Author Archives: SHG

Opening Bravado Undermines Conviction

In the suburbs of New York City, there is substantial variability in the quality of criminal defense representation.  There are some very good lawyers, and there are some dangerous lawyers who really shouldn’t be allowed near a client.  It’s hard to tell them apart when they put on a suit. 

But here’s a clue :  When the defense lawyer’s “resume” consists of “32 years in the Nassau County District Attorney’s Office, where he was deputy chief of the district court bureau and a senior assistant district attorney in the major offense bureau. He . . . has been in private practice since 2002.”

In People v. Dean, 2006-05415, the Appellate Division, Second Department held that the lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel and reversed the conviction for sexual abuse of her child, following a bitterly contested custody battle, and her net sentence of 21 years.  The panel


faulted her trial attorney, Mineola solo practitioner Ronald Schoenberg, for ineffective assistance that began during his opening statement when he argued to the jury, “[W]e’re going to prove to you that she’s innocent,” and continued throughout the four-week trial.

Prove her innocence?  That’s incredibly tough talk for a defense lawyer.  Of course, that’s the flip side of what a prosecutor says in every opening statement.  Was the lawyer confused about which side he was on, or was this his idea of defense bravado? 


Here, the ineffective assistance of trial counsel commenced from the opening statements. The defendant correctly contends that defense counsel erroneously assumed the burden of proof when he made the following representation to the jury: “[W]e’re going to prove to you not only that the People can’t prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we’re going to prove to you that she’s innocent” (emphasis added). It is impossible to reconcile defense counsel’s assumption of the burden of proving the defendant innocent with the defendant’s constitutional right to the presumption of innocence. Notwithstanding the trial court’s correct charge to the jury on the burden of proof, her counsel’s impermissible assumption of the burden of proof was so egregious and prejudicial that it contributed to the deprivation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. (citations omitted)

Thirty-two years in the Nassau County District Attorneys office is a very, very long time.  This was a lifer, a career prosecutor who switched sides very late in his career.  There’s no indication why, nor am I inclined to speculate.  But after 32 years of hearings and believing in the mythology of the criminal defense lawyers as cowboy, as gladiator, as wild-man without rules, it appears that the message was too deeply ingrained.

Things didn’t go much better during the trial, with witness badgering, failure to object to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, and nasty fights in front of the jury with the trial judge. 

The attorney on appeal, Kevin Keating, is a solid and serious lawyer.  As this case is going back for a new trial, hopefully the defendant will chose Kevin the next time around.

This apocryphal tale isn’t told for the purpose of letting you know about one particular lawyer who has no business trying cases for criminal defendants, but to harp on the old theme that former prosecutors make competent defense lawyers.  The skillset of the prosecutor is not the same as the defense lawyer.  The fact that someone was once an assistant district attorney, even a bureau chief, or an assistant United States attorney does not mean that he has the knowledge or ability to represent defendants.

Whenever a criminal defense lawyer’s primary self-promotion is that he was formerly a prosecutor, run.  Run fast and far.  It is not that some former prosecutors have become excellent criminal defense lawyers, but that they don’t use their former position to sell themselves. 

Let me be as clear as possible about this:  There are many former prosecutors.  They do not have any “inside track” to getting better deals from their old buddies, or insider knowledge of the system that will help defendants.  The skills that make for a good prosecutor (or a bad one, for that matter) have little to do with the skills needed to defend.  If anything, as shown by this decision, former prosecutors have a huge hurdle to surmount before they learn how to be effective defense lawyers.  If there’s anything to assume, it’s that a former prosecutor will make a lousy criminal defense lawyer until proven otherwise.

Most people, including lawyers who don’t practice criminal law, assume the opposite.  They think that a former prosecutor necessarily makes for a good criminal defense lawyer.  This is absolutely, totally, completely wrong.  And I plan to keep making this point over and over, until it sinks in.

Should Courts Consider The Efficacy of Police Tactics?

Last Friday morning, I argued an appeal before the Second Department in a case involving a number of good issues, one of which was the denial of suppression.  Two detectives received a radio call that an armed robbery had just occurred, and they were looking for a perp in a burgundy Infiniti.  That was about it on information.

