Author Archives: SHG

Finally, A Good Reason to go Republican

I know, too many posts, but I just had to add this one. 

From Overlawyered, that bastion of thoughtfulness, comes this advertisement on its sidebar.



Hey, if you can’t get ’em with policies, then use flash drives.  I know a GOP flash drive stuck into my “US”b port will change the world.  Now where could I plug one in on Rudy?

New Blawgs in the Hood

There’s some new blood in the practical blawgosphere that’s bringing in content worthy of a look-see.  First, in the New York hood comes Niki Black’s newest entry in the blawgosphere,

Women Lawyers–Back on Track (For women attorneys seeking success and happiness in the legal profession).  Niki no doubt thoroughly considered the variety of niche options available to her and consistent with her world view before going with a blawg for Wayward Women.  The initial concept, “Men Lawyers — Let’s Bobbitize ’em!” lacked a certain egalitarian tone, and was summarily rejected.  Good choice.

But Niki is the Queen of the New York blawgosphere, and her first few posts on the new Chicks with Women Lawyers blog makes her point particularly well.  She posts about stories that highlight a law firm with women as majority owners.  The fact this is a story, at all, is shocking.  I’m sure Niki will be a terrific job with her new blawg, and the need for a little more head-straightening on the subject is clear.  Just step away from the knife, Niki.

Next, a new criminal defense blawg, The Common Law, from Todd Taylor, a Colorado criminal defense lawyer who is “proud to represent real, flesh-and-blood people.”  Not to mention, it’s incredibly hard to get paid with any other type of client.  While the blawg has only been around for a short time, Todd’s been pretty busy posting stuff, with some original commentary (which may be slightly sarcastic, as opposed to my overly serious approach).  Hopefully, Todd will continue down the road of infusing his posts with his own thoughts and critiques, and reconsider the name of his blawg, both because The Common Law is a bit of a Common Phrase, and because it has absolutely nothing to do with criminal law. 

And finally, a hard blawg to post about.  Not because it can’t be described, but because it hasn’t got a name.  The author is an anonymous prosecutor (which makes you appreciate Ken Lammers at  CrimLaw all the more for being man enough to stand behind his blawg), who is quite taken with his/her prowess at winning drunk driving cases.


And another guilty verdict.  Honestly, I am not sure how I keep winning these cases.  It seems like every one gets harder than the last.  I say that despite how one-sided today’s trial was

How can you pass up a post that begins like that?  Or (note that the url is gspeezy.wordpress.com) this zinger title:



The G in GSpeezy Stands For…  GUILTY!


Ken has taken to calling this blawg “Objection” because that’s the middle word in the title bar.  It’s a good a name as any (other than The Common Law), so it works for me.  So if you want to have some fun viewing the world of the young and proud prosecutor, pay a visit to Objection and see if you can find anything objectionable.

New York (Unlike Texas) Has Boring District Attorneys

How often does a Mike Nifong come along?  Well, those lucky devils in Harris County, Texas, have a District Attorney of their own to ridicule, and to tell you the truth, I’m jealous.  Green with envy.  I’m stuck with Robert Morgenthau, who has not only been New York County District Attorney forever, but is the epitome of what a District Attorney should be.

Now the Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett, is a lucky guy.  He’s got Chuck Rosenthal.  Chuck is the sort of DA that provides a veritable cornucopia of dirt.  Not only does he dig himself into a hole, but when he gets caught, he just keeps digging.  How often does that happen?

Bennett’s been posting about Chuck for a while not, starting with his emails expressing his sexual feelings toward his assistant that caused him to drop out of his race for re-election, and up to yesterday’s testimony in federal court where he can’t seem to remember how or why he destroyed a bunch of email evidence.  He may not suffer from TBI, but he apparently has a severe case of CRS.

Bennett has been detailing the life and times of Chuck Rosenthal for a while, breaking news about Harris County’s own little DA from Hell.  The rest of the blawgosphere, not to mention mainstream media (including our own Gray Lady, the New York Times) picked up on this slice of heaven to tell the sorry tale of Rosenthal’s fall from grace.  But few have given credit to the mother-load of Chuck Rosenthal’s misdeed.

