Author Archives: SHG

Spotlight on Rats, Thanks to Scandal

Despite the painfully misguided view of Cara Buckley in her  New York Times apologia for the difficult path of narcs who go bad, the  New York Times today shines the spotlight into the sewer of law enforcement at the lowest of its inhabitants, the rat. 


Formally known [?] as C.I.’s, for confidential informants, they are a detective’s best friend. They act as eyes and ears. They serve as secret tipsters. They take the police, by proxy, to the dangerous and privileged places where badges cannot go.

An ignominious start, indeed.  Perhaps next time, they might mention the place rats are most likely to take cops:  Hell.  But enough of my snarky asides, what does the Times think of rats?


At the same time, they present problems of administration — and sometimes of temptation — to those who uphold the law. Petty crime is often tolerated in exchange for information. Detectives can be duped by an informant’s agenda. While cases of corruption are rare, it is fairly common to have more “give” in this delicate give-and-take.

I hate to pick nits with the ultra-liberal Times, but perhaps the claim would be better stated as “cases of prosecution of corruption are rare.”  But then, in its zeal to be fair-minded and present all sides of a story, the writers, Alan Feuer and al Baker, with the help of our dear friend Cara Buckley, neglected to speak to anyone except those who live off rats. But if you can’t trust cops when writing about cop scandals, who can you trust?  Again, I digress.

The focus in snitches (see, I use the nice word) comes from the revelation that the Brooklyn South police scandal included stealing drugs from busts to give to snitches in payment for their services.  Surely this is a problem.  Well, it apparently falls under the heading of “petty crime,” which will be good to know for all those petty criminals doing state prison time for the same thing that makes rats the cops’ best friend, a needed self-esteem boost.

And what explains this willingness on the part of law enforcement to lie down with dogs?

“With confidential informants we get the benefit of intimate knowledge of criminal schemes by criminals, and that is a very effective way to investigate crime,” said Daniel J. Castleman, chief of the Investigative Division of the Manhattan district attorney’s office. “It’s no secret that people conduct criminal activities not alone but in combination, and if you can flip someone involved in the criminal scheme, it makes it much easier to investigate and to prosecute.”

Dan is a nice guy and all, but it would also be much easier to investigate and prosecute crime if the cops were just allowed to break into apartments in Harlem at will.  Ease of prosecution really isn’t the best argument for paying off rats who will say or do anything to get their needed fix or avoid the consequences of their own criminal conduct.  It’s that darned trustworthiness thing.

To avoid problems, it is standard practice in police departments and federal law enforcement agencies to closely vet and watch informants — a process that one official in the New York field office of the Drug Enforcement Administration called “knowing them from womb to tomb.”

“Womb to Tomb,” what a great phrase!  It’s almost like they actually do it when they have a cute name for it.

But all is not lost.  If you can tolerate the Times’ love-fest with this ugly but necessary tool in the war on drugs, you finally get to Brooklyn Assemblyman Joe Lentol.

“This kind of informing stuff that is going on in the ghettos of today is not unlike what had gone on in the ghettos of Warsaw and Eastern Europe and East Berlin,” Mr. Lentol said.

He proposed a bill in Albany last year to give defense lawyers more power to challenge an informant’s testimony, prohibit or require court approval when prosecutors drop serious charges in exchange for testimony, and require that the police file annual public reports on their use of informants. The bill was not voted on last year but was again referred to committee this month.

“All of these snitches have stopped people from wanting to cooperate with the police because nobody knows who to trust,” Mr. Lentol said. “It’s like a community poisoning.”

But you will no doubt be shocked to learn that police do not support Assemblyman Lentol’s bill.  Sure, they recognize that the unrestricted, uncontrolled, unsupervised use of rats presents a problem, but they can handle it.  Our police have their snitches under control.  As proven by this latest scandal in Brooklyn South.

Before ending, there’s just one thing I have to add.  If there is anyone left at the New York Times who isn’t a law enforcement sycophant, please disengage your head from some cop’s butt and let us know you’re there. 

Window Tint, the New Threat to Humanity

Not too long ago, I  opined that the significant drop in serious crime was going to create a cottage industry in cops going after ordinary people for the most trivial, if not absurd, of malum prohibitum offenses. 


Crimes that nobody thought twice about have become the greatest threat to civilization since the Wii.  This is what happens when they don’t have enough to do.

And so it happens.  This  New York Times piece chronicles that latest focus of law enforcement in New York, the dreaded threat to mankind, window tint.


“Because we’ve seen an increase not only in the volume of tint but in the intensity,” said Asharoken’s avuncular, and tint-averse, top police officer, Ray Mahdesian. “We don’t have quotas, and we don’t use tint to go fishing for other violations, but yes, there are a lot of summonses being written around here for window tinting.” For the record, his department issued 70 tint-related summonses in 2007, up from 35 in 2006.

Idle hands are the devil’s . . . well, now those idle hands are holding tintmeters, waiting for some unsuspecting miscreant in his tinted BMW to try to smash through civilization’s barriers toward anarchy.

In New York, the law prohibits front driver and passenger windows from preventing more than 70% of natural light from passing through. 


Why target tint? “It’s a safety violation.” Whose safety? “Yours and the officer’s.” Mr. Mahdesian says eye contact, whether between motorists or between a police officer and occupants of a suspicious vehicle, is paramount.

“If we can’t see you, we don’t know if you have a gun in there or if, God forbid, something worse is going on, like a kidnapping,” he added.

Certainly, we don’t want to enable kidnappings, right?  And the safety of police officers approaching a car and being able to see the perp’s hands is important too.  Or so they say.

