Author Archives: SHG

Brandishing a Right After Heller

Doug Berman at SLP has challenged Head Conspirator  Eugene Volokh’s acceptance in our latest edition of lawprof mud-wrestling.  Eugene, who has been tracking the atrocity of lower-level court decisions post-Heller, proffers an alternative view of the proper way to address the issue of a crime committed by a person who, at the time, has a gun.

It seems to me that the Washington Supreme Court’s rule — requiring some connection between the possession and the crime, to distinguish unprotected use of a gun in crime (even if the gun isn’t fired or brandished) from protected possession of a gun even when a crime is in progress — is a sensible way of reading the Second Amendment as well; and as best I can tell federal law would be consistent with such a rule, because it already includes this sort of “nexus” requirement. But in any case, the deeper point is that some of these novel Second Amendment questions aren’t novel right-to-bear-arms questions, because state courts have dealt with them under many of the 40 state constitutional provisions that clearly secure an individual right to keep and bear arms in self-defense.

To summarize (or really to snarkily recharacterize), this is the “some sorta, kinda connection of some sort, but short of firing or brandishing” rule.  Since this would be unwieldy to speak or write, it should be hereinafter referred to as the “SSKCOSSBSOFOB Rule.”  I hope that helps.

Doug takes issue with Eugene’s proposal.


The problem I have with this idea is that, if one really believes in a true right to “keep and bear arms,” why should any keeping of a gun be deemed an “unprotected use” leading to an enhanced sentence unless and until the gun is fired or brandished or otherwise actively and directly used as part of a crime? 

Doug analogizes this with the exercise of another fundamental constitutional right, free speech, with a tenuous connection to the commission of a crime, and questions why that, like possession of a gun, shouldn’t result in an enhancement.  Doug also questions how one exercises this right when the tipping point between constitutional right and crime is so tenuous.


These ideas lead me to wonder whether and how “chilling” or “undue burden” doctrines that have often been applied in the First Amendment and other contexts might extend to the Second Amendment.  If a person is under constant fear that his (otherwise lawful) possession of a gun could lead to a massive sentence increase if he even gets in a bar fight, won’t persons be (unduly) chilled from exercising their constitutional rights to keep and bear arms?

I think Doug recognizes something that Eugene’s analysis does not.  Eugene has still not wrapped his arms around the idea that if gun possession is a fundamental right, then it must be viewed as are other constitutional rights, provided all people, good or bad, felons or virgins, citizens or illegals.  We are still so used to thinking of the possession of a gun by “bad people” as criminal that we can’t quite seem to grasp or accept the real consequence of Justice Scalia’s decision. 

From a practical point of view, Eugene’s test, the “SSKCOSSBSOFOB Rule,” presents a bit of a problem.  We like bright-line tests, where we know when someone has crossed the line and engaged in criminal conduct,  We don’t like tests that are vague and leave it up to individual judges to decide where the line is drawn.  Not only do we lack the ability to properly advise clients, but we look pretty darn foolish trying to pronounce such an ill-conceived acronym (what were you thinking, Eugene?).

I’m glad to see that Doug has continued to hold his other lawprofs’ feet to the fire on this. 


Of course, as I have said in many prior posts, I seriously doubt that courts (or even vocal gun right advocates) will ever work through all the implications of taking and protecting Second Amendment rights seriously for everyone and not just for “preferred individuals.”  This suggests that in the gun arena, like in so many others, advocates seek principally to protect rights for people they like, not for those they don’t.

That’s the bottom line.  Now that the proponents of the individual right to keep and bear arms got their wish, it’s time to live the hard consequences of intellectual integrity. 

Should Troopers Prosecute?

David Giacalone of f/k/a wondered whether the Legislature’s effort, again, to undo a New York State Police ban on having troopers handle their own tickets in local traffic courts was a good thing or a bad thing, as Governor David Paterson considers vetoing the bill, just as Governor Pataki did before.  So he asked me what I thought.

As explained in this Schenectady Daily Gazette editorial,

For the second time in two years, the state Legislature has passed a bill that would undo the state police ban on having troopers appear in local courts and plea-bargain traffic tickets there.

The ban, adopted in 2006, was a policy change, and a wise one. Before that, troopers who wrote the tickets regularly appeared in local traffic court, acting not only as witnesses but as prosecutors, making deals with speeders to plead guilty in return for a reduced charge like parking on pavement.

The editorial urged Paterson to veto the bill for two reasons.  The first was financial, as the cost of having troopers in local courts, paid for three hours of overtime even if they were only there for minutes, was exorbitant.


