Frank Pasquale at CoOp opens an interesting conversation about the varying levels of techno-sophistication, and what this means for judges making decisions about the application of law to a new, and ever-changing, technological landscape. He links to a post at OnTheMedia about Adam Liptak’s New York Times piece.
In the scheme of things, I’m hardly an old man in lawyer years, but I border on the ancient in the blawgosphere, where young men and women prevail and people like me, who enjoyed IBM Selectric IIIs and wet paper copiers in our early years, struggle to keep apace.
You might think that because I have a blawg, I’m on the cutting edge of techno-savvy. I assure you, I’m not. Nowhere near the edge, in fact. Actually, I can’t even see the edge if I stand on a techno ladder, I’m that far away. The problem is that in the world of people like me, I am viewed as remarkably up on technology. Scary, isn’t it?
And what about judges? I must believe that there are some who, on their own, have done far better than I have in closely watching the growth of technology. But I bet that the vast majority haven’t a clue how far behind the curve they are. I only recognize it because it smacks me in the face with great frequency around here.
So as these cases, these situations, come before courts, how do judges get their arms around the concepts, the implications, the penumbras, of this foreign technological world? For one thing, judges have their law clerks, fresh out of law school, to explain things to them. This may well serve to help them understand what Facebook is all about (something I have yet to comprehend), but this fresh-faced computer mavens are unlikely to appreciate the types of problems faced by the ordinary, law-abiding businesspeople crossing borders with their laptop computers.
Even some of the most mundane, commonly accepted technology, such as the ubiquitous cellphone, remains something of a mystery to many judges. Take, for example, the fact that the Eastern District of New York has just this month changed its policy of permitting lawyers to carry their cellphones, blackberries, whatever, into the courthouse. The Southern District of New York still refuses to allow this, although a letter writing campaign by some defense lawyers to Chief Judge Kimba Wood will hopefully change it.
It’s understandable that courts don’t want proceedings interrupted by a loud burst of Queen’s Bohemian Rhapsody, or counsel distracted by the latest email joke making the rounds during argument, but refusal to permit lawyers to carry cellphones is tantamount to being held in contempt by many. It doesn’t bother me, since I haven’t figured out how to turn my new cellphone on yet, but I’m hardly the measure of a normal cellphone user.
What’s worse is that the product cycle in technology is so fast, so much more in comparison to advances in anything else as I was growing up, that the judge who finally gets the hang of myspace is ten steps behind the times by then.
I recently argued an appeal involving the faxing of a legal update to a bunch of lawyers, a couple of whom took issue with the unrequested fax. By the time the case was argued, the facsimile machine no longer bore any relationship to the effective transmission of communications of this nature. It had long since been replaced by email and thereafter the blogosphere. The speed of the litigation process was dwarfed by the speed of technological advancement.
Still, as I argued the case, it quickly became clear that the judges were unaware, and unpersuaded, that the fax machine was as relevant to the transmittal mechanism as a horse to FedEx overnight delivery. One judge was clearly stuck on the problem of how to deal with undesired faxes, the 1st Amendment notwithstanding, and could not be convinced that his fears, “if taken to the logical extreme,” would never be realized since this bit of techno-magic was more of a dinosaur than he was.
Even though I understand little about the power of technology, where it’s heading and why I should try to keep up with the wave, I understand very well that courts are ill-equipped to deal with the interrelationship. I see many of our old and loved rules of law hindering technological enjoyment and advancement, not because anyone intends that to be the result but because they just don’t get it or know any better. I see misapplication of law and horrible unintended consequences in our future, and judges stuck to ill-conceived precedents that simply don’t work in the real world the way courts understood them to work in the quiet of their chambers.
Before some reader demands (I’ve been getting an awful lot of demanding readers lately) that I provide a viable answer to the problem I raise, let me say as clearly as possible that I have none. Don’t ask. I don’t know. But for those of you who do understand all about the latest and greatest in technology, bear in mind that when you have a case involving some new-fangled gadget or idea or phenomenon, chances are pretty good that the judge won’t have a clue either. Adjust your argument accordingly, and be prepared to explain what your talking about to the court in a way that could be understood like a 3 year old.
