Author Archives: SHG

An Easy $500 Mil

If you’re in it just for the money, law was a lousy pick.  After all, you could have been a hedge fund manager like Walter Noel, who is such an important fellow that he made the front page of the New York Times.  His secret to success, and success it indeed was, was to manage a “secretive hedge fund advisory company” that paid his company, Fairfield Greenwich Group, $500 million in fees since 2003.  Not too shabby.

And what did Noel do to deserve this bountiful compensation?  He invested his clients’ money with Bernie Madoff.  I could do that.  You could too.  It worked out pretty well for Noel.

Internal documents from Fairfield show that the firm has taken more than $500 million in fees since 2003 alone from the money it placed with Mr. Madoff. Nearly all those fees went to a handful of Fairfield executives, including Walter M. Noel, Fairfield’s founder, who used the money to build a glamorous life, splitting his time between homes in New York, Connecticut, Florida and the Caribbean.

Like Mr. Madoff’s firm, Fairfield was at least in part a family business. Four of Mr. Noel’s sons-in-law worked at Fairfield. But unlike Mr. Madoff, Fairfield’s partners, led by Mr. Noel, were not shy about spending their money and taking a high profile in wealthy New York society circles.

“The last few years, they really made a play to be a part of that New York-Southampton social axis,” David Patrick Columbia, the editor of NewYorkSocialDiary.com, said of Mr. Noel and his family. “It happened so fast that you really noticed them.”

Of course, he’s allowed.  Rake in $500 million and you can be pretty much anybody you want to be.  Southampton socialite?  No problem.  Caribbean jet-setter?  Welcome aboard.  Park Avenue Patron?  Why not?  There are so many doors that will open for half a billion dollars.

Now if I understand correctly, about the only thing that Fairfield Greenwich Group was actually supposed to do, aside from sending off the wire transfers and cashing the commission checks, was to track and verify the assets taken under wing. 


As it raised money all over the world, Fairfield also made detailed pledges about how it would monitor and track Mr. Madoff’s investments, the documents show. Now, investors and regulators are sure to ask whether Fairfield made good on those promises — or whether it was a facilitator of the Madoff scandal as well as a victim.

Of course, it’s understandable that they may not have had the time necessary to do their once a week due diligence,  It takes a lot of time to keep up with the maintenance on all those far-flung residences, not to mention decide what to wear to the next hot Hamptons party.  Busy people can’t always get around to the more mundane nuts and bolts of their work.  And who really cares, as long as the cash keeps flowing.

So next time you find yourself in the well, getting your butt kicked by some unduly officious government employee while your client whines about how used your fee to pay for juniors pampers, think of Walter Noel and wonder, does he get to keep the half a billion dollars?

The Defendant’s Worst Enemy

It’s hard to say that a defendant has a “worst” enemy, since there are so many to chose from.  But at least we are well-equipped to deal with most of them, ranging from cops to witnesses to prosecutors to judges.  There’s one, however, that presents an entirely different sent of problems.  The defendant himself.

What do you do when the defendant is his own worst enemy?  As a practical matter, we try to make, or keep, our clients happy.  Happy clients are cooperative clients.  They make our lives easier, our work more pleasant.  They like us better, and pay our fees.  They speak well of us and refer us to other clients.  Happy clients are good clients. But…

There are certain aspects of a defense that require a client to either perform a task, or forgo a task, in order to pursue a viable strategy.  We instruct them on what to do or not do, and the instructions are generally not terribly difficult to follow.  Yet clients often find it impossible to do so.  The problem then shifts back to the lawyer.  How do you deal with the client who is destroying himself?

It goes without saying that the lawyer is responsible for the successful execution of all tactical decisions necessary to achieve the agreed-upon strategy.  When the prosecutor tries to get in the way, it’s the lawyer’s job to find a way over, under or around him.  But when it’s your own client who keeps creating roadblocks, the situation grows hairier.  It’s no longer an issue of tactics, but one of ethics.

This is one of the many points where a lawyer differs from a businessperson.  From a business perspective, the client is always right.  We want to keep our clients perpetually smiling.  But we give up the long term happiness, prevailing in the case, for the short term happiness of telling the client that his latest act of destruction, undermining his own defense, is “okay, no problem, we’ll deal with it.”  The fact is that many of the things that a defendant can do to harm his cause cannot be fixed.  And they can be devastating.

This is one of those points where lawyers must decide what they really are, a lawyer or a businessperson.  The lawyer’s duty is to do what is in the best interest of his client, regardless of whether it pleases the client.  This can be a difficult matter to handle, and produce a very unhappy client.  No client wants to be told the harsh truth that his actions, the ones he does in contravention of instructions, or the brilliant ideas to help himself that he comes up with all on his own, are going to put him in prison. 

When the client resists, it can become a battle for control.  The lawyer, recognizing that it’s the client’s life and if he choses to ruin it, then he will pay the consequences, may well feel justified in throwing up his hands and letting the client destroy his defense.  After all, it is his life, right? 