But it wasn’t just money, it was also the ethics of having the person who issued the citation also prosecute the case. That gives, as state police counsel Glenn Valle put it, “an inherent outward appearance of unfairness.” For one thing, it assumes the arrest is good and the trooper acted properly, where an independent prosecutor might have doubts in some cases. It also raises the possibility that the motorist might not get a fair shake — i.e. not get a plea-bargain deal, or the same deal that another would have gotten — if the trooper doesn’t like him for some reason, perhaps if he didn’t show enough deference at the traffic stop. There’s a reason that police and prosecutors work for different offices and have different roles and responsibilities. Here they are blurred.

This is not only true, but a very frank assessment of the dynamics involved in such discretionary decision-making.   Plus, no one likes to negotiate with a person who has a gun on his hip.

Clearly, the best of all worlds requires that a fair-minded prosecutor, who will make a detached review of the case and fashion a plea offer (or perhaps even dismissal?) be present.  But this is a bit Utopian.


While the ban served the interest of the state — and justice — it has made life difficult for localities, especially small, rural counties with small district attorney staffs. Some have had to use their scarce resources to hire prosecutors or designate lawyers to handle traffic violations — which many small localities rely on for a significant amount of their revenue.

The dirty little secret of many of these local-yokel courts is two-fold.  First, they prosecutors appear only occasionally, when they have nothing better to do and happen to be available, or they assign no prosecutor at all.   The result of the absent prosecutor is that the judge takes on the role of representing the state.  Imagine the prospect of the judge, the person who we turn to in expectation of justice, is also the prosecutor.  Guess who is going to win that battle?

The second dirty little secret is that many of these local-yokel judges are not lawyers, leaving no one in the room with the slightest clue how due process is achieved, or how laws are to be applied.  Non-lawyer judges have proven to be a competency and ethical nightmare for the New York court system, but the politicians lack the will to put an end to this anachronistic system that has caused so much grief.

Given the choice between a trooper playing prosecutor and the judge doing the dirty deed, I would pick the trooper.  Given the choice between a good system and the lesser of two very bad evils, I would pick a prosecutor to be the prosecutor.  So why doesn’t the Legislature put its effort into requiring that local courts have prosecutors handle the prosecution, rather than troopers or, worse yet, judges?  And why are the choices always between bad and worse?

Two Pimps Meet Face to Face

An op-ed by John R. Miller, former State Department ambassador at large on modern slavery, in the New York Times tells a strange tale of the struggle between State and Justice that stymied efforts to stop the sex slave trade.

While many of my brethren in the practical blawgosphere have advocated for the treatment of prostitution as a victimless crime that should not be a crime at all, I doubt that any would have thought that the Department of Justice was one of their biggest supporters.  But according to Miller, that’s exactly what was happening behind the scenes.

From 2002 to 2006, I led the State Department’s efforts to monitor and combat human trafficking. I felt my job was to nurture a 21st-century abolitionist movement with the United States at the lead. At times, my work was disparaged by some embassies and regional bureaus that didn’t want their host countries to be criticized. I didn’t win every battle, but the White House always made it clear that the president supported my work and thought it was important.

Imagine my surprise, then, when the Justice Department started a campaign against a new bill that would strengthen the government’s anti-human trafficking efforts. In a 13-page letter last year, the department blasted almost every provision in the new bill that would reasonably expand American anti-slavery efforts.

Miller then runs through a series of rhetorical questions, the point of which is to show the harms that this bill was designed to address, and concludes that the Justice Department’s attitude was that it did not want to cure the disease of sex slavery.   Of course, it is impossible to know from Miller’s description whether the law would have far exceeded his view of the cure, but assuming that it was sufficiently surgical to have had the effect he claims, why would Justice be so antagonistic?


A culture clash, I suspect, is the real reason for the Justice Department’s opposition. This isn’t the usual culture clash of right and left, religious and secular. In this case, the feminist, religious and secular groups that help sex-trafficking survivors are on one side. And on the other are the department’s lawyers (most of them male), the Erotic Service Providers Union and the American Civil Liberties Union — this side believes that vast numbers of women engage in prostitution as a “profession,” by choice.

As one Justice Department lawyer put it at a meeting I attended, there is “hard pimping and soft pimping.” The department’s letter hints at this view. Adult prostitutes who are transported across state lines, in violation of the Mann Act, should not receive grants under the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 because they “do not meet the legal definition of ‘victim,’” the letter states.

This is where one begins to get an inkling that all is not as Miller suggests.  As soon as he raised the dreaded ACLU to smear his enemies, Miller gives away the high ground in fit of Rovian pique. 

The problem Miller raises, that an international sex slave trade exists and subjugates the poor and desperate, both male and female, is a real one, and one that should disgust Americans.  But Miller’s argument, framed by vague rhetoric coupled with his slash and burn attack on his opponents, suggests that this was a real problem addressed by an overbroad, overreaching law that presented huge potential for abuse and problems. 

