Author Archives: SHG

What Do You Call Someone Who Forces A 13 Year Old Girl To Strip?

Answer:  A school administrator. 

When the story of Savannah Redding’s abuse at the hands of the grocery clerks put in charge of the Safford Middle School in Tucson, Arizona first went public, the conduct of the very people into whose hands we entrust our children brought about widespread outrage.  The combination of such utterly outrageous conduct, stripsearching a 13 year old girl, with its purported justification in the school’s “zero tolerance” policy in search of dreaded ibuprofen, was too much to bear.

The 9th Circuit en banc held that Redding’s case against the district could proceed, which was more than “educators” could bear.  After all, the rule of thumb in the school yard is that “educators”, and only “educators”, know what to do about children, and courts should keep their nose out of schoolyard decisions.  The circuit felt otherwise.

Via Popehat and SCOTUSblog, however, comes the bad news, that the Supreme Court has granted the school district’s petition for cert, joined by those protectors of children, the National School Board’s Association as amicus curiae, who argue:


Deference to educators’ judgments recognizes that the role of the courts in school administration should necessarily be limited to avoid placing unwise constraints on the ability of those educators to preserve the learning environment and protect the safety of students.

Apparently, our most brilliant educators consider it an “unwise constraint” to prevent vice principals from strip searching 13 year olds in the war on aspirin. 

That this the district chose to pursue this matter, given the depth of outrage, is shocking.


This is incredibly stupid, and even more-so sick.  Mind you, under any circumstances that didn’t involve the federal courts’ overwhelming deference to public schools authority, somebody would go to prison over this conduct.  How then can it be fine when done by a trusted educator?

Patrick at Popehat (who by the way wears a few other hats aside from the Mitre, including Social Service for Feral Children and guest-blogger at Overlawyered), posted essentially the same thing:


I stand by what I wrote earlier: If this had happened anywhere but school, they’d all be in jail.

All of this makes the Supreme Court’s grant of cert all the more alarming.  Other than to extend the deference given school officials over children, and smack the 9th Circuit for doing its job in protecting children from these educators who think nothing of sexually abusing a 13 year old in their mindless zeal for cute-named policies like “zero tolerance,”



Rather than paying deference to the judgments of educators here, the Ninth Circuit majority trivialized the dangers posed by the nonmedicinal use of prescription and over-the-counter (“OTC”) drugs by students. See Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1,531 F.3d 1071, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008)  suggesting that prescription grade ibuprofen does not pose “an imminent danger to” anyone). Recent reports, however, highlight a much more alarming trend with respect to prescription and OTC drug abuse. By accepting review, the Court would have the opportunity to address the legal issues presented here in the context of a growing problem of prescription and OTC drug abuse among young people.


Lacking in this argument, which naturally raises the ugly specter of the “growing problem” of drug abuse among young people, is any recognition that there must be a check on the unfettered discretion, and the incredible harm cause, by the goofball grocery clerks who run schools and are charged with the care of our children.  The 9th Circuit didn’t trivialize the dangers, but ridiculed the outrageous justification for this conduct.  Merely invoking the words “drug abuse” doesn’t provide carte blanche to every boneheaded vice principal to do engage in any abusive conduct that pops into his head.

Federal courts are already far too deferential to school officials in their abusive conduct and irresponsible handling children.  Will the Supreme Court now approve of the school officials engaging in conduct that would make anyone else a sex offender for life, at the expense of a child?  Stay tuned.  This indulgence in family values has huge potential to be a nightmare for every parent in America.

 

Indictment Tossed Against Lawyer For Advising Clients (Update)

In a stunning victory, Mineola criminal defense lawyer Oscar Michelen prevailed before the Appellate Division, Second Department in having the indictment thrown out against labor lawyer Felix Vinluan for advising 10 Filipino nurses who had been fraudulently induced to come to the United States to work for a SentosaCare nursing home. 

The nurses retained Vinluan to represent them after the promises made to them in order to get them to come to the United States to work for SentosaCare were quickly forgotten, and they were subject to abusive working conditions.  The indictment claimed that Vinluan conspired to cause the nurses to walk off the job, leaving patients, including children, without case.  As it turned out, and as Felix and Oscar were kind enough to bring to our attention, this was absolutely false, the nurses having waited until the end of their shift to leave their jobs, when other nurses were there to maintain continuity of care.  No patient, and certainly no child, was ever put at risk.

Oscar took the highly unusual step of bringing a writ of prohibition to the Appellate Division, which stayed the prosecution.  From Law.com, the Second Department decision in Matter of Vinluan v. Doyle was finally issued,

In a unanimous decision, the Appellate Division, 2nd Department, ruled that District Attorney Thomas J. Spota of Suffolk County must halt his prosecution of attorney Felix Vinluan and his clients.

“We cannot conclude that an attorney who advises a client to take an action that he or she, in good faith, believes to be legal, loses the protection of the First Amendment if his or her advice is later determined to be incorrect,” Justice Randall T. Eng wrote for the panel in Matter of Vinluan v. Doyle (pdf), 08-02568.