Author Archives: SHG
Cops Go Non-Jury in Sean Bell Killing
New York is a big city, but Queens, home to Archie Bunker, is a little less so. At least the three NYPD officers on trial for pumping 50 bullets into Sean Bell on the night before his wedding believe so.
They tried to have venue changed because of the intense media coverage, and condemnation, of the killing. That’s a tough sell in New York. There are plenty of high profile cases in the Big Apple, and the headline one day is displaced by the next day’s horrific murder, crash or scandal. The media machine always manages to find something new to get us to buy a paper. If courts were to start changing venue every time someone found their face on the front page, it would become a full-time job. It just doesn’t happen in New York City, and an appellate court ruled that it won’t happen in this case.
But something happened here that changes the calculus. Rather than play the change of venue card so that they can later argue “I told you so” when the cops get convicted, they have chosen to take a monumental gamble. The cops are going non-jury. They are leaving their fate in the hands of a judge.
Common wisdom is that you don’t go non-jury unless the judge gives you “the wink.” But there’s no suggestion that the defendant cops got “the wink” from Supreme Court Justice Arthur Cooperman, who will hold their fate in his hands. This one’s on the up and up, which means that they’ve shifted their future from the hands of 12 jurors to one person.
It seems that the cops believe that a judge, neutral, detached and capable of not letting the emotion and sympathy of Sean Bell’s death cloud his judgment, offers them a better chance than a jury. Given that a judge has seen too much, heard too much and experienced too much to buy into media hype, there’s some merit to the idea.
But the flip side is that a jury offers 12 chances to find one person who can at least hang the bunch. Do the cops believe that every person in Queens, every potential venireman whose name is called, will hate them so much that they will reject their defense? Apparently so. This belief is so strong that they are prepared to risk their lives on it.
There’s no way to say whether this will prove to be the right call, but it will be interesting to watch.
Midnight Cowboy
Rolling up to the humble Greenfield home in a long, long white stretch limo, we were taken aback. Who was getting married? Who was such a powerful person that commanded such a grand entrance.
The door swung open, and out came a black cowboy boot. Then a tall, slim man, with a leather jacket and a couple days growth of beard on his face stepped out. I stepped outside, lest this be Carlos the Jackal, a hit man sent by some competing cartel to one or another that I’ve represented over the years, coming to pay me back for freeing some nefarious competitor. If everything was to end at that moment, at least I could protect the children from having a deep psychological fear of white limousines for the rest of their lives.
The man, behind dark gray shades, stood erect, tall, taller still with the heels of his boots elevating him far above an ordinary height person like me, with the late afternoon sun behind him, silhouetting his head and obscuring his features. Then suddenly, without warning, the man stretched out his arms, grasped me around my shoulders and gave me a big hug.
The Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett himself, was here.
Mark had a case in the Southern District of New York, having wound its way from Texas, across the country, to wind up in my backyard, and was to appear this morning. My initial fear turned to shock, thinking that he was so incensed by my pedantic ramblings on the Boucher decision that he jumped on a plane from Houston’s “El Guacamole” International Airport to confront me mano a mano. But no, he bore no ill will.
The Greenfield family was honored to share our supper and guestroom with this modern day Paladin. Mark and I stayed up until the wee hours of the night, which at my advanced age is just after 9:30 PM, talking about the state of the law, the state of criminal practice and why Harris County is more fun than New York City.
But the surprises weren’t over when he appeared out of the back of that stretch limo. Mark came bearing a gift from the great Nation of Texas, a wooden-boxed, picture perfect pecan pie. There were no rhetorical exercises that could rationalize this pie with my perpetual state of Atkins, but I could never be so rude as to turn away from a gift that had traveled so far.