Let’s face facts:  For the Justice Department to join the ACLU in a big group hug means that this law must have been just horrific.  Justice loves all laws that empower them and criminalize behaviors Americans enjoy.  This one must have been so far over the top that it would even make Ashcroft and Gonzalez blush.

But the fact that Miller is pimping for bad law doesn’t mean that the sex slave trade isn’t real, and isn’t a terrible problem that should be addressed.  This is a very different issue than the one my brethren have been talking about, with consenting adults engaged in an occupation of choice.  This is the one of 14 year old children sold to slave masters for lives of misery and abuse.  I can’t imagine that appropriate law, and a meaningful approach, can’t be devised to deal with it, without sweeping in a multitude of other “sins”.

But if Miller couldn’t even get Justice to go along with his “solution”, it’s hard to imagine just how bad it must have been.

“Sorry” Does Not Make for a Federal Judicial Nomination

When Liptak broke the story of Michael E. O’Neill’s plagiarism, it was barely a “2” on the yawn-o-meter.  After all, George Mason lawprof and Bush nominee for a federal judgeship had lifted substantial portions of other people’s scholarship and included them, without attribution, in at least four articles.  Sexy, right?

The assumption, after news of O’Neill’s deceit came out, was that he would fade quickly into the background and go hide under a rock somewhere on the George Mason campus, never to be heard from again.  This guy would be laughed out of a classroom, no less a courtroom.  Or so it seemed.

The WSJ Law Blog reports that O’Neill isn’t going quietly into the night.  Instead, O’Neill has announced that he:


will not withdraw his nomination because he fully disclosed the controversy to both White House officials and the FBI. “It wasn’t intentional. It was my fault. It was my mistake, and I have to own up to it.”

Well, that settles it, right?  Well, maybe not. 

Let us consider the pieces of the puzzle.  O’Neill will not withdraw his nomination because he “fully disclosed the controversy.”  So if you do wrong but later admit to it, you get to be a federal judge?  I have a number of clients who will be darned happy to hear that.  They could use a job.

O’Neill further asserts “it wasn’t intentional.”  So those “substantial portions” of unattributed writings from other guys snuck into his law review articles by accident?  Four times?  At least?  Oh baby, I’m loving the way this guy thinks.  “Yes, your honor, it was all a big accident, all 37 bullets.  Even after I reloaded.  Three times.”

Owning up to one’s mistakes is generally considered a good thing.  But it doesn’t necessarily wipe the slate clean immediately.  Usually, there’s a consequence to doing bad things.  In this instance, the consequence appears to be that O’Neill will be sentenced to life.  As a federal judge.  Harsh.

The potential that Michael O’Neill will wear the robes offers some fascinating possibilities.  Consider the drug dealer whose defense is that he was really bad at chemistry and hence didn’t realize that the substance he was selling was a “precursor”.  Or the guy who was really bad at math and couldn’t convert pounds to kilograms.  Dismissed!  After all, it was just a mistake.  It wasn’t intentional.  Blame the school system.

And if only he was the judge presiding over Martha Stewart’s case, convicted for proclaiming her innocence.  Certainly he would be sympathetic, knowing how he similarly erred, four times, by unintentionally plagiarizing the work of others.  It can happen, you know.  After all, who can remember who wrote what.  Or who said what.  Same sort of thing.

No one expects perfection of all persons nominated for the federal bench.  Beyond the fact that judges are human, we all have done things that, whether at the time or in retrospect, reflect poor choices.  But this one is awfully clear, awfully significant and goes to the heart of integrity.  If he was a testifying defendant, this would come in to impeach his veracity.  That’s usually a pretty good reason not to make someone a federal judge.

There’s only one real question remaining:  Will the Dean of George Mason Law School take him back as a lawprof, knowing what he’s done?  Dan Polsby, it’s your turn to put your school’s integrity on the line.

Just Doing What Comes Unnaturally

Wisconsin must be a tough place to get a date.  From the Chicago Tribune,


Armed with shovels, a crowbar and a box of condoms, the men went to a cemetery in Cassville in southwestern Wisconsin in 2006 to remove the body of a 20-year-old woman killed the week before in a motorcycle crash, police said.

One of them had seen an obituary photo of the pretty nursing assistant and asked the others for help digging up her corpse so he could have sexual intercourse with it, prosecutors said. They used the shovels to reach her grave but were unable to pry the concrete vault open and fled after a car drove into the cemetery.

So there are sick people in the world.  Some really sick.  It’s beyond the ability of normal people to comprehend what could have possibly motivated these fine fellows to do this.  Some may attribute it to generational issues, but this one is off the charts.

The defendants were charged with attempted sexual assault.  The charges were dismissed.  It appeared that there was no law in Wisconsin that made it a crime to attempt to have sex with a corpse.  Wisconsin was necrophilia heaven, if such a thing could exist. 