But there is a logical disconnect between this law and the purported rational basis for its enactment.  Who says 30% tint is the threshold for safety?  “[T]his is a case of driving a car on Long Island with driver and front passenger windows tinted an infinitesimally smoky shade of charcoal gray.” 


Jeff Tabachnick, owner of Top Edge Inc., a St. James firm that claims to do the largest volume of tinting, especially legal tinting, on Long Island, . . . says the 70 percent tint is virtually indistinguishable from a clear piece of glass. No more shade for car interiors in the summer (“Tint can shield 45 percent of the sun’s heat!”), no more blocking of ultraviolet rays, and definitely no cosmetic cachet.

While there are cars with windows tinted so dark that they look black, there are similarly cars which have such a minute coloration to protect against UV rays but are barely noticeable as far as tint is concerned.  Still, these cars (some coming this way from the manufacturer or dealer) violate New York law and subject the owner to punishment.

But a law is a law, right?  True, but, it’s not the law “in Sun Belt states like Florida, where 35 percent is considered just fine.”  So 65% tint in Florida is considered sufficient to serve the rational purpose of the law, but in New York the limit is 30%.  Do Floridians not care as deeply as New Yorkers about cops or kidnapping?  I don’t think so.

This window tinting law has been on the books in New York since 1992, when somebody noticed that black out windows were a problem and a bunch of guys in Albany had to come up with a number to plug into the law.  How they arrived at 30% I can’t say.  I bet they can’t either.  At the time, I would expect that nobody really cared what the number was, since they had no expectation that any cop would use the law except to nail those drug dealers with blacked out windows. After all, there was plenty of serious crime to go around in 1992, and no one could imagine cops with so little to do that they would drive around with tintmeters looking for taxpayers to bother.

And now, the problem becomes increasingly broader as one considers how cops are supposed to deal with the silly pointless numbers when addressing the plague of window tinting.  What happens to drivers from Florida, whose windows are perfectly lawful in their home state, but turn magically into a primary threat to the life of cops in New York?  While the law legalizes vehicles from other states that don’t comply with our local quirks, how is a cop to know what the permissible percentage of light passing through a window from state to state, not to mention any local jurisdictions that may stick their nose into this very serious problem.

This is what happens when there are too many cops with too little to do.  They find obscure laws, put on the books to provide a weapon that was only meant to be used under certain circumstances, and decide to turn it into their new money maker.  This is the sort of nonsensical approach that can turn even the most liberal person into a libertarian. 

Deconstructing the Boucher Confusion On Password and Privilege

Wreaking havoc in the blawgosphere,  Gideon at A Public Defender posted about the Boucher case, followed immediately by the Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett at Defending People, on the heels of a  Washington Post story about the case.  I had  posted about it more than a month ago after  Orin Kerr alerted me to the case, when the Vermont  federal court decision had first been issued.

Briefly, this is the case where the feds sought the defendant’s PGP password to get into the contents of his laptop computer.  Bennett kindly shows us what a PGP (Pretty Good Protection) looks like, in what is being touted by local prosecutors as his most lucid and interesting post of the year.  The problem arises from the fact that Boucher had previously used the password to provide border guards access to his computer, which started this whole mess.

If you want the full fact patter or additional details, take a look at any of the links above.  No reasons to restate them here.

This is an important case and decision, and because it’s caused so much confusion around the blawgosphere, it’s worth another visit to try to deconstruct the confusion.   While the right of a defendant not to be forced to incriminate himself always stems from the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, not all efforts at forcing incrimination seek inculpatory statements.  This case is one that has the government subpoenaing a specific act from the defendant, not a statement.  The government is demanding the defendant input his password into a computer so that they can access the protected files.

What distinguishes this demand is not that the defendant speak the word out loud, or say it on the witness stand, or tell it to any federal agent anywhere at any time.  The government would be more than happy to put the defendant into a private room, have him input the password with no one watching, and walk out of the room with no one the wiser as to the password.  Or, for that matter, have his attorney input the password, or anyone else for that matter, as long as they are able to access the files afterward.

The 5th Amendment right is implicated not because he is being told to give up the word to a federal agent, but because the act of inputing the password proves that he has the password that allows access to the computer and, by complying with the subpoena, can produce it upon demand.  It is this act that incriminates the defendant, not the password itself or the manner in which he provides it.  This is called the “act of production” privilege.

Judge Jerome Neidermeier (I chuckle every time I see that name; I’m such a child) in quashing the subpoena, analogized the demand to opening a safe.  If the subpoena was for a key, because a key is a physical thing, it would be a proper subject of a subpoena.  But if the safe was opened by a combination rather than a key, it would call for something that existed only in the defendant’s mind, and while not testimony in the traditional sense, would have a testimonial component since it provides evidence of what the defendant “knows”.

In other words, the defendant would be compelled to give “testimony”, thus bringing it within the protection of the 5th Amendment, by divulging that he knows the password rather than the password itself.


The act of producing even unprivileged evidence can have communicative aspects itself and may be “testimonial” and entitled to Fifth Amendment protection. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) [hereinafter Doe I ] (“Although the contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may be.”). An act is testimonial when the act entails implicit statements of fact, such as admitting that evidence exists, is authentic, or is within a suspect’s control. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988) [hereinafter Doe II ]. The privilege against self-incrimination protects a suspect from being compelled to disclose any knowledge he has, or to speak his guilt. Id. at 210-11. The suspect may not be put in the “cruel trilemma” of choosing between self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.

