Author Archives: SHG

Morgenthau Responds: No One Forced Bibb

When former ADA Dan Bibb spilled his guts to the New York Times about how he was forced to pursue one of the Palladium murder defendants, even though he believed him to be guilty, and how he intentionally threw the case, it was like thrusting a huge knife in the heart of the beloved New York County District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau. 

Morgy is not only a figure of historic proportions in New York, but one that has endured for so long as to take his place in the Pantheon of District Attorneys, right next to his predecessor, Frank Hogan.  One does not attack living legends lightly.  Adding yet another wrinkle, Morgy, swiftly approaching his 112th birthday, will be challenged again by legend-wannabe, Leslie Crocker Snyder, who should be anticipated to disingenuously use this to body slam Morgy during the primary campaign.

But men like Robert Morgenthau do not get into the gutter to fight it out.  He’s from a day when dignity at all costs was the rule, and he’s not about to change now.  So, Morgy took the high road by sending a letter to the New York Times, reprinted here in its entirety:



To the Editor:


“Doubting Case, City Prosecutor Aided Defense” (front page, June 23), about Daniel L. Bibb, a former assistant district attorney, requires a response.


On Nov. 23, 1990, Marcus Peterson, an unarmed 23-year-old bouncer, was gunned down at the Palladium nightclub. Two men were arrested and charged with the crime, which involved a number of participants.


The case against the two was based on substantial evidence, including multiple eyewitness identifications and a confession made by one defendant to his girlfriend. In December 1992, a jury convicted both defendants, who were sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Their convictions were upheld in postjudgment proceedings in both state and federal court.


When new evidence later came to light, my office willingly reopened the case. Mr. Bibb was assigned to investigate. The investigation was protracted, partly because of the passage of time since the murder, but also because of the reluctance, the criminal backgrounds, the conflicting statements and the dishonesty of a number of witnesses.


With the concurrence of his supervisors, Mr. Bibb kept the defense informed of the progress of the investigation and of the information developed as matters proceeded.


Ultimately, we consented to a hearing at which the relevant evidence would be aired before a judge. Even at that juncture, the investigation was not complete, as additional facts and witnesses continued to be found.


Given his familiarity with the case, Mr. Bibb was a necessary participant in the hearing. A second, senior assistant district attorney was assigned to conduct the hearing with him. Their mission was to conduct a fact-finding proceeding, with witnesses under oath and subject to cross-examination, affording us the opportunity to resolve substantial issues involving the weight and credibility of the evidence. In fact, the hearing resulted in the development of important new evidence.


Mr. Bibb was never asked to prosecute someone he believed to be innocent. He was asked to participate in a fact-finding hearing essential to determine the position my office should take with respect to two murder convictions.


It was only after that hearing that we reached a final conclusion as to our position regarding each defendant.


Ultimately, at the recommendation of every other staff member involved in the case, we consented to set one conviction aside, and determined that the second defendant should be tried again. We reached that determination because we believed him to be guilty.


To the extent Mr. Bibb disagreed with those conclusions, he was neither asked nor required to defend them. He did not participate in the retrial.


As the district attorney of New York County since 1975, I stand for the truth, and have taught generations of my assistants to do the same. Mr. Bibb recognized that in his letter of resignation, in which he wrote, “I will also always remember the consummate professionalism of the office and its unyielding pursuit of justice.”


Robert M. Morgenthau
District Attorney
New York, June 24, 2008


The letter was perfectly adequate, right up to the last paragraph.  When you have to fall back on a line from a letter of resignation to make one’s point, it smells of desperation.  Though dramatic, Bibb’s positive final words were obviously not written to address this particular instance, but to leave the office on a positive note.  Nothing more, and Morgy no doubt knows this well. 

But one sentence in Morgenthau’s letter is curious:  “To the extent Mr. Bibb disagreed . . . he was neither asked nor required to defend them.”  Defend “them” what?  Defend the conclusions with which he disagreed?  Defend the defendants?  Considering that this letter, likely the effort of the best and brightest minds of the District Attorney’s office, with the big guy himself giving final approval, was to blunt the thrust of Bibb’s blade, how is it possible that the critical line is so obviously confusing and confused.

I’m constrained to conclude that the Morgy defense committee couldn’t figure out a way to express their defense against Dan Bibb without digging themselves into some other, perhaps deeper, hole.  The decision to go with such a vagary was their only choice.  A poor choice, but when there is no better answer, a punt may be the best you can do. 