My argument on this issue focused on the “burgundy Infiniti” aspect of the call.  The detectives spotted one a few blocks away from the scene, pulled next to it and one detective jumped out of his car with his gun drawn, screaming “put your hands up.”  He couldn’t see inside the car as the windows were darkly tinted, so he opened the car door.

At the hearing, the detective conceded that his actions on the street that day violated police procedure, though he didn’t testify as to what proper procedure would be.  The gist of the argument was that the description, “burgundy Infiniti,” was too vague to establish reasonable suspicion to believe that this was the car they were looking for, and that his approach with gun drawn constituted a full blown seizure, beyond the scope of his authority. 

The presiding judge asked a question:  What else could the detective have done? 

The smart-aleck answer would have been, comply with the Constitution.  That response would have been particularly unhelpful and antagonized the judge. 

The judge’s point was that he wasn’t really disputing that the information about the car was too vague, but that the detective have limited choices.  The proper procedure would have been to pull the car to the side of the road, call for backup (since his information was that it was an armed robbery, giving rise to a reasonable belief that the occupants of the car might be armed if this was the right car) and then approach the car to determine whether this was the right car. 

The judge didn’t see how approaching the car, without a gun drawn and in “shock and awe” mode, would have been safe of the officer.  I can see his point. 

There are a variety of reasons why the officers conduct was improper.  There could be potentially hundreds or thousand of cars that meet the vague description of burgundy Infiniti within relative proximity.  There were indicia that this was not the car, particularly the lack of a description that included darkly tinted windows, a stand-out aspect of the car.  But it was certainly possible that this was the car, and the detectives would have been derelict had they not done something.

But consider what could have happened as a result of the detective’s cowboy approach.  What if he fired out of fear, accident or just bad judgment?  And inside the car was grandma and grandpa, a little slow on the move and hard of hearing.  What if this was the car of the bad guys, and they started a gunfight on the road with the detective, on a heavily trafficked road, where bystanders would have been struck by flying bullets.  There were numerous problematic scenarios available resulting from the detective’s conduct.  Of course, none of them happened or we might be looking at the next Sean Bell trial.

From a legal point of view, the appellate court became involved in weighing the constitutional issues with the very practical problem of police tactics.  While application of dogmatic constitutional law was clearly in my favor, they had great difficulty seeing how it would play out on the street in a way that would enable the police to do their job, and do it safely. 

The judge shifted the burden of resolving this problem to me by his question, not so much for an answer but as a way of showing that the strict application of law would result in an untenable situation.  The problem is that neither the judges aren’t police strategists.  Nor am I.  While lawyers gain a working knowledge of many things in the course of their career, it doesn’t make us experts at everything by a long shot.  So the entirety of this discussion was misplaced:  None of us were competent to address the problem.  Should we be?

My issue is that we are lawyers, working with an issue of constitutional law.  Is it our role to trade off the Constitution with viable police procedures?  We know the former.  We do not know the latter.  And what business does a court have giving away constitutional rights for the practicalities of something none of us have an answer to?  Yet this is a constant theme on appeal.  When weighing the application of constitutional rights, judges always try to understand and appreciate the practical effect of their decisions.  At least when it comes to the police.

While I have some theoretical understanding of how I believe the police should have handled the situation in order to do their job while not violating the Constitution, I do not believe that it is my role as an attorney to provide a viable police tactic in order to secure my client’s constitutional rights.  I don’t accept the notion that wild, cowboy police conduct either enlarges police authority to ignore the Constitution or in any way minimizes my client’s constitutional rights.  Essentially, my position is that the Constitution protects individuals, and it’s the responsibility of the police to find a way to do their job without violating constitutional rights.  But that’s not the way things work in real life.

It’s frustrating to read the lawprofs discussions of how courts should decide case knowing that all the deep-thinking nuances they so love are trumped by a bunch of semi-ignorant lawyers trying to figure out the practical implications of a rule.  No matter how many decisions are cited, or how clearly the law is set out, there will still be the question, “but what were the cops supposed to do?”