My wife, ever the charmer, reminded me that pecan pie was a shell containing sugar and starch, increasing my pie-lust to untenable proportions. It was one fine pecan pie, during its brief life. My son immediately called dibs on the wood box. At 13 years of age, they are still fascinated more by the box. It was a great box, though, I have to admit. I was considering whether to fight him for the box.
If you thought, by reading Defending People, that Mark was one of the smartest, most dedicated criminal defense lawyers around, you haven’t scratched the surface. While debating, discussing and matching wits across the internet allows folks from as far away as Texas and New York to engage with each other daily, there’s still nothing like talking to someone face to face. Mark Bennett is one hell of a lawyer, and if you ever have need of a criminal defense lawyer down Houston way, you would be exceptionally lucky to have Mark standing beside you.
Charge It on the Fear Card
As has often been discussed, fear is the coin of the realm in politics. Forget persuasiveness. Who cares about hope? Our government accomplishes much more with fear than anything else. After all, why else would a majority of Americans have approved of the invasion of a small, inconsequential sovereign nation at the expense of the lives of American youth and laying waste to our economy, if not for fear?
So Mark Draughn, our Windypundit, has borrowed the idea from Drug WarRant to create the Fear Card. It’s a beaut!
Don’t leave home without it.
Fear of crime. Fear of terrorism. Fear of the dark. It doesn’t matter, because as long as they can keep you afraid of something, they can control you. And isn’t that what democracy is really all about?
NYT: Target Blows Off Blogger
The New York Times carries a piece today about how Target, the store for chic on the cheap, feels about the blogosphere. Blogger Amy Jussel, who runs ShapingYouth.org, a blog about the impact of marketing on children, had a bone to pick with the Target add showing a woman spread eagle on a target.
The response she received was enlightening:
“Unfortunately we are unable to respond to your inquiry because Target does not participate with nontraditional media outlets,” a public relations person wrote to ShapingYouth.
“This practice,” the public relations person added, “is in place to allow us to focus on publications that reach our core guest,” as Target refers to its shoppers.
You, Amy, are not worth our while, according to Target, because you are nothing but a mere blogger. Dissed and dismissed. Well, now we know what Target thinks of the power of the blogosphere.
But what does the Times think of the blogosphere. Kevin O’Keefe raised that issue a while back, because none other than the New York Times shared the view that the blogosphere was journalistic wasteland. But as an add-on to this Target story, the Times solicited reader comments to the following:
Target to the blogosphere: you’re irrelevant.
Do you think bloggers should expect to be treated the same as traditional media outlets?
Bearing in mind that this is an online reader survey, the reactions are quite illuminating for those of us engaged in, or concerned about, the blogosphere. While the nature of the query, should we be treated “the same as” traditional media outlets betrays the Times’ bias, the response were still surprising strong.
Frankly, bloggers (myself included) have not earned the right to be treated the same as traditional media outlets. Indeed, I don’t see my blawg as a media outlet at all, though there are some commonalities. But at the same time, a majority of the response were quite off-putting, reflecting a decided lack of respect for the blogosphere.
I’ve argued abut this in the past, that those pumping and dumping more worthless, contentless blogs into the blogosphere as part of a marketing scheme is unhelpful to those of us why try (whether we succeed is another matter) to contribute to the marketplace of ideas.
And what have we learned from this? Three things: Target doesn’t respect the blogosphere. The Times has no problem with the blogosphere, as long as we stay in our place beneath the traditional media outlets. But most importantly, there remains a significant swathe of the public that has yet to be persuaded that the blogosphere has anything of consequence to offer. I don’t blame the public. The blawgosphere needs to do better.
As for the comparison of bloggers to traditional media outlets, it was a silly, loaded question. I would love to have the time and access to play journalist and gather original content. But I work for a living, and my time is spent representing people instead of playing junior journalist. Would journalists have the time, access and interest if they weren’t getting paid to write? Let’s keep things in perspective and not get ridiculous.
On the other hand, the blawgosphere (as opposed to the blogosphere) has had some significant impact on the bigger picture, so I wouldn’t dismiss it as glibly as Target. We may not be the New York Times, but we aren’t chopped liver either.
