Author Archives: SHG

Scruggs Judge Biggers: Blogger Is Worthy

While most people who care about the Dickie Scruggs sentence tomorrow are more focused on how much they love/hate the lawyer and the case, Slater at the WSJ Law Blog has pulled a gem out of the middle of the mess for those of us in the practical blawgosphere.

While media outlets were busily trying to get their hands on the letters of support provided by Dickie’s friends (remember the hoopla about the letters when Mel Weiss was on the chopping block?) after the letters were held tight to the vest by the court.  This, of course, was totally unacceptable, as it denied the press the opportunity to find out who was backing leniency for Dickie and then make fun of them.

As is often the case leading up to criminal sentencing, letters supporting Scruggs and asking for leniency have been pouring into the chambers of the judge presiding over the case, Neal Biggers. But until today, we had no idea what the letters said; unlike those submitted in the cases involving Bill Lerach and Mel Weiss, the letters concerning Scruggs had been kept private.

That is, until the Mississippi press got involved. Several news organizations filed motions with Judge Biggers, arguing that the letters were of public interest and that they should be allowed to see them.

Fair enough, since that’s what the press is supposed to do.  Courts are public.  Letters submitted to judges to influence their decision should be public as well.  And if you don’t want the press to get their hands on your intimate thoughts about Dickie, then don’t write a letter.  Otherwise, whatever you offer a judge in the execution of his public function is part of the record.

But there was a little finger in the mighty fist of the media that merits further attention.


Judge Biggers ruled in favor of the pubs, which included the blog folo. (From the Law Blog Blogger Victory of the Day: “The court has been advised by readers of the blog Folo that [folo writer Tom Freeland] has been exceptionally thorough, energetic and accurate in his writings on this case and the court will and does hereby make an exception for his status as a blogger and allows him equal credentials with the traditional press in this matter.)

Say what?  A blogger?  A blogger is worthy of “equal credentials with the traditional press?”  And so comes the good news, and the bad. 

The fact that Judge Biggers gave Tom Freeland of folo the time of day is big.  This is a recognition that blawgs exist and, maybe, just maybe, carry sufficient weight to make it onto the radar.  Given the general view that the blawgosphere is the home of lunatic rantings of people with too much time on their hands, recognition like this is an important first step to legitimacy for those who earn it with their thoughtful and incisive coverage of significant legal events and issues.

But now the bad news.  Judge Biggers recognizes Tom Freeland because of his “exceptionally thorough, energetic and accurate in his writings on this case.”  Now if a blawg is anything close to the equivalent of the traditional press, what gives Judge Biggers the right to pass judgment on the quality of the blawg before deigning to recognize it as worthy?  If a judge thinks the New York Times’ coverage of a case sucks, can he deny the rag access as being unworthy?  Not on your life. 

The exercise of the First Amendment freedom of the press does not depend on meeting the approval of a judge as to the worthiness of reporting.  He doesn’t have to like it, admire it or consider it particularly energetic.  It doesn’t have to meet any judges’ approval.  But apparently, not so for blawgs.

So while Judge Biggers has ordained folo worthy of traditional press treatment, he has made clear that such an honor is a privilege, not a right.  Only if a blawg meets the judge’s standards will it receive such a concession, which means that any blawg that doesn’t will wallow in the gutter of the practical blawgosphere. 

It also caught my eye that Judge Biggers largess was bestowed only on folo, and there’s no mention of any other blawgs that have followed the Dickie Scruggs case in minute detail.  Could that be because some other blawg has lost interest in Dickie and couldn’t be bothered to gain access to the supporting letters, or because they didn’t meet Judge Biggers criteria for worthiness? 

Book Review: Your Witness, Lessons on Cross-Examination (Update)

When Steven Molo and James Figliulo came up with the idea to put together Your Witness, Lessons on Cross-Examination and Life From Great Chicago Trial Lawyers (Law Bulletin Publishing, 2008), they undertook a big task.  And they pulled it off.

The book is a compilation of 50 lawyers war stories, each telling a tale designed to make a point about some aspect of cross-examination.  As you can imagine, getting 50 lawyers to put words on paper, especially without an advance retainer, and then coordinate what they have to say to a degree sufficient to produce a cogent book isn’t easy.  Like herding cats, great lawyers can be notoriously uncooperative.
    