To ignore the fact that judges want and expect the cops to do their job, capture the perp and make us save, is folly.  By definition, the end result can’t be too bad, since we’re on appeal, meaning the somebody has been convicted for the crime.  In other words, it may have been a messy bust, but they did get the right guy.  This isn’t supposed to have anything to do with suppression or consideration of constitutional issues, but it always has some degree of impact.  If they stopped the wrong car, we wouldn’t be there.

Some years ago, I did a suppression hearing in New Jersey for a mule who was taking a large quantity of narcotics to Ohio from New York.  He was busted on the Route 80 corridor, a major drug trafficking route to the west, where Jersey cops stopped any minority driver to search for drugs.  After winning suppression, the cop (who was a nice guy) asked me what he should have done.  He was distraught by the fact that his bust went south, and thought he had nailed it properly.

I told him not to be too upset by the decision.  After all, he had taken a substantial quantity of drugs off the street, even though the perp would walk.  I explained that there was no lawful way for him to stop vehicles because of profiling; even minority drivers were allowed to travel without being subject to a stop.  He thought this was silly, but understood that the law was often silly in his eyes. 

While I anticipate a positive decision from the Second Department on my appeal based upon other, less controversial arguments, the suppression argument was the one that I knew would be the hardest to make but had to be done.  The vitality of the Constitution cannot be subject to the practicalities of police procedure, and neither the court nor I should be in the position of trying to figure out how the cops should do their job in order to give force to the Constitution.  I see the problem.  It’s just not my problem to solve. and it’s not theirs either.

A Big Win For A Young Lawyer

Carolyn Elefant, of My Shingle fame, in the course of noting the successes by solo practitioners, has an interview of Georgia lawyer Warren Caswell.  A 2003 law school grad, he filled his spare time with indigent defense appointments, even though his practice was relatively general and he had no background in criminal defense.

But Warren had something that mattered and compensated:  A strong drive to excel and the will to put in the time and effort to fulfill his obligation to his client.



Just five years out of law school and a solo for his entire career, Caswell received what at the time must have seemed like an impossible case: post-conviction representation of an indigent defendant found guilty by a jury of his second failure to register as a sex offender.   Based largely on hearsay, the jury concluded that the defendant had moved to a new residence when in fact, he was simply visiting his mother in the next county.   And as if Caswell wasn’t under enough pressure to reverse a jury verdict, the stakes were raised even further by draconian sentencing laws that resulted in a mandatory life sentence because of a failure to fill out necessary paperwork!   


After reviewing the transcript, Caswell initially intended to attack the verdict as insufficient due to admission of hearsay.  But an interesting conversation with jurors post-verdict lead Caswell to consider a constitutional argument that the duration of the sentence was so utterly shocking and contrary to societal notions of proportionality that it violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  In the end, both the hearsay and the constitutional arguments carried the day.


Carolyn does a great interview, and for all you law students and young lawyers out there, Warren’s story is really quite inspirational.

For the more experienced lawyers reading this, Warren’s story has another side worthy of reflection.  Some of us become to jaded and tired, believing that the right thing happens so rarely that it’s just not worth the effort anymore.  Young guys don’t know that they can’t win, so they still try.  Warren’s story shows that every once in a while, we can and do win.  He didn’t know enough not to try. 

It’s important that experienced lawyers remember that one of the things that prevents us from overcoming adversity is lackluster effort and performance.  If you don’t make the effort, you are guaranteed to never achieve success.  I realize how difficult it is to face down the constant stream of bad results from bad judges in a bad system.  But if you can’t get up the interest and effort to try, then we doom our clients, not all those “bad” people.

So Warren, young lawyer with only limited criminal defense experience and background, scored a major win.  Maybe there’s hope out there?  Read Carolyn’s interview and perhaps it will get your juices flowing through your old veins again.  It’s good to remember why we bother waking up every morning.

Is It Too Broken?

Greybear posted  a comment to my post, The Dignity of the Court At Stake, that got me thinking. 


The question is–At what point is the system so broken that we can no longer even pretend that it works? Personally, I think we passed that point some time back. The trouble is, I can’t foresee that tearing this one down would result in anything better.

Before deciding it the system is so broken, it would be interested in knowing what about the system people think is broken.