Even though my legal career has no ties with Robert Morgenthau, and I owe him no debt, I am saddened to see something like this mark the December of his career.  He came from a time when people were bigger than their office, and public service was a calling rather than an excuse to get decent dinner invitations.  I miss those days, and Morgy is the last of the great dinosaurs.  Whoever follows him will never fill his shoes.  And will never understand why the shoes don’t fit.

Tankleff, Finally Over But No Closure

The 17 year saga of Marty Tankleff, whether the boy who murdered his parents or the boy who was railroaded by over-zealous detectives, has finally come to an end.  New York Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Rosenberg, who had stepped in for the Suffolk District Attorney, moved yesterday to dismiss the case.

But it wasn’t all that Bruce Barkett had hoped for.  Not only did the AG announce that they would not prosecute anyone else for the murder, but there was no declaration that Marty Tankleff was innocent.  Bruce sought exoneration.  He got a dismissal.


“Everyone has come to the same decision: Marty Tankleff did not kill his parents,” said his attorney, Bruce Barket of Garden City.

Good try, but not even close.  Bruce is a take-no-prisoners type of lawyer.  This was an all or nothing proposition for him and investigator Jay Saltpeter, both of whom would blow past anything they had to get an exoneration for Marty.  But it never happened, Bruce’s words notwithstanding.


“The issue in this case is not whether there is evidence . . . but whether there is sufficient evidence,” said Benjamin Rosenberg, lead counsel for the attorney general. “The people move to dismiss the indictment.”

In the same motion, prosecutors said they would not proceed against suspects identified by Tankleff’s defense team, saying that “on balance, the defense theory does not appear to be supported by clear evidence.”

So there’s no conclusion that Marty Tankleff is innocent, or that the people his team fingered as the “real murderers” are guilty.  There’s just the promise of a perpetually open question, and a cloud over Marty for the rest of his life.

The saga of Marty Tankleff has suffered from significant confusion subsequent to the low of a post-conviction hearing, where Tankleff lost in a crushing decision, and the high of the Second Department’s reversing his conviction upon the showing of sufficiency impropriety in the investigation and prosecution to render it unreliable.  But there’s a huge gap between a bad conviction and innocence. 

This confusion, between proof of guilt and innocence, has not only permeated the pubic reporting of the case, but the criminal defense bar in New York as well.  At the gala dinner of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers last January, an impromptu award was given the Tankleff “defense team” for the reversal of the conviction, which may have been a bit premature had the AG decided to retry the case.  But details aside, the group had gotten a reversal, and some appreciation of their efforts was appropriate.

But when called to the front, not only the attorneys and investigator ascended the Dais, but so too Marty Tankleff, whose presence at the dinner was itself curious.  Sitting at the Dais was Chief Judge Judy Kaye and Senior Associate Judge Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick (whose name was spelled wrong on the invitation).

As the Tankleff defense team made its way along the Dais, hugging and hand-shaking its way down the line, Marty took a position as the caboose.  It was shockingly awkward as Marty Tankleff, fresh from his murder reversal, came to the two Court of Appeals judges for his public display of affection.  Hands were shaken, but there was no hug or kiss.  After all, Marty was still subject to being tried again and convicted for the murder of his parents.

For most people convicted of murder and imprisoned for 17 years, dismissal is more than sufficient. It’s a great result.  But for Marty Tankleff, who is now attending Hofstra University and has expressed a desire to become a lawyer and work to free the wrongly convicted, dismissal is the best he will ever get.  And it will never be enough.

See also Newsday’s editorial.

Testify or Jail, A Connecticut Lawyer’s Dilemma

From the New York Lawyer, New Haven criminal defense lawyer Gregory Cerritelli has found himself in the one place that no lawyer ever wants to be:  The witness stand.  It all started in the ordinary fashion.

Last year, Cerritelli, of New Haven’s Knight, Conway & Cerritelli, negotiated a misdemeanor plea deal for Lisa Lantz with three years’ imprisonment suspended, plus three years of probation and repayment of the money.

After the sentence was imposed, that’s where most criminal defense lawyers shake their clients’ hands and wish them the best of luck, with the warning to stay out of trouble and heed the probation officer.  Though you tell them to call you if they need anything, one hopes that the call never comes and that the client thereafter leads a happy, accusation-free life.