                               Your Witness: Lessons on Cross-Examination

But somehow, Molo and Figliulo managed to get this book done, and have produced a remarkable piece of work.  As the cover says, these are the stories of great Chicago lawyers.  So it comes as no surprise that the book is Chicago-centric, and some of the names are better known there then elsewhere, though many are nationally known trial lawyers.  If you’ve been in this game for a while, you’re bound to know at least a few of the writers, and that will give you a good appreciation of the quality of the group that Molo and Figliulo have put together.

The book consists of 50 short chapters, each essentially a vignette presented by the writer of his experiences in court.  Some have a few war stories, while others just one, but each chapter seeks to demonstrate one higher order concept of cross.  This isn’t about cross-examination as taught in law school, but the fine points that distinguish the master cross-examiner from the yeoman.

What is fascinating about the book is that the points frequently conflict, often trip over one another and, to the unobservant, are too vague to provide a clear rule to follow.  That’s the trap for the inexperienced, and this is not a book to bolster an inexperienced lawyer’s desire for a quick and dirty list of rules that will turn him into an expert overnight.  It’s all about the subtlety of the fluid nature of cross-examination, and more importantly, about appreciating rules when there are no rules.

One of my favorite chapters is by former Cook County Judge, Gene Pincham.  Plain spoken, he offers small bites from his 50 years in the courtroom that ultimately lead to a theme that repeats throughout the book:  Once you know “the rules,” find those that work for you and be yourself.  While we can watch and admire how other lawyers perform, that doesn’t mean that we can put on their face and make it work.

Lawyers are natural raconteurs.  They LOVE to tell stories of their exploits in court, so the concept of this book appeals to our base instincts.  Unfortunately, the stories don’t always come out with the details intact, and Molo and Figliulo disclaim the accuracy of any particular tale.  It’s not terribly important, however, since the point is to provide entertaining stories that make a point, not to provide an historically accurate recounting.  Forgive the lawyers their trespasses, as it could ruin a good story.

On the other hand, you have to really enjoy reading war stories to get through this book.  Frankly, other lawyers’ war stories don’t hold as much interest for me as they may for others.  Some are rather pedestrian.  Others  are shamelessly self-aggrandizing (shocking, right?).  And still others aren’t as good as my own war stories. 

I found it curious that the editors chose Tom Durkin for the opening chapter, since his first few paragraphs consisted primarily of name-dropping, which nearly made me put the book down and leave it in a place where I would never find it again.  Not being a Chicago lawyer, I couldn’t care less who Durkin knows or hung out with, and this homage to himself and his coterie of big-time Chicago lawyer friends was a real turn-off.  But once I got past it, forcing myself to avoid regurgitation, it was worth the effort.

The book can be spotty from chapter to chapter, as some stories are more interesting, some points more sophisticated and some writing simply better or more readable than others.  But I don’t imagine that can be avoided when dealing with 50 different lawyers, even with the best of editing.

Also unavoidable is the lawyer tendency to be pedantic, resorting to the typical puffery of the greatness of the law, platitude-envy and cliché.  Lawyers, especially those who have enjoyed substantial financial success at the practice of law, espouse its wonder and majesty.  They can’t help themselves, and they feel it would make them seem disingenuous to enjoy the benefits of the law while admitting that it’s anything short of the most wonderful system ever invented. 

This too is a forgivable sin, and largely a sign of the old-time lawyer requirement that you don’t bite the hand that feeds you.   Just take it in stride and understand that these lawyers know just what a lousy system it is, but they will never admit it publicly and will instead spout the party line.  Just ignore it.

As light reading for the experienced lawyer and layperson, this book will be fun if you enjoy war stories.  Imagine hanging at the courthouse bar, listening to the guy at the end who is buying beers and telling about his many victories.  If you’re still willing to sit there and listen when he stops picking up the tab, then this book is for you.  There are no magic secrets revealed in Your Witness, and chances are you’ve already learned everything the book has to tell the hard way.

If you have zero tolerance for ambiguity, this book will make you crazy.  But then, you are probably in the wrong line of work as well.  One of the pervasive points of this book is that cross-examination is all about ambiguity, and this is a great lesson in itself.  Sure, you want rules.  Tough, it doesn’t work that way.  Get over it.