There can be no reasonable person who does not believe that necrophilia is a horrible, disgusting, despicable act, a crime against nature.  But to be a crime against man requires a law.

The problem is that Wisconsin had no law prohibiting sexual acts with dead people.  This proved too embarrassing to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, compelling them in a 5-2 decision to hold that this was a crime because the dead woman was incapable of consenting to the sexual act. 


Justice Patience Roggensack, writing a majority opinion with three other justices, said state law bans sexual intercourse with anyone who does not give consent whether a victim is dead or alive at the time. Dead bodies obviously can’t give consent, she said.

“A reasonably well-informed person would understand the statute to prohibit sexual intercourse with a dead person,” she wrote.

This is a prime example of truly bad, result-oriented reasoning.  Notwithstanding the salacious nature of the case (which is precisely the sort of case that gives birth to bad law), the decision is instructive for what courts should never do.

On its surface, the Supreme Court’s rationale is absurd.  If “a reasonably well-informed person” would read the statute as prohibiting sex with a corpse, then the trial level judge who dismissed the charge, and the judges on the intermediate level appeals court that sustained the dismissal, are by definition unreasonable and/or poorly-informed people.  Did the Wisconsin Supreme Court intend to say that?  That’s a bunch of black robes to be hung up, since they should no longer qualify to sit in judgment, not to mention hold a law license, if they are neither reasonable nor well-informed.

If a whole passel of judges don’t understand a statute to prohibit this conduct, how can the court hold the defendants to such an understanding?  This is basic due process; a statute must provide notice of the prohibited conduct. 

But there is a deeper failing in this decision.  While the Wisconsin Supreme Court focused on the question of whether a corpse can give consent (both an absurdity by definition and facile solution when faced with a hard choice), they failed to consider the far broader ramifications of the definition of a “person”. 

If the word “person” is to include corpses, it opens a wide world of criminal conduct that no one intends.  Consider the criminal liability of the anthropologist in Wisconsin, messing around with people’s bones.  A “person” can be the victim of a homicide.  A corpse cannot, at least before this decisions.  What now?

There should certainly be a crime of desecrating a corpse and necrophilia.  But that is something for a legislature to do, not a court by disconnecting language from meaning.  A corpse is not a person.  A person is alive.  A corpse is not.  To borrow from the court, no reasonably well-informed person could disagree with this proposition.

None of this escaped the notice of dissenting Judge Ann Walsh Bradley, who adds, perhaps with a touch of sarcasm, that it’s always dubious when a court holds something “plain” and then requires a multitude of pages to explain how “plain” it is. 

It’s understandable that the judges of the Wisconsin Supreme Court should want to appease the citizens and find a way to hold Grunke and his pals accountable.  It offends sensibilities to do otherwise.  But that’s what the law demands at times, and the Supreme Court could have just as well put the ball in the legislature’s court to enact a law that made the conduct criminal.  Instead, it sacrificed reason and law to achieve the desired result.

This was one sick case to begin with.  Now, it’s a sick case that shows everyone how bad decisions are made.  This is a bad one all around.

Are Criminal Defense Lawyers Targets of Violence?

Blakely at Judgment Day suggests that criminal defense lawyers are in a particularly dangerous profession:

Most people don’t think of the legal profession as a dangerous one. While many attorneys—especially those practicing criminal defense—have received threats from clients, more often than not it’s just empty talk. I think many attorneys become numb to threatening phone messages and letters, primarily because everything has worked out fine in the past.

Blakely then tells two stories of lawyers who are subject to threats and violence.  In one of the stories from the Mercury News,

Xia Zhao, an attorney who was murdered by a man named Jason Cai. Zhao’s law firm was pursuing a wrongful death suit against Cai in the death of his wife. Cai had threatened Zhao and she had obtained a restraining order against him.

“I really don’t have a big part in the whole thing (the wrongful death suit against Cai)” and added, “If I walked away every time somebody threatened me, what kind of business would I have?”

Of course, business is rarely very good when you’re dead.  But Zhao wasn’t a criminal defense lawyer, and Cai wasn’t her client.

Still, the assumption is that since criminal defense lawyers deal with criminals, and criminals are evil, violent people, we should be far more at risk than lawyers in other practice areas.  Are we?

Not according to the Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett.

[W]e deal with (often) bad people on their best behavior; family lawyers, by contrast, deal with good people on their worst behavior. I’d bet that family lawyers and personal injury lawyers get more threats from their clients (and from opposing parties) than criminal defense lawyers.

I’m betting with Bennett.  While many criminal defendants are angry, they recognize that we are the only people in the world who stand at the same table as them.  They may hate the cops, the prosecutor and the judge, they don’t hate us.  Sure, they express their frustration with the system to us, and they may get loud and yell on occasion when they have no other way to vent this frustration, but that’s because they know we are safe and won’t lock them up for being frustrated.  After the catharsis, they remember why we’re here and for whom we stand.