Unfortunately for Ms. Lantz, that wasn’t to be. 


Last fall, Lantz paid $53,350, and was arrested Oct. 27 for the probation violation of incomplete restitution. This year, a relative offered a check for about $29,000 on the balance, which the state calculated as $32,425. The lower figure is not good enough, said Meriden assistant state’s attorney James Dinnan.

There has to be some back story to this, as it seems unfathomable that Lantz would be violated for failing to complete restitution.  The typical remedy is a tongue lashing by the judge and a new payment schedule based upon the defendant’s ability to pay.  The old saw, you can’t get blood from a rock, applies.  Obviously, that’s not the case here.

So Dinnan moved to have Cerritelli relieved as Lantz’s lawyer so that he could be called as a witness against her.


The issue, he said, is whether Lantz has the ability to meet the restitution requirement of her probation. Cerritelli has already spoken in court about some of what he knows about Lantz’s financial situation. 

“Violation of probation is out of the realm” of the attorney-client privilege in this case, said Dinnan. Furthermore, he added, the probation violation hearing set for Aug. 4 is not a trial.

Not being a Yankee, there may be ethical rules that apply in a different fashion in Connecticut than apply elsewhere in the United States (or many foreign nations).  While the legal fees paid to a lawyer are not covered by privilege, I can see no rationale for other information about the client’s personal situation, including finances, learned during the course of representation to be outside the privilege.

Cerritelli argued that, by relieving him, the court interfered with his client’s right to counsel of choice.  Dinnan’s argument, that this doesn’t implicate the client’s 6th Amendment right, is conclusory at best and inexplicable at worst.  Yet, of course, he got a judge to go along with him.


Cerritelli said Lantz could potentially be forced to serve three years in prison based on the hearing results. “This hearing is every bit as serious as a trial,” Cerritelli said. “And Ms. Lantz’s right to be represented by the counsel of her choice is constitutionally protected. I fully expect her to assert her attorney-client privilege.”

Well, putting Lantz in prison for three years will certainly help to get restitution for the victims.  So what’s the prosecution’s point?

Notably, the prosecution doesn’t seek Cerritelli’s testimony about criminal conduct that the client may have committed while in his care, but removed him as lawyer to engage in a fishing expedition.  At the barest minimum, the prosecution would have to show that it had no other source to ascertain the evidence it seeks before interfering with Lantz’s constitutional right to counsel of choice, and only then after the court has balanced the need with the right.

But then, when it comes to making a showing that a person possesses the wherewithal to pay restitution, there are always a variety of ways to show that someone is holding back and concealing wealth.  Sure, the attorney’s knowledge would be one of the easier paths to obtain the information, but it’s the path that requires the court to trample on the defendant’s constitutional rights.

Something smells very bad with this situation, and I bet there’s more to this story than meets the eye.  Perhaps one of my Connecticut friends could enlighten me?  Based on the report, this strikes me as absurd, most notably with the client attempting to satisfy the restitution requirement by proffering an additional $29,000 and the state rejecting it because it falls slightly short, preferring instead to open this Pandora’s box.  Why?

Cops Pay Homage (and Cash) to Skelos, New King of the Senate

When Joe Bruno announced that he was done with the New York State Senate (and the investigations that swirled around the legitimacy of his ownership), he passed it along to Long Island Senator Dean Skelos.  But the King of the Senate gets more than mere power.  He gets cash.

In case you were wondering how sympathetic Skelos might be to criminal law issues, here’s a list, courtesy of Newsday, of his 30 top contributors:


Empire Dental PAC, $12,000
New York State Court Clerks Association, $12,000
Uniformed Fire Officers Association FDNY Local, $10,450
NYS Troopers PAC, $10,300
New York State AFL-CIO COPE Account, $10,200
Physicians Reciprocal Insurers, $10,000
Nassau County PBA PAC, $9,850
NYS Funeral Directors Association PAC, $9,500
Parents and Children PAC Inc., $9,500
New Yorkers for Affordable Housing, $9,400
Rocco Trotta, of Syosset, $9,350
Medical Society of the State of New York PAC, $9,300
The Life Insurance Council of NY PAC, $9,100
J.Y. Trans PAC, $9,000
KeySpan Energy PAC, $9,000
Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman Eisman, $8,700
LAWPAC of New York, $8,600
1199 SEIU NYS PAF, $8,500
Aetna Inc. PAC, $8,500
Carol Harrison, of Woodsburgh, $8,500
Michael Kerr, of Woodsburgh, $8,500
Zachary Kerr, of New York, $8,500
NYSCOPBA, $8,500
RSA-PAC, $8,500
United Transportation Union PAC, $8,500
Weld for New York, $8,500
Cambridge Engineering and Association, $8,500
Detectives Association of Nassau PAC, $8,350
VOTE/COPE, $8,300
ATU New York COPE Fund, $8,000