This is a great tale of hubris, and has been told in wonderful detail by Bennett.  It’s a shame that other blawgs and mainstream media have enjoyed the benefits of Bennett’s efforts but have failed to give attribution to the source.  This is one of the more unfortunate and despicable things about the internet, where people can locate stories that they would otherwise never know about and take them as if they figured something out all on their own.  It angers me that people don’t give credit where it’s due.  When it comes to Chuck Rosenthal, it’s due Bennett. 

I just want anyone who reads Simple Justice to know that this is all Bennett’s doing, and everyone else is just stealing from him and feeding off his efforts.  Bennett did the work and deserves to get the credit.

But Lawprofs, It’s Just A Story

There’s some pretense amongst the Ivory Tower crowd that they are capable of, and it’s worth their while, dissecting fiction as if it was something that actually happened.  I thought this was mind-bogglingly stupid when it involved Harry Potter, and it’s no less stupid when it involves 12 Angry Men.

A debate has broken out at Libertarian Central (a/k/a Volokh) over whether the Henry Fonda’s character put the prosecution to an unfair burden, raising questions in deliberations that were never raised during the unseen trial, according to Conspirator David Bernstein.   Ilya Somin then chimes in that while Fonda was able to counter individual arguments, he failed to overcome the cumulative weight of the evidence.

Guys, it’s a story.  It never actually happened.  You see, this other guy named Reginald Rose wrote words on paper and created a story.  It was turned into a movie, starring Henry Fonda.  Fonda studied and studied the words on the paper and then spoke them dramatically in front of movie cameras.  Later, they sold tickets and people saw the movie.  But it was only a movie.

Thankfully,  Orin Kerr jumps in to assume the novel role as the voice of reason.  Rather than get caught in the odd world of what “really” happened, Orin explains the author’s use of the jury as proxy for telling the story of the trial through their eyes.  It was the literary device that made 12 Angry Men such a good movie. 


The audience never even hears any testimony, and what we hear second-hand from the jurors is conflicting. It’s conflicting for a reason, I think; the idea is to make the audience dwell on the difference between guilt and the absence of reasonable doubt of guilt.

Yes!  Yes!  It was a good movie because it created thoughtful tension, making the audience ponder.  What a great idea for a movie.  What a well executed movie.  But it’s a movie.

I have no problem with lawprofs giving movie reviews, even if the movies were made long before any of their readers (or they) were born. (12 Angry Men, Sidney Lumet, 1957)  But if you want to put on scholarly airs, discussing the merits of legal and procedural improprieties, don’t you think it would be more productive to do so with things that are, oh, real?  What’s next, a dissertation on the concert contractual obligations of the Spice Girls in Spice World (1997)?

Wesley Snipes Aquitted: Lessons Learned and Blown

Wesley Snipes was a “tax denier,” one of those people who believed that the tax laws are illegal and, for a variety of reasons, don’t apply to them.  This strikes me as a bit facile, considering that Wesley Snipes earned something in the order of $38 Million as a film actor, but even high-income earners are allows to believe in silly things.

According to this  New York Times anthology of the case, the purpose of the government’s prosecution of Snipes was general deterrence, to send a message to other tax deniers that they were wrong, their failure to pay taxes was criminal and that they could be convicted and sent to prison.  Well, that didn’t work out nearly as well as the government hoped.


In closing arguments on Tuesday, lawyers for Mr. Snipes sought to portray him as a well-intended victim of bad advice by his co-defendants. They called his tax theories “kooky,” “crazy” and “dead wrong,” but said acting on these views did not make him a criminal because he disclosed his actions.

So the technical message from this verdict is that sincere, though erroneous, beliefs preclude a conviction for fraud.  But it seems unlikely that this is the message that most people will take from this case.  Even though Snipes was convicted of 3 misdemeanors, his acquittal on 2 felony fraud and conspiracy charges, and 3 other non-filing misdemeanor counts, will be the focus of this case.

By using a celebrity to make its point, and then losing the case, the government has not only failed to achieve its purpose of general deterrence, but has sent a wholly unintended message.  The most likely message is that celebrities can’t be convicted in the United States of America. 