Orin contended that this decision has one glaring flaw:  Since Boucher had already input the password when he was initially stopped at the border crossing, the “act of production” privilege was already waived and Judge Neidermeier’s decision, while otherwise strong, fails to recognize that the government already possesses proof positive of this “testimonial” fact.  Now, it just wants to get into the computer, and the defendant has no more “act of production” privilege to protect.

Both Gideon and Bennett have argued that this case should be analogized to a simple Miranda-type statement waiver.  Even if a defendant has waived his Miranda right to remain silent by talking to the agent, he can invoke it again at any time and stop.  The fact that he once answered questions doesn’t mean that he has to answer questions again in the future. 

Bennett, always looking for the sex angle, goes a step further:


That reminded me of one of our law school classmates who, when we were discussing the law of rape in first-year criminal law class, asked the professor, “if you consent to have sex with someone once, does that mean you’ve consented for always?”

Um, no.

Aside from this brief salacious interlude, Gideon puts it in terms of an inquiry:


My question is: Why is it a waiver for him to use the password once? I don’t know enough about 5th Amendment waiver jurisprudence, but when a witness invokes the privilege, it is usually done on a question by question basis. What if Boucher here is telling the truth that these may have been inadvertently downloaded and “went along” to prove to the agents that he was “innocent”? Then when he discovered that he was looking guilty, he didn’t want to “help” them anymore.

Gideon’s point is well taken, and indeed Boucher doesn’t want to “help” them anymore, which is why his attorney moved to quash the subpoena.  The problem for Sebastien Boucher is that he is not being asked to subject himself to questioning, but rather to produce one piece of information that will expose physical evidence against him. 

While individuals have a constitutional right not to incriminate themselves by way of being compelled to give testimony, they do not have the right under the Constitution to withhold physical evidence that incriminates them.  That’s why the government can get a search warrant to search a home for a weapon, or drugs, or any physical evidence that can be found there. 

This case involves the pivot point between self-incrimination and the collection of physical evidence.  Orin Kerr’s point is that by Boucher having already input the password, he has already given the government this crucial piece of evidence.  There is no longer any question that Boucher possesses the password, and the testimonial nature of the “act of production” has already been given up.  The genie is out of the bottle and can’t be put back in.

What will be curious on appeal of Judge Neidermeier’s ruling is whether the Circuit goes with the waiver approach or the invocation of privilege approach.  There are plenty of apt analogies to apply, such as consent to search a car or apartment, subsequently withdrawn. 

The difference here is that each new question, new room searched, new act of sex (if one is inclined to follow Bennett’s lead), is an independent act and hence entitled to independent protection.  The password demanded from Boucher is not a new bit of information, but the same bit that has already been provided.  They just need it again. 

This is a peculiar fact pattern, but one likely to recur given the breadth of federal investigations into computer crime and child pornography.  What is most important about the decision is its guidance in people dealing with federal intrusion into the private world of their computers.  One aspect that has not yet been satisfactorily addressed, in my opinion, is why the contents of a computer are not viewed in the same way as a personal diary, containing content that the owner intends to keep deeply personal that reflects the operations of his mind, and hence should be beyond the scope of government intrusion.  Hopefully, this will be explored soon as well.

Additionally, I still can’t figure out what basis existed for border guards to be entitled to demand that Boucher permit them to access the contents of his hard drive.  While the general rule is that everything is subject to search at the border, the rule was grounded at a time when border guards were looking for dangerous plants, untaxed watches and bombs (in our Age of Terrorism).  This is another situation of “remembering the rubric while forgetting the rationale.”  There is no logical reason for the government to need to search a computer hard drive before allowing entrance into the United States, except general law enforcement.

As technology exceeds the bounds of old laws and court decisions, cases like Boucher will test the limits of the old ways to see whether they can and should be applied to a new, digital world.  Precedent provides stability in the law, but technological advances render the old rubrics truly obsolete and inapplicable.  As the Courts try to fit square pegs into round holes, there’s bound to be a great deal of confusion and disagreement as to our “tried and true” rules and what little privacy we have left. 

My guess is that it’s going to be a bumpy, unpleasant ride, but Judge Neidermeier’s handling of this case, aside from Orin’s nit-picking on one fact, is an exceptionally good start.  Now if only the Circuit will agree.

Student Loans Got You Down?

Then this probably won’t help much.  Paul Caron posting at MoneyLaw posts Senate Asks Why Colleges Earn 17.6% on Endowments But Spend Only 4.6% on Students.   What?  With college presidents paid like rock stars, and even law school professors getting multi-million dollar pads, the money had to come from somewhere.

The Senate is asking 136 schools (out of 4300 nationwide) to explain why they are soaking students (my words) with the annual barrage of tuition increases when they are sitting on endowments of $500 Million or more.  Harvard, the mother load of endowments, tops the charts at $34.6 Billion.

So what are they doing with these vast riches?  Well, they aren’t holding the line on tuition, that’s for sure.  And why not?  According to Inside Higher Education,

Asking colleges how the endowment payout “meets the needs of the current student body,” for instance, fails to recognize that endowments exist primarily not to get an institution through the next year or even five, but to support its long-term financial health,  Sarah Flanagan, [vice president for government relations and policy development at the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities] said.

It strikes me that  colleges and universities must certainly watch out for their “long-term financial health.”  But doesn’t $34.6 Billion seem to be enough of a cushion?  And at what point do they show concern, any concern at all, for the long-term financial health of their students?

I can’t quite articulate a reason for this, but I somehow doubt that Harvard is in imminent fear of no new applications for the coming school year, such that it will have to dig deeply into its endowment.  So for all you law students worried about that lack of job prospects and repayment demand from your friendly student loan provider, at least you can take comfort in knowing that no harm will come to Harvard on your watch, no matter how much the application rate drops.