“Indeed, it would eviscerate the right to give and receive legal counsel with respect to potential criminal liability if an attorney could be charged with conspiracy and solicitation whenever a District Attorney disagreed with that advice,” the panel said.

This is a huge smack in the face of Suffolk County District Attorney Thomas Spota, having taken the position that he was entitled to indict attorneys for giving advice with which he disagreed.  As the court held:


“It cannot be doubted that an attorney has a constitutional right to provide legal advice to his clients within the bounds of the law,” the judge wrote, citing Matter of Primus, 436 US 412, among others. Here, the indictment “seeks to punish Vinluan for providing legal advice, which he avers was given in good faith.”

Since Spota did not dispute that Vinluan acted in good faith, Eng held, the attorney could not be prosecuted for giving legal advice to commit an act, which, under the circumstances, was not a crime.

“The potential impact of allowing an attorney to be prosecuted in circumstances such as those presented here are profoundly disturbing,” concluded Eng, adding that the prosecution of any matter potentially involving the disclosure of confidential attorney-client confidences as a defense “is an assault on the adversarial system of justice.”

In the scheme of prosecutorial abuse of authority in an effort to chill an attorney’s ability to advise clients to take action against governmental or powerful corporate interests, this decision is huge.  In exceptionally strong language, it makes clear that lawyers are protected from prosecution for providing good faith legal advice to clients, and that overreaching prosecutors cannot punish lawyers because they disagree with the advice.

As an added note, the Second Department prohibited Suffolk Supreme Court Justice Robert W. Doyle, who had denied Oscar’s motion to dismiss, from presiding over this matter, making him the latest in the string of Suffolk County Supreme Court justices to be overturned and taught a firm lesson that they don’t work for the prosecution.  Ironically, the assistant on the case was Leonard Lato, the same prosecutor who fought vociferously to keep Marty Tankleff in prison despite overwhelming evidence that his conviction was irreparably tainted.


We won,” Michelen said in an interview Thursday. “It’s a vindication for the nurses, certainly for the rights of attorneys and for the lawyers who represent people in the labor and health fields. This was a dangerous prosecution from the beginning.”

You bet it’s a vindication.  Congratulations to Oscar Michelon for a job superbly done.  And Lato, on the other hand, couldn’t be reached for comment.  Finally, he’s figured out that it’s best to keep his mouth shut.  One has to wonder when the next time Spota, Lato and the fine judges of Suffolk County will step in their own excrement again, or will they finally learn a lesson from this crushing defeat that indictments are toys to keep their enemies in line.

Update:  I’m not sure how this slipped by me, but Eugene Volokh posted about this decision before me, with particular interest in the 13th Amendment aspect.


[T]he indictment handed down against the petitioners explicitly makes the nurses’ conduct in resigning their positions a component of each of the crimes charged. Thus, the indictment places the nurses in the position of being required to remain in Sentosa’s service after submitting their resignations, even if only for a relatively brief period of notice, or being subject to criminal sanction. Accordingly, the prosecution has the practical effect of exposing the nurses to criminal penalty for exercising their right to leave their employment at will. The imposition of such a limitation upon the nurses’ ability to freely exercise their right to resign from the service of an employer who allegedly failed to fulfill the promises and commitments made to them is the antithesis of the free and voluntary system of labor envisioned by the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment. While we are, of course, mindful that protecting vulnerable children from harm is of enormous importance, the fact that the prosecution may serve a legitimate societal aim does not suspend the nurses’ constitutional right to be free from involuntary service.

While my focus was on Vinluan’s indictment for advising the nurses, it’s always good to remember that involuntary servitude is unconstitutional, even in Suffolk County, New York.  For those of you who are not resident on Long Island, you may be surprised to learn that this will come as a shock and disappointment to many around here, who firmly believe to the contrary.

Update 2:  Looks like Mike at C discovered the decision too, though apparently all previous news and commentary slipped under his radar. (H/T Walter Olson)

Doctrine or Reality: What Does the Exclusionary Rule Do?

Gun enthusiast and Talmudic scholar, Joel Rosenberg, well-known around the blawgosphere as Jdog, raised a very good issue yesterday in a comment to my analysis of the Supreme Court’s Herring decision.


The limitation to reckless or deliberate conduct goes to its [the exclusionary rule’s] efficacy as a deterrent.

Yup. And that’s where I think that both you and the SCOTUS have it wrong, because I think they (explicitly) and you (implicitly) accept that it is a deterrent to reckless (official) conduct, rather than a motivation to code around the appearance thereof.

In 1914, the Supreme Court decided that the way to deter police from violating the 4th Amendment to the Constitution was to exclude evidence.  As Jdog questions, is exclusion a deterrence?  Was it ever?  Is it still?  Or is this just another  bright  dull opaque line test that we grab onto like a life-preserver because of precedent and its deep entrenchment in the myth of the law?