This theme has been echoed for a while, from O.J. Simpson to Robert Blake to Michael Jackson to Phil Spector.  The public sees these cases as a reflection of their being above the law, above reproach, but juries that are so star-struck that they can’t convict.  Except for any celebrity represented by Mark Geragos, who will be definition be convicted (see Winona Ryder), or the celebrity/business icon who opts for a White Shoe defense lawyer (see Martha Stewart), the fact remains that most celebrity defendants do not get convicted.

Is celebrity the reason?  I have some doubts.  The positive aura surrounding celebrities, coming from the confusion between the public persona or the characters they portray, is likely a very important factor.  Celebrities walk into court with a level of credibility or positive public image that bears little connection to reality, but likely exists in the minds of jurors nonetheless.  Even though jurors realize that the real people are different than the characters they portray, there remains a tacit favorable impression, a bias if you will, that a celebrity has that others do not.

But once the evidence is introduced of actual conduct by these individuals, the hidden bias is unlikely to be sufficient to overcome the presumption of guilt that attaches to all people accused of crime.  A leg up in the first place, then, won’t prevent conviction if that’s all they’ve got.

What’s rarely spoken, and even more rarely considered, is that these defendants have committed an enormous amount of resources into mounting a defense.  By putting the wherewithal into the hands of competent counsel to use all the tools and weapons available, they are capable of walking into court and presenting a defense with the greatest potential for prevailing.

This begs two questions, one good for the government and one important for the defendant.  While the government’s ill-conceived effort to send a message to the public by prosecuting a celebrity such as Wesley Snipes may not have resulted in the desired conviction, there remains a point that Snipes has suffered a huge financial blow in the course of his win.  Are ordinary people prepared, and capable, of mounting such a defense?

While a celebrity may possess the ability and willingness to do everything possible to prevent their conviction, normal people are too often shockingly resistant to putting up a real fight.  Of course they want the fight, but they don’t want to pay for it.  Legal fees in a criminal defense are often viewed as dead money; at the end of the day, the best you can hope for is to remain in the status you held before the prosecution started.  They don’t view their personal freedom as having a value attached. 

One question that I’m asked with amazing frequency is, “Why should I have to pay a lawyer when I didn’t do anything wrong?”  Bear in mind, but it’s not just paying the lawyer, but paying for all the ancillary services that enable the lawyer to mount a winning defense.  The investigators, forensic accountants, document examiners, neuro-psychologists, whatever, all expect to be paid for their services as well. 

The answer to this question, the one that’s important for the defendant, is because without this panoply of services, you will be unable to defend yourself against the government’s accusation. 

A recurring corollary to the “why do I have to pay” question is that a defendant, having paid for a lawyer, can’t understand why the rest of the potentially necessary services don’t come as part of the deal.  The answer is obvious, yet problematic.  When you retain the criminal defense lawyer, you are paying for the lawyer’s services, his “time and advice” as Lincoln put it.  There may well be a host of additional disciplines that will enable the lawyer to make his representation more effective, but it’s up to the client to decide if he wants them, and is willing to pay for them, in order to mount the best possible defense.

Adding to this problem is the potential that an investigator will come up empty-handed, despite his efforts.  Or a neuro-psych will determine that the defendant is mentally healthy as a horse.  We don’t buy the desired results from legitimate, competent professionals, but only their services.  Sometimes things don’t pan out the way we hope, and this leaves defendants miserable.  Believe me, the lawyer isn’t any happier about it, but when we use respect professional services because their opinions in court will carry the necessary weight, we run the risk that they will come back to us with an honest answer that doesn’t help us.  

The lesson of Wesley Snipes, and other celebs, is that the defendant can prevail against the government, but it requires a commitment from the defendant to do whatever is necessary to mount the best possible defense.  This begins with retaining a real criminal defense lawyer, and forgetting such nonsense as bigger is better, and it ends with giving the lawyer the ability to do his best work.  While it won’t get you a role in the next big action movie, it can keep you from going to prison for a crime you didn’t commit.  And that’s a good thing.

Court To NY Lawyers: If You Do It, It’s Advertising

Remember the old days when lawyers had fax machines?  Well, a blast from the past is going to come back and bite lawyers in a place where it won’t feel good.  It seems that the First Amendment freedom of speech doesn’t apply to lawyers, at least as far as a majority in the Appellate Division, First Department is concerned.  Given the impact new attorney advertising rules could have on the digital world of lawyers, this could be a huge problem.