For the newer lawyer who wants to learn the tricks that most of us get after making 20 years of mistakes, Your Witness is a fast-track course in the finely nuanced art and science of cross-examination.  No, it won’t make you a better cross-examiner, but it will tell you how great cross-examiners do it.  After that, it’s up to you to figure out which points will work for you, absorb them, run them through your head a few thousand times and put them effectively to use. 

So if you think you’re doing a great job as a trial lawyer, but have less than 20 years in the well, chances are that Your Witness will have plenty to offer you, as well as save you (and your client) from learning it the way the writers did.  They don’t call it trial and error for nothing, you know.

Update:  Mark Bennett’s review can be found here, and Mark Draughn, the WindyPundit reviews here. 

I received an emaiil from Steve Molo, who reminded me that:  “the author royalties from Your Witness are being donated to the Chicago Bar Foundatio
n ,which supports about 40 not-for-profits that bring legal services to the less fortunate in the Chicago area.”

No Death Penalty for Child Rape

The Supremes, by Justice Kennedy in a 5-4 decision, have rejected Louisiana’s effort to impose the death penalty for the rape of a child.  Tom Goldstein at SCOTUS Blog characterized the decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana as “barring” the death penalty for child rape.  And yet, there’s a clarity issue again.

From the syllabus, this is the Court’s holding:

Held: The Eighth Amendment bars Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim’s death.

By adding the qualifying phrases, what is the Court trying to say?  The significance of “Where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim’s death,” is hard to understand.  If an act results in, and was intended to result in, a victim’s death, then it’s got a special name:  Murder. 

So why, when it’s an up or down question, add in this qualifying phrase?  Can it be chalked up to sloppy writing, or is it intended to distinguish a new classification of crime, the rape/murder of a child, that will be treated differently than your garden variety murder?  Perhaps when the Supreme hold the death penalty unconstitutional for the murder of an adult, this will allow them to distinguish the rape/murder of a child?

It could happen. 

See also Orin’s quick analysis at Volokh, which seems to think well of this quote from Justice Alito’s dissent:

These policy arguments, whatever their merits, are simply not pertinent to the question whether the death penalty is “cruel and unusual” punishment. The Eighth Amendment protects the right of an accused. It does not authorize this Court to strike down federal or state criminal laws on the ground that they are not in the best interests of crime victims or the broader society.

Orin also raises the question of how to square the Court’s holding, that the death penalty is unconstitutional for crimes not resulting in death, with the death penalty for treason.

My initial reaction is that these nitpick individual points raised by the majority.  While they may be sound arguments, they fail to address the totality of the majority holding.

Special Districts Try Their Hand at Spinning

When I received my latest water district “newsletter”, the message was clear.  The landed aristocracy had no intention of giving up its little fiefdoms without a fight.  The front page was all about how the evil state and county governments were trying to destroy our water, and how our local water district commissioners were fighting for us.  This newsletter, of course, was done on the ratepayer’s dime.

As Anne Michaud reports on Viewsday, the special districts have joined together to hire a point man to lead the fight:


Dear Special District Official:

These are challenging times for special districts throughout New York State. Prosecutors, high elected state officials and overly energetic politicians, are jockeying for promotion by singling out the operations of special districts in an attempt to paint them as greedy, mismanaged and out of control.



It was with those concerns in mind that we have created the SPECIAL DISTRICT ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK STATE INC. as a way of defending what we do; our functions and how we police ourselves to guaranty that the public gets the fullest range of services.


Just about any group that renders services to the public has a group representing it. Whether its libraries, volunteer firemen, water providers or countless other organizations they are there to speak up for their members.


The mouthpiece is “Arthur “Jerry” Kremer, president. Kremer is a former member of the Assembly, who chaired its Ways and Means Committee and now works as a registered lobbyist.”

It might be viewed as ironic that the issue with special districts is their cost to the tax and ratepayers, and that the fight for their preservation will be similarly at public expense.    Jerry’s letter concludes:

The time is now to protect the special districts of New York State from headline seeking politicians who wish to undermine our every day service to the people of this state.

After all, the special district people aren’t seeking headlines.  They do it for cash and prizes.

Anne’s post breaks clean of the Viewsday approach of “take no positions” and makes a clear statement:

Anyone who’s been following this story knows that several of Nassau County’s top elected officials are critical of special districts and would like to see them consolidated. Not only do they waste money by providing overlapping services — in trash disposal, for example — but they also operate outside of public scrutiny. This has allowed them to run wild.