The problem, of course, is that the Constitution confers a right to the people, and a prohibition on government (which has since been determined to be more applicable to police than the rest of government, though no language to that effect exists in the amendment), but fails to inform us of what to do when then police violate the right.

In Weeks, the Supremes decided that the proper remedy for a violation was the exclusion of evidence.  The reason for concluding that this remedy was the most appropriate was that, knowing that evidence unlawfully seized could not be used against a defendant, this would deter police from unreasonable searches and seizures.  What Jdog doesn’t appreciate is that the Supreme Court justices, being former lawyers and all, can’t just come up with a rule, but have to provide a rationale for it.  Hence, the deterrence argument.

Joel’s point (as I understand it) is that every time a “rule” is announced in the name of protecting constitutional rights, it only serves to begin a quest by law enforcement to figure out a way to circumvent, overcome, sidestep or take advantage of the rule,  Miranda being the obvious example.  It’s a damn good point.

We, on the criminal defense side, often act like Pollyanna when we urge new rules to cure extant problems, ignoring the issue Joel raises as if this next rule will be the one that can’t be beat.  History shows that eventually, the government will find a way to beat all rules, if by no other means than the wealth of exceptions that compliant courts provide to elevate the value of order over law.  Let’s face facts; this is the harsh reality that we’ve been fighting all along, though we are perpetually shocked by decisions (like Herring) that rationalize a way around a rule until we are left with rules that bear no nexus to their original purpose, a problem that I describe as a rubric without the rationale.

Unfortunately, many of us truly consider these decisions on a very superficial level.  Granted, we are nuts and bolts types, unlike the law professors whose concerns tend to run much deeper but lack a pragmatic appreciation of how doctrine plays out on the streets and in the trenches.  Many of the comments about Herring spoke to the death of the fourth, to the extent it’s alive at all, but really offered no insight at all.  This tendency to curse the darkness isn’t a helpful way to arrive at better ideas.

So if the exclusionary rule a deterrent?  It should be, from a doctrinal perspective.  Does it work?  Obviously not, since unreasonable searches and seizures happen routinely, a mere 94 years after Weeks.  Clearly, we’re doing something very wrong, having failed so miserably to achieve the goal of governmental compliance with the 4th Amendment.

But I can’t think of a better remedy.  Then again, being a lawyer, I am handicapped by my devotion to precedent.

Anything But Boring

Seth Godin has the most remarkable way of making a critical point without being either pompous or pedantic, and I’ve become a huge fan of his blog.  It’s not merely his style that I find endearing, but he speaks to simple truths.  One, posted yesterday, summed up a critical point that has been a frequent subject of discussion, but never before said with such clarity.  Don’t be boring.



If the marketplace isn’t talking about you, there’s a reason.

If people aren’t discussing your products, your services, your cause, your movement or your career, there’s a reason.


The reason is that you’re boring. (I guess that’s what boring means, right?) And you’re probably boring on purpose. You have boring pricing because that’s safer. You have a boring location because to do otherwise would be nuts. You have boring products because that’s what the market wants. That boring staff? They’re perfectly well qualified…


You don’t get unboring for free. Remarkable costs time and money and effort, but most of all, remarkable costs a willingness to be wrong.


The bottom line is that many people blog and twit to no end.  Say something.  Marketers use the phrase “add value.”  Give the rest of us a reason to read what you write.  If you don’t, then there’s no reason for you to write at all. 

But as Seth notes, being unboring means doing something few are willing to do, take a chance.  You want to be right.  You want to be loved.  You want to be inoffensive.  Thats fine, but then you offer nothing. 

I would add one further note to Seth’s thoughts.  Be thoughtful.  Adding a curse, or some outrageous but ridiculously inane comment, may make you unboring, but will also make you the village idiot.  For those conspiracy theorists for whom every case reflects the death of civilization at the hands of Big Brother, give it a rest.  It takes effort to be thoughtful, and discretion to not post about something when you have no actual thoughts on the subject.


There is no expedient to which man will not resort to avoid the real labor of thinking.

        –Sir Joshua Reynolds

And finally, both the blawgosphere and the twittersphere have enough people trying to prove their mettle by being “news aggregators,” meaning beefing up their mojo through passing along the same information available to everyone else.  We don’t need more, and the days of getting 6 million followers by retweeting other people’s efforts are over.  If you want people to be interested in you, earn it.

Which brings us to a serious paradigm for “retweeting” by a post RT by Susan Cartier Leibel.  From David Armani at a blog called Logic + Emotion, a short, sweet set of rules to apply before one hopes to become a twittersphere hero by a heavy hand on the “retweet” button:



Kept it short
Short Tweets are more likely to get re-tweeted if people do not have to edit them. The shorter the better because multiple “RT’s” and names are added each time someone does it.


Keep it creative
Good writing is essential to getting re-tweets. Think you’ve mastered the art of 140 Characters or less?  Now you have to master the art of 70 Characters or less. Creative writing helps generate interest.