In a 3-2 decision in Stern v. Bluestone, the court affirmed summary judgment, holding that The New York Attorney Malpractice Report is advertising, and therefore subject to 47 U.S.C.S. §227, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).  The Report was faxed several times a year to thousands of attorneys in New York, back when the fax machine was the newest techno-transmittal medium in town.  A few called to say that they didn’t want it anymore, and it was stopped.  About 50 lawyers called to ask why they didn’t get it, and they were added.  Two lawyers, separately, sued under the TCPA, which provides for a $500 per fax penalty and treble damages for deliberate abuse.

After the first complaint, Supreme Court Justice Jane Solomon granted summary judgment that it was unsolicited advertising, and indicated a few things about the Report that she found objectionable.  Rather than fight (since the changes were inconsequential to the defendant), the Attorney Malpractice Report was changed to accommodate the things noted by Justice Solomon immediately.

Then came Attorney Stern, who apparently didn’t care to receive the report.  Rather than call, or email, the defendant, he sued.  The case somehow was assigned to Judge Solomon (again) and, despite the changes to comply with her own decision, she again granted summary judgment, as well as found the conduct deliberate based upon her prior decision. 

The significance of this case has nothing to do with the manner in which it was transmitted, but something far more insidious and troubling for lawyers.  It was held to be advertising, for only commercial solicitations fall within the TCPA.  With the changes in flux for New York lawyer advertising, this decision could have a disastrous impact on lawyers and their exercise of First Amendment rights.

Bluestone argued that this was fully protected free speech, and not commercial speech of any sort, no less advertising.  As Justice Kavanagh wrote in dissent:


This is especially true where the content of each fax is almost totally devoted to a commentary on issues involving attorney malpractice and not one contains a single word that can be fairly read as promoting the author’s law practice or inviting the recipient to employ his legal services.

And indeed, there was no dispute that this was true.  The majority, rather, held that:


While Bluestone contends that his faxes were purely informational and do not explicitly offer services, his position defies common-sense. The faxes at issue certainly have the purpose and effect of influencing recipients to procure Bluestone’s services, which are for the specialized field of legal malpractice claims. . . .

Contrary to the dissent’s viewpoint, Bluestone’s motive is not a factor in the determination that these faxes are advertisements. It is not necessary to probe that deeply, since simply looking at the faxes in the context in which they were sent is sufficient to establish them to be advertisements. The faxed “commentaries” are not just information with an author’s name attached, but include the name of the author’s law firm and direct readers to his web sites which advertise his professional services.

Add it up:  Legal commentary with the author’s name attached, then adding “the author’s law firm and direct readers to his web sites which advertise his professional services.”  According the 3 judge majority, it “defies common-sense” to find that this is anything but lawyer advertising, and hence within the TCPA.

Now plug this into other lawyerly endeavors, such as newspaper columns (even the Outside Counsel column for the New York Law Journal), law review articles, and need I mention blogs? 

When legal commentary, with ordinary attribution in the age of the internet, becomes per se lawyer advertising, this decision will wreak havoc with what little free speech rights lawyers still possess.  Notably, the First Department thought it of huge consequence that the Attorney Malpractice Report included the defendant’s website.  What we would consider as basic to ordinary identity as an address, the 3 judge majority of Justices Marlow, Williams and Catterson, found sufficiently bizarre and consequential that it was worthy of specific note.  And you wondered whether I was blowing smoke when I asked what judges know about technology?

The case will be appealed to the Court of Appeals, as of right based upon the 3-2 split.  What was clear in oral argument before the First Department was the lack of familiarity of some justices with First Amendment issues and, even more so, the implications of clouding First Amendment rights because of a distaste with the particular delivery mechanism. 

For the sake of all lawyers who feel that they would really like to have the right of free speech granted to everyone else in the First Amendment, let’s hope that the Court of Appeals doesn’t think that the only reason a lawyer would write legal commentary is to make a buck.  Frankly, it’s a terribly sad commentary that lawyers, in the eyes of at least 3 judges in the First Department, are seen as money-grubbing pariahs, “as a matter of law.”