Since 2006, Skelos has brought in a reported $1,257,309, more than twice the average for a State Senator.  Note that there are at least seven law enforcement PACs in the top 30.  But then Skelos made his bones being “tough on crime,” and the words “smart on crime” have yet to be spoken.

But if Dean would like to hear a contrary view from time to time, he’s welcome to call.  I’m always here to help.

Taking Judge Posner’s “Ostrich” Debate to the Mats (Update: Roberts/Liptak Mud Wrestling)

Somehow, I suspect that no working lawyer lost sleep over this aspect of 7th Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s decision in United States v. Black.  Not that the scheme to defraud case or the “no harm-ho foul” defense isn’t interesting, though not earth-shattering, but that isn’t why the case is notable now.

In the course of his decision, Judge Posner wrote:


Three more issues need to be discussed. The first is whether an “ostrich” instruction should have been given. The reference of course is to the legend that ostriches when frightened bury their head in the sand. It is pure legend and a canard on a very distinguished bird. Zoological Society of San Diego, Birds: Ostrich, www.sandiegozoo.org/animalbytes/t-ostrich.html (visited June 12, 2008) (“When an ostrich senses danger and cannot run away, it flops to the ground and remains still, with its head and neck flat on the ground in front of it. Because the head and neck are lightly colored, they blend in with the color of the soil. From a distance, it just looks like the ostrich has buried its head in the sand, because only the body is visible”). It is too late, however, to correct this injustice.

Slip op at 12.  Aside from an appreciation of Judge Posner’s writing style, Howard Bashman had a little fun with this paragraph, noting:


And while we are debunking canards (which, by contrast, are birds that can fly), allow me to question the use of the singular “head” in the following sentence from Judge Posner’s opinion: “The reference of course is to the legend that ostriches when frightened bury their head in the sand.”

Judge Posner, with similar humor, responded to Howard’s nit:


Dear Prof. Bashman, to say “ostriches hide their heads in the sand” would imply that each ostrich had more than one head.

Richard Posner

P.S. And yes, canards fly–glad you caught the pun.


Now this is all pretty funny, or perhaps cute would be a better description, over the critical question of whether ostriches hide their head or heads, meaning that multiples ostriches share a single head or individual ostriches have more than one.  Since I enjoy language (and puns), this was the sort of “inside joke” that I appreciated Bashman sharing.

But, as with so many pressing scholarly questions, some professor actually took up arms following this exchange.  University of Pennsylvania linguistics professor Mark Lieberman actually wrote “more than 1600 words” in a post at Language Log scrutinizing precedent to determine whether Bashman or Judge Posner was correct.

Another pressing issue facing society resolved by a scholar.  You can’t make this stuff up.

And, lest I leave you hanging, Conrad Black’s conviction would not have been reversed had Judge Posner chosen the plural rather than singular. 

Update:  As if not to be ignored on issues of great substance, Liptak chimes in at the Times by noting that Chief Justice Roberts, unlike his predecessor, the very model of a modern chief justice, quotes Dylan (Bob, not Thomas) in an otherwise unmemorable dissent.

“The absence of any right to the substantive recovery means that respondents cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack Article III standing,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote. “ ‘When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose.’ Bob Dylan, Like a Rolling Stone, on Highway 61 Revisited (Columbia Records 1965).”

The dawn of a new age?  But not good enough to satisfy the journalist in Liptak, who strains to note:


On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts gets the citation wrong, proving that he is neither an originalist nor a strict constructionist. What Mr. Dylan actually sings, of course, is, “When you ain’t got nothing, you got nothing to lose.”

The larger objection is that the citation is not true to the original point Mr. Dylan was making, which was about the freedom that having nothing conveys and not about who may sue a phone company. (See, e.g., “Me and Bobby McGee.”)