But the most critical reason a client retains counsel is to exercise the degree of professional discretion necessary to protect the client from bad and destructive choices.  The client may be well intended, but that’s not going to save him from conviction.  This is when we are truly tested; Will we put the client’s interest first?

The ethical duty of a lawyer is to seize control of the situation, to assert his authority to defend his client and to do everything in his power to prevent the client from taking actions that are antithetical to his defense, no matter how painful this may be.  As I’ve told clients over the years who bristle and resist ceding control over their lives for a brief period of time to a lawyer, the choice is to have a nice lawyer now and lose, or a tough lawyer now and maximize your chance to win. 

Nobody ever said this was an easy job, or that we can ethically perform our duty while keeping everybody happy.  But when push comes to shove, and the choice is between fulfilling your true responsibility to your client even when it requires you to take a stand that will not make him love you and keep the client happy, the choice is clear if you’re a lawyer rather than a businessperson.

It is our job to protect our client from his worst enemy, even when the enemy is him,

The Full Miranda

Cal Berkeley Lawprof Chuck Weisselberg’s epic law review article, Mourning Miranda, is now available for all to read and consider, and it provides a vast wealth of background and issues to raise and consider for the criminal defense lawyer.  When first visited here, the article was noted as having debunked the notion that Miranda provided protection to suspects:


Since Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court has encouraged police practices that have effectively gutted Miranda’s safeguards. This paper presents police training materials that are not generally available to the public. Training is a primary link between the Court’s pronouncements and the way in which interrogations are actually conducted. Combined with the social science literature, these training resources demonstrate how the warning and waiver regime coheres with a sophisticated psychological approach to police interrogation, rather than operate apart from it, as the Court intended.

This is not merely an apocryphal tale about Miranda, beginning with the Supreme Court’s unempirical guesswork about how this silly little warning would somehow prevent police abuse of suspects and coercion of statements, and culminating in a sophisticated approach by police to use the clearly defined test to circumvent any benefit it might potentially have offered.  As we continue to seek solutions to the vexing problems of confessions, such as videotaping, and identifications, such as double-blind procedures, we cannot forget the lesson of Miranda.

Chuck explained that the Supreme Court, in developing this bright-line test, assumed that no defendant would ever make a statement again once the Miranda warnings were given.  Of course, they missed the boat by a mile on that one, For most of us, it’s hard to imagine that the Supreme Court, in developing a rule as fundamental as Miranda, based it entirely on assumptions lacking any empirical basis.  It was nothing more than an idea that struck them as good at the time. 

As carefully noted in the article, the assumptions underlying Miranda failed to prove accurate, in some instances inherently and in others as a result of law enforcement efforts to create interrogation schemes specifically designed to not merely circumvent the protections Miranda sought to provide, but to use Miranda as a weapon against defendants and to protect statements taken.  Once the rules were set in stone, figuring out ways to get around them was child’s play.

One of the most dangerous precepts was that Miranda need only be administered when a suspect was in custody, a concept so vague (and made continually vaguer as caselaw developed) that it rendered protection meaningless.  The Court believed that a defendant who was not in custody, believing themselves free to leave at any time, would have no problem exercising that right and taking a quick walk toward the exit.  Of course, few believe themselves free to leave, and most feel quite certain that any attempt to exercise that right will have dire consequences.  It’s a gaping hole exploited intentionally by police.

Similarly, the invocation of rights under Miranda has itself become a bit of an inside joke.  While the courts have held that it doesn’t require “the discrimination of an Oxford don,” it does require “an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel,” or “the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.”  Litigation over the specific words of a suspect’s request are legion, and makes one wonder whether an Oxford don could manage to invoke his rights. 

By placing the burden of precision on the suspect, the Court made another assumption, that defendants wouldn’t find it so painfully difficult to speak with words, “I want to speak with a lawyer,” that has borne out.  The fact has been proven over and over that suspects submit to the shield in ways a Supreme Court Justice, and a criminal defense lawyer, will never quite understand.  Any bright-line test that fails to recognize this reality is doomed to fail.

As we continue to consider and address the ongoing problems with interrogation and identification, and advocate for new bright-line tests, it is critical that we understand and appreciate what went so horribly wrong with Miranda to avoid falling into the same trap.  While many contend that videotaping interrogations is a critical solution, some of the same techniques now used to undermine Miranda will be easily adapted to make this not only a dubious solution, but one that will provide conclusive evidence against defendant. 

Let’s face it, lawyers and cops love bright line tests, but for different reasons.  The tests provide a clear dividing line that removes the dreaded element of judicial discretion from determinations of constitutional violations, and lawyers don’t trust judges enough to leave it up to their good judgment.  That’s our issue. 

Cops, on the other hand, love easy to remember rules, both because it makes their job simpler and because rules, once clearly set forth, provide the limits of hurdles for them to find ways around.  Anyone who believes that police won’t figure out a way to circumvent the intent and then use a rule requiring videotaped confessions against defendants, you won’t feel the same after reading this article.

Regardless of whether your interests are in attacking statements taken from suspects or considering the various other issues confronting criminal defense lawyers, spend the time to carefully consider this article and Chuck’s admonition:

It will be not be easy for judges, officers, and lawyers to let go of Miranda. For over four decades, this icon has occupied the center of interrogation law and practice. Yet Miranda’s protections are more mythic than real. At some point myth must yield to reality.