Keep it valuable
Provide value in the form of a good link, a good laugh, or a good thought. Inspirational tweets or flat out humorous ones spread like wildfire. And really solid links to valuable content do as well.


Like me, David appears to be unimpressed with the nouveau fame of retweeting fools, though he has a clearer appreciation of the viral benefits of collecting untold millions of followers.  On the other hand, I suspect he lacks my trepidation at having followers with names like “sexyhotpantsgirl” and “bangaloremassmarketer”.  No good can come from that as far as I’m concerned.

In an earlier post, I asserted that retweeting constituted an endorsement of the post being retweeted.  The twit at issue, @Rex7, responded on twitter that this assertion “was a joke,” but declined my invitation to discuss in the comments.  Some agreed with @Rex7, while other did not.    Those who took the position that a retweet is meaningless are fooling themselves, though my guess is that their views were based on a lack of understanding of what “endorsement” means, having been subjected to too many political advertisements lately. 

When you retweet, you are saying that I believe that the post I’m retweeting is worth your time.  You can retweet positively or negatively (as in, “read this idiotic/dangerous post”), but retweeting is an affirmative act that says you believe that those following you should read it.  If not, then you’re either a spammer (as David says), unbearably lazy or borderline psychotic.  As for those who retweet posts that praise them to spread their own greatness, you’re just a shameless slut.

Which brings me to the podcast, Lawyer2Lawyer, by Bob Ambrogi and J. Craig Williams.  Kevin O’Keefe was on to discuss the virtues of twitter, and I was asked as well after all the more suitable candidates respectfully decline.  Being less than a half hour, and Kevin having about a three hour spiel always at the ready, I was like a babe in the woods in comparison.  But one thing is clear.  With all the talk about twitter, including my own posts, it’s gotten some serious attention which means that it is definitely not boring.

New York to Internet: Feeeeeeed Me!

When faced with two options, one simplistic and short term and the other more sophisticated and long term, you can bet your bottom dollar which one the grocery clerks who run government will pick.  So as our nation desperately needs an engine to drive our economy back to vitality, the grocery clerks of New York have scored a victory by staving off the Amazons attack on New York’s collection of taxes. 

Hey, it’s taxes!  Government LOVES taxes, especially those collected by someone else on its behalf.  I know they say they don’t, but they’re lying.  They need them like addicts need crack.  They use them to pay their COLAs and filled their annual budget increases.  The bigger the budget, the larger the genitalia.  Who wants to be a grocery clerk with small genitalia?

From the AP :



New York state won a round in court against Amazon.com over a new law requiring out-of-state online companies to collect sales tax from shoppers in New York.


The law applies to companies that don’t have offices in New York, but have at least one person in the state who works as an online agent — someone who links to a Web site and receives commissions for related sales.


A state Supreme Court justice [Eileen Bransten] in Manhattan ruled the suit should be dismissed, saying Amazon had no basis for legal action.


The suit argued the change unfairly targets Amazon, is overly broad and vague, and violates the commerce clause of the constitution because it imposes tax-collection obligations on out-of-state entities.


New York state argued that the law closes a “tax loophole.”


Businesses with a physical presence in New York already collect the state sales tax on online purchases. The proposed law would apply to companies that have $10,000 or more in New York sales.


Officials estimated the state would gain nearly $50 million in the next two years from the tax.


Dontcha just love the word “officials”?  It makes everything they say sound so, well, official.  And $50 million certainly sounds good, kinda like getting an annual bonus from Bernie Madoff.  What’s not to like?

The answer is that online retailers are not the functional equivalent of brick and mortar stores, the bread and butter of sales tax advocates who prefer taxes to be as regressive as humanly possible.  While Justice Bransten views this extension of tax collection as a neutral law, she reveals her lack of understanding or appreciation:


The judge said New York’s law doesn’t broadly tax “any and all Internet sales,” but instead requires companies to collect state and local sales taxes if the company generates $10,000 or more in revenue as a result of commissions paid to persons in New York for sales referrals. “The neutral statute simply obligates out-of-state sellers to shoulder their fair share of the tax-collection burden when using New Yorkers to earn profit from other New Yorkers,” the judge wrote.

By tossing in the buzz words “fair share,” the court  somehow believes that changes the world and makes things right.  It doesn’t. 

This law obligates Amazon to collect New York taxes on every product purchased through it and delivered to a purchaser within the state because it sells items from such stores as J&R Musicworld on Park Row in Manhattan.  So what’s the message?  Stop doing business with J&R Musicworld and sell the same product from Seattle instead.  In other words, just stop doing business with New York businesses.  That will certainly help New York.

Before my fellow New Yorkers jump all over me for denying our grocery clerks their due, bear in mind that our state collects taxes on everything that happens within the state.  They collect directly from J&R in corporate income taxes.  They collect personal income tax from its employees.  They collect sales taxes from its employees when they buy food to eat to give them the strength to go to work.  They collect taxes on every tissue used by J&R employees to wipe the tears from their eyes over the amount of taxes they have to pay.  So would we be better to run J&R out of business over this?