Some potential problems areas:


The Jury
    Are jurors capable of discerning truth from deception, or is this just a vanity of our 
        support for trial by jury?
    Do jurors default to “trust the cops” for lack of a better way to decide who is 
        telling the truth?
    Can jurors understand the court’s legal instructions?
    
The Judge
    Are judges biased?
    Are trial level judges capable of understanding nuanced distinctions in the law?
    Are judges willing to make hard, unpopular decisions?
    Are the people who become judges properly motivated?
    Are judges too result-oriented, couching decisions in fine sounding rhetoric 
        but essentially bent on ruling consistent with political outcomes?
    Is there a fundamental flaw in our selection of judges, such that the people 
        who want to sit in judgment are not necessarily the people we want 
        to have as judges?
    
The Law
    Have laws based on political considerations, such as mandatory minimums, 
        undermined the ability of the system to deliver individualized justice?
    Has the constant “tweaking” of laws to control outcomes by politicians usurped and 
        undermined the authority of the judicial branch?
    In the zeal to address all issues of crime, have states and Congress enacted 
        enough laws to turn essentially everyone into a criminal?
    
The People
    Has the American public lost all sense of proportionality in criminal justice?
    Have American’s become too harsh in their view of the treatment of others?
    Are people too simplistic to grasp complex concepts relating to criminal justice?
    Has fear of crime and terrorism been so instilled in the American psyche that 
        the public can no longer serve as a check on unfettered governmental power?

The Lawyers
    Has the transition from profession to business caused a loss of trust in lawyers 
        by the public?
    Are there too many lawyers?
    Is the distribution of lawyers in practice areas and public/private service so out of
        whack that lawyer no longer fulfill their purpose in society?
    Do lawyers lack the skill and ethics demanded of them?
    Have lawyers lost sight of their proper role in society?

These are just a few quick questions, and certainly not intended to limit the potential source of issues confronting the criminal justice system.  So, what’s broken and why?

Sean Bell Verdict Aftermath

Just so you know, I bet 3 total acquittals.  Not because I agree, but because that’s what I expected.

This is going to be one of those cases that compels catharsis, so knock yourselves out.  But consider this: 

The Queens District Attorney was conflicted throughout this case.

Cops as defendants win when no one else will.

Life is rarely as clear when it’s happening as it is when we talk about it afterward.

The burden of proof is on the prosecution, not the defense.

Does this verdict reflect a botched prosecution, or the sort of trial that all defendants should be given but only cop-defendants receive?  Is the judge to be faulted for reaching a verdict that the prosecution failed to prove its case, when that is how most of the observers felt as well?

And finally, could a jury have  gotten past the 50 bullets?

Snipes: Is General Deterrence Enough of a Reason?

So Wesley Snipes got 3 years.  The predictions were all over the boards beforehand, and the recriminations are spread out just as well. 

I made no prediction, but I’m not surprised.  He’s a celeb, and celebs are used for the purpose of general deterrence.  The rest of the country should know what happened to Snipes so that they don’t do the same.  The media will make sure the news is spread far and wide because he’s a celebrity.  It’s a win- for everybody but Snipes. 

But is it right?  General deterrence is a proper purpose of sentencing.  But it’s only one purpose.  Should it be predominant?  Is it a good enough reason to take person, max them out, just to send a message to other people to keep their nose clean?

Of all the legitimate sentencing factors, I consider general deterrence to be the least important, and indeed the one with the worst justification for legitimacy.  I understand all too well from the government’s point of view that it wants to get the word out, don’t commit crime.  I don’t begrudge this to the government.  But the general impact is paid for by an individual.  After the word is spread, the individual remains in his prison cell, paying the price of the government’s warning to others.

This isn’t a commentary on the sentence, standing alone, or the sentencing guidelines, but just the obvious rationale for throwing the book at Wesley Snipes.  Being in the public eye has its down side, but then being a tax denier is just stupid.   What’s the sentence for stupidity in the first degree?

Loving Losing Arguments

Anne Reed at  Deliberations has a wonderful habit of finding ways to burst the bubble of even the most confident lawyer.  And I am always thankful she does, as these are the things we need to know, painful though they may be.