Miranda launched a forty-year experiment in reforming police practices. I think the Court was right to try; sometimes there can be no progress without experimentation. Now, four decades later, we know that a set of bright-line rules is not a panacea for the issues endemic in police interrogation.

I cannot stress sufficiently the caution of rushing headlong into the fray with the next magic bullet solution without considering the lessons of Miranda.  Be careful what you wish for, as we have been stuck with Miranda for 40 years, there’s no end in sight and rather than put an end to the interrogation of suspects, it has become a favored weapon in the law enforcement arsenal.

Trusting Clients Trusting Us

The Texas Tornado (and New York Steak Aficionado), Mark Bennett, follows up on a comment by J-dog Rosenberg that raises one of the more hairy, and bizarre, aspects of defending people.  Why do some defendants insist on their innocence, pushing their attorney to act upon a piece of evidence that will conclusively prove their guilt? 

Walter Reaves, at Waco Criminal Law, relates his experience dealing with this phenomenon.  His theory is that some defendants convince themselves of their innocence, reality notwithstanding.

So why do people insist they are innocent, when there is no doubt they are guilty? I don’t have any scientific support, but I think that are some people who can actually convince themselves of something. The more they tell themselves they aren’t guilty, the more they believe.

Of course, I also think that are people who just don’t believe their lawyer (yes, its really true). If you tell them the tests are accurate, and its going to prove their guilt, they aren’t going to believe you. Maybe some just feel like they don’t have anything to lose, and want to roll the dice – even the odds against them are astronomical.

While I’ve seen the former, and generally attribute it to a problematic psychological state, it’s beyond the ability of a criminal defense lawyer to address.  We can speak with our clients until there are no more words left, but if they insist on providing us with misinformation, we are left with no choice but to work with it. 

In many instances, reason compels us to ignore the client’s pleas of innocence and not engage in a strategy that will conclusively prove our clients’ guilt.  Of course, this requires the lawyer to make a judgment call as to the accuracy of the defendants information, and we may be wrong in our assessment.  This could well be the most serious error a defense lawyer can make, believing our client is lying to us when he is telling us the truth, even though it may appear to be so outlandish that its strikes as impossible.

But if we accept the defendant’s claims, and they prove false, resulting in our creating the very evidence that destroys any possibility of a successful defense, we want to bang our head against the wall.  Even though we may not be omniscient, the notion that we have locked the prison door on our client is something that few defense lawyers can shake off.  It’s just not what we do, and we take failure hard.

I think there’s a corollary to Walter’s second point, where clients grasp at straws in the hope that the test will somehow produce a false negative and exonerate him.  After all, if he’s going down anyway, why not bet the long shot?  The corollary is that defendants, for all years that Perry Mason was broadcast on television, harbor a belief deep down within their darkest heart that criminal defense lawyers are still lawyers first, vested in the system, and will abandon their zealous representation of defendants if they believe they are guilty.  

Defendants want us to believe they are innocent, and by so believing go to extreme lengths to win their case. 

Somehow, our belief that they are innocent will push us to find that magic bullet, that secret key, that will save them from their fate.  It’s not merely that they do not subscribe to the idea that we defend people who are guilty just as hard as innocent, but that we move heaven and earth for the innocent, while the guilty only get lip service and a bill for legal fees.  This is a harshly cynical view of the law and criminal defense lawyers, but it comes from a select group of people whose lives are the very foundation of cynicism.  Can you blame them?

The element of trust between lawyer and client is fundamental to our ability to defend.  But it isn’t always an easy thing to develop, particularly for lawyers who do higher volume of representation.  Trust takes time.  Trust takes communication.  A half hour with a client isn’t sufficient to create a bond, where the defendant will believe that his attorney is really there to defend him, guilty or not.  And if the client doubts that his lawyer is on his side, and happens as well to be guilty, all forms of mischief can follow.

We may not be able to improve the situation for clients who are psychologically impaired, and believe themselves innocent in conflict with reality, but we can help those who doubt that criminal defense lawyers are really on their side by taking the time necessary to develop a relationship of trust.  Some will be easier, and some will never buy into what we do.  But as long as we’re representing criminal defendants, they must recognize that guilt and innocence are wholly irrelevant to our representation.  And some criminal defense lawyers could stand being reminded of that from time to time as well.

It’s not always a pleasant task, developing trust with certain clients, and takes time away from the other tasks that keep our days full, but may ultimately prove key in making the decision of whether to demand that the DNA in a rape kit be analyzed before the trial.  We need to make sure our clients understand that we are better at creating a reasonable doubt of guilt than proving guilt conclusively.