Even more importantly, the internet is a digital landscape without borders, and was meant to be.  The smallest business is able to compete with the largest.  The garage retailer in Seattle can go head to head with the megastore in Raleigh-Durham.  It fundamentally changes the nature of business, and provides a benefit to every person with a computer who can shop for best quality and price anywhere in the world. 

Once the states stick their itchy little fingers into the mechanics of the internet, sucking greedily on the teet of supposedly never-ending cash to fill their perpetually undernourished coffers, rest assured that they will suck it dry.  It’s time for the federal government to pre-empt the states’ efforts to kill the internet for its own purposes, but the fear is that the grocery clerks who run the federal government will be far more interested in taking its own piece, the largest piece, then preserving the one economic engine that could propel us to future economic stability.

Chopped Herring: Is Negligence the New Loophole? (Update)

The Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Herring v. United States, and the defendant lost.  I’m shocked.  Shocked!  Of course, I predicted this, yet so many others are indeed surprised by the decision and deeply disappointed.  But the impact of the decision has yet to be determined, dire rumors of the death of the 4th Amendment notwithstanding.

Orin Kerr at VC does a good job of dissecting the decision itself, with the majority written by Chief Justice Roberts and dissents by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in the 5-4 ruling.  The majority:


1. The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or arrest was unreasonable— does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. 
2. The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.
3. To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that level. 
4. We do not suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion.

To add some critical details, the decision held that the wrong committed by a police clerk in failing to update the warrant database was mere negligence, rather than reckless or deliberate conduct, and that this negligent failure was “attenuated” from the search itself. 

Justice Ginsburg’s dissent took direct issue with the heart of the majority’s conclusion that the exclusionary rule, as a separate judicial remedy apart from the 4th Amendment prohibition, would not serve as a deterrent when the failure was merely negligent:


I would not so constrict the domain of the exclusionary rule and would hold the rule dispositive of this case: “[I]f courts are to have any power to discourage [police] error of [the kind here at issue], it must be through the application of the exclusionary rule.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 22–23 (1995) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

[After describing narrower view of the exclusionary rule, Ginsburg writes:] Others have described “a more majestic conception” of the Fourth Amendment and its adjunct, the exclusionary rule. Evans, 514 U. S., at 18 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Protective of the fundamental “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” the Amendment “is a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). I share that vision of the Amendment.

Being of the view that Arizona v.Evans was terribly wrong, it’s easy to guess which side I come out on.  While negligent conduct lacks the aspect of malice that law and order types seem to need before attributing sufficient wrong to the police to mandate a remedy, my view remains that the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure belongs to the people, as is not concession to the government’s good intentions.  If there is such a right, and the Constitution tells us there is, then its violation demands a remedy.  A right without a remedy is no right at all.

But does that mean Herring signals the death of the exclusionary rule?  Tom Goldstein at SCOTUSBlog believes it just might:


But in fact the majority’s reasoning is broader – much, much broader.  Today, the Supreme Court holds that negligent errors by the police generally do not trigger the exclusionary rule.  “As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”  Slip Op. at 9.  “[W]e conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,” the exclusionary rule does not apply.  Id. at 12.

The opinion has nothing to do with the fact that the error here is one of recordkeeping.  It applies fully to negligence by police officers in their day-to-day determination whether there is probable cause to conduct a search.  If the officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake – i.e., he is merely negligent – the exclusionary rule does not apply to whatever evidence he finds.  Put another way, the Supreme Court today extended the good faith exception to ordinary police conduct.

If Tom is correct, and the Court’s Herring decision is read to disapprove of application of the exclusionary rule to all police violations of the 4th Amendment when done in good faith, then we have a big, big problem.  The issue of faith is largely outside the realm of hard proof, going to intentions and the workings of the police mind.  It becomes a rhetorical argument, where the side with the best spin to excuse or condemn the conduct wins the day.  Traditionally, the government’s spin always sounds better than the defendant’s.

Tom notes that the “attenuation” element of the decision, that the negligent police failure was in updating the database of warrants rather than directly related to the search itself, and that this point could provide a conceptual ledge to prevent a slide down the slope into a blanket good faith exception.  However, Tom has little faith that the decision will be read that way:


Thus, immediately after stating that “nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is thus far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the [exclusionary] rule,” the Court’s opinion states that “we have never applied the rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was no more intentional or culpable than this.”  The latter phrasing omits any reference to the attenuation requirement (which is no accident), and I predict that it’s that one that is likely to be found controlling by the Supreme Court in later cases.

As much as I find the Supreme Court majority’s decision just fundamentally misguided, for many of the same reasons I believe Arizona v. Evans was wrong, plus the fact that the distinguishing argument there was that the negligence was by a court clerk, and here by the police themselves (not that I buy into the notion that one arm of the government has a lesser duty to adhere to the Constitution than any other), I don’t see Herring as being a watershed decision.