Sympathy For The Devil

While those neo-cons hate the liberal media, I happened to belatedly notice the beloved New York Times’ story about the burgeoning Brooklyn South Narcotics scandal.  Cara Buckley just gushes sympathy for those poor undercover narcs.  Oh, their job is so difficult.  Oh, there’s so much temptation.  Oh, there’s so much risk.  To borrow liberally from my good Republican buddy, Young Shawn Matlock, boo hoo.

Cara mia, save your sympathy.  Not only are they not worth it, but they wouldn’t give you a second thought if the shoe was on the other foot.

There is nothing, absolutely nothing, difficult about distinguishing between being a police officer and being a criminal.  There is one big, huge, impossible to miss line the runs between the two.  When a cop chooses to cross that line, he knows exactly what he’s doing.  He makes his choice.  That’s it.

Oh, but undercovers have to live in the gutter, in a world of crime and violence, and they have to play the role in order to be effective and to stay alive.  You’re watching way too much Law & Order.  The rules for undercover work do not mandate that they steal drugs or money from dealers and put it into the trunk of their personal car.  Being an undercover has nothing to do with skimming enough to buy a boat, or a roadster, or a house.  It has to do with using a shield and gun, together with a whole lot of trust and authority (like the authority to put a bullet in someone’s head and claim, they were trying to kill me), to break the law.

And what about the sex part?  Is that forgivable too?  Are you fine with these fine married with children police officers copping free sex with prostitutes, drug addicts, perhaps the occasional lone woman at night pulled over for speeding?  This is just sick, and somehow the New York Times finds it understandable?


“The problems that come with vice enforcement are as old as policing themselves,” said Eugene O’Donnell, a professor of police studies at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. (Mr. O’Donnell also briefly represented one of the arrested officers, but no longer does; he would not comment specifically on the Brooklyn South case.)

“It’s a dirty business,” he said, “and it’s hard to be involved in the business and not get your hands dirty.”

No, it’s not hard at all.  In fact, it is unbelievably easy.  Just don’t commit crimes.

There is a difference between cops and criminals.  It is at the core of the criminal justice system, that the cops are cops.  They are expected to be truthful, honest, law-abiding.  That’s why they are the cops.  When we start to excuse them for being criminals, then the system is reduced to a farce.  

Police union leaders love to say around contract negotiation time, “if you don’t support your cops, the next time you’re in trouble call a criminal.”  It’s a great line.  Utter crap, but with spectacular surface appeal to ignorant people.  Criminals are not the measure of law enforcement.  Criminals are the people we defend and they try to put in jail.  That’s the game. 

The notion that police officers can somehow simultaneously be heroic law enforcers while suffering the occasional, understandable, “slip” is garbage.  When police officers break the law, they are every bit as heinous a criminal as any other person.  Indeed, they may well be viewed as worse, having sought and received a level of trust that few others in society have.

“But in a Police Department of around 35,000 members, some people will go astray.”

Lost dogs go astray.  Law-breaking cops are just dirty.  So Cara Buckley, save your sympathy.  They know exactly what they’re doing when the deliberately break the law.  It’s just not a problem for a cop to figure out which side of the law he wants to be on, and being a narc has nothing to do with it.

Practical Blawgosphere: The Art of Really Listening

Susan Cartier Liebel asks, “[D]o you really know how to LISTEN to what is being said? This arises in the context of establishing and maintaining solid client relationships, but it is similarly critical to defending our clients.  When we formulate strategy, or put facts down on paper, our precision may ultimately  prove critical to success.  But we can’t be precise if we don’t “hear” what our clients are telling us.

Basic communication has two components:  Messages are sent and messages are received.  Contrary to popular belief, they are not the same.  The easy analogy is the game of “telephone”, where a message is passed from person to person to see if the ultimate listener gets the same message as originally sent.  Personally, I always garbled the message just for fun, which is why my children won’t let me play this game with them anymore.

In criminal defense, as opposed to other areas of practice, we being with a bit of a handicap.  Our clients are not always the most articulate when providing us with information.  Worse still, they aren’t always the most forthright.  Frequently, they tell us what they want us to know, to believe. 

Clients assume that if they give us their exculpatory story, it somehow makes their position real and causes all evidence to the contrary to disappear.  Of course, this can be the death of a viable defense, since their choice of ignoring evidence does nothing to help us in preparing a viable strategy.

Clients also assume that if they make themselves seem innocent, or at least more innocent than they are, criminal defense lawyers will fight harder for them.  This is a natural tendency, since no one wants to make themselves out to be bad people, but it’s another stumbling block for the creation of a viable defense.  As I’ve written in the past, criminal defense lawyers don’t (and shouldn’t) care about guilt or innocence.  We don’t judge, we just fight.  That’s our job and we don’t fight any harder for “innocent” people than anyone else.  I know it’s hard to believe, but that’s just what we do.

The first step in really listening is making sure that the client is conveying what he means to convey.  If we listen hard to the message, but the message is nonsense, then we’re cutting out clients’ throats.  With some experience, smelling a rat in the client’s story comes fairly easily.  It’s not that they are definitely lying to us, but that we need to test the message to make sure that the client is clear that it’s not in his interest to convince us of anything. 

I generally tell clients that if they want their lawyer to be the only guy in the courtroom who doesn’t have a clue what really happened, then they should feel free to spin their story any way they want.  But if I don’t know the truth, I can’t protect them from it, and they’re the one who will suffer.  Win or lose, I still go home to my family at the end of the day.  So it’s entirely up to them if they want me to do what they are paying me to do, and I can only defend if I know what really happened, no matter how ugly.