To paraphrase Kris Kristofferson, freedom is just another word for nothing left to write about.  And we can’t forget Janis.

One Juror’s Thoughts on Acquitted Conduct Sentencing

The fundamental wrongfulness of sentencing a person based upon acquitted or uncharged crimes has been reared its ugly head with some regularity, but rarely do we get a glimpse of its impact on a participant who is not engaged in the defense.  But in the case of Antwuan Ball, where a $600 drug deal could put him in prison for 40 years, a window is opened.

By way of brief background, the government’s sentencing argument relies on two propositions, that the crime of selling

 

5 grams of more of crack cocaine authorizes a sentence of “not less than 5 years nor more than 40 years” incarceration. Hence, any sentence which is within the 5-to-40 year range “plainly falls within the authorized sentence.”

 

A sentence falling anywhere within that statutory range is therefore constitutionally appropriate for the crime.

Second, the Court noted that the Booker remedial opinion concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that no limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of the convicted person that a sentencing court may receive and consider, posed no Sixth Amendment problem and permits a sentencing court to consider acquitted conduct.

 

Thus, be adding apples to oranges, the crime for which a defendants stands convicted to the unproven or acquitted “information concerning the background, character, and conduct,” the government seeks to influence the court to sentence a defendant for his bad character and conduct, not because it’s proven but because he can.

When news spread of the government’s sentencing position as to Antwuan Ball, one of his jurors (#6) was moved to action.  Not only because he felt that this was fundamentally wrong for the defendant, but because of the cynical disregard of this position for the men and women who sat on the jury, gave up months of their lives, tried so hard to do the right thing, and ultimately arrived as their verdict.

Juror #6’s letter to District Court Judge Richard W. Roberts is quite a remarkable expression of the dismay of a citizen at how the system has been manipulated and undermined by the facile twists of law and reason that result in the use of acquitted and uncharged conduct in sentencing.  Unlike those who are happy to ignorantly opine that, “screw him, he’s guilty of something so who cares what happens to him,” this is from an ordinary citizen who fulfilled his civic duty and has actual knowledge of what the government could prove.

Just as remarkable is the way Juror #6 is able to express his feelings.  While the entire letter is a must-read, this will give you a sense:

As you remember, Judge Roberts, we spent 8 months listening to the evidence, filling countless court-supplied notebooks, making summaries of those notes, and even creating card catalogues to keep track of all the witnesses and their statements.  We deliberated for over 2 months, 4 days a week, 8 hours a day. We went over everything in detail.  If any of our fellow jurors had a doubt, a question, an idea, or just wanted something repeated, we all stopped and made time.

It seems to me a tragedy that one is asked to serve on a jury, serves, but then finds their work may not be given the credit it deserves.  We, the jury, all took our charge seriously.  We virtually gave up our private lives to devote our time to the cause of justice, and it is a very noble cause as you know, sir. We looked across the table at one another in respect and in sympathy.  We listened, we thought, we argued, we got mad and left the room, we broke, we rested that charge until tomorrow, we went on.

What does it say to our contribution as jurors when we see our verdicts, in my personal view, not given their proper weight. It appears to me that these defendants are being sentenced not on the charges for which they have been found guilty but on the charges for which the District Attorney’s office would have liked them to have been found guilty. Had they shown us hard evidence, that might have been the outcome, but that was not the case.

 

Sentencing is not only wrong because of its impact on the defendant, but because of its smack in the face to those citizens who gave of themselves to see that justice was done.

H/T Berman

The Fallacy of Original Intent

The blawgosphere is abuzz with discussions of Nino Scalia’s first 54 pages of Heller, compared with Justice Steven’s dissent, in discerning what was meant by the Second Amendment.  The discussions center around one of those infamously controversial phrases, original intent.

While use of the term “originalist” causes many to convulse, consider that it isn’t much different that the common resort to “legislative intent” as we argue the meaning of run-of-the-mill statutes in everyday appeals.   Courts love to fall back on such arguments in determining what laws mean because it takes the onus off of them and places it on those old guys, the ones who passed it in the first place.  “We would like to conclude that the law should apply in an intelligent and meaningful way, but we are precluded by the intention of its framers.” 

But this resort to intent is invariably based on expressions that are of dubious reliability, although I can’t think of a single instance when a court recognized that laws, including the Constitution, was enacted in a political forum, and therefore the expressions of the framers as to its purpose, intent, meaning, may have been nothing more than a political sales pitch.

