of being so absolutely certain in the righteousness of one’s decisions that they would breach no disagreement.  As Robert Draper’s book was entitled, they were “Dead Certain.” 

Does President Obama believe that he too can do no wrong?  I don’t think so, as he’s building a coterie of advisers much like John F. Kennedy, made up of the best and the brightest.  Of course, that didn’t really work out so great either, as David Halberstam tried to tell us.  With Nancy Pelosi sitting in Sam Rayburn’s old chair, it’s unlikely that she will express the wisdom that was offered Harry Truman as he assumed the presidency.  Will anybody tell Barack Obama that he may be the president, but that doesn’t make him the smartest son of a bitch on earth?

Even though we may not agree with every choice a president makes, it is his job to make decisions.  That’s what it means when the buck stops on your desk.  It’s my plan of action to try to help him to do so, since I know he reads Simple Justice regularly and I assume he will continue to do so throughout his term of office.  Okay, this may be a stretch, but I can dream. 

Sometimes, the only help I can offer is to disagree, perhaps present alternative thoughts.  But then, I’m not the smartest son of a bitch on earth either, and no one has elected me president.  If any reader thinks they have some thoughts that will help the President to make the best possible decision, it’s your patriotic duty to let him know.  But we will still all him Mr. President from now on.

Thanks, Geoffrey Fieger, You Jerk

As Howard Bashman reported, Geoffrey Fieger lost his appeal before the 6th Circuit, challenging Michigan’s imposition of civility on lawyers.  Fieger, after having a $15 million verdict overturned, decided to use his radio show to express his personal feelings toward the court.  His words were not kind.  His words were pretty awful, in fact.  He compared the judges to “Nazis”, which is about the worst thing one can say, even though more than 60 years have elapsed since the end of World War II. 

Most reports of this case have limited their mention to “vulgar” and offensive.  This is what the decision says:

Three days later, on August 23, 1999, Mr. Fieger, in a tone similar to that which he had exhibited during the Badalamenti trial and on his then-daily radio program in Southeast Michigan, continued by addressing the three appellate judges in that case in the following manner, “Hey Michael Talbot, and Bandstra, and Markey, I declare war on you. You declare it on me, I declare it on you. Kiss my ass, too.” Mr. Fieger, referring to his client, then said, “He lost both his hands and both his legs, but according to the Court of Appeals, he lost a finger. Well, the finger he should keep is the one where he should shove it up their asses.”

Two days later, on the same radio show, Mr. Fieger called these same judges “three jackass Court of Appeals judges.” When another person involved in the broadcast used the word “innuendo,” Mr. Fieger stated, “I know the only thing that’s in their endo should be a large, you know, plunger about the size of, you know, my fist.” Finally, Mr. Fieger said, “They say under their name, ‘Court of Appeals Judge,’ so anybody that votes for them, they’ve changed their name from, you know, Adolf Hitler and Goebbels, and I think–what was Hitler’s–Eva Braun, I think it was, is now Judge Markey, she’s on the Court of Appeals.”
Fieger is outrageous.  His language is inexcusable.  He apparently wants to be the “shock-jock” of the legal profession, pushing the envelope to the edge, then giving it one, final huge shove into the precipice.  He is an idiot.  And for this, I thank him.

For somewhat obvious reasons, somebody was not happy with Fieger’s choice of words.  As Turley explains :
He was charged by the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission with violating the courtesy and civility provisions of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. While he agreed to a public reprimand, he reserved the right to challenge the “civility” provisions on free speech grounds.

So Geoffrey Fieger, being Geoffrey Fieger, did what one would expect Geoffrey Fieger to do. He sued.  Because Geoffrey Fieger is such a jerk, and so inherently pugnacious, we don’t have to be. 

I absolutely believe that lawyers must conduct themselves with courtesy and civility in court, and that judges, no matter what, must be shown the respect due their station.  This is not to say that we cannot be critical of their decisions, and indeed I believe we have a duty to be critical of rulings.  But we do not levy personal attacks against judges for being morons, even if they are. 