Justice, eBay Style

Via Douglas Berman at Sentencing Law & Policy, a scholarly article by Lawprof Stephanos Bibas of Penn Law School and formerly an AUSA in the Southern District of New York, seeks a mechanism to assess prosecutorial discretion:


Prosecutorial discretion is a problem that most scholars attack from the outside.  Most scholars favor external institutional solutions, such as ex ante legislation or ex post judicial and bar review of individual cases of misconduct.  At best these approaches can catch the very worst misconduct.  They lack inside information and sustained oversight and cannot generate and enforce fine-grained rules to guide prosecutorial decisionmaking.  The more promising alternative is to work within prosecutors’ offices, to create incentives for good performance.

Always an issue with criminal defense lawyers, who harbor the belief that there are far too many prosecutors who take advantage of the fiat of their position despite our claims of the blindness, the injustice, the harshness of their attitude and approach.  Given that charging and plea authority in the hands of young prosecutors is the most significant factor in determining the parameters of the outcome of a prosecution, short of a total acquittal, it’s hugely significant that prosecutors exercise discretion appropriately.

But that’s not what caught my eye.  This did:


A better solution is to collect and aggregate feedback from a variety of sources, including peer prosecutors, supervisors, judges, defense counsel, victims, defendants, and the public, as eBay does.  This information, appropriately weighted and discounted, could better encourage prosecutors to serve all their constituencies.

Few of us have given sufficient thought to eBay as the model for assessing the criminal justice system.  Don’t scoff.  You never know where the next great idea comes from.

I can see it now, click on the docket number and check out the crime.  The outcome of the case can replace the price on the feedback page, unless of course there actually is a price (which could present other issues).  And then the comment. 


Great prosecutor, gave deft 5k1 for nothing.  Coop was total crap! AAA++++

The AUSA can have a feedback score, with little colored stars to show how many defendant’s he’s covered.  But not all feedback will be positive, of course.


Jerk, coerced 121 months b/c co-D flipped & lied. Do Not Use This One!!!!!!!

Of course, it’s not like you can pick your prosecutor, so the system may have a flaw in that regard.  And what about a Rule 35 motion, where a miserable plea ended up with a decent cut in sentence after the fact?


Feedback withdrawn by mutual consent

That could raise some eyebrows on the street. 

The system requires that a degree of discretion reside in the hands of prosecutors.  The fairness, propriety and utility of the criminal justice system depends in large measure on how they exercise this discretion.  Many prosecutors are young, naive and deeply sheltered from reality.  This isn’t a fault, but a fact.  One can only expect so much understanding from a young person who has just emerged from law school or a clerkship and has been given people’s lives to play with.

While the eBay feedback system raises fun images in my mind, particularly given how much I enjoy eBay to find those antiques I so love, I don’t imagine any feedback a defense lawyer might leave will have much of a positive impact on a young prosecutor.  As for judges, it would be my hope that they might express their thoughts during the course of the prosecution rather than wait until afterward to play a role. 

I can’t imagine any defendant being satisfied with learning after the fact that the shipping cost was too high.  And whether or not the description was accurate will inevitably be a product of outcome, hardly a good way to judge the exercise of discretion.

Do It For the Children (Award Update)

“For the children” is a rallying cry for subversion of rights that usually causes an alarm to go off in the frontal lobe of libertarians and criminal defense lawyers alike.  A therapist used it here a couple of days ago, bringing down a rain of criticism that shocked him, because he thought it was a powerful justification.  While the knee-jerk reaction is to evoke immediately harsh scrutiny on any claim that a law is vital “for the children,” there are indeed times when it’s true.

Radley Balko at the Agitator told this horrible story about a 12 year old that makes the point, though coming from the opposite direction than one would ordinarily expect.



[Dymond Milburn] a blue van drove up and three men jumped out rushing toward her. One of them grabbed her saying, “You’re a prostitute. You’re coming with me.”


Dymond grabbed onto a tree and started screaming, “Daddy, Daddy, Daddy.” One of the men covered her mouth. Two of the men beat her about the face and throat.


What would you do if this was your child?  If you’re anything like me, the possibility that you would do these men as much harm as possible to protect your child is strong.  There is nothing more worth fighting for than my child, and there is no risk I wouldn’t assume for my child’s protection. 


As it turned out, the three men were plain-clothed Galveston police officers who had been called to the area regarding three white prostitutes soliciting a white man and a black drug dealer.

After the incident, Dymond was hospitalized and suffered black eyes as well as throat and ear drum injuries.

Three weeks later, according to the lawsuit, police went to Dymond’s school, where she was an honor student, and arrested her for assaulting a public servant.

Her father was arrested as well, presumably for trying to protect his child.  As it turned out, the police made a mistake and were two blocks away from the location where they should have been.  They concede the error, but as usual contend that the officers behaved properly and followed all procedures.

Law and order types will explain that the police, albeit mistaken, were just doing their jobs.  While this is questionable as a matter of fact, given that three police officers couldn’t manage to seize a 12 year old girl without beating her and causing her substantial harm, let’s assume that this is relatively accurate.  Are we, as a society, prepared to sacrifice an innocent child on the alter of police compliance?

Consider: Had Dymond been carrying a stick of some sort and been perceived as presenting a threat of harm by a weapon to the officers, causing one to pull out his handgun and demand compliance, would her father have been justified, watching this from his front door, in using his legal sidearm to shoot and kill the officer?