Dale Carpenter at Volokh, along with Orin Kerr, spent a great deal of effort discussing the conflicting sources upon which the sides in Heller based their originalist positions:

That Orin and I think it obvious and inevitable that the justices should as a matter of interpretive principle concentrate so heavily on what commentators, dictionaries and other usages of the 18th century had to say about phrases like “keep arms,” “bear arms,” “the people,” and the “militia,” may only indicate that he and I have bought very much into this method. But the fact that not just Orin and I, but also every justice on the Court, in this rare and pristine constitutional moment, grasped for originalism as at least a cover for their views indicates that something more profound has happened in our constitutional culture.

But no asks the question, what makes us believe that contemporaneous expressions which today are viewed as absolutely trustworthy, if not sacrosanct, were not total hogwash at the time?  While we flinch at the mention of the USA Patriot Act today, knowing full well that its selling point to the public was a total scam and that the Congressional expressions of purpose are utterly worthless from the perspective of understanding the “real” purpose of this mutt law, why do we think politicians were entirely trustworthy way back when?

One of the things that the majority and dissent in Heller makes clear is that there was plenty of old fodder for both sides to rely on to support their positions.  Yet we pretend today that there is a true expression of original intent, just as we pretend that the speeches given by Senators actually provide a reliable basis upon which to discern the meaning of legislation. 

My favorite example of a political sale pitch in the Federalist Papers.  It’s not that I don’t enjoy them, and haven’t used them whenever they serve my purpose.  It’s that they were meant to sell the Constitution like dog chow.  Madison (a/k/a Publius) would have claimed that it cures leprosy if it would help.  It’s not that Madison was a scoundrel, but that he thought that ratification was the best thing for the country and now had to sell it to the public.  But it’s a sale pitch.  And yet it provides a primary source for the interpretation of the Constitution.

Do you wonder whether Madison might have been more cautious if he realized that the Constitution would be interpreted hundreds of years later based upon his sale pitch?

We think of today as being a time of political extremism, but politics back in the 1780s was every bit as rough (and maybe more so) than today.  They were vicious, and lies and deception was typical to achieve their goals.  Sure, we’ve bathed our founding fathers in that white light of purity that makes them appear saintly, even though they were at each others throats constantly, but that doesn’t turn their every statement into gospel.  And yet, we rely on these statements today as unimpeachable proof of their purpose.

I don’t trust original intent, or legislative intent, or any other expression of a politician in the sale and marketing of ideas.  I don’t do it now, and see no reason to think that it was any better before my time.

Are Law Professors Afraid of the Practical Blawgosphere? (Update: Justice Scalia’s Comment)

Before there were many lawyers with blawgs, there were lawprofs.  They had the blawgosphere largely to themselves, with their networks and back and forth banter in the fascinating jargon of the academy.  When the blawgosphere began to expand, with the inclusion of lawyers posting substantively about the issues du jour as well as practical ideas, problems and commentary, we were largely ignored.

That’s when the Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett, came up with the name practical blawgosphere, to express the different path we were traveling, as opposed to that of the academicians.  We, perhaps because we came later or perhaps because we had broader horizons, liberally linked to, discussed and considered the issues that floated around the lawprof blawgosphere.  The favor was rarely returned.

I recall Anne Reed at Deliberations referring to a post of mine with this observation:


And it’s changing the way we see each other.  Back in July, Scott Greenfield was explaining the differences between professor and practitioner bloggers (“They post about academic studies while we post about how young lawyers should never go to court wearing their underpants on the outside, no matter how cool they think it makes them look”). This week he could end a terrific post on the other side of the mortgage crisis with an airy, “H/T Volokh.” 

Anne’s point was that the two blawgospheres were slowly edging closer together, beginning to inter-relate and perhaps even feed off one another.

But this week, with Heller and a few other Supreme Court decisions front and center, it occurred to me that the promise of Anne’s observations remains a long way from realization.  I keep a bunch of blawgs by lawprofs on my feeds, and find some illuminating, frustrating, helpful and ridiculous.  They provide me with ideas for posts here, and I link to them all the time.