Once you feel confident that you’re hearing the real story, you still have to overcome the client’s inability to express details fully and clearly.  Probing questions are needed, particularly since clients almost always have a point of the story that they want to emphasize, and tend to leave out significant details so that they can reach that point as quickly as possible.  While that works fine for them, it leaves you with only half a story.

But hearing the story that they’re telling is entirely up to the lawyer.  We have some big issues of our own that we need to overcome to be effective.  The first is the “we’ve heard it all before” attitude, as if this is another garden-variety case and there’s nothing the defendant is going to tell us that we don’t already know.  Maybe it is a garden-variety case, but that doesn’t mean that something didn’t happen in the course of the bust that opens a door that we can drive a Mack truck through.  If you jump to a conclusion without really listening, you’ll never know.  Besides, being a know-it-all does little to instill faith in your client that you’re taking his particular case seriously.  You may well be, but how is the client to know?

The nuance in the clients’ story offers a wealth of clues as to areas of potential collateral attack.  Does the client suffer from cognitive impairment?  What about mental illness or drug addiction?  Chances are no one has ever given the clients’ mental state any thought, even if they’ve been convicted before and subject to supervision.  The system is remarkably poor at recognizing and addressing such issues, but that doesn’t mean that lawyers should be equally oblivious.  While we are not qualified to diagnose anything, we can certainly send clients to appropriate professionals if we are prepared to recognize issues by paying close attention.

Also in the nuance of the clients’ story is the opportunity to understand the clients’ risk tolerance and goals.  Some walk in the door hoping for a quick, easy plea deal.  Others come in ready to fight to the death.  By paying close attention to the way the defendant frames his description of events and goals for representation, we can avoid the enormous problem that comes down the line when we’ve planned the defense strategy along the lines that we think best, or what we believe the client wants, only to find that the sands have shifted and the designed strategy works against the clients’ interests.

For example, the client comes in on day 1 and announces that he will never rat and will fight this to the bitter end.  On the surface, these seems to be a clear enough mandate, but this bravado often masks a defendant’s low risk tolerance and is performed to calm his spouse or family.  Later, once things quiet down, you come to realize that he would much prefer a plea to rolling the dice.  The problem is that the criminal defense lawyer, in the meantime, has taken a “scorched earth” approach with the prosecution in order to prepare for and win the trial.  The prosecutor, who has been put through his paces hard, isn’t in the mood to offer the defendant a sweet plea.  While the lawyer has relied on the client’s words, he may not have really listened to the client and heard the subtext.  Now the client is screwed.

In the context of preparing affidavits in support of motions, the detail is invariably where a failure to hear what the client is saying can wreak havoc.  The tendency to take broad notes, without the detail that distinguishes one case from another, which ultimately end up in an affidavit that is overbroad, inaccurate or unduly vague.  It may not seem like a problem at the time, but bear in mind that there may come a time that inconsequential details become very consequential, and your failure to hear them and incorporate them in the defendant’s affidavit can cause the defendant monumental unanticipated problems later.  And don’t blame the defendant for not telling you when he reviews the papers; a blatant error is one thing, but it’s the nuance of the message that will kill you.

While criminal defense lawyers like to believe that we pay careful attention to our clients, listen to them, and hear what they are telling us, we come to recognize after the fact that we missed something, or got something wrong just a little too late.  Listening to what our clients say, and what our clients mean to say, is a crucial component of our job.  Take the time, put aside the attitude, and pay real attention t
o the client.  We want to go into battle with our weapon fully loaded, and facts are the bullets.  Listen to your client and be well-armed.

Federal Judges on Sentencing: But What Do They Really Think?

Traditionally, the only way you got a real feel for a federal judge’s views on sentencing was when you had a defendant standing next to you about to lose a huge chunk of his life to the Guidelines God.  Would she adopt your downward departure argument, always a long shot, or accept the role of grid referee and take the easy route that assured affirmance for not straying.

After Gall and Kimbrough, I  questioned whether the Supreme Court’s language would be strong and clear enough to put the various Circuits in their place.  After all, there were no more stringent backers of the mandatory result of the “advisory” guidelines, making sure that those judges who thought Booker actually meant something were shown the light.  But that’s old news.  It’s a new world now, right?

Through this convoluted sourcing, via  Bashman to Doc Berman to the newly launched  Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, comes four remarkable essays by federal judges on their views of the impact of Gall and Kimbrough.  While my views are no doubt the most fascinating of all, these come from people whose views actually mean something.  Of particular note is that we have access to judge’s vision of federal sentencing without any defendant’s life on the line, a window that never really existed before the blawgosphere. 

Without further ado, here are the players (and their respective pdf’s) as described by Berman:




  • Judge Richard Kopf of the District of Nebraska takes a Letterman-esque “Top Ten” view of the sentencing world as interpreted by Supreme Court decisions.
  • Judge Gerard Lynch of the Southern District of New York emphasizes the “guideline” nature of the Sentencing Guidelines.
  • Judge Lynn Adelman and law clerk Jon Deitrich of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, ask us to “curb our enthusiasm” for the twin decisions, which—they argue—do not go quite far enough.
  • Judge Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts identifies both the apparent blessings and the less-obvious dangers of the Court’s holdings.
  • Judge Kopf, who happens to be the good-natured fellow who sent Doc Berman  a half case of brewskis on a lark, has the most fun with this exercise in his “Top Ten” list:

                       10. Following the Court’s approach, always put off to tomorrow what you can do today.



  • 9. You don’t need experience in actually sentencing people in order to totally screw up the law of sentencing. It is telling and painfully obvious that not a single Justice ever had to look a federal defendant in the eye while not knowing what law to apply.


