Judge Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit wasn’t impressed with Justice Antonin Scalia’s “originalist” interpretation of the Second Amendment in D.C. v. Heller. So he decided to publish an article in The New Republic to explain why.
At the end of June, the Supreme Court, in a case called District of Columbia v. Heller, invalidated the District’s ban on the private ownership of pistols. It did so in the name of the Second Amendment to the Constitution. The decision was the most noteworthy of the Court’s recent term. It is questionable in both method and result, and it is evidence that the Supreme Court, in deciding constitutional cases, exercises a freewheeling discretion strongly flavored with ideology.
The majority opinion, by Justice Antonin Scalia, concluded that the original, and therefore the authoritative, meaning of the Second Amendment is that Americans are entitled to possess pistols (and perhaps other weapons) for the defense of their homes. Scalia’s entire analysis rests on this interpretive method, which denies the legitimacy of flexible interpretation designed to adapt the Constitution (so far as the text permits) to current conditions. The irony is that the “originalist” method would have yielded the opposite result.
Bear in mind, this isn’t some lawprof taking cheap potshots at Scalia’s opinion, but a circuit judge who says the Supreme Court “exercises a freewheeling discretion strongly flavored with ideology” in interpreting the Constitution. Guess who’s not getting invited to the party?
It’s past the point of mattering whether Judge Posner is right. The case is decided, even though the decision has the teeth of a wet hen. But it’s a fascinating argument, made even more so by Posner’s willingness to buck the big court so openly and strongly.
But Judge Posner argues a more expansive point.
The Framers of the Bill of Rights could not have been thinking of the crime problem in the large crime-ridden metropolises of twenty-first-century America, and it is unlikely that they intended to freeze American government two centuries hence at their eighteenth-century level of understanding. Because of the difficulty of amending the Constitution, it has from the beginning been loosely construed so as not to become a straitjacket or a suicide pact. The older the constitutional provision and the more the environment has changed since enactment, the more appropriate is the method of loose construction.
Essentially, Posner contends that certain provisions of the Constitution are antiquated as written, and the push to apply them based upon originalist thought misses the mark. He argues that both sides of the ideological equation use loose construction, but to serve the opposing ends. He concludes that it’s all a pattern of unprincipled decision-making.
I cannot discern any principles in the pattern of the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations. The absence of principles supports the hypothesis that ideology drives decision in cases in which liberal and conservative values collide. If loose construction produces a conservative limitation on government, most conservatives will support it and most liberals will oppose it; and if it produces a liberal limitation on government, most liberals and conservatives will switch sides.
So the debate continues.

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