What I have not seen is lawprofs doing the same with the practical blawgosphere.  Sure, it happens, but it’s still quite rare and certainly nothing comparable to the way they tussle with each other.  And I’m not just talking about linking to Simple Justice, but to any of the blawgs in the practical blawgosphere.    There were a ton of posts on the same subjects this week, yet almost no cross-fertilization between the two.

Why is this?  The only time you can be assured of the lawprofs showing up in the practical blawgosphere is when you post about how they blew something, or don’t get it, or some equally negative aspect of their writing.  They can’t bear being criticized, and are there within minutes to defend their honor.  But does it have to be negative to catch their attention.  Does the practical blawgosphere offer nothing intellectually positive what merits discussion?

Some of my “must-read” blawgs include Volokh Conspiracy, Concurring Opinions, Sentencing Law and Policy, Prawfs Blawg and Turley.  Other than Turley, who links to no one and (for whatever reasons) exists as an island in the blawgosphere, the others engage in “blawgversations”.  Yet, they really don’t engage in the ideas of real lawyers in the practical blawgosphere in the way they do their fellow lawprofs. 

It could be because trench lawyers fail to offer the level of scholarly discussion that the lawprofs feel merit their attention or acknowledgment.  We don’t use words like “paternalistic pedagogy” as much as they do.  Does this mean that the practical blawgosphere offers nothing of consequence for the scholars?  I don’t believe that to be the case, as there is enormous content and controversy abrew in the practical blawgosphere that would add enormously to the academic blawgosphere’s conversation. 

Rather, I believe it to be the product of an insularity, a circling the wagons if you will, because of the lawprofs need to prove themselves to their peers and use blawging as a weapon to prove their worth within a community that only cares about its own internal status structure.  In other words, they don’t really care much about the ideas or issue, but about how they are viewed by their academic brethren and how it will impact on their tenure track.  The practical blawgosphere doesn’t help them achieve higher status, so as far as they are concerned, it doesn’t really exist.

While hiding behind their scholarly demeanor, this really reflects a very unfortunate anti-intellectualism bent.  They aren’t really concerned about the issues as much as the impact of their brilliance on their peers.  And there’s no purpose in spending their time discussing anything in the practical blawgosphere when they could be impressing their fellow scholars by focusing exclusively on themselves.

So I ask a question of the lawprofs (and I know some of you will read this, so let’s see if you’re willing to come forward and answer this question):  Why are you afraid of the practical blawgosphere?  Why do you remain insular when there is so much out there to challenge your theories? 

I suspect that we will get no answers from the lawprofs.  I doubt any will have the balls to step forward and respond.  But to my fellow blawgers in the practical blawgosphere, allow me to say that your posts, your ideas and your commentary is every bit as thoughtful, helpful and significant as the lawprofs.  You’re just able to express yourselves without the pretentious use of jargon.  And the lawprofs are scared to death to admit that they don’t hold a monopoly on meaningful legal thought.

Update:  While the lawprofs are hiding their head(s) in the sand, Justice Scalia, bold as ever, is happy to speak out on this topic:


Scalia also reiterated his feeling, expressed in other interviews, that too many of the best minds in the U.S. are wasting away in law. “I think that any system that requires that many of the country’s best minds, and they are the best minds, is too complex,” he said. “If you look at the figures, where does the top of the class in college go to? It goes into law. They don’t go into teaching. Now I love the law, there is nothing I would rather do but it doesn’t produce anything.”

I guess they don’t go into teaching, do they?

Update 2:  CrimLaw’s Ken Lammers, who has been around the blawgosphere far longer than I (which is why he looks so much older than me) corrects my timeline errors and general misunderstandings about who was here first, etc.  He notes that back when he started, about 70 years ago, lawprofs were not yet deeply involved in blawging, other than Glenn Reynolds (InstaPundit), who was a lawprof but didn’t blawg on lawprof topics.

Ken takes us through the entire history of blawging to point out that those of us who weren’t there at the beginning cannot appreciate how the blawgosphere developed the way it did.  To cut to the chase, all the extant problems are, per Ken, his fault entirely.  He says he’s sorry and he won’t do it again.

LexMonitor Week 2: Francisco Franco is Still Dead

Not that I’m out to get Kevin O’Keefe, but I decided to follow up on my post of last Sunday on the improvements to LexMonitor. Having slammed it pretty hard, and Kevin, being gracious as always, responding that he appreciated the comments and sought to improve his product, it seemed only right to check back and note its progress.  Just so it’s clear, I want to see LexMonitor succeed.