But creating and enforcing rules of courtesy and civility are another matter.  These concepts are so terribly vague, so inherently bound up with individual sensibility, as to be essentially meaningless as a measure for disciplinary action.  My line and yours may not be the same, and it’s unlikely that many people share the same line as Fieger.

Based upon the line I would personally draw in the sand, Fieger went so far past it that I can’t see him in the distance.  Why he would do so is beyond me.  Did he think he would endear himself to the judges, persuade them to revisit their ruling, achieve rhetorical greatness?  Frankly, he sounds like candidate for heavy doses of Ritalin, administered hourly. 

But for the rest of us, it’s the risks taken by the Geoffrey Fiegers that test the line.  If the rest of us are to have some clue where the line is drawn, somebody has to do something incredibly stupid to make himself the guinea pig.  So as much as I think he’s a flaming jerk, I offer my appreciation to Geoffrey Fieger for doing what I would hope never to do: testing the fragile edges of free speech.  Better him than me.

History Can’t Be Left to the Gravediggers

While I may lack the ability to discern an white oak from a Norwegian maple, I can state with absolute certainty that I like trees.  I’m also quite an aficionado of history.  Put the two together and this post by Turley breaks my heart.


The National Park Service has a curious way of protecting history. The Service cut down four “witness trees” from the Gettysburg battlefield. The white oak trees were between 160 and 229 years old and were present at the battle. They were supposed to be protected, but the NPS appears to chop now and ask questions later on matters of history. The NPS policy appears to be to cut down and let God sort them out.

Stercus accidit?  Forgive and forget?  Get over it perhaps?  No.  Not acceptable.  And frankly, I am deeply tired of our willingness to come up with excuses for inexcusable incompetence.  There are two things that, once gone, can never again be recaptured: old trees and history.  The National Parks Service, the very agency charged with the protection of both, has murdered historic trees.  This is not an “oops” moment.

From the Gettysburg Daily, what does the NPS have to say about this “mistake”?


“well, when you cut down hundreds of trees, you’re bound to make some mistakes and cut down some witness trees.”

Bound to incompetence?  Bound to make mistakes.  No, we are never bound to error.  Avoiding mistakes is a choice available to senscient beings.  Sure, it takes a modicum of effort, along the lines of waking up in the morning and making certain that your feet touch the floor before alighting.  Is this too much to expect of our National Parks Service?

We have become a society that expects so little that we attribute the rare example of skill to a deity, calling it a miracle.  How else can we justify the pervasive demonstrations of incompetence?  That would mean that we expect people to do their jobs well, perform their functions properly, fulfill their purposes.  Think.  We can’t have that.  It would make people feel like constant failures.  It would hurt their self-esteem.  It would be mean, and no one wants to be mean because other people won’t like them.

So enjoy the view of the witness tree stumps and think about the men who died on the battlefield at Gettysburg.  Maybe they could put up a majestic sign attesting that the trees once stood there.  They could make it from the wood of the felled trees.

Did Herring Create a New Element of Proof?

That different minds see things differently is axiomatic, but some minds are capable of envisioning a world that would make others stand up and take notice.  Via Grits for Breakfast, Kent Scheidegger’s post at Crime and Consequences is such an apocalyptic vision that it will make your hair stand on end.


After noting that Weeks and Mapp both involved flagrant violations,* he drops this bombshell:

To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that level.

Wow. Is that a rule generally applicable to all motions to suppress? Must a defendant seeking to suppress evidence establish not only that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred and no categorical exception applies, but also that there was no “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct”?


Wait a second.  Could he possibly be on to something?  Is it possible that a court applying  Herring could hold that it places an affirmative burden on the defense to prove not merely a 4th Amendment violation (as admittedly existed in Herring) but an additional element of proof in order to invoke the exclusionary rule remedy?

At first blush, the answer of course is “nah, that’s not what it said.”  Kent ignores the attenuation language.  Kent hates the exclusionary rule, preferring instead a right without a remedy because it’s good for his political agenda. 