Remarkably often in mock trials, here’s what happens.  Lawyers tell me they have an analogy or chart or argument they’re sure will conclusively show their case is a slam-dunk win.  They present this to the mock jurors, in a voice full of hard-earned pride.  Then they listen to the jurors deliberate, and they’re mortified.  The jurors hate the analogy, trash the chart, use the argument to support the other side.  The lawyer was so sure, and so wrong.

This is a problem, and it’s fairly universal.  The job of a trial lawyer is not to find a strategy that she thinks is absolutely brilliant, or a  nuanced analysis that would make her law professor proud.  The job is to persuade a jury to render a verdict in her client’s favor.  That’s it.

We are often left to ponder, in the quiet of our office, what tact to take.  On our own, we devise a plan that we believe will serve our clients’ end.  We think about it, mull it over, until we reach a point of certainty.  We have convinced ourselves that our strategy is a stroke of genius.  We hone and refine it.  We tweak it.  We work it over from the other side, considering every argument against it, and then we settle back in our big leather chair, confident that we have arrived at a winner. 

Anne’s point is critical.  Convincing ourselves means nothing.  We don’t get to decide, just argue.  Our clients engage in a somewhat similar process, coming up with what they believe to be the critical points that will set them free.  They tend to miss the boat altogether, since they possess no ability to recognize the failings of their strategy and simply dismiss all the nasty little facts that will prove them guilty.  Of course, that’s why they retain counsel.  We are the professionals.  It’s our job to do better than they could.  We are supposed to know better.

Like Anne, I’ve had the experience of doing mock trials and focus groups.  The outcome is invariably surprising, if not shocking and disconcerting.  No matter what point is intended by an argument, an analogy, a chart, they seem to come up with a different understanding that you would never anticipate.  Sure, they often “don’t get it,” but they are frequently antagonistic to it to the point that they strain to find a way to rip it to shreds. 

The problem that all criminal defense lawyers share is, once we accept the notion that our brilliance in the privacy of our own minds may not work, how do we learn what does work?  Where do we turn to find the strategy that may not be our first choice but convinces the jury to give us that winning verdict?

This is the unanswered question.  One way to learn is trial and error, bringing point after point to our mock juries or focus groups, until we hit on one that resonates.  But this has its flaws as well, for we learn that each mock jury and focus group thinks differently, and a point that works wonders with one mock jury can fall flat with another.  We can’t be assured of consistency between small groups of human beings, because each is comprised of different people, with different experiences that create a different dynamic.

So we know from Anne what we are doing wrong.  Anne, how do we do it right?

The Dignity of the Court At Stake

Houston criminal defense lawyer Mark Bennett has been following  the matter of criminal defense lawyer Adam Reposa, who was held in contempt and given a 90 day sentence for making masturbatory gestures toward a judge who yelled at him to be quiet when he whispered into his client’s ear while the prosecutor was speaking.  As Mark puts it, Reposa was known as a “gonzo” lawyer.  Every locale has one.  They go too far.  They are too course and  rough.  They are frequently embarrassing to the criminal defense bar.

But what this is really all about is an affront to the dignity of the court.

From the Austin American-Statesman :


Saying that Austin defense lawyer Adam Reposa tarnished the dignity of the judicial process by making a lewd gesture in court last month, visiting state District Judge Paul Davis on Wednesday sentenced Reposa to 90 days in jail for contempt of court.

We play a curious game in courtrooms.  We use language found nowhere else, such as calling the person in charge of the room “Your Honor” and using such courtesies as “may it please the court” when we speak to that person.  There are officers in the courtroom to keep people quiet and force men to remove their hats, at gunpoint if necessary.  The judge sits on an elevated bench, putting her above everyone else. 

This is different than the obsequiousness that some show the judge, laughing at jokes that aren’t funny and the occasional bowing and scraping.  These are done to curry favor, not to show respect.

We dress “appropriately” when we appear in court.  Wearing a suit and tie is expected, even when ties couldn’t be found anywhere else in the work world.  The judge wears a black robe.  Behind the judge we frequently find the flags of the State and nation.  The room itself is usually grand, often with high ceilings and wood paneling.  Or at least it was grand at one time, though it may now be seedy from years of neglect and too many hands on the rails and bodies in the chairs.