And here is  Eric the Turk’s take on this case.

Full Disclosure:  The defendant in this case was Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, of The New York Attorney Malpractice Blog.  And who would a lawyer who specializes in plaintiff’s legal malpractice litigation go to be his lawyer?  Why, that would be me.

Victims Want Veto Over Plea Agreements

Judge Paul Cassell, the new  Volokh Conspirator,  posts about how he, as pro bono attorney for victims of the Texas City Refinery explosion in March 2005, which left 15 dead, hundreds injured, and untold property damage, has filed papers to kill the plea deal.

Well, that’s going to make negotiations a bit more complicated, if he gets his way. 

As discussed numerous times, Judge Cassell (which I’m going to continue to call him until he invites me to call him something else) left the federal bench to become a Utah lawprof and victim’s rights advocate.  Clearly, his experience has left him feeling that the system neglects victims and that victims deserve a voice in the criminal justice process.  To this end, this is what he’s done in this Texas case:


Today the other lawyers and I filed pleadings in the federal district court in Texas. Our pleadings argue the court should reject the plea because the proposed plea blocks the court from appointing its own independent safety monitor to supervise BP Products’ environmental compliance. The pleadings also argue that since the statutory maximum fine in this case (based on the gain to the company or loss to the victims) is more than $2 billion, a substantially larger fine is appropriate.

This begs one immediate question:  Why didn’t he just pick up the phone, call the AUSA, and discuss his concerns?  In all likelihood, he (or someone) did and the AUSA blew him off.

It strikes me that Judge Cassell’s problem starts with the government (you remember them, those fine folks who live off our tax dollars and serve us), because in the eyes of the victim, the government just isn’t doing what they want.  So go over the AUSAs head to the United States Attorney, to the Department of Justice, to your Senator, and demand to know why the government doesn’t take its orders from the victims.

Sound ridiculous?  It is.  And it should be.  While the victim’s argument may have substantial validity, probably more so in the context of a corporate defendant than an individual, and about which I take no view, the criminal justice system does not vindicate the interests of individual victims.  It isn’t supposed to. 

While crimes have victims, as do torts, the criminal justice system vindicates the interest of society.  When it ceases to do that, it loses the legitimacy of its imposition of criminal sanctions.  We don’t imprison people because Joe Victim is angry, per se, but because a law that has been enacted to guide the conduct of all members of society has been violated. Victims themselves get recompense civilly.

Can you imagine trying to negotiate a plea with the AUSA, should the victim have the power to veto whatever aspects he finds too lenient or unacceptable?  After working to reach an agreement, everyone would then have to renegotiate with a non-party lacking any interest or motivation to accept anything short of their personal ideal of vengeance.  If this is ever permitted, it would be the end of plea negotiations.  For both sides.  The government wants no more of victims’ interference in their work than does the defense, though it will always be the defense that would suffer greater harm from this concept since victims rarely argue to the government, “please be more lenient. Please be more reasonable.”

So if you thought life was difficult enough dealing with those easy-going guys down at the United States Attorney’s office, hashing out the rest of your client’s life, imagine what a nightmare this victims’ veto would be.  While it may seem so reasonable to inject the victim into the process from a humanitarian point of view, this is nothing short of an assault on the integrity of the criminal justice process.  I wonder how many will see it this way?

Legal Fashionista: Biglaw Says They Ugg-ly

Since I am the foremost acknolwledged authority on lawyerly fashion on the internet, it would be irresponsible of me to ignore the scathing WSJ critique of associates by the Biglaw partners who have to observe them, day after day.


“I share the lament and disgust about the general level of associates’ attire,” says Tom Mills, the 60-year-old managing partner of the Washington office of Winston & Strawn LLP. “I think it’s abysmal.”

When it came time to pick a point person for a plum assignment at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips recently, the New York law firm chose “a polished, professional-looking associate” over a “brilliant” and experienced associate who had been counseled, to no avail, to improve his grooming and attire, says Renee Brissette, a partner at the firm.

Winston & Strawn brought in a personal shopper from a local department store last year to address associates on how to shop and dress for work. Mr. Mills says that when some associates do make an effort to dress up, they seem to base their look on Hollywood. “You get the TV-woman lawyer look with skirts 12 inches above the knee and very tight blouses,” he says. “They have trouble sitting and getting into taxis.”