Some special districts pay meter readers $93,000 a year. Others provide full, free health benefits for board members — boards elsewhere in New York State are staffed by volunteers. Some districts hold meeting after meeting, so that the board can rack up $20,000 in per-diem charges for unnecessary conferencing. At the Water Authority of Great Neck North, the board approved a big-screen television, gas and insurance for vehicles, and even a home for its paid staff. These people are living large — at taxpayer expense.

It’s not necessarily the concept of special districts that presents the problem, but their greedy, hidden and frequently unlawful execution of their duties.  Hiring Jerry Kramer to try to run a counter-smear campaign may just be the move that makes the public recognize how ridiculous this has all become.  Then again, with so many issues and so little interest, who knows.

In any event, it’s gratifying to see Anne’s blog post, and to see Viewsday begin to his its stride.  Let’s hope they keep it up.

Drunk Driving, Crime or Not?

Following the Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett’s, post on DWI being a “victimless” crime, Shawn Matlock, Republican criminal defense lawyer has decided to “one-up” Bennett (who, by the way, had a great profile of him in the Houston Chronicle) and argues that drunk driving should not be a crime at all.

Ah, those Republicans, always arguing about how their individual right to drink (no mention of gin, but we know the gig) trumps any effort by government to rein them in.

I read through Shawn’s post a couple of times and, to be frank, remain unclear about why he thinks DWI shouldn’t be a crime.  He writes:


DWI should not be a crime. There I said it. I don’t think the criminal justice system should be consumed with the “crime” of DWI. I would venture to say 85% of misdemeanor court dockets are DWI cases. Think of the efficiency we could have in our justice system without DWIs bogging us down. But that’s not the reason I think DWI should not be a crime.

So it’s not because DWIs clog the docket.  Fair enough.  So why?


I would say around 70% of the people that come to see me about a DWI are more concerned with their drivers license than on the fact they might get a criminal conviction that is never going away. There is more genuine concern about losing their license than the possibility they might go to jail. Something is wrong with that.

But you’re in Texas, Shawn.  We can’t expect rational thinking (note that I always try to include a gratuitous slam against Texas whenever possible).  So why?


Money, money, money.

Of course government tries to capitalize on DWI.  It tries to capitalize on anything it can get away with, which generally means that any subset of inappropriate behavior without a well-financed lobbying group is going to get financially penalized.  That’s only to be expected.

As Bennett astutely notes, the only different between a basic DWI arrest and one where someone is killed is “dumb luck.”  The wrong is not that the drunk driver mowed someone down, but that he drove drunk in the first place.  Everything after that is mere kismet.  Most make it home without causing any harm.  Some kill people.  But the conduct at risk is exactly the same, driving when incapable of doing so safely because of volitional behavior.

While the penalties for ordinary drunk driving have gotten way out of hand, pandering to the visceral reaction of the public to the tragedies that happen when the drunk kills, that doesn’t make the act less criminal. 

So we are busy dumping on drunk drivers, using them as a piggy bank and a punching bag.  That doesn’t make the conduct any better, or reduce the degree of moral culpability for putting the rest of society at risk because you feel like having a couple of brewskies (or gins, as you Republicans prefer). 

It’s a crime.  It should be a crime.  If you want to complain about the ridiculously harsh penalties, that’s another matter.  But DWI is properly a crime.

New York’s Finest Get Tasers

Tasers are coming to the New York City Police Department, prompted by a RAND Corporation study and such killings as Sean Bell, according to this New York Times editorial. 


In 2007, after a Queens man, Sean Bell, was killed by police fire, Mr. Kelly asked RAND to recommend ways to minimize police shooting. The study, released earlier this month, made several suggestions, including training police to avoid indiscriminate firing. The Taser proposal has attracted the most attention.

Well, it’s pretty obvious that training police to avoid indiscriminate firing isn’t going to work, so no point in wasting time with that.  Without being facetious, New York has a monster police force of over 37,000 officers.  Training notwithstanding, it’s naive to think that training alone will solve anything with that many chances for something to go wrong.

So Ray Kelly has turned to plan B, the Taser panacea.  Given the options, it’s not unexpected and, probably, not a bad move.  But this too is not sufficient standing alone.  You can’t just pass out tens of thousand of Tasers to a bunch of cops and say, “be careful out there.”