It pains me to say this, but there is no progress in sight. Perhaps I’m missing the point of LexMonitor, which I understood to be a place where the day’s best posts from around the blawgosphere could be found, as selected by “editor” Rob La Gatta, as well as posts in specific content areas (such as criminal law) and tagged posts, such as New York.

It’s old. The posts are old. The news is old. There’s nothing new there. Nothing. Of the four “editor’s choice” posts across the top, they are all from last Friday, and frankly they weren’t cutting edge posts then. Particularly disappointing is that most of the posts come from the obvious characters, like the WSJ Law Blog, or one of the other “usual suspects.”

The title states that this is supposed to be a daily review of the best the blawgosphere has to offer. The concept is bold. I think we would all love to see LexMonitor fulfill its goal. But I’m left with the feeling that, as of now, it’s hype without substance.

I do not believe that anybody is parsing the blawgosphere for great posts. I suspect the posts are arbitrarily picked and then left there until somebody gets around to changing them. The subject areas and tagged posts are utterly worthless; Indeed, the same New York post from last week is still there. Are you telling me that there have been no posts in a week that would be tagged for New York?

The bottom line is that no one needs a stagnant aggregator of old posts. Perhaps Kevin and Rob are busy working in the background trying to get their program tuned up (particularly since it crashed my browser during my visit today), which would be fine if you put up an “under construction” page, but if you’re trying to tell me that LexMonitor is alive and active, then it’s a case of another great idea that failed in its execution.

I don’t plan on returning to check out LexMonitor again until Kevin tells me it’s ready for prime time. And should I get that message from Kevin, I hope he’s got this worked out sufficiently that it not only functions properly, but offers something of real use. It would be great to have LexMonitor fulfill its purpose. As of today, it’s just another great idea in need of execution.

New Florida Chief Justice: Treat People Fairly

From Doug Berman via the hardest working man in the blawgosphere, Howard Bashman, comes this quote from Florida’s new Chief Justice, Peggy Quince, during her swearing in ceremony:

Chief Justice Peggy Quince, the first black woman to head any branch of Florida government, used her swearing in ceremony to call for a new commission to fight a widespread perception of unequal treatment in the courts. “No one should come out of this court system feeling that they were treated unfairly,” Quince said. “You may lose, but you should not feel that you were treated unfairly.”

Quince vowed to continue a push by her predecessor to reform a criminal-justice system that spends $250 million a year housing defendants too mentally ill to stand trial. “Our jails and prisons cannot continue to be the psychiatric hospitals that no longer exist,” she said.

Aside from the fact that this is from Florida, not usually considered a state on the cutting edge of anything aside from hanging chads, this is perhaps the most profound understanding one could hope for from a Chief Justice.  Courts must, be definition, have winners and losers, but the greatest failing of our collective court system is that litigants leave feeling that they were treated unfairly. 

Justice Quince is a 60 year old former prosecutor and appellate judge.  It’s hard to know whether her sense of purpose comes from her earlier or later experience, but the experience in the well, as opposed to the sanitary chambers of an appeals court, would seem to have the greatest impact on her appreciation of the fact that people feel that the system is arrogant, callous and stacked against them. 

Trial judges, some of whom come into the job with the hope of providing both the atmosphere as well as the reality of fairness, tend to grow hard shells around themselves so that they can make their numbers in a system that would do better moving cattle than people.  Becoming inured to human misery, both caused externally and internally, is one of the most destructive forces to the law.  Perhaps Justice Quince, never having sat as a trial level judge, has managed to achieve her position without growing that hard shell to protect herself from the destruction caused by the system.

But she is not the first Chief Judge to take office with a focus on something other than herself, her patron or the greater glory of the law.  Judy Kaye tried to do so as well in New York, but her vision was far more narrow than Justice Quince, and her accomplishments never exceeded her vision.

Chief Justice Quince’s statement gets to the heart of the matter.  To say that the court system should be, in fact, fair is too obvious.  But to recognize that the perception of unfair treatment by litigants is at the heart of disrespect for the courts, the judges and ultimately the law, is both simple and profound. 

I wish Chief Justice Quince the best of luck in accomplishing her goal.  And I’m amazed that Gov. Charlie Crist, who didn’t bother to show up for the swearing in ceremony, would have a Chief Justice with such vision, empathy and understanding.