Why are they made to suffer so at Biglaw?  It those darned kids! During the dot com boom, law firms, perpetual fashion followers, adopted casual Fridays, which soon became “wear whatever you want” any time you want.  Well, that was foolish.  Now they are paying the price of Biglaw fashion liberalism and the partners are not pleased.

For young men and women, a business suit is an uncomfortable yoke to be dusted off for special occasions. “Getting up in the morning and putting on a suit is hard,” says Sara Shikhman, a 26-year-old legal associate at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP in New York. She says she hasn’t worn one in six months.

When I was a young lawyer, we wore suits and ties, white shirts and polished shoes, every day. Women wore dresses (not pants suits, Hillary).  We were lawyers, and that was how lawyers dressed.  Not any more.  It’s no longer about looking professional, even for a $160,000 starting salary, but about looking cool.

She [etiquette consultant Gretchen Neels, a former executive recruiter] says many members of the so-called millennial generation have never been schooled in the traditions that previous generations learned at their parents’ knees. Yet these 20-somethings are still being evaluated by old-school bosses and clients. Many members of this generation not only “don’t own a watch — they’ve never owned a watch,” says Ms. Neels. In many white-collar professions, an expensive watch signals success, while a cool cellphone or iPod, though it tells time, signals hipness.

This desire to be “hip” is echoed by the associates as well.

When associates show up at work in suits, their peers think they have a job interview, Ms. Shikhman says. “Guys don’t really polish their shoes,” she adds. They go for cool, rather than traditional. “They wear shoes like you might see Johnny Depp wearing to the Oscars.” She recognizes that her firm’s partners “definitely look more put together than associates, but they also get more sleep than the associates.”

Since I would be unable to identify Johnny Depp, at the Oscars or elsewhere, I can’t say how his shoes appear.  But I get the point. Gretchen Neels also points out that associates don’t put their napkin on their lap anymore either, but then it really doesn’t matter since their blue jeans look better with a dollop of tomato sauce on them.

So how is Biglaw dealing with this sartorial disaster?

Some associates at Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft this winter received a note asking employees to change out of their snow boots after young associates began wearing their Ugg boots all day at work, says Ms. Shikhman.

They call them “Ugg” for a reason, you know.  Being on top of fashion, I can understand why partners mistake the clunky down-under fashion-fixture for snow boots, while associates see them as comfy-cool.  After all, they now come in all sorts of colors, one to match every shirt that reveals one’s belly button.

And as long as we’re discussing women’s fashions, this is not appropriate to wear in the office or court:



Yes, I realize it’s not actually see-through, but there are certain prints that simply won’t do.

With this background, allow me to express my refined views on the subject of office attire.  For crying out loud, you bunch of numbnuts, they’re paying $159,000 a year more than you’re worth and all they want is for you to look like a lawyer.  Would it kill you to put on a tie?  Who exactly do you think you’re impressing with that Johnny Depp scuffy shoe look?  And Uggs are the only footwear that make Crocs look attractive.

Wake up and smell the coffee.  Not only will the people who get to decide your fate (as in, partnership or library lizard) feel better about you, but you may even find that you feel more like a real lawyer yourself.  Grow up!

It’s Clouds Illusions I Recall . . .

From Jim Chen at MoneyLaw, one of the few, the proud, the brave, who admit that the grand, ivory tower could use the occasional scrubbing, brings us this video of Jesse, the Utah Law student. 



Which one will be the lawprof?  Remember, that means the other one will have to work for a living. 

There are two remarkable things about young Jesse here.  First, that he’s managed to maintain his sense of humor and irony about law school.  Second, that he’s from Utah, land of the preaching lawyers and taser-happy cops. 

“Appreciable Diminution of the Coercive Sequelae of Prior Illegality” And Other Good Stuff

That’s right.  How many times have you said to yourself, “But what about the diminution of the coercive sequelae?”

I  wondered what would happen when Gov. Eliot Spitzer named long-time Administrative Judge of the Unified Court System, Jonathon Lippman, to the post of Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department.  After all, his career was entirely administrative, and he had no background in the courtroom from which I could divine his views.  On top of that, there were any number of other judges in the First Department, including Pataki’s old roommate, Rick Andreas, a perpetual A-lister for a Court of Appeals seat, who was passed over.