The gist of the editorial is that before the deployment of Tasers, rules of engagement must be in place.


If more Tasers are deployed in New York City, strict conditions would have to be imposed on who could use them and under what circumstances. They might make sense as a last-resort alternative to lethal force, but it would be folly to allow them to be used in more routine situations like crowd control or policing political demonstrations. Nor should they be seen as the full answer to the problem of police shootings.

The greatest fear about Tasers is that they will become the option of choice for the lazy, stupid or angry cop.  Sass a cop, get Tasered.  Move too slowly, get Tasered.  Bother a cop during a donut break, get Tasered.  We’ve watched this happen across the country (and in Canada), and it’s going to happen in New York as well. 

Frankly, it’s likely to happen with greater frequency in New York, given the numbers and attitudes.  Eventually, they will kill somebody.  It won’t be on purpose, but the person will be just as dead as if it was.  Then we’ll have another scandal, another protest, recriminations and a review of the department’s policies and practices.  Why not just jump to the front and put strict rules in place before someone dies?

Incidentally, I submitted an op-ed on this very subject to Newsday more than a week ago.  Don’t bother looking for it, as they decided not to run it.  Too bad they got skunked by the Times.  Perhaps the New York Times editorial board has a broader understanding of problems.  Perhaps Newsday just didn’t like my piece.  But then, it’s not like the Newsday editorial board wrote an editorial of their own, as the Times did. 

Was DOJ Hiring “Corrupt”?

The New York Times reports that a report by the Department of Justice Inspector General has revealed that hiring for the Honors Program began cutting first level applicants based on political and ideological affiliations.


“Many qualified candidates” were rejected for the department’s honors program because of what was perceived as a liberal bias, the report found. Those practices, the report concluded, “constituted misconduct and also violated the department’s policies and civil service law that prohibit discrimination in hiring based on political or ideological affiliations.”

According to the report, it started under Attorney General John Ashcroft in 2002, and picked up steam under Alberto Gonzalez in 2006.


Applications that contained what were seen as “leftist commentary” or “buzz words” like environmental and social justice were often grounds for rejecting applicants, according to e-mails reviewed by the inspector general’s office. Membership in liberal organizations like the American Constitution Society,Greenpeace, or the Poverty and Race Research Action Council were also seen as negative marks.

Affiliation with the Federalist Society, a prominent conservative group, was viewed positively.

The issue arises out of the foundational belief that career attorneys, the ones who serve regardless of which political party owns the White House at any given time, should be hired, retained and promoted on merit rather than ideological devotion.  Political appointees, on the other hand, are supposed to be political and similarly expected to pack their bags and go home at the end of their rabbi’s term, to be replaced by the next crop of political appointees.

But is this really a scandal?  When Orin Kerr applied for (and was accepted) to the DOJ Honors Program during the Clinton Administration in 1997, the vetting was hardly as overt as the Inspector General’s report says.  On the other hand, Orin suggests that it wasn’t as pure as driven snow either:


Although I’m not aware of anything like this happening during the Clinton years, I doubt politics was entirely irrelevant to hiring at the time. When I applied to the Honors Program in the fall of 1997 (and was accepted), it was generally understood among conservative/libertarian applicants that being conservative/libertarian was a negative on a DOJ Honors Program application. It wasn’t necessarily an automatic ding, except of course at the Civil Rights Division. But it was a negative in an intensely competitive process. As a result, it was common not to list extracurricular activities that signaled conservative/libertarian viewpoints and that were the kind of thing that an applicant might or might not list on a resume depending on the job. I followed that practice in my case. I remember thinking at the time that I wouldn’t have gotten the job otherwise.

It would come as no surprise that hiring decisions by any agency of the Executive Branch of government would involve some element of political or ideological bias.  Nor does this strike me as inherently wrong.  When a party’s candidate for President takes office, part of the baggage he brings with him is the belief that his ideological position is right.  It’s natural that he (and his political appointees) would view those who share his ideology are similarly right.  Why wouldn’t they favor applicants who are right over those who are wrong?

This is particularly true for DOJ applicants.  Part of the job of a Justice attorney is to exercise discretion, and it makes perfect sense that hiring decision would include an expectation that discretion will be consistent with the guiding philosophy of those in charge.  No sane person hires someone to make decisions based upon a philosophy inconsistent with vision of right and wrong.