That’s not to say that I’ve never been the target of a serious threat.  It happened in 1990, when a guy named Jamie Hunt confronted me in a hallway.  He was armed and dangerous, and informed me in no uncertain terms that he was going to blow my head off.  But for the interference of one of his “partners,” he may have done so.

Of course, Hunt was a DEA Agent, a member of DEA Group 33, and the incident happened in the hallway of New York DEA Headquarters.  This happened just before DEA Group 33 (and Hunt in particular) was exposed as rogue agents, lying their way to convictions with fabricated evidence, before Judge Ken Conboy, SDNY.

Back to the point, I think Bennett has nailed the issue quite well.  While lawyers have long been the whipping boys of the public’s anger toward the legal system, and judges have lately been brought into the mix as well, I’ve never had the experience of clients threatening me or acting violently toward me.  Indeed, one of my expectations of my clients is that they behave respectfully, and I’ve fired clients who find it difficult to do so.

This is not to say that other criminal defense lawyers have the same experience as me, but that it’s not a pervasive problem that is inherent in being a criminal defense lawyer.  Perhaps any lawyer who seems to have serious issues with threatening clients needs to take a step back and ask himself what he’s doing that may be causing this problem.  The occasional problem can happen, but if it reaches the point where you have to ask the question that Ms. Zhao did,

“If I walked away every time somebody threatened me, what kind of business would I have?”

Maybe the problem isn’t the client.

Confrontation, Counsel and a Defendant Who Just Won’t Behave Himself

Courtesy of Bashman, the Second Circuit decision in Davis v. Grant, on appeal of denial of habeas, not only addresses the difficult conflict between a defendant’s right of confrontation, pro se representation, and behaving badly, but happened before the icon of judicial misery, New York County Supreme Court Justice Harold Rothwax.  If Harold was still alive today, he would definitely make Lat’s Judge of the Day, but not Judicial Hottie.

In 1997, Carl Davis was ready to go to trial for a gypsy cab robbery (gypsy cabs are unlicensed taxis, which in New York cruise uptown and the outer boroughs where medallion cabs were not inclined to go) when he announced his desire to proceed pro se.  His assigned lawyer (the second one, after Davis complained of his first) apparently didn’t “agree” with Davis’ trial strategy, along with various other complaints that were later enunciated. 

Judge Rothwax explained the risks of pro se representation, and Davis responded that he understood and was prepared to proceed anyway.  The assigned counsel was ordered to remain as legal advisor.  During the voir dire, things began to go south, and David asked if the lawyer could finish up for him.  Rothwax said no, that either he could try the case or counsel, but hybrid representation would not be permitted. 

Davis then embarked on a path of challenging Harold’s neutrality and refusing to abide the judge’s effort to shut the defendant up and conduct himself according to court protocol.

Now to appreciate this, one has to know Harold Rothwax.  Harold was a long-time legal aid lawyer, and quite a good one in his day.  And so he was made a criminal court judge, and elevated to Acting Supreme in due course.  Harold turned bitter over time, ultimately writing a book called, “Guilty, The Collapse of Criminal Justice,” which advocated doing away with those “ridiculous” constitutional thingies that let guilty people go.  He became one of the meanest, nastiest, most despised judges on the bench.  By the time of his death, the nicest thing his old legal aid buddies could say about him was that he was “a prick.”  It got worse from there.  Harold’s nickname was the Prince of Darkness. 

The Circuit decision describes the downward spiral of the trial, as Davis sought to express his unhappiness with his legal advisor, his inability to perform the lawyer function, and his belief that the judge was prejudiced.  Harold, in return, told Davis to either follow his orders or he would be removed from the courtroom during the trial.  Davis didn’t.  Harold did.

And so, the trial proceeded in Davis’ absence, leaving no one to cross-examine witnesses.  Davis was eventually allowed to return, when he promised to obey, but some of the cross was lost.  The conviction was appealed, and the First Department held that Davis had brought all of his problems on himself by his behavior, and hence waived his confrontation right.

Davis sought a write of habeas corpus in the Southern District of New York based upon violation of his right to confront witnesses.  He argued that if the court was going to remove him from the courtroom, then it had to appoint counsel to represent him.  What the court could not do was eliminate his ability to confront witnesses while simultaneously deny him right to counsel.

The Circuit, while agreeing that Davis brought all of his problems on himself because he just wouldn’t do as he was told, found curious merit in Davis’ point.  The court did not agree with his characterization of the trial as a denial of confrontation, but rather as a denial of right to counsel. 


Davis notes that, in removing him from the courtroom, Justice Rothwax implicitly held that he waived his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, which required a determination that he was unwilling to abide by courtroom protocol. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (“[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if . . . he . . . insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.”). Thus, Davis argues he forfeited his right to self-representation and, because his trial continued in the absence of replacement counsel, his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.