Most people would struggle with this hypothetical, as no one would want to see an officer killed over a mistake. On the other hand, from the father’s perspective, a man (regardless of whether or not he knew the man to be an officer) appears to be about to shoot and kill his daughter.  Does the hypo change if the bullet about to strike his innocent daughter comes from a police officer’s weapon?

If the answer is that no civilian can justifiably shoot and kill an officer in the performance of his duty, would you have Dymond’s father left with a dead daughter by dint of a police mistake while he stood there doing nothing.  Is anyone ready to let an innocent child die to avoid a violent confrontation with police?

Radley entitled this story “another isolated incident,” noting the irony of how these situations are invariably described as “isolated” while comprising nearly daily fodder for the blawgosphere.  We have a never-ending stream of isolated incidents.  That mistake happen is obviously true, and possibly beyond the control of police officers as they, like us, are human.  But how mistakes alter the dynamic is important to recognize.

Those who apologize for the police, and see their errors as having no discernible impact on the propriety of reactions by civilians, are hiding their heads in the sand.  While we may have a constitutional right to defend ourselves, I would argue further that we have a moral obligation to do so, and our children as well.  No one should be compelled to suffer a dead child because a police officer erred.  In this case, the worst that came of it was an arrest for assaulting a police officer, which can be easily dismissed by any prosecutor who isn’t entirely brain-dead.  A dead child can’t be fixed as easily.

But when the police make a mistake and put the life of an innocent person at risk, they create the potential harm that befalls them.  As such mistakes happen regularly, it presents a very real legal scenario.  I would propose that the proper rule is that any action taken to protect the life and physical safety of a person, particularly a child, from police engaged in the mistaken performance of their duty should be fully protected to the same extent it would be against any other person.

The primary fault belongs to the police, who alone are responsible for their error.  It provides an incentive for police to be accurate in determining that the individuals against whom they act are the correct ones, at the correct address, for the correct reason.  Civilians cannot do this for the police, and should not suffer the consequences of each “isolated” incident of harm following police mistakes.

The rationale for this rule is that we need to have it “for the children.” 

Update:  From the Agitator, one of the police officers, Sean Stewart, who attacked Dymond Milburn named Galveston 2008 “Officer of the Year!”  Perfect.

Everyone’s a Victim, The Sequel

An email came in late yesterday from Alan Tannenbaum, the attorney representing the borrowers who sought victim status in the prosecution of Phillip Coon.  Attached was discussed earlier, this was the latest effort by the Victims Rights militia to get a third table in the well.  They had been rebuffed by the Magistrate Judge.  They had been rebuffed by the District Court Judge.  But third times the charm, and they finally obtained the love they sought from the 11th Circuit, in a 2-1 decision.  Mandamus granted.  Oy.

Upon reading the offending decision, I immediately cruised over to the Volokh Conspiracy to see whether Paul Cassell was gloating.  Indeed he was, as he was fully entitled to do having finally persuaded two out of five judges to conclude that the earth was flat.  It’s not easy to do, you know.


In a ruling released today, the Eleventh Circuit held that borrowers were protected “victims” under the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA) because they suffered financial harms because the became legally obligated to pay the point that Coon skimmed off the loan and had to pay interest on the point. The Eleventh Circuit stated: “The CVRA does not limit the class of crime victims to those whose identity constitutes an element of the offense or who happen to be identified in the charging document. . . . Under the plain language of the statute, a party may qualify as a victim, even though [he] may not have been the target of the crime, as long as [he] suffers harm as a result of the crime’s commission.”

This pretty much captures the depth of rationale of the decision.  Of course, that’s the problem.  The CVRA doesn’t require that the victim be named in the charge, but it does require that the victim be a person “directly and proximately harmed.”  18 USC 3771(e).  Well, that’s a problem, since there is no rationale by which the Coast Bank borrowers can show this.  After all, they agreed to pay the points on the mortgage, accepted the deal, and by definition believed that this was a satisfactory deal or they would not have completed their purchase.  Where the points go afterward has nothing to do with the borrowers.

So how does the 11th Circuit explain away this little detail?  The conclusory statement trick:  “On the face it, petitioners were victims.”  Well then, that’s that.  They are victims because they are victims.  Welcome to Sophistry 101.  If we call a cow a horse, feel free to milk it.

But then, does it really matter that this group of borrowers is now entitled to have an active role in the criminal prosecution of Phillip Coon? According to Cassell:


The ruling is an important victory for crime victims. It means that all those who have been harmed by a financial crime are entitled to be protected in the federal criminal justice system. As a result, all such victims will be entitled to confer with the prosecutor on the charges, to obtain restitution for the crime, and to make a statement at sentencing about the proper punishment for the crime.

In fact, it means much more than that.  It means that they are entitled to oppose plea agreements, sit through trial testimony in advance of taking the stand, and to have legal standing to intervene in the prosecution when things don’t go their way.

Whether it means that “all those . . . harmed by a financial crime” will be given standing as “victims” under the CVRA has yet to be seen.  Some circuits disagree with others.  But given the wealth of financial crimes these days, the implications of this misbegotten decision on the integrity of the criminal justice system could be huge and devastating.  If you thought that courts gave short shrift to the defendants’ constitutional rights before, just wait until the victims get their turn.