Indeed, I agree with Orin that Herring is a relatively trivial decision, fact-bound by a peculiar set of circumstances, heavily influenced by the attenuation aspect, since the admitted failing, sloppy and negligent record keeping by a back-office police clerk having nothing to do with the search itself, that will preclude its extension to some nefarious generalized “good faith” exception to the warrant requirement under any other circumstance.  They sky isn’t falling, in other words.

At the same time, the general principle set forth in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is absolutely correct:  Mere negligence by the police violates a person’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure just as much as deliberate conduct, and it our rights that the 4th Amendment protects, not the cops “right” to search. 

The exclusionary rule can be used as an exceptionally effective tool in compelling police to create effective systems to avoid simple negligence and thus avoid searches based on the “Barney Fife Exception,” as Jdog likes to call it.  In this case, the exclusionary rule would be highly effective in holding police accountable for the sloppy performance of their function at the expense of the rights of citizens.  That sounds remarkably like a very good deterrent.  A substantial deterrent.

Harm caused by negligence is still harm, and we neither forgive nor excuse it in general.  Why then would we simply overlook it when the negligence is by police and a constitutional right is at stake?  The only answer is that a value judgment has been made by the majority, along the oft-quoted Cardozo approach (cited by the majority):


In such a case, the criminal should not “go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587 (1926) (opinion of the Court by Cardozo, J.)

Of course, the value judgment was made long ago when the exclusionary rule became the remedy for 4th Amendment violations, first in Weeks and later in Mapp.  Certainly a believer in judicial modesty like Chief Justice Roberts and my favorite originalist, Nino Scalia, will remember this when next the exclusionary rule crosses their bench.

Update:  Scott Henson at Grits for Breakfast does a roundup of the practical blawgosphere’s reaction to Herring. Yes, a wee bit Texas-centric, but no reason to look beyond the borders of the Great Republic.  It appears that everyone is pretty much in agreement about that the message of the decision, though the ramifications vary wildly.  Is it the end of the world, a big yawner or something in between?

Scott closes with a funny:


Instapundit Glenn Reynolds offered an especially apropos analogy writing about the case in the New York Post :
COMEDIAN Steve Martin once explained how to make a million dollars without paying taxes. First, you make a million dollars. Then, you don’t pay taxes. If the IRS finds out, you explain: “I forgot.” Then, if that’s not enough, you say, “Well, excuuuse me!”

I think Steve Martin can be awfully funny.  Unfortunately, sometimes good jokes don’t make for good analogies.  This one doesn’t cut it at all as an analogy, but it’s still funny and worth repeating.

The First Victim of the Victims: The Prosecution

How many times have we asked ourselves, why does it only happen to us?  Why doesn’t the prosecution ever have to suffer?  Now they do.  Schadenfreude comes immediately to mind, but to indulge in the joy of watching the prosecution twitch would be petty.  And yet, for the sake of legal analysis, we must.

After the victims rights cabal prevailed in the Phillip Coons case before the 11th Circuit, asserting their right to a table in the well under the CVRA, fears swelled about the impact of this innovation on the nature of the adversary system.  Due to my obvious bias, I assumed that the defense would be the first to fall victim to the victims.  Surprisingly, I was wrong.

At VC, conspirator Paul Cassell, who serves as one of the victims’ attorneys, alerts us to their first battle in the war for victimization:


In the wake of that ruling, the Government has filed a petition for panel rehearing with the Circuit. Now the victims (whom I represent along with other attorneys) have filed motion to strike the Government’s Rehearing Petition alleging a violation of their right to confer.

A few facts: The victims sought to confer with the Government before it filed any rehearing petition. The Government refused, sending a note to the victims that the right to confer in the CVRA does not extend that far.

The victims’ motion to strike, found here, contends that the Government’s failure to confer with them about the rehearing petition violated the CVRA and that the proper remedy for that violation (and others) is to strike the rehearing petition.

So the government doesn’t want to “confer” with the rabble and the rabble wants blood.  Government blood.  Oh my God.  That this insanity will wreak havoc with the operation of the criminal justice system was painfully obvious, not merely for the insertion of a third team in the game, but for the nature of the team, being comprised of feral cats, each of which running as hard and fast as possible in a different and entirely self-serving direction. 

But here’s the part that’s truly special.  If it was the defendant complaining about the interference of victims in the orderly functioning of the system, we would be seen as disingenuous and monumentally unsympathetic.  But it’s not the defense.  It’s the prosecution, our very own government charged with the protection of Americans, being hampered, hounded and held back by these complaining cowboys. 

Who can’t enjoy and appreciate naked mud-wrestling between victims and prosecutors?  Okay, sorry for the image.  It won’t happen again.  It’s just schadenfreude, and the defense doesn’t get too many opportunities to enjoy it.  It will be our turn to get into the battle soon enough.

The Bricks That Build a False Confession

Grits for Breakfast has an incredibly useful post providing a structural framework for understanding why false confessions happen, together with some contentions about how to deal with them. 