But the difference here was that the DOJ used such things as club membership and “buzz words” to make their first level cuts.  Put the American Constitution Society on your application, and you were assured that it would sail straight through to the circular file.

It’s simplistic practice.  It’s poor management.  And it’s too flagrant.  But it’s not shocking, given the overly politicized nature of Washington practice.  Given the ideological divisions of America over this period, which were as close to open warfare as this country has seen since the Vietnam War era, should we have expected any less?

Perhaps this report will prove sufficiently embarrassing that future administrations will limit their ideological input into career attorney hiring to the basics: qualifications and sound discretion.  It will likely never be entirely devoid of ideological influence, but at least it won’t be so flagrant.  But to expect the political appointees (and their minions) to rise above political or ideological influence entirely is unrealistic. 

Sound discretion, by definition, has an ideological component of what’s right and wrong.  So think about this when you vote.

Justice Thomas says I’m a Sword

It takes a while to reach the end of a 49 page Supreme Court decision.  They aren’t the juiciest of readings, and they use a lot of words to say things that could be said in much simpler language.  But I finally got to the very end of Justice Clarence Thomas’ dissent in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, and found a nugget that compels me to write.

At pages 48-9 of the slip opinion, Justice Thomas writes:


But we have never suggested that the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel “for his defence” entails a right to use counsel as a sword to contest pretrial detention. To the contrary, we have flatly rejected that notion, reasoning that a defendant’s liberty interests are protected by other constitutional guarantees. [Gouveia, 467 U. S., at 190] (“While the right to counsel exists to protect the accused during trial-type confrontations with the prosecutor, the speedy trial right  exists primarily to protect an individual’s liberty interest,” including the interest in reducing the “ ‘impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail’ ”). (Hyperlink added)

That’s nuts!  Having a lawyer represent a defendant who is before a court on the issue of whether he should be held on bail, have his liberty restricted, at the request and insistence of either the police or the prosecutor, constitutes using “counsel as a sword to contest pretrial detention.”  That’s positively loony.

It’s not that I don’t like the image of the criminal defense lawyer as a “sword”.  It makes us look pretty darn cool and manly.  I see myself as a massive Scottish Claymore.  I am definitely not some dainty rapier or girlie foil.  The sword of justice!  How cool is that?

But my flights of fantasy aside, Justice Thomas’ attempt to reverse the role of defense counsel from the shield to the sword has crossed the line into the absurd.  The defendant does not take the initiative, demanding that the judge (or magistrate as was the case in Rothgery) free him immediately or else.  Or better yet, demand that the judge set bail on the arresting officer for levying a frivolous and outrageous accusation of criminal conduct against the defendant.

And since when is speedy trial the only protection for a defendant’s liberty interest?  Not to mention, the speedy trial right exists not only for the benefit of the defendant, but for society to assure it that criminal prosecutions move forward with appropriate speed and the public is assured that crimes are dealt with in a timely fashion. 

While this bit of foolery at the very back end of the Rothgery dissent is almost entirely without real world consequence, it should not go entirely unnoticed.  Some day Justice Thomas may author a decision that affects a case that matters.  On that day, we should remember fondly gems such as this.  A sword indeed.

The Problem with SCOTUS

This term’s crop of decisions out of the Supremes is a very real problem.  While the lawprofs obsess over 5-4 decisions and parse each for intellectual integrity and faithful adherence to precedent, lawyers in the trenches look for something different.  Actual Answers.  And we’re not getting them.

The Rothgery decision is a perfect example.  It has generated mass confusion, leaving commentators all over the place as to what it’s supposed to mean. 

The Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbitrator of constitutionality.  It’s purpose is to provide the courts of our nation, and hence the people of our nation, with clear guidance as to what the law is.  The Supreme Court has failed to do so. 

It’s like a tease, taking cases and leading us on to believe that we will finally get some answers to questions that plague the courts.  And then, a bunch of words that may (or may not) resolve one question, but leaves us with a bunch of new questions to flesh out the rule.  In other words, we are no better off after the case is decided then we were before.