    8. Footnote 9 in Blakely (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.”) is the biggest practical joke in the history of American law. See lesson One below.


    7. The “merits” and “remedial” opinions in Booker satisfy George Orwell’s definition of “Doublethink.” That is, the two opinions, and Justice Ginsburg’s swing vote to make both the law, reveal “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.”


    6. Never impose a sentence that is too harsh or too lenient. To quote Baby Bear, make it “just right” or, perhaps more importantly, to satisfy Justice Breyer, make sure it is just “reasonable.”


    5. Some sentencing judges used to take the Supreme Court seriously, but that got harder and harder beginning with and following Apprendi.

    4. In an Ivy League sort of way, it makes sense to address the “crack” question fifteen years after everyone else knew something was terribly wrong. See lesson One below.




    3. Justice Scalia’s dictum should be rewritten this way: The rule of law is the law of rules except when it isn’t.


    2. Sentencing judges can be divided into two groups–those who are damn sure they’re right and those (like me) who have no clue.


    1. There are a lot of really good, hard-working people “in the field” plus tens of thousands of defendants who deserved far better than the seven years of “water boarding” that ensued between Apprendi and Gall.


    I don’t know about you, but this is about as funny as a federal judge has been since Sam Kent, who is no longer allowed near women and children.

    Book Review: “Solo by Choice” by Carolyn Elefant

    I expected Solo by Choice, Carolyn Elefant’s new book on “How to Be the Lawyer You Always Wanted to Be,” to be a good read because Carolyn’s always an interesting writer.  The subject matter, on the other hand, gave me pause, since I am often disturbed about the one-sided approach of writers espousing the joys of going solo.  The tendency to promote the benefits and ignore the problems is hard to resist.  Was Carolyn up to the task?

    Solo by Choice blew me away.  As I read it, I became deeply concerned that I didn’t have enough glowing adjectives at my command to capture just how fantastic this book was, and how much I recommend it to anyone who has even a twinkle in their eye about the possibility of breaking out of the grind.  If I wasn’t already a solo, I would become one after reading this book, it’s that thorough, balanced and persuasive.

    Before turning to the substance, I was captured by Carolyn’s style, every page filled with wit and humility, exactly the tone one would hope to achieve in a book about solo’ing.  Interspersed throughout the book are sidebars, almost vignettes, that include real life stories, including some from Carolyn’s own personal and career history, that assure you that the thoughts going through your head aren’t novel or insurmountable. 

    It would be far too easy to be pedantic about telling others how to live their lives, and Carolyn instead draws us into her world, never making the reader feel that their issues or concerns are inconsequential.  In fact, one feels that Carolyn is there sharing it with us, and fully appreciating the difficulty of the decision.  She’s humorous and serious at the same time, and moves forward with just the right degree of speed to inform without becoming tedious. 

    Substantively, the book begins by dealing with the common issues confronting a wide variety of lawyer facing up to the hard decision of breaking out of the box.  What amazed me was the breadth of thought that Carolyn put into this book, raising issues and concerns that had never entered my mind, but were of clear significance once Carolyn raised them. 

    Perhaps the most important part of Carolyn’s approach was its balance.  While maintaining a positive tone throughout, Carolyn never ignored or sugar-coated the problems facing a solo practitioner, and faced up to the wide variety of issues head on.  Indeed, Carolyn created rubrics to consider whether the reader would be able to surmount some hard, real problems, thus saving the honest reader from finding themselves swept up in the tide of solo-joy, only to find that it wasn’t the right path for them. 



    Solo by Choice then turns into a “how-to” of extraordinary depth and detail.  Carolyn includes the nuts and bolts, from worrying whether your home electrical power is adequate for an office, to the color of your business cards, to billing difficult clients, to give the new solo a huge leg up in building a practice.  There are a thousand decisions and considerations to make in starting your own practice, but with this book, you will be so far ahead of the curve that your chances of success are increased exponentially.

    But it doesn’t stop there.  Carolyn’s book isn’t geared to just the urban lawyer, or the Nebraska lawyer, but covers ground that will be meaningful to the full panoply of issues confronting lawyers under almost every circumstance.  While most solo lawyers can relate their own experiences, Carolyn has studiously covered issues that are both common to all, and quite unique to the varying circumstances around the country.  Clearly, Carolyn has given her topic enormous thought, and it shows in every chapter.

    After the nuts and bolts, Solo by Choice moves forward to the cutting edge of solo practice, from software to marketing, with information that us old-timers who have done things the same way forever could certainly use.  Throughout the book, Carolyn cites to website and blogs for additional back-up for the reader as well as background support.  (Note to self:  Carolyn didn’t include your blawg anywhere.  What does that tell you?)

    Solo by Choice is so full of truly useful and meaningful information that I can’t conceive of anyone who is considering starting a solo practice not buying a couple of copies so that they can pull the “what to do” lists and timeliness out and tape them to the wall.  I’ve never seen anything as comprehensive, and thoughtful, available to any lawyer ready to give it a go. 

    But even if you’re already solo, and could benefit from a little confidence bolstering or perhaps some exceptionally detailed pointers to shore up that shaky practice, read Solo by Choice.  It’s so well written that the worst that can happen is you’ll enjoy the book and admire Carolyn’s thorough take.  Rarely will you find a book that’s such a pleasure to read and so incredibly useful.  Solo by Choice is destined to be the bible for going solo.  Don’t even think about starting a solo practice without reading it.