But as much as I abhor this decision, I congratulate Alan Tannenbaum, who prevailed in this case and believes that his efforts serve the greater good.  Disagree though I might, I respect his effort and integrity.  I just wish he would have lost.

10 Reasons to Avoid Marquette Law School

Gideon at A Public Defender posted a very funny list entitled “10 things I didn’t learn in law school.”  I thought it was very funny.  How funny was it?  Funny enough that it made it onto Feminist Law Professors, and we all know that Ann Bartow lost her sense of humor in a tragic kiln explosion years ago.  It was funny enough that Jessica Slavin, Marquette lawprof posted it on the school’s faculty blog.

That’s when the true nature of Marquette law school reared its old, ugly, stodgy and humorless head.  Along comes David Papke to find misery under every rock:

With the exception of item #10, I thought the list was cynical to a fault. Too many lawyers have a sad bitterness and mean anti-intellectualism about them. Maybe living in debt and working in the context of hierarchy and bureaucracy produces those attitudes. I wish somehow that lawyers could remember law school as a demanding but enriching academic experience.

Let’s add up the adjectives:  cynical, bitterness, mean anti-intellectualism (does that count for one or two?).  Since Papke came of age in the 60s while attending Hahvad College, when a guy named Andrew Weil was busily promoting altered states of consciousness and Timothy Leary was enjoying the benefits of psilocybin, maybe there’s an organic explanation for his need to see the dark cloud in front of every silver lining.  Some people can just suck the fun out of anything.

The comments devolved after Papke’s shower of venom rained down.  Andrew Golden, a student contributor, wrote:


Also, to respond to Professor Papke:

“Maybe living in debt and working in the context of hierarchy and bureaucracy produces those attitudes.”

I couldn’t disagree with you more vehemently. I think the problem is that the happy ones don’t waste their time making silly lists; they do their jobs well and enjoy their lives. It’s just the few vocal malcontents that seem to grab the spotlight.

Gideon a malcontent?  Few are more dedicated to their cause than Gideon.  What would possibly give this law student the sense of self-righteousness to reach such a bizarre conclusion?


And if these 6 months at the Public Defender’s office internship have taught me anything, it’s that A LOT of clients hate me because I’m white, because I’m Jewish, because they perceive me as looking through them, or just because I’m not cuffed and they are.

I can only speak to my personal experiences, but the people I work for at the PD’s Office are FAR less cynical than I am, and I’ve been called overly idealistic by many people at MU Law.

Six months interning with the PD.  I wonder if Gideon’s years of practice can possibly hold a candle to that.  But it’s harder to fault this law student after some grumpy old professor has already spun the post into a condemnation of misery, leaving the kid to spout his one-dimensional understanding of what lawyers do, as if they hold ice cream parties at the close of business every day.

If I had to come up with some rational explanation for this purveyor of misery, it’s the product of his spending his life in the academy where he was never challenged to actually represent a human being, deal with judges or wallow in the trenches with real lawyers.  Such defensiveness might be derived from his own deep-seated recognition that he can’t enjoy the joke, because he’s never experienced what lawyers do.  Wrapped up in his pompous self-righteousness, no one can make fun of law school and, by so doing, make him the butt of the joke.  There is bitterness here, but it has nothing to do with Gideon. 

Thankfully, this isn’t the way most lawprofs I know react.  First, they can enjoy a funny list.  Second, they realize that law school falls a tad shy of perfection.  Third, they aren’t miserable jerks.  Some, particularly those who have actually practiced law, are well aware of the fact that law school falls far short of preparing kids to practice law, as has been discussed ad naseum by just about everyone who isn’t a pompous, self-righteous law school sycophant.

Am I being too harsh on Papke?  Probably, but no more harsh than he was on Gideon.  If those who can, do, and those who can’t, teach, then Papke is the poster boy for Law Professors.  So if you need a lesson in how to be a miserable, pompous, disagreeable jerk, there’s a special seat for you in David Papke’s class at Marquette Law School.  Otherwise, here’s 10 reasons to avoid Marquette Law School, and they’re all Papke.

Post Script:  I have great respect for a number of the other lawprofs at Marquette, and offer my sympathies for having to hang out with this miserable jerk at faculty parties.

Nonrefundable No More

Miami criminal defense lawyer Brian Tannebaum has had enough of dissatisfied clients demanding a refund of their legal fee.


I have decided, today, that I will no longer simply include the word “nonrefundable” in my retainer agreements with a detailed explanation of the word “nonrefundable and how it affects the retainer agreement, i.e. you’re not getting your money back if you choose to hire another lawyer, have a dispute with this lawyer, or otherwise wish to cancel the agreement.

What I am going to do from now on is provide the client with a separate document solely discussing the word “nonrefundable.”

I am doing this because I am tired of explaining it to clients, having them nod in agreement, some acting like they are listening to me re-state the obvious, and then at some point, asking for money back.