But he has a point, much as I hate to admit it.  Roberts’ language for the majority does suggest that the remedy, the only remedy, is contingent on proof that the violation was due to “deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent conduct.”  It says it right there in the opinion.  It’s not like he made this up.  Must this be proven?

The prosecution has the burden of production at a suppression hearing, but the defense has the burden of persuasion.  How exactly would the defense be capable of doing so under most circumstances.  What about the times the cops knocked down the wrong door.  Mere accident?  We can’t look into their minds, and we lack the ability to investigate what is really happening under the hood on the law enforcement side, since they rarely respond to our requests to chat about things. 

Even Kent sees this as a bit of a long shot, thankfully.

A lower court that wishes to be bold could certainly apply Herring this way. To do so would be no more violative of precedent that the state court decision affirmed in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). We could expect certiorari to be granted, and then we would find out if Herring really does have this sweeping scope.

And he then takes the ginormous leap to asking, if this were so, then why bother to have Mapp v. Ohio at all, since few would ever be capable of surmounting this mountain.  How he reaches the other side of this chasm is hard to fathom, apparently being too far fetched to be worthy of much explanation.  But still the imposition of this additional element, if some wag on the federal bench decided the time was right to take a stand, would make put the remedy out of reach in many cases.  Maybe even most cases.

Reading Kent’s take on Herring is like reading a bad anti-Utopian short story, one where a government purports to give us rights, but takes away any penalty for violating them.  If you thought Brady/Giglio was a joke, then imagine what Mapp would be if it was not presumed that unreasonable searches and seizures compelled remedial action.

The Oath: Bad and Badder (Update)

So the oath was flubbed.  That’s bad.

Best joke :   “How many former editors of the Harvard Law Review does it take to administer the Presidential oath properly?”   “More than two.”

Best solution :  Just do it again at a press conference, “because you know the deranged Obama haters are going to go crazy insisting he’s not really the president.”

Historical significance:  None.  We have far more consequential matters before us, and this piddling one is nothing more than a curiosity and at absolute most, an historical footnote.  Everyone has had their fun, but we now have a nation with problems to address.  Move on.

Update:  Aside from the Prez taking my advice (well done there, Sir), Marc Randazza chimes in with yet another claim of error:


The words “so help you God,” are not in the Oath. However, since Chester A. Arthur, most (if not all) Presidents-elect have thrown in this little garnish. I previously opined that Mr. Obama could, if he wanted to, throw in a little extra props to his personal deity. In fact, if Obama wanted to end the oath with “The Snozzberries taste like Snozzberries,” he would have had every right to do so.

On the other hand, upon the completion of the Oath as it appears in Article II, Section I, Roberts next line should have been to either shut up or say “congratulations, Mr. President,” — not to ask Obama, “so help you God?”

Snozzberries?  No, I don’t think that would have been right.  Not at all.

Gaming the Name: What It Says About You

Susan Cartier Leibel twitted a link to Grant Griffith’s Blog For Profit that disturbed me, both for the position taken and because it suggests a direction to be propounded to new blawgers that could lead them down a path they might not prefer.  It’s all about the name.

Kevin O’Keefe and I have discussed blog-naming a few times, including during a panel discussion at the City Bar. Kevin’s view is that blog names should be descriptive in order to maximize search engine optimization.  In other words, the name of my blog should be New York Criminal Defense Lawyer, since that’s the most likely search someone would use if I wanted them to find me as a lawyer.  But Kevin, while recognizing the point of SEO, similarly harps on LexBloggers providing substance in their posts, noting that SEO alone doesn’t cut it, since potential clients will immediately see that a blog without substance reflects a lawyer without substance. 

While I disagree with Kevin about the name, arguing that every top blawg has a unique name, spitting in the face of SEO and achieving relevance on the basis of its content rather than ability to game the search engines, I at least respect Kevin’s efforts to inform his clients that SEO is but a part of the equation.

Not so much with this guest post by Michael Martine.