Of particular concern is the game being played where the court expressly refuses to determine some critical aspect of an issue, whether under the guise that it is not before them, or the record is inadequate, or “it need not be decided” for lack of a better excuse.  These are extraordinarily smart people, and they have incredibly smart people supporting them.  They know that their decision fails to serve any real purpose unless it covers the issue in its entirety, addresses the new questions that arise from their answer to the old question.  They know what it means to provide meaningful guidance.  And still, they refuse to do it.

Rothgery was a disaster of a decision.  Not because of how it came out, but because it was so lacking in clarity, and so limited in scope, that it accomplishes nothing.  Who needs a Supreme Court that accomplishes nothing? 

The bottom line, with all due respect to the lawprofs, is that courts exist to resolve issues for real people.  To do so requires clarity of thought and expression, together with a level of completeness to their decision that serves to tell regular people, not to mention us trench lawyers, how to conduct ourselves.  We need issues resolved. They are not giving us answers.  The Supreme Court is failing us.

In many instances, the issues taken up by the Supremes are so limited, perhaps even trivial, that we don’t feel much heat as a result of their partial decision-making, or their indecipherable holdings.  While certainly a warning of problems ahead, such decisions aren’t important enough to society to raise voices in concern.  But this week may well prove to be very, very different.  This may be the week that the Supreme Court decides one of the most significant issues to impact society in decades.  This may be the week of Heller.

District of Columbia v. Heller could cause a seismic shift in society.  It could hold that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental constitutional right.  It could hold that laws restricting this right must pass the strict scrutiny test.  And it could wreak havoc upon our society if it is consistent with the half-baked decisions that the Court has issued of late.

Should the Court open the door in Heller, but fail to address the many obvious questions that arise from such a decision, it could open the door to a decade (if not more) of confusion, litigation, inconsistency and irrationality, as people, legislators and courts try to sift their way through the application of a broad rule without any real parameters. 

This will cause chaos.  It will throw the legal world into disarray.  It will cause harm, expense and anger.  It will put people into prison who may have committed no crime, but won’t know because the Court neglected to provide answers to the obvious questions.  It is unacceptable.

Perhaps the justices (and those who provide support) are too intelligent, paralyzed by their brilliance from providing fully fleshed-out answers to the questions before them.  Perhaps they are disconnected from the need for guidance in the trenches, satisfied with their product and oblivious to the fact that those of us in the trenches who rely on their every word can’t make use of decisions that beg more questions than they answer.  Maybe internal politics precludes them from providing fully formed answers to pressing questions, leaving us with nothing more than a decision unworthy of the tree that was killed. 

But one thing has become clear to me.  The Supreme Court has failed to deliver this term.  If they cannot issue a decision that provides meaningful guidance on how courts should decide cases, people should behave and other branches of government should conduct their affairs, then there is no reason for the Supreme Court to exist. 

I pray they do a better job in Heller.  I fear they won’t.

Nice Letter, Lawyer Letter

Few things generate as much anger from non-lawyers as the lawyer letter.  When I posted about lawyer letters the other day, following Patterico’s and Jeff Jarvis’ complaints about the APs handling of their silly quotation demands, a comment was left by my buddy Mark, the WindyPundit.  I wrote that a letter was just words, and this is how Mark reacted:


Almost everything a lawyer does is just words, so that’s not exactly a comfort.

And maybe it’s not just words, maybe it’s notice of some kind—an official requirement before the next step. Is there some response I have to make to preserve my options? Did the letter start some clock running that will ring later on?

Whenever I get a letter that someone spent over $100 to write (maybe way over $100), it gets my attention. If I have to pay a lawyer to read the letter for me, it could easily cost more than all my out-of-pocket expenses for a year’s worth of blogging.

A lot depends on whether the AP tried a lighter hand first. Did they originally send a letter that starts something like “Hi, I’m Bob Smith at Associated Press, and we just noticed something about your website that caught our attention…”?

Aside from the issue I raised in response, that the idea that there should be required precursors to lawyer letter, where “nice” overtures precede the demanding ones, it struck me that there is a substantial gap in the appreciation of why letters are sent by lawyers in the first place.  I want to try to clear this up.

A short time back, I was asked by a client to help with a problem he was having with a neighbor.  My client was the former CEO of a major corporation.  His neighbor is a professional athlete in a major sport.  This is a volatile mix.  While both are accustomed to getting their way, the added element of celebrity brings with it a sense of entitlement that makes the ordinary rules inapplicable. 