Ah, the good old days of nonrefundable retainers.  Not since Edward Cooperman got beaten up by Cardozo Lawprof Lester Brickman before the New York Court of Appeals have New York lawyers been permitted to use nonrefundable retainers.  Brickman, who’s never met a practicing lawyer he didn’t hate, championed the notion that nonrefundable retainers were amongst the most despicable things lawyers could do. 

It wasn’t his problem that criminal defendants either paid up front or didn’t pay at all, leaving the lawyer dangling in the wind, stuck on a case where he won’t be relieved, without a fee.  Fees are dirty, Lester pronounced, and make people hate lawyers.  People must be free to discharge their lawyers at will, and a nonrefundable retainer prevents them from doing so.  So sayeth the court in Matter of Cooperman :


Because the attorney-client relationship is recognized as so special and so sensitive in our society, its effectiveness, actually and perceptually, may be irreparably impaired by conduct which undermines the confidence of the particular client or the public in general. In recognition of this indispensable desideratum and as a precaution against the corrosive potentiality from failing to foster trust, public policy recognizes a client’s right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time with or without cause.

Lawyers, because of our special relationship of trust, are the only group whose freedom of contract is so limited.  In fairness, Brickman had a point.  When a substantial retainer was paid up front as nonrefundable, and the defendant figured out a little later that he had made a bad choice (perhaps his second in a row), his ability to discharge the lawyer and obtain new counsel was seriously impaired.  First, he likely lacked the funds to retain a new lawyer without a refund of the monies previously paid, and second, even if he had more money available, was reluctant to walk away from the first legal fee.  Hey, it’s money.

This created quite a problem for criminal defense lawyers, particularly those who did state court, street crime work.  While they may love their clients dearly, the time to collect a legal fee was at the inception of representation.  Once the attorney is in the case, or once the case is over, the likelihood of payment diminished greatly.  There is something about the lack of pressure of prison that reduces a defendant’s desire to make his lawyer happy.  Go figure.

Unlike Florida, New York lawyers had to learn to adjust.  And so we did.  Certainly, there were the defendants who were dissatisfied because they didn’t receive the outcome they desired, or it didn’t happen quickly enough to satisfy them.  That can’t be helped, since every case doesn’t result in acquittal or dismissal.  But through communication, effort and attention, lawyers learned to keep their legal fees another way; by keeping their clients.

There are still lawyers who try to hold onto unearned legal fees as if the old nonrefundable retainer was available to them, and defendants who will try to get back fees fully earned through false complaint of incompetence or worse.  Some criminal defendants turn out to be unsavory characters, and are not entirely trustworthy.  Then again, some criminal defense lawyers are unsavory characters too.

Brian has decided to take a firm stand on this subject:


As a young criminal defense lawyer I used to shudder when a client requested a “refund” of fees. Now, I just get annoyed, but write no checks, ever.

See, the reason we criminal defense lawyers are known for “getting the fee up front” is because we sometimes don’t get the entire fee if things don’t go well. The definition of “things not going well” vary, but usually entail anything less than what the client expected.

Because we cannot be in the “satisfaction” business, we have to protect ourselves, like other professionals and businesses. We have to protect ourselves from those clients who believe they can agree to something, and then break that agreement and think that the lawyer will cower or not pursue payment because we are afraid of our state bar association.

I’m not afraid.

Unsavory defendants, or their family’s, think that lawyers will succumb to threats of grievances, and return fees to avoid the threat.   Some will.  Most won’t.  None should.  Giving in to a threat encourages this sort of conduct, and when a lawyer collapses in the face of an unwarranted threat, word spreads on the street like wildfire.  Even when the client loves and appreciates his lawyer, babymama may appreciate cash in her purse more, should the defendant be a guest of the state for any significant period of time. 

Unlike Brian, however, I will happily refund any unearned portion of the legal fee to any client who requests it.  I agree with Brickman that any client who is dissatisfied with my representation should be free to change lawyers, find someone with whom he’s more comfortable.  I take no umbrage.  It’s the defendant’s life, and he is absolutely entitled to sit next to his lawyer of choice. 

Does this present a burden?  Sure.  In taking a case, lawyers will set aside time and reject other cases (or other clients within the same case to avoid conflicts).  Opportunity costs are real, and don’t quantify well in an hourly bill.  But the Court of Appeals tells us that this is the price of being a lawyer in the State of New York, and so we live with it.

Fortunately, the secret to avoiding the angst inherent in Brian’s rant has blunted the impact of the Cooperman decision.  Serve your client exceptionally well, and most will prefer to pay the fee and have you beside them rather than play the switcheroo game and seek a refund.  I’ve returned a couple of fees over the years.  I’ve kept almost all of them, with my clients’ blessing. 

I’ve even been the recipient of post-representation gifts, reflecting my clients’ appreciation.  They aren’t required to do this, which makes such a gesture very special.  It’s much nicer than arguing about nonrefundable retainers.

Problem solved.

The Right Lawyer for the Job

This is a dirty little secret, so don’t tell anybody.  Lawyers are not fungible.  One isn’t the same as another.  No, this isn’t going to be an expose about incompetent or dishonest lawyers.  Rather, I’m talking about good lawyers all.  Just not good at everything.  Even within a discrete practice area like criminal defense.