While the Second Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, it noted that guidance was needed from the Supreme Court on the issue. 

In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford,  Giles v. California, Indiana v. Edwards, one has to wonder whether the Davis scenario creates a conundrum which cannot be resolved by the long-standing rule that a defendant’s refusal to behave himself constitutes an implicit waiver of constitutional rights, whether confrontation or counsel. 

Nowhere in the Constitution does it say that a defendant enjoys these rights unless he annoys the trial judge.  Indeed, given the fact that judges get to control a record, it’s hard to imagine any judge allowing a trial record to exist that doesn’t make the judge look fair and reasonable and the defendant disruptive and unreasonable.  Trials lawyers know this about the record.  Pro se defendants don’t.  Any half-way competent judge can produce a record that would create the appearance that the defendant has so violated courtroom protocol (something else a pro se defendant may be incapable of realizing) that he’s dead on appeal. 

But only if, on review, acceptable courtroom behavior trumps constitutional rights.  Historically, this was the law.  Implicit rules of decorum, some written and some not, provided a huge gaping hole into which the unaware defendant could fall, and thereby forfeit all those fine rights provided by the Constitution.  But without those rights being provided, could the result of a trial be deemed legitimate?

The latest series of SCOTUS cases calls into question whether the myriad of exceptions, developed over many years to the point where they swallow the rule (or tail wags the dog, which Jim Chen refers to as the “inverted canine metaphor”), will be tolerated.  At least Justice Scalia seems to take the position that fundamental rights in the Constitution must be honored, even though it presents some inherent drama in the courtroom.  Of course, that doesn’t apply to guns, but that’s already been beaten to death.

The Second Circuit’s view, that the Davis case presents more of a right to counsel issue than confrontation, strikes me as suspect.  Both rights are fundamental, though not absolute, and once a defendant has asserted his right to proceed pro se, I fail to see that they can be so easily waived by violating unwritten rules of courtroom decorum.  Indeed, Rothwax never allowed the defendant the opportunity to speak his mind outside the presence of the jury and thus make a record of his claims of prejudice.  Why should Davis be responsible for waiver when the judge, the person whom we pay to know and apply the law properly, could have handled things far better than he did?

Reading between the lines of the Davis decision, and knowing Harold’s penchant for kindness, helpfulness and tolerance toward defendants, I can’t help but smell something very fishy about how Davis’ trial was handled.  But if cert is granted in this case, it will go up on the record as characterized by the Circuit, with Davis’ conduct being deemed atrocious, yet still implicating some very serious issues. 

In my view, the bottom line issue is whether behaving badly trumps the Constitution.  It could be interesting.

When Law Schools Cheat (Update)

The subculture of legal academia turns out to be a dirty little place, with goateed lawprofs skulking about the dark back hallways of the Ivory Tower trying to figure out ways to cheat their way to prominence.  Who knew?

According to this New York Lawyer report, it’s forcing the hand of U.S. News and World Reports, that paragon of public integrity, to change the way it does business.  You see, one of the factors that’s used to calculate how wonderful a law school is (and hence its ranking) is the LSAT scores of its admits.  But there’s a little secret.

U.S. News currently uses only the grades and test scores of full-time students. The magazine is considering pooling the scores of part-time students after hearing allegations that some schools move students with lower grades and test scores into part-time programs so they can report better data, said Robert Morse, director of data research for the magazine.

“One way to prevent gaming of the system is to count [grade and test data of] all students,” Morse said.

As I sat, quietly laughing to myself at the notion of law schools “gaming the system,” the question “why” kept running through my mind.  If the schools get a higher ranking, do the Deans get a performance bonus?  If the schools get a higher ranking, do their graduates get a favorable first jury verdict?  Maybe they get an affirmance/reversal (as the case may be) on their first appeal?  Why?

There is no doubt that this is very serious business for law schools.


The proposal is strongly opposed by deans at schools with part-time programs designed for students who are years past college graduation and often well into careers outside the law. They warn that a school’s place on the U.S. News list is so important that some schools would drop the part-time programs rather than slip lower in the national rankings.

They would rather shut out an entire class of students, those who are older, employed and minority, than drop a position in the rankings?  That sounds crazy.  Worse yet, it sounds vicious.  Would they really sacrifice their part-time program, and all the individuals who would otherwise be unable to attend law school, just for a rank?

While the article makes clear that this is very serious business, it fails to explain why this matters so much.  Would potential Biglaw employers confuse Harvard Law School with Ave Maria if they didn’t have rankings?  Would lawprofs be unable to get their law review articles published because they taught in a T-25 rather than a T-14 school?  Would alumni donations slow to a trickle?  I don’t know what ill would befall these schools, but it must be huge for them to be willing to sacrifice any sense of mission to hold onto their rank. 