Neighbor problems tend to be some of the ugliest around.  They get very personal, and impact some very basic interests.  When things started to go wrong between my client and the neighbor, he tried to do the neighborly thing and address it in a friendly manner.  He was ignored, as far as he was concerned.  The sports guy, on the other hand, thought my client was a pain, but he had address it and moved on.  The nature of the problem was daunting, since it involved a significant encroachment, something that most people would never even consider.  The sports guy decided it was no big deal to use his neighbor’s property.  Entitlement.

Then it happened again.  Same process followed.  But now the sports guy was getting annoyed, with his neighbor “bothering” him constantly.  He saw my client as being a complainer.  It never dawned on the sports guy that his efforts to expand his property onto his neighbors was the root cause of the problem.

By this time, both neighbors were quite unhappy with the other, each believing that the other was unreasonable and ridiculous.  There are nothing particularly tricky about the problems themselves, but communication had broken down and attitudes prevented any effort at reasonable discussion between the two.  Enter the lawyer.

It was my hope to de-escalate the problems between the neighbors.  They didn’t have to be best friends, but it’s best for neighbors to at least learn to live in relative peace.  The alternative just makes life miserable for everyone.  So rather than send the lawyer letter, making demands and threatening litigation should the sports guy not clean up his act, I decided to try to make an effort to circumvent the personality conflict by going through the sports guy’s lawyer.  I had a way that the numerous problems that existed could be addressed to everyone’s benefit, but needed to have someone to speak with who would be detached from the personal animosity and understand the implications of the solution.

So, in lieu of a lawyer letter, I sent word through an intermediary that there was a resolution that would benefit everyone, and that a discussion between me and the sports guy’s attorney would be the best way to make life better for both neighbors.  It was nice.  It was cooperative.  It was an effort to do exactly what Windy suggests, use a “lighter hand.”

A few days later, I received a call from the sports guy’s wife.  As an aside, why is it that the spouse of people who have minor celebrity think that they become important by association?

In any event, the wife then harangued me with how awful my clients were, how wonderful and reasonable she was, and how she had no need for her attorney, to whom she paid “hundreds of thousand of dollars a year” she informed me (note: she had no clue how silly this sounds), since she was a genius and can handle her own fights.  Rather than use the nice approach to smooth things over, Mrs. Sports Guy was now more deeply entrenched in her animosity than before.  Worse yet, she adamantly refused to bring her attorney into the mix, which she saw as an affront to her reasonableness, intelligence and righteousness. 

To Windy’s point, when a problem arises that is legal in nature, it is already ripe for litigation.  While there are certainly occasions when someone will knowingly do something wrong to see if they can get away with it, the bulk of these problems are the product of people believing that they have a right to violate someone else’s right.  Tell them that they’re wrong, and you’ve got a fight on your hands. 

If they are as reasonable as they believe themselves to be, the lawyer letter alerts them to the problem and they can fix it.  But this rarely happens.  We all believe ourselves to be reasonable, no matter how unreasonable we in fact are.  It’s human nature.  The lawyer letter is a clean, clear notice that one side is asserting a belief that a significant problem exists and needs to be addressed.  No, it isn’t the nicest way to handle things, but then nice is in the eye of the beholder.

Going back to the AP example, if Joe Smith from the AP called up Matt Drudge and told him that they would appreciate it if he could cut back on the quotes as overuse of their creative content, do you think Drudge would have said, “Gee, Joe.  I didn’t realize.  I am sooo sorry and will put a cap on it at 27 words.”  Or would he have told Joe to get lost, it was fair use and posted about it the next day?

Of course the recipient of the lawyer letter would prefer a nice, friendly phone call instead.  The phone call is much easier to ignore, or better yet, disagree with.  And it gives the recipient the opportunity to take pre-emptive action to turn the situation upside down.  The putative recipient gains an advantage at the expense of the person complaining, all because he tried to be nice.

Is this always the case?  No.  Nothing is always the case.  But it happens regularly and ends up exacerbating the problem and placing the party asserting the right into a worse position than when he started. 

As for my CEO and sports guy, war has been declared and the resolution that would have been mutually beneficial may yet come to pass, but only after plenty of blood will be spilled.  In the alternative, the sports guy will lose the war big time, and end up believing that lawyer-hater John Stossel is a great legal philosopher. 

That’s what came of trying to be nice.  The problem with nice is that people are still people.