Getting a domain name, naming your blog, and coming up with a tagline can feel like tough decisions, but they don’t have to be. If you have a good idea of what you’re going to blog about, everything is easier. You have two main considerations: search engine optimization (SEO) and branding/positioning.

Search Engine Optimization

As much as we’d love to think that if you just come up with a clever, catchy blog name, the world will beat a linkpath to your URL, it just ain’t so. People will find you via search. The question is, with what keywords will they find you, and how high in the rankings will your blog be? You want the main subject of your blog to be in the domain name if possible.

In fairness, that is precisely what the blawgosphere is all about to two discrete groups, marketers and consumers of marketers, those lawyers whose primary purpose in being here is to get business.  While I may harbor some problems with these folks for clogging the pipe with what I deem worthless spam, this is the right advice if marketing is your purpose.  Whether it will pay off as the marketers claim is another matter.

When I expressed my disagreement to Susan, she told me that naming blogs is one of the biggest issues she hears about from people who are going solo, and potential consumers of Solo Practice University.  I don’t doubt that for a moment, though that doesn’t answer the question of whether one should name a blawg based solely on SEO considerations or whether there’s an alternative.  It’s my hope that the SPU curriculum will not be so single-minded as to ignore the possibility that marketing is not the answer to every solo lawyer’s desires.

So why does this concern me enough to write about it?  Because the blawgosphere is currently comprised of maybe 80% of blawgers whose purpose is to get business, and 20% whose primary purpose is to provide substance.  No, the two are not mutually exclusive, and yes, providing substance also serves to market, whether it’s the purpose or not.  Let’s take the obvious canards off the table, though marketers so love the obvious that its nearly impossible for them not to restate it a half dozen times.

My problem is that naming a blawg, purchasing a URL, is something that will follow a blawger down the road, and will have a substantial impact on how that blawger is perceived by the rest of the blawgosphere.  When the only advice given, and given with such clarity, comes from the marketing perspective, a newcomer to the blawgosphere can forever taint his existence by following the marketers’ formulaic approach.  If you want to game the search engines, then name your blawg using SEO language.  Your chest will swell with pride when first you hit enter on Google and see yourself on the first page.

If your purpose is join the conversation in the blawgosphere, to establish your relevance as thoughtful contributor to the analysis and discussion, however, you may want to ignore the SEO/marketing path and select a name that identifies your blawg’s real purpose.   As Seth Godin says, be the “the”, as in Attila the Hun rather than Iowa Real Estate Hun Attila.  One will be more easily searched.  The other will be more highly regarded.

Consider the top blawgs around.  Volokh Conspiracy, Above the Law, Overlawyered, What About Clients?, f/k/a, Defending People.  Notice anything?  Nary a one is search engine optimized, but you won’t find a single blawg that follows the marketers rulebook that can hold a candle to these blawgs with respect to recognition, respect and, yes, volume of traffic. 

I do not contend that the Blog For Profit post is inaccurate.  Indeed, it is right on target for the quickest, easiest and most obvious way to generate quick traffic via a search engine.  I only want to make sure that newcomers know that there is another approach, an alternative to the marketers’ rulebook, that could prove far more effective in accomplishing your longer term goals than the quick and dirty SEO route.  And by taking the easy route, you may well find that you’re choice has started you off on the low road, where you will have to fight much harder to rise above the marketing taint to establish your substantive worth.

Again, each new blawger needs to make the choice as to the path that best suits his or her purposes.  But you should know that the marketing path is not the only one available to you, and may well prove not to be the path you really want in the long run, and a path that brings regret as you find it a struggle to overcome the taint of the marketing blawg.

Walk a Mile in Their Shoes, Or Not

Ken Lammers at CrimLaw suggested that anyone who seeks to spend their legal career in criminal law should try on the other side before siding with “the good guys,” whichever side one feels the good guys are on.