I’m quite sure that I’m naive, but I suspect that this may be more an internally driven competition, where the impact is more psychological than anything else.  Potential law students may obsess over rankings, but I can’t recall any client caring what your law school rank was.  Yet very smart people have become slaves to Mort Zuckerman.  Think about how crazy that sounds.  Mort Zuckerman, for God’s sake!

What if a bunch of top law schools refused to provide data to U.S. News & World Reports next year?  What if they decided that their mission was to teach people to become lawyers, and they were going to do it the best they could?  What if they decided that putting a bunch of promising, but older, less LSAT-savvy, students in seats to fulfill the demand for public service lawyering was more important to society than putting a feather in their well-endowed cap?

The sky would fall, right?  So it’s worth it for law schools to cheat for a rank?  Not in my book.

Update:  It looks like I have company in my disgust at the fact that law schools would game the system, or do away with their part-time program to keep their death-grip on their rank.  See Jim Chen at MoneyLaw (check out his great Sir Thomas More quote and video from “A Man for All Seasons”) and Nancy Rappaport at MoneyLaw as well as her personal blawg.

It’s gratifying to know that I’m in such good company, and that there are some important people in the Academy who have survived with their integrity intact.

Memo to Paterson: Give us a Leader

The New York Sun surveys the candidates who have expressed an interest in taking Judy Kaye’s job as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals.  At present, there are two leading contenders, Jonathon Lippman and Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick.  Lippman is the former administrative judge for the system, now presiding justice of the Appellate Division, First Department.  Ciparick is an associate judge of the Court of Appeals.

Much as I hate to delve into ancient history, I will.  New York once had a stand-out Court of Appeals under Rockefeller Republican Chief Judge, Sol Wachtler.  It was a leader in thought, and neither bent nor broke under pressure.  Then that ninny went off the deep-end in 1992 and blew it.  Rarely has one man’s personal collapse caused as much trouble for so many.

Since then, the New York Court of Appeals has floundered, both intellectually and ideologically.  It has become a follower court, going with the prevailing trends rather than creating the trends that others will follow.  The time when the New York Court of Appeals told the United States Supreme Court that it would follow it’s own darn Constitution, which provided stronger protections than those wobbly-kneed, wishy-washy Washingtonian dandies, was over.  It would fall in line, like a good little court.

So what’s Paterson’s plan?


“I can only guess that he wants to put a very bright liberal in the center seat of the court,” an Albany Law School professor who is a close watcher of the Court of Appeals, Vincent Bonventre, said.

Unfortunately, there’s absolutely no basis for this “guess”, and one has to wonder what is meant by “very bright liberal” these days.

This quasi-appointment has the potential to be a watershed event, particularly given the potential that the next president could wreak havoc according to who gets the next Supreme Court nod.  We may need a strong Court of Appeals more now than before to counterbalance a SCOTUS inclined to make some monumental changes to our already suspect Bill of Rights.  With this in mind, dipping in the same old judicial well may not be the right place to find a new Chief Judge.

And so, the state selection commission should look beyond the safe bets, those candidates who would be on “anybody’s” short list, and seek someone who can fill the gap.  We need to find a leader.  But that won’t be easy.


One challenge facing the state’s commission, which has begun soliciting applications, will be to convince partners at law firms and law school professors to apply, a lawyer involved in the selection process said. In getting to the Court of Appeals, lower court judges have fared better than lawyers in private practice in recent years, a law professor at Columbia University, Richard Briffault, said.

Referring to the density of top lawyers in private practice in New York City, Mr. Bonventre said: “In just a few blocks’ radius you could pick seven people and make a great court, so there’s no excuse that we don’t have a great court.”

Will Gov. Paterson see it this way?  That’s hard to say, as we really don’t know him all that well.  It’s not like he was elected governor and put through the ringer of electoral scrutiny.  True, he was elected Lieutenant Governor, but that’s about as meaningful as dog catcher.  Maybe less.

Scuttlebutt is that Paterson will be a one-term wonder in Albany, unless he pulls off some major coup that elevates him in the eyes of New Yorkers and gives us a reason to want him back.  Judging from this past legislative term, that’s not going to happen.  At the moment, he aspires to mediocrity, though in fairness he inherited his lackluster performance from the beloved Eliot Spitzer, friend to all (and really close friend to some).

But Paterson could have a lasting impression on the State of New York with this one appointment.  He could make up for failing the bar the first time by making a bold appointment, a person who has a clear vision in the tradition of New York’s dear protection of freedom and liberty.

David Paterson, give us a leader.  Go back and read Berger and Belton II, and see what a leader does.  That leader could be Jim Yates.  Or perhaps a private lawyer who owes no debt to the system.  But if you have only one chance to make an impact on the future of New York, do it here.  Give us a leader.