University of San Francisco academic Richard Leo expounded on his research into police interrogations and the causes of false confessions. (See Grits’ prior discussions of Leo’s work here, here, here, and here.) What follows is a recap from my notes:

False confessions are exceptions, said Leo, not the norm, but they are caused by flaws in policing techniques that make them much more likely to happen. As has been discussed previously on Grits, most police interrogation training in the United States is based on the so-called “Reid method,” which teaches there are three stages to the process of questioning suspects: Behavior analysis, the interview, and the interrogation.

Police tactics that encourage false confessions include erroneous behavior analysis and moving too quickly from the “interview” to the “interrogation” phase.

So why bother spending time gaining an academic understanding of the mechanics of false confessions?  After all, we’re trench lawyers; we know these things happen and we can argue our way out of anything, right?  Wrong.  When we don’t have a clear, firm grasp of how and why people do something that ordinary people consider incomprehensible,

As a group, criminal defense lawyers implicitly accept the idea of false confessions, knowing with certainty that they happen from the wealth of DNA reversals that follow confessions.  But then, we’re the advocates, not the fact-finders, so who cares what we know.  We need to be able to transmit our knowledge to the jury in a way that jurors find comprehensible if we are to be capable of using our knowledge effectively.

How to address this problem, however, is another matter.

While Leo said recording interrogations would be his top recommendation for reducing false confessions, he mentioned several other approaches worth recording here:



  • Expanded police training on the causes of false confessions and how to avoid them.
  • Create a post-confession review team when a confessor falls in an at-risk group
  • Jury instructions where confessions are the primary evidence.
  • Allowing expert witnesses in court to dispute confessions.

Those last two on the list are Leo’s least recommended options, he said, because they occur so late in the process the damage has mostly been done. He preferred approaches that might catch or prevent false confessions earlier in the process, long before the defendant ever gets to trial.


It’s certainly true that society would be far better off if people were saved from prosecution by false confession, but it strikes me as quite naive to believe that cops, whose purpose in life is to close cases by jumping to conclusions and then gathering evidence to support their assumptions, are going to have a sudden desire to seek justice rather than scalps.

I’ve expressed similar doubts about the silver bullet of recording interrogations, which I see as the false confession equivalent of Miranda, another bright line rule that will be manipulated through relatively easy and obvious means to provide hi-def evidence against defendants while concealing the “nudge” in the back seat of the cruiser and on the way into the holding cell.  I fear the panaceas that are rife with opportunity for abuse.  They sound so wonderful, but lock us into the nightmare yet to come.

Lacking any stroke of genius as to how to prevent false confessions in the first place, and unwilling to accept reliance on the good faith of police to save us from false confessions, it remains our burden to make sure that bad doesn’t turn to worse by a conviction based upon a false confession.  The best way to do this is to understand what we’re talking about.

Read all of Scott’s posts about Leo and false confessions.  It’s always best to know your enemy.

Fat Ones, Thin Ones, Ones Who Smell Really Bad

So enamored we’ve become of the “scientific” approach to jury selection that we are shocked and appalled by the dirty little secret that most lawyers in the trenches base their decisions on venal stereotypes.  And as fortune would have it, a string of stories has come along to make the point painfully clear.

Following my controversial post on the efficacy of a deaf juror, which raised the hackles of some knee-jerk liberals at Overlawyered, news has broken that a San Francisco Public Defender was instructed to keep Asians off a jury.  Coming from an intern’s blog on MySpace (let that be a lesson about interns):

The blogger, Carrie Wipplinger, posted an entry on Sept. 3 about a case that she said involved a drunken man whom authorities found receiving oral sex in a car.

“I got to listen in on a conference regarding jury selection,” she wrote. “My bosses gave the following advice to the lawyer … don’t pick any Asian jurors, because (and I quote): ‘Asians don’t drink, they love Jesus, and they’re creeped out by everything.'”

She wrote that the lawyer followed that advice, and the client was acquitted.

So what would Clarence Darrow think of this?  According to Anne Reed at Deliberations, Darrow would be right on board.  Following up on her post about how a prosecutor could justify bumping fat people off the jury as a race-neutral explanation for having no blacks on board (fat people favor defendants, he claimed), Anne takes a stroll down memory lane to jury stereotypes in Darrow’s eyes:


Lawyer and jury consultant Mark Stanziano wrote me wondering if Clarence Darrow might have said it (fat people favor defendants).  “Darrow had lots of thoughts about heavy set people, thin people, Baptists, Methodists, lots of stereotypes,” Mark wrote. “It was the way he saw the world and the people in it.  Clearly, a different age, but one the prosecutor may have ‘read about.’”

It seems that Darrow had some quick and dirty rules about Irishmen, Englishmen and Presbyterians, which Anne has provided at length.  And Darrow similarly made clear that stereotypes aren’t the best answer:



He is cutting-edge when he reminds lawyers that individual experiences easily trump stereotypes:



There is no sure rule by which one can gauge any person. A man may seem to be of a certain mold, but a wife, a friend, or an enemy, entering into his life, may change his views, desires and attitudes, so that he will hardly recognize himself as the man he once seemed to be.