With time, questions get answered.  In People v. Packer, Justice Lippman writes the majority opinion, reversing denial of suppression of a knife found in a backpack.  The facts are:


Defendant had been a passenger in a car operated by an individual sought by the police for cashing forged checks. When the car was stopped by the police so that the arrest of the suspected check forger could be made, defendant attempted to leave the vehicle but was told by one of the officers assisting in the arrest, Officer Jones, to remain in the car and place his hands where they could be seen. A moment later, defendant was directed by Jones to step out of the car. He complied, and was immediately frisked. A small knife was recovered from one of his pockets. Jones then asked defendant for identification. Defendant responded that his identification was in his backpack, which he attempted to retrieve from the back seat of the car. Jones, however, stopped him, saying, “I will get the bag.” Once Jones had the bag, he asked defendant if he could open it to look for defendant’s identification. Defendant replied “yes.” Jones unzipped the bag, and inside found the knife upon which defendant’s conviction of attempted possession of a weapon is premised.

The People concede on appeal that the original frisk was bad, but that the subsequent search of the backpack was on consent.  In a 3-2 split, the Court held that the consent was tainted by the initial unconstitutional frisk and suppressed and dismissed.

Not a bad decision.  Not bad at all.  But that’s not what this post is about.

Judge Lippman wrote the majority opinion, and it’s quite an extraordinary read.  Not so much for its content, but its language.  Consider,


The sole attenuative circumstance urged by the dissent is that, after the frisk, defendant was not arrested and placed in handcuffs. It is not explained, however, how this forbearance from even more pronounced illegal intrusion would have communicated to defendant that, notwithstanding the just concluded frisk, he was no longer subject to the authority of the officers who had in the preceding moments blockaded the car in which he was a passenger, prevented him from exiting the vehicle, and then directed him out of the vehicle, where he was summarily frisked. It will nearly always be possible to hypothesize some greater level of intrusion to which a defendant might be submitted. Attenuation, however, does not lie in an imagined differential, but in an appreciable diminution of the coercive sequelae of prior illegality.

Is that breathtaking or what?  I intend to use this quote wherever possible, and there is always room for “appreciable diminution of the coercive sequelae of prior illegality” in every case. 

Bear in mind that one of the pervasive criticisms of the various Appellate Divisions around the State of New York is that their decisions tend to be a tab spartan.  If they say anything at all, it’s often a string of quotes from other cases with little seguey in between.  Granted, these are courts that are buried in briefs of dubious merit and even worse writing, but then that’s why they pay appellate judges the big bucks.

So, Justice Lippman’s opinion, showing an exceptional degree of attention to language, and turning some mighty fine phrases in the process, is most refreshing.  The only downside is that most criminal defense lawyers will have to pull out their Funk & Wagnalls to make sure they understand what he said.  Big words can do that to a lawyer.

But as long as People v. Packer is on the table, let’s consider what the dissent had to say about it.


Upon the conclusion of that brief frisk, defendant’s “momentary seizure” ended, and the consensual nature of the remainder of the encounter was restored (United States v Davis, 202 F3d 1060, 1062 [8th Cir 2000], cert denied 531 US 883 [2000]).

Uh, a federal case, and from the 8th Circuit (wherever that is)?  Well, let’s think lawyerly about this.  It was only a “brief” frisk, as opposed to those long, leisurely frisks.  The defendant’s “momentary seizure” ended upon the completion of the “brief” frisk where the cops recovered a small knife, because of what?  Did he suddenly feel free as a bird to exercise his  right to ignore the cops who had just frisked him?

So the defendant, now freed for the harsh bonds of his momentary seizure, made a knowing, voluntary choice to allow the police officer who had just demanded his identification to search his backpack, according to the dissent.  No pressure at all, the defendant did it because he wanted to do it.  Free will at work, nothing more.

Even without Justice Lippman’s over-wrought prose, he had this case nailed.  But as long as Justice Lippman keeps deciding cases the right way, and writing opinions like Packer, I think he’s going to be one of my favorite judges of all time.  Way to go, baby!