The Politics of FISA Capitulation

If only the Senate could hold off voting on the FISA Capitulation Bill until after November, there might be hope.  But the vote will today, and the bill will pass according to all reports.  The New York Times editorial board has come out against the bill, which is usually the kiss of death. 

This is the bill that was touted as a compromise by Congressmen for whom words have no actual meaning, and will free the telecoms from liability for breaking the law at the behest of an executive branch that broke the law.  And that, more than anything, tells us what our government’s priorities are.

Bob Egelko at the San Francisco Chronicle writes about the corrosive affect of politics on this bill, and how our two presidential candidates have both taken the low road to the White House by shifting their positions to appeal to the masses.

Mr. Obama first: 



Obama has been an outspoken critic of the surveillance program for more than two years, and voted against the confirmation of its director, Michael Hayden, to head the CIA in 2006.

“No more illegal wiretapping of American citizens. … No more ignoring the law when it is inconvenient,” the Illinois senator declared in August 2007.

Obama has been particularly adamant against Bush’s insistence on protecting phone companies from lawsuits.  “No one should get a free pass to violate the basic civil liberties of the American people – not the president of the United States, and not the telecommunications companies that fell in line with his warrantless surveillance program,” Obama said in January. He backed legislation that would have barred immunity for the companies, and says he will support an immunity-stripping amendment to the bill this week.


Obama promised to filibuster the bill should it come to a vote on the Senate floor.  But that was when he had more time on his hands.  He’s busier now, and barely has the time to show up in Washington to yell “aye”.

While less than perfect, Obama said, the bill would require some judicial review of surveillance orders and an audit by the Justice Department’s inspector general within a year – bringing to an end, he declared, “the president’s illegal program.”

As president, Obama said, he would monitor the surveillance program carefully and take any necessary steps – which he didn’t define – “to protect the lives and the liberty of the American people.” And he said he would support the bill even if it immunized telecommunications companies, explaining that the issue “is not one that overrides the security interests of the American people.”

Note that Obama is busily fighting to prove he can be commander in chief and protect the American people.  Plus, if he wins, then he gets to pull the trigger on illegal wiretapping, which is completely different than if a bad president has control.  Get it?

And what does Senator McCain have to say about this?


In December, McCain was asked by the Boston Globe whether Bush had to comply with the 1978 law requiring warrants for surveillance of suspected terrorists. “I don’t think the president has the right to disobey any law,” he replied.

A month earlier, McCain told Cnet that companies that provide Americans’ records to the government without legal orders “undermine our respect for the law” and should be granted immunity only if Congress holds hearings to determine what went wrong.

Aside from the fuzziness of the Cnet statement (it’s okay to ignore crimes if Congress holds hearings?) which suggests a Washington mentality that should scare the pants off of anyone who would expect a President who grasps the crime-consequence continuum, at least McCain understood that even presidents don’t get to break the law with impunity.  But that was then.  What about now?


In the campaign’s most recent statement, spokesman Tucker Bounds said June 6 that McCain still believes the president must follow the law – but that in this case, Bush did so.

A number of courts, Bounds asserted, “have recognized the president’s constitutional authority to conduct warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.”

Most of those rulings, however, were unrelated to the current surveillance program. Although legal scholars aren’t unanimous, most who have spoken on the subject have concluded that Congress’ 1978 requirement of court approval for wiretaps related to terrorism or espionage overrode any power the president had to order wiretapping on his own.

The new McCain position is that the “commander in chief during wartime,” has the power “to override the law.”  Aside from the accuracy of this position, remembering how well the Gulf of Tonkin resolution worked out, our government seems to be in a state of announced yet undeclared war against something or someone at all times. 

This epiphany follows harsh criticism from the rightest of the right wing.


His comments drew conservative criticism, most prominently from Andrew McCarthy of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who described McCain as wishy-washy on surveillance in online articles for National Review magazine.

Andy was a great guy to fight against when he was a SDNY assistant, but I’m not sure I would look to him as a political arbiter.  He’s a bit extreme these days.

I would have thought that the “freedom isn’t free” crowd would have stood down after having its way for 8 years under President Bush.  It seemed that things hadn’t worked out too well, and perhaps they would reconsider (I was going to use the word “rethink” but that would have required thought in the first instance) their position.  But Obama’s shift toward ideological necromancy, and McCain’s attempt to become “typical” suggest that they believe that they cannot attain the presidency unless they sell their souls.  I’m sure they have polls to prove it.

Granted, McCain’s position is a far less dramatic turn-around than Obama’s, whose campaign is comprised of one word, “Change”.  I’m finally beginning to understand why this one word best characterizes Senator Obama’s politics. 

But fear not.  Even though laws may be broken by telecoms and the executive, you and I will still be held accountable.  The government hasn’t gone that crazy.