As Mark points out, there is nothing dignified about what happens in courtrooms to people, or how they were treated before they got there or after they leave.  And sometimes, the respectful words spoken toward the judge are not returned.  There is occasional yelling, or abrupt commands, or snippy responses from the bench toward the participants.  Some judges, the ones with appropriate temperament, can be quite respectful to counsel and defendants alike.  It doesn’t change their decisions, but they are rendered in a courteous manner.

So why do we play this game, and is it right for an attorney like Adam Reposa to break out of his role and show the dignity to be a mere act put on for the sake of appearances?

The answer to the first question might well be Charlie Wilson’s answer to why Congress is incapable of doing anything useful:  Tradition, mostly.  This is the way courts are supposed to be, dignified, and rather than buck the system for no useful purpose, we all go along with the tradition of behaving appropriately and showing respect to the judge.  It creates an atmosphere of dignity.

But this pretense is all about form over substance, right?  Well, not completely.  Sure, judges know all the bad words and gestures that are used outside the courtroom doors.  Some even realize that the words “your honor” conceal dripping sarcasm or outright disdain.  Indeed, one of the inside jokes of the law is that the phrase, “with all due respect,” is actually the courtroom way of saying, “judge, you are a blithering idiot.”  It just sounds nicer the other way.

There is, however, one very real purpose to maintaining the facade of dignity.  The power of the judge is dependent upon it.  The third branch of government has neither army nor power of the purse.  Sure, there are a handful of court officers in the room, but the hundred plus criminal defendants in the audience could take them if they wanted to.  The ability to function, both substantively and procedurally, depends on the perception of the multitude of unhappy people coming through the doors to believe that they have entered a different world.  It is a world of quiet and respect.  This world has an atmosphere that is different from anywhere else.  It is one of Dignity.

If that facade is broken, the functioning of the legal system would be impossible.  Imagine people behaving in court as they do in the streets.  Without the participants behaving respectfully toward the judge, there would be chaos, even anarchy, in the courtroom.  If the participants were to shout down, or just ignore, the judge, the judge would be essentially powerless to stop them short of demanding the court officers shoot someone, just for effect. 

I’ve watched a television show called “Judge Judy.”  I didn’t know Judy Sheindlin when she sat in New York, though I had been before her husband many times.  When I hear the way she speaks to participants on her show, I often cringe.  It’s not just because she makes snap baseless credibility judgments, but because her tone is so pointlessly caustic. 

I often wonder why no one rushes the bench and gives her a licking.  She’s no spring chicken, and most litigants could take her.  Yet they put up with her vicious tongue.  And it’s not like this only happens with TV judges.  There are real judges who demonstrate such horribly low self-esteem that they are unfulfilled unless they berate people in the process of judging the merit of their cases.

While there is much to question as to the merit of our legal system, from its efficacy to its wisdom to its legitimacy, the plain truth is that we need it until we get something better.  It’s absence would reduce society to its most animalistic ways.  There would be no hope for reason and fairness; power would be all that mattered. 

So, we walk into courtrooms, in our suits and ties, and await our turn to speak with “your honor” is respectful tones.  We can make the same point as Adam Reposa without resorting to crude gestures, and frequently do, but in a way that doesn’t serve to undermine the facade of dignity.  We instruct our clients to show the same respect to the court, because our ability to serve their interests depends to some extent on their agreeing to play by the rules that allow us to do our job.

I agree that what happens inside courtrooms to criminal defendants is hardly dignified.  It can fairly be said that substantively the emperor has no clothes.  And yet, maintaining the facade of dignity matters, as long as we maintain any hope of receiving justice, even small little pieces of it.  Not because the legal system is deserving.  Not because some particular judges are deserving.  Because there is no better option around. 

It would be nice if those judges who speak rudely toward defendants and counsel would remember this as well.  Attorneys have no call to be offensive toward judges in the courtroom.  Judges should bear in mind that the dignity of the process is almost entirely for their benefit.  It would behoove them to maintain the facade too.