    The “Drug Court” Conundrum

    Somebody got it in their head a while back that drug courts was a good idea.  New York’s District Attorney Association thinks so, and has called for an expansion of drug courts.

    “The entire board of directors, made up of DAs from upstate, downstate, big counties, little counties, both sides of the aisle, resolved to make (drug courts) a legislative initiative,” said Murphy, a Republican. For some time, drug courts have operated in several counties “even though we’re not getting a penny for them, but because it’s the right thing to do.”

    Whenever the DAs think something is a great idea, I figure that there’s something wrong with it.  When they say it’s the right thing to do, then I get really scared.  Their idea of “the right thing” and mine rarely conincide.

    The drug court notion was aimed at “fixing” perceived problems, the idea being that the basic adversarial nature of litigation had failed to provide people with a means of breaking the cycle of drug-related crime.  So drug courts promoted diversionary sentences, primarily treatment.  Now I assure you that I am all in favor of treatment for drug addicts.  What I am not in favor of is the notion that courts are no longer in the business of first deciding guilt and innocence.

    The idea of drug courts emitted an unpleasant odor to me from day 1.  My problem is two-fold:  The cost to the integrity of the system and the courts, supposedly our detached and neutral magistrates, becoming a party to the law enforcement effort and engaged in curing society’s problems.  This isn’t the role of the court.

    What is the benefit of a drug court?  According to the National Drug Court Institute, this is the purpose :

    The traditional adversarial system of justice, designed to resolve legal disputes, is ineffective at addressing AOD abuse. Moreover, many features of the court system actually contribute to AOD abuse instead of curbing it: Traditional defense counsel functions and court procedures often reinforce the offender’s denial of an AOD problem. The offender may not be assessed for AOD use until months after arrest, if at all. Moreover, the criminal justice system is often an unwitting enabler of continuing drug use because few immediate consequences for continued AOD use are imposed. When referrals to treatment are made, they can occur months or years after the offense and there is little or no inducement to complete the program.

    In response, a few forward-thinking and innovative jurisdictions began to reexamine the relationship between criminal justice processing and AOD treatment services. Several commonsense improvements sprang up spontaneously throughout the Nation. It became increasingly apparent that treatment providers and criminal justice practitioners shared common goals: stopping the illicit use and abuse of all addictive substances and curtailing related criminal activity. Each system possessed unique capabilities and resources that could complement the other and enhance the effectiveness of both if combined in partnership. Thus, the concept of treatment-oriented drug courts was born.

    Very holistic.  But underlying this helpful scheme is one troubling concept; the end of a defendant’s ability to challenge the accusations against him.

    In exchange for this wonderful system to help drug addicts, defendants are compelled give up the right to challenge their arrest, to vindicate violations of their constitutional rights, to argue their innocence.  This isn’t really a court; it’s surrender if, at the end of the day, a defendant wants diversionary treatment.

    On the other hand, if a defendant, drug-addicted though he may be, seeks to challenge his alleged guilt or dispute the way he was caught, he gives up the opportunity to receive needed help at the end of the proceedings.  The adversarial nature of our criminal justice system is, according to drug court advocates, the problem with “fixing” this problem, and if you want to fight, then you lose the chance at rehabilitation.

    Drug courts are a  trade off.  In my view, the wrong trade-off.  If rehab will make do such great things to eliminate recidivism, then why would it not be the appropriate option after the rest of the adversarial system has done its job?  The answer is that this is a game, where the system will give a defendant the benefit of actually helping him, but only if the defendant gives up the right to fight.  This is intended to coerce the defendant to make a choice, surrender your rights in exchange for help.  Fight and you will be denied the help you need.

    Many will think this is a fair trade-off, one that benefits the defendant and exacts a reasonable price for that benefit.  To me, there is no reason why a price, reasonable or otherwise, need be charged at all.  Our criminal justice system exists for a reason, both to prevent the government from having its way with people and to keep its agents from violating the Constitution in the process.  There should be no price for exercising the rights set forth in the Constitution.  And there should be obstacle to fixing problems such as drug addition after the system has completed its job.

    No, I don’t think drug courts are a great idea.  And denial of diversionary drug treatment because of the exercise of constitutional rights exemplifies why the government can’t be trusted.  It’s a blatant reminder of how needlessly punitive government can be when given a chance.

    Another Kerik Lawyer Bites the Dust

    Bernie Kerik is about to become a martyr to the cause of legal representation, now that his latest lawyer, Kenneth Breen of the well-known highly-regarded go-to white shoe law firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker has been Curcio’d off the case, according to the New York Law Journal.

    The Southern District of New York United States Attorney’s attack on Kerik’s representation has been chronicled here,  here and here.  Apparently, Breen, like Joe Tacopina before him, has become so involved in Bernie’s case that there’s no way to allow him to remain.


    Southern District Judge Stephen Robinson based his decision on the virtual certainty that Mr. Breen would be called as a witness in United States v. Kerik, 07 Cr. 1027.

    “The conflict in this case is so severe that no remedial measure will cure it,” the judge said as he discussed the allegedly misleading statements Mr. Kerik made to Mr. Breen and defense attorney Joseph Tacopina that had been passed on to investigators.

    While there is a certain ironic humor to Bernie Kerik, who was about  an inch away from being Homeland Security Czar, before landing in a bit of a Bronx brouhaha when caught enjoying his newfound power a little too much, this is going to end up being one of those cases that bites lawyers for lower profile defendants hard in the butt.