Lawyers tend to be a little possessive about clients.  We want to keep them close, lest they find another lawyer with a brighter smile.  But the fact is that most lawyers, even great lawyers, are not great at everything.  It’s impossible to be on top of your game in every minute aspect of the law, and have the skillset to handle every facet of representation.  But when is the last time you heard a lawyer say, “Well, it’s not something I do well, so why not have Joe the Lawyer (less wealthy brother of Joe the Plumber) take care of that aspect of the case?”

A while back, I received an email from an upstate lawyer asking me if I wanted to handle a DWI case in New York City.  I said thanks but no thanks.  I haven’t done a DWI case in 20+ years, and consequently don’t stay on top of the law, the technology or the procedure.  I could probably figure it out well enough to provide passable representation, but the truth is that there are other lawyers who would do a far better job than me, and likely at a much lower cost because of their experience.

Even within my niche, there are things that I don’t do well.  I do not, for example, provide anything remotely resembling great representation when it comes to federal cooperation.  I know, there isn’t a whole lot to do when it comes to cooperation, but there’s a bone in my head that makes it exceptionally difficult for me to help the government put other people in prison.  So should a client wish to cooperate, I refer them to another lawyer more appropriate for the job.  It’s just not my thing.

Criminal defense lawyers like to think of themselves as trial lawyers.  Some are; most really aren’t.  Many haven’t tried a case in years.  Some have never tried a case.  And some are extremely proficient at taking a plea.  But they won’t tell you that.

Criminal defense lawyers pride themselves on their work inside the courtroom.  But to do this job properly, there’s a substantial portion of the job that requires research and writing of motions, memoranda and appeals.  The best trial lawyer in the world may not be a very good writer.  The most persuasive lawyer before a jury may not keep up with the law. 

As a delivery system of services to clients, the law has some issues.  It would be best if we could work to our strength rather than hold onto the client at all cost.  Share the client with other lawyers who are better or more experienced at a specific function.  But as law has become a business, and businesses need to generate revenues to survive, handing clients off to other lawyers is fiscal suicide. 

Even if lawyers could put ego aside, trust one another and work together, it would be prohibitively expensive for the client.  It’s like buying a car, one part at a time.  Whatever economies of scale one enjoys by having a single lawyer represent a client start to finish would be lost, and without this continuity, the practice would prove unduly burdensome and undesirable to lawyers who were given only a little piece of a case.  The time, trouble and cost for lawyers to relearn a case, agree on strategy and work in cooperation makes this a pipedream.

Sure, there could be a synergy if groups of lawyers with different strengths put themselves together and offer the best talents of each, but it doesn’t work that way.  First, the varying needs of a case make it impossible to either cover, or equate, the varying skillsets required, meaning that some lawyers would have too much relative work while others played Nintendo all day long.  

There are some criminal defense lawyers who specialize in discrete aspects of the work, such as appellate lawyers or DWI lawyers.  But for the most part, criminal defense lawyers take cases indiscriminately.  There’s nothing funnier than a state practitioner in a federal case, clueless about the significant differences in procedure.  Unless you happen to be the client, in which case it isn’t funny at all. 

Second, rarely do practitioners in criminal defense agree with one another about anything, no less how to approach a defense.  The attempt to divvy up work within a group like this will likely result in open warfare, with lawyer blood spilled across the floor.  Some might not have a problem with this, but it ends up with disjointed strategy, loose ends and conflicting approaches.

And then there’s the client, who doesn’t want anything to do with this.  In criminal defense, the relationship between lawyer and client is one of personal trust.  The client doesn’t want his trusted lawyer to farm out pieces of the case to other, unknown and untrusted, lawyers.  He wants you.  He knows you.  He doesn’t want to hear about anything else. 

Almost everyone remembers the first O.J. trial, with the Dream Team.  Ah, they all want the Dream Team, all the lawyers working together like a clock, with the top skills in their subniche.  Johnny Cochran and Bob Shapiro didn’t stay best friends, and Flea Bailey has seen better days, but O.J. walked.  If you can afford to pay for four lawyers under comparable circumstances, this might work.

But most defendants can’t and don’t.  And most lawyers really don’t want any part of it either.  The critical question is whether the lawyer has sufficient skills to handle the particular representation he’s undertaken, or whether he’s taken on a case that he’s not competent to handle. And the defendant is rarely in a position to know.  Does the criminal defense lawyer have the guts to turn down a case, refer it to a lawyer better suited to handle it, and lose a fee?

And if you think it’s a problem within the criminal defense bar, think about what happens when your friendly, neighborhood real estate lawyer tells you, “Oh sure, I can handle a criminal case.”  Don’t mistake the small town lawyer who is forced to do everything as lacking the ability to try a case.  Some of these small town guys are brilliant trial lawyers, and it’s just a matter of not having a sufficient calling for their skillset to specialize, plus a desire to feed their kids every day.  But that’s a different story.

Now remember, this is just between us, so don’t tell anybody.