But Will the Church Insure You?

Sorry for the volume of posts today (shocking to all but Ken Lammers), but I had to add this one.

Proposed Florida Christian license plate

That’s right!   Florida is considering becoming the first state to issue Christian license plates (which go  remarkably well with trucknutz, I might add).



The problem with the state manufacturing the plate is that it “sends a message that Florida is essentially a Christian state” and, second, gives the “appearance that the state is endorsing a particular religious preference,” said Howard Simon, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida.

You think?


Bullard, the plate’s sponsor, isn’t sure all groups should be able to express their preference. If atheists came up with an “I Don’t Believe” plate, for example, he would probably oppose it.

That’s because “they’re wrong.”  How about one that says “My God can beat the crap out of your God?”  Unbelievable.  Do they have absolutely nothing to do in Florida other than screw up elections?

Virginia v. Moore: The Cynics Win Again!

When the Supremes granted cert in Virginia v. Moore, we cringed.  Nothing good could come of this, was the overwhelming sense of the criminal defense bar.  After all, the Virginia Supreme Court had reversed the lower court and held that a cop who had unlawfully arrested Moore for driving with a suspended license (an offense in Virginia for which arrested are not permitted under state law) and then, in a search incident to arrest, found cocaine, violated the Constitution.  This was a good decision.  Cert did not bode well.

Then came  oral argument in the case, with the classic  “wow” exchange with Justice Scalia.  There was hope.  There was hope!

And then the world of the idealists came crashing down.  The cynics won again.  Unanimously reversed.

There’s already much discussion of Virginia v. Moore around the blawgosphere.  See Court-o-Rama, Robert Guest, Jon Katz,  Orin Kerr and, of course, Lyle at SCOTUSBlog. [Edit:  Add Howard Wasserman at  PrawfsBlawg to the list.]

Cutting to the chase, the decision of SCOTUS is that probable cause to search, not to mention the time honored search incident exception, trumps the fact that the police officer’s arrest is not authorized by state law.  While the officer’s conduct in arresting the defendant might subject him to some degree of discipline for the “infraction”, it does not extend as far as providing the defendant with the benefit of suppression, as long as there was probable cause under the 4th Amendment to search otherwise.

Even Justice Ginsburg went along with the result (though concurring to reject the originalist argument of Justice Scalia’s majority decision).

Moore would have us ignore, however, the limited consequences Virginia attaches to a police officer’s failure to follow the Commonwealth’s summons-only instruction. For such an infraction, the officer may be disciplined and the person arrested may bring a tort suit against the officer. But Virginia law does not demand the suppression of evidence seized by an officer who arrests when he should have issued a summons.

Given the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, that suppression was indeed the consequence of the officer’s violation of Virginia state law, this is particularly curious.  On the other hand, given how the precedent of SCOTUS favors approving automobile searches, including pretextual, as long as they come up with some drugs, it’s not curious at all.

Here’s my problem, as plainly as I can write it.  The “authority” for a Virginia police officer to stop someone on the road derives from the law passed by the state.  Without it, he’s just another bandit on the highway with a gun.  The cop only has the power and authority that Virginia chooses to allow him.  There is no “inherent right,” as is so often claimed, to either create or ignore the law.  It is whatever the state tells them it is.  It’s their job to abide by it.  They get no choice in the matter.

When a police officer decides to do something beyond the scope of the law, meaning outside his authority, he is no longer cloaked in the power given him by his employer, the government that enables him to act on its behalf.  When he sheds that cloak of authority, he is a state actor engaging in unlawful conduct.  Unlawful conduct, no matter how one twists it, cannot enjoy the protection afforded lawful conduct.  If it does, then why would anyone in the employ of the state ever abide the law?  They become free-range cowboys, off to enforce their personal version of right and wrong with a state-purchased car and gun.

So once they act beyond the scope of their authority, rendering their actions outside the protection of the very law that allows them to act in the first instance, they are outlaws.  Their conduct cannot, by definition, be “reasonable” under the 4th Amendment because it is unreasonable for anyone to break the law and derive a benefit from doing so.

But the Supreme Court of the United States says I’m wrong.  What else is new?