Whether this is cutting edge is hard to say, since it’s difficult to imagine any time when stereotypes were considered more accurate than hard information.  But it begs the question: When you have 3 minutes apiece to question the 45 potential jurors sitting in the box, how exactly are you supposed to get “up close and personal?”

Stereotyping jurors has a long and sordid history in jury selection, and if it was good enough for Darrow, who are we to question it?  et we now know that there is one thing we can all agree on: Nobody wants a juror who reeks so badly of body odor that they can’t bear to be in the same courthouse.  To quote the legal philosopher, Bob Ambrogi :


“The moral of the case: Justice may be blind, but it retains a healthy sense of smell.”

While it may be voodoo trying to figure out what another person truly has going on inside his head, we always have the olfactory sense to fall back on.  Right, Clarence?

New York has a New Chief Judge

Despite the hard feelings in Albany that not a single name on the list reflected the glory of diversity, Governor Patterson has selected Jonathon Lippman as the new Chief Judge to replace Judith Kaye.  As announced yesterday at the WSJ Law Blog, and appears in today’s New York Law Journal, the current Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, is moving upstate.

Justice Lippman is both an expected, and curious, choice.  At age 63, he’s got about 7 years to look forward to in Albany before aging out at 70, hardly enough to get to know his way around the courthouse but for the fact that he served as Chief Administrative Judge under Kaye from 1996 to 2007.  From what I can tell, Justice Lippman has never run for office, having spent his judicial career as an appointed Court of Claims judge and, for the most part, serving in administrative capacities until arriving at 25th Street on 2007.

When we speak of a judge, we usually use the phrase “taking the bench.”  The problem is that Justice Lippman really never did.  Check out his resume:


Judicial experience: presiding justice, Appellate Division, First Department, 2007-present; chief administrative judge, 1996-2007; Westchester County state Supreme Court justice, 2006; judge, Court of Claims, 1995-97 and 1998-2005

Other experience: deputy chief administrator, Office of Court Administration, 1989-95; principal court attorney, chief clerk and executive officer, Supreme Court, Civil Term, Manhattan, 1977-89; law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Spiegel, 1975-76; law assistant, Supreme Court, Manhattan, 1968-74

While he’s obviously been around a long time, there is one huge, glaring hole in his experience: He’s never actually practice law.  He’s never met a deadline, dealt with a recalcitrant client or faced down a hard-nosed judge when a defendant’s life was on the line.

While this has nothing to do with Jonathon Lippman personally, it is somewhat shocking that a person can be a lawyer for so long and have been told to be in two courtrooms at the same time or had to take the subway home by himself after a jury returned a guilty verdict.  These are experiences that every judge should have. 

These are the experiences that teach a judge what the law really means.  It’s unclear to me that Justice Lippman has ever looked a client in the face to tell them the bad news that another innocent person will spend the rest of their life in prison.  This shapes one’s comprehension of the law.  It doesn’t mean that he is unaware of these things.  Just that he’s never personally experienced any of them.  But personal experience is very different than having someone else tell you a story.

Even from the judicial side of the room, Justice Lippman’s focus has been on running the courthouses rather than running the docket.  As a long-term court administrator, which is part of the Chief Judge’s job, I doubt anyone will be more familiar with facility management than he.  But understanding what it means in a cold, hard Appellant’s Brief to have been denied confrontation by a lying, miserable skel has nothing to do with how many janitors it takes to adequately sweep the hallway floors.

All that aside, Justice Lippman has had nearly a year at the helm of the Appellate Division, First Department, to show who he is as a judge, and what we’ve seen is someone who does seem to have his heart and head in the right place, even if his language has been a bit strained.  Who will ever forget the words :


Attenuation, however, does not lie in an imagined differential, but in an appreciable diminution of the coercive sequelae of prior illegality.

It’s amazing that they haven’t found their way into a modern folk song.  I guess its just hard to find words that rhyme with “sequelae”.

Despite my long-time advocacy of substantially broader depth of experience in those who take the bench (oops, there I did it again) so that they can understand and appreciate the significance of their function in the very real life of very real people, and despite Justice Lippman’s spartan record on substantive legal issues and reasoning, I have faith that he will be a fine Chief Judge. 

It’s now up to him to decide whether he is going to be a leader, to return the New York Court of Appeals to a position of national prominence and to assert itself as a court that reflects a strong and independent state jurisprudence, as it did under Sol Wachtler, or whether it will be a rubber stamp, toeing the line of federal constitutional law, abandoning the state’s once-strong position on individual rights and freedoms, and elevating the speed of decision-making over the quality of its decisions, the consensus of judges over the integrity of the ruling.

To Chief Judge Jonathon Lippman, I wish the best.  The Court of Appeals is now yours to lead. Surround yourself with people who possess the experiences in life from which you’ve been cloistered, and listen to them. Make your legacy one of restoring New York’s courts to its historical strengths of mercy, freedom and humility.