    Bernie’s choice of counsel problems stem from plea negotiations in the Bronx, where Joe Tac made his client’s case for a reasonable plea by doing what lawyers do, arguing on behalf of his client and putting the wrong in the best possible light.  Ken Breen, to some extent since his involvement remains awfully foggy, has been alleged to be a witness to the same.  What gives?

    After his indictment, Mr. Kerik argued that the alleged conflict was merely hypothetical and that, in any event, the conflict was waivable. He also claimed the statements were privileged and protected by Federal Rule of Evidence 410 because they were made in the course of plea negotiations.

    And even if they were not protected by Rule 401, he argued, admission of the statements would deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

    Mr. Kerik said Mr. Breen’s role was limited and that Mr. Tacopina was the one who took the lead on what he claimed were plea discussions.

    This is quite a remarkable turn of the lawyer’s responsibility and liability for doing what lawyers are engaged to do, responsible for doing and do every single day.  Clients tell their lawyers “their story” and lawyers run with it.  When there’s a disparity between the initial write-up by prosecutors and an agents subsequent statement or testimony, do we get to bump the AUSA off the case so that he can be called as a witness?  Of course not.

    But the situations are not at all comparable.  Kerik, and by extension all defendants, have a constitutional right to counsel, which means a qualified right to counsel of choice.  In contrast, the government has no “right” to prosecute, or call witnesses who may hypothetically help the prosecution.  Judge Robinson’s ruling elevates the government’s desire to have available any and all potential witnesses above the defendant’s right to counsel.  This is a very dangerous proposition.

    Consider that every criminal defense lawyer, even those working for white shoe law firms, talks to their clients.  Thereafter, a discussion ensues with the prosecutor, where the lawyer argues on behalf of his client.  In the past, words coming out of the lawyer’s mouth were never considered evidence, but rather argument based upon the lawyer putting the allegations into the best possible light for the defendant.  This is what lawyers do.

    According to the judge:

    Mr. Kerik tried to argue that he was not challenging his plea allocution in the Bronx but was instead reserving the right to challenge the government’s interpretation of that allocution.

    “This argument misses the point,” Judge Robinson said. “It is not the truth of Mr. Kerik’s plea allocution that is questioned here. The issue is whether in discussions prior to his plea Mr. Kerik authorized his attorneys, including Mr. Breen, to relay statements . . . that were misleading and obstructive.”

    With this decision, Breen has been turned into a witness against Kerik (or against Joe Tac, as Kerik’s Bronx lawyer) because he had that talk.  It would appear that the unspoken rule now is that by going to the prosecutor and trying to argue the defendant’s position, the lawyer has somehow breached confidentiality, exposed that privileged communication to the world, and subjected himself to becoming a witness against the defendant.

    There is a very bad message here, one that will chill any effort at discussion or plea negotiation lest the lawyer expose himself to being a witness against the defendant.  Worse yet, it is a purely hypothetical situation, with the government and the court speculating about how the dynamic between lawyer and client, one that we thought was a matter of privilege, transpired.  Defendant’s don’t “authorize” specific phraseology when a lawyer chats up a prosecutor (especially in the Bronx, where the use of English to communicate is optional).  Defendants hire lawyers, and lawyers do whatever they do.  We don’t ask permission to do our job, and no one I know has ever sought a client’s approval before engaging a prosecutor in discussion.

    So what becomes of Bernie’s new lawyer, Ken Breen?

    Mr. Breen may have to be called to corroborate or dispute those accounts, he said, and should he disagree with Mr. Tacopina’s recollections, Mr. Breen “will either be forced to sit quietly in detriment to his client or (without taking an oath or being cross-examined) to ask questions to which the jury might assign undue weight.”

    The court has truly missed the forest on this entire scenario.  The problem would be eliminated entirely if the government was precluded from calling either Joe Tac or Breen, as it should be.  The relative “rights” and “authority” positions have gotten all screwed up here.  If the feds want to show what was said to the Bronx prosecutor, they can always call the Bronx prosecutor to the stand.  He can’t remember?  Bummer.  But that doesn’t give rise to a “right” to get inside the defense camp. 

    Kerik’s right to counsel trumps the government’s authority to breach lawyer-client privilege.  Kerik’s right to counsel the government’s need for using defense counsel as a peripheral bolstering witness.  But most importantly, the government’s entire theory as to why Tacopina and Breen should be subject to examination about their privileged communications with their client is a facial assault on the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 

    And what does Judge Robinson has to say about the violation of privilege?

    Even if the statements were privileged and the privilege has not been waived, he said, “the statements would still be admissible under the crime-fraud exception, even where, as here, the attorney was not a knowing participant in the crime or fraud in question.”

    A chill comes over me just reading that sentence.  So it’s clear, if the defendant isn’t exactly honest in his recitation of events to his lawyer, and the lawyer relies on the defendant’s recitation of events to negotiate with the prosecutor, then privilege goes out the window, the lawyer becomes a witness against the defendant and the entire scheme of representation does a 180 and crashes down on the defendant’s head.

    This new vision of the role of defense lawyer fundamentally alters the nature of the game.  If this is upheld, there are only two safe courses of action for the criminal defense lawyer and defendant:  Either the defendant is brutally honest at his peril, or the lawyer can never engage the prosecution in discussion.  Anything else and everybody is put at risk. 

    This is a bad decision for all involved.  Defendants need to be able to speak freely with counsel, even if it means that they are entitled to lie and spin their version of life.  And defense counsel needs to be able to discuss and bargain with prosecutors, or the system will grind to a halt.  This is a very bad decision.