So, here’s my suggestion to those of you interested in starting a career in criminal law. I know that no one will listen to me, but I think the world would be a better place if they did. Whichever side you feel are “the good guys”, start on the other. Practice there not for 6 months – or even 2 years; practice there for at least five years – enough time that it becomes second nature. Then flip sides. Stay there for at least 3 years. Then put some serious thought into where you want to put your efforts.

Ken, for those who live in a cave, was a criminal defense lawyer who in later career turned to the dark side and became a prosecutor, a rare thing to do.

The Texas Tornado, Houston criminal defense lawyer and the top criminal law blawger around, Mark Bennett, responds: Nuts.


I don’t think it’s bad advice for everybody (lots of people might have no clear idea of how the system works, and might be leaning only gently toward one side), but for anyone who has a clear preference for one side or the other, it goes against several of my principles.

Mark lists four principles to consider:




  • Do the right thing right now.
  • What is in your heart is more important than what is in your brain.
  • Your duty to do right is a duty to your self.
  • Never lose altitude unnecessarily.

While it’s impossible to argue against these principles, there are some additional concerns that really must be considered. 

Initially, the presupposition of who are the “good guys” by those who have yet to experience the joys of being involved in criminal law are largely meaningless.  No side sits at the right hand of God, always doing the good work while the other is wrong or evil.  Both are necessary.  Both have their place. Both serve a vital function to the extent that system serves any purpose at all.

To think otherwise is to be a “true believer,” and such zealots, regardless of side, are one of the gravest evils in the system.  While there are some on both sides who ferverently believe that the other is inherently wrong, thus justifying the “win at all costs” attitude that defeats the ability of the system to serve its function with any integrity, these people should never be considered the heroes.  When someone is so blind as to be incapable of seeing the beneficial purpose of their adversary, they are destined to be blind as well to the limits of their own integrity. 

An appreciation of the role served by the other side is important, and while it doesn’t necessarily require a defense-oriented person to prosecute to appreciate the good done by prosecutors, the competitive nature of criminal lawyers tends to propel some toward a level of zeal that blinds ones eyes. 

Moreover, law students predisposed to one side may well find that exposure to the others, to its goals and purposes, changes their minds.  There’s nothing wrong with that, but without an opportunity to learn and appreciate that there are other points of view, one might never realize that the concept of “right” as a child may change as one matures.

Even if a stint in a district attorney’s office doesn’t alter ones feelings toward the poor and oppressed, it never hurts to have a breadth of experience that can be added to the arsenal available to the criminal defense lawyer.  While I have argued, probably more than necessary, that experience as a prosecutor does not, per se, translate to competency as a defense lawyer, every experience of a human being helps to broaden one’s scope of knowledge and experience.  It’s certainly not a negative.

And finally, there is quite a bit of good that can come from walking in the other guy’s shoes for a while.  A defense-oriented person may well be able to do a great deal of justice with the proper use of the power of the prosecution.  Indeed, we may well hope that all prosecutors have that bone in their head that leads them to possess a greater understanding of justice rather than a shallow desire to put notches on their gun.

Recently, Shawn Matlock (who has been largely AWOL around here) opened a huge can of worms by allowing a guest blogging prosecutor to post the ten things he hated most about defense lawyers.  Other prosecutors then jumped on the bandwagon, adding yet another ten.  For the most part, these lists were interesting because of how myopic they were, demonstrating how little understanding there is between young prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers.  This isn’t a slight on the prosecutors, as I have no doubt that a top ten list by criminal defense lawyers would be similarly myopic. Both sides see the other side’s problems so clearly, but completely understand and excuse their own issues. Shocking, right?

Once a lawyer has experienced, or at least come to a real understanding of the role played by both sides in the system and truly appreciates that both provide a real benefit to society, they are entitled to decide who the “good guys” are.  Until then, their notions of righteousness are unearned. 

While I can’t question Bennett’s bottom line, to be true to ones own beliefs, I can ask whether those beliefs are the product of a full, real and grounded understanding of the life.  Until they are, it wouldn’t hurt to heed Ken’s advice and walk awhile in the other guy’s shoes.  It might make for a far better system than we have now.