Car Searches May Be Supressible Again!
As I’m painfully reminded when Niki Black at Sui Generis leaves Simple Justice out of her weekly New York blog round-up, such as here, though not here, I sometimes neglect New York cases. This isn’t good for a New York criminal defense blog, but truth be told, most of the New York decisions that come across my desk are truly inconsequential.
But there was a decision that flew under the radar last week, although it was picked up by New York Legal Update. The Third Department decision in People v Hackett initially struck me as pedestrian, even though it was a suppression decision in which the defendant prevailed. Sure, a defendant won in the Third Department, not an everyday occurrence. And the Third Department suppressed, also quite the rarity. But the issue, a car stop where the cop searched for no reason, certainly wasn’t the sort of thing that pops out at you.
But when this case made the New York Law Journal, something dawned on me. What matters about Hackett is not that it reflects some novel or remarkable turn of the law, but rather that it’s the first time in memory that a New York court didn’t find some excuse, any excuse, for upholding the search of a vehicle. What’s remarkable is that a vehicle search was brought back under the protection of the 4th Amendment. Now that’s news.
The facts of the case are provided by the court in somewhat straightforward fashion, with one glaring and painful detail.
Late at night on December 7, 2005, State Trooper Jason Lewis observed defendant driving his vehicle over the fog line. After Lewis activated his emergency lights, defendant pulled to the side of the road and leaned toward the passenger seat of his vehicle before Lewis approached. When Lewis requested defendant’s license and registration, only the registration was produced. Upon questioning defendant concerning his movement toward the passenger side of the vehicle, defendant explained that he was reaching for his cell phone, which he then showed to Lewis.
Lewis ordered defendant out of his vehicle, deciding to detain him for a traffic violation. Lewis handcuffed defendant for safety reasons, placed him in his police vehicle and ran a warrant check which revealed no outstanding warrants; he did not run a check to determine if defendant possessed a valid New York State driver’s license. Upon the arrival of a backup, Lewis went to defendant’s vehicle, opened the passenger door, and looked at the floor board. Observing “a clean floor,” he bent down and shone his flashlight underneath the passenger seat, discovering a loaded handgun. A later search of the vehicle yielded a quantity of cocaine.
Note that the court glosses right over the matter of the defendant being handcuffed for safety reasons, without any explanation of what these safety reasons might be. But let’s put that aside, since no answer is forthcoming.
After restating the obvious limiting language of the automobile exception from People v. Torres, 74 N.Y. 224 (1989), the Third Department did something extraordinary: It did NOT fashion an excuse to thereupon distinguish this case from the “basic” rule of law that hasn’t actually been applies since somewhere around 1990. The Court held:
Here, no specific threat was presented by defendant’s conduct. To be sure, he was driving erratically and disappeared from Lewis’s line of sight when he leaned toward the passenger seat. However, defendant explained his movement when he produced his cell phone. And, while Lewis testified that defendant seemed nervous and repeatedly looked at his vehicle, this conduct, in and of itself, is insufficient to justify a search. Lacking any present objective indicators which could lead to a reasonable conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood that a weapon was located in defendant’s vehicle, we conclude that the search was unlawful since no actual or specific danger threatened the safety of the officers.
Now this is hardly a strong endorsement of a return to the days when the 4th Amendment applied despite the mere involvement of a motor vehicle, but at the same time, the Court suppressed. It’s been a long time since we’ve seen that happen in New York, where the mere mention of “motor vehicle” was enough to shut down a suppression hearing so fast it would make your head spin. At least this may be a harbinger of the return to the days before the knee-jerk application of the exception, and giving defendants a chance to argue that they do not shed all 4th Amendment protections the minute they enter a car.
Could the pendulum be swinging back to a state of reasonableness? It’s too soon to say, but this is certainly a step in the right direction.
Sorrow Felt By Police Nationwide: Why, They Ask?
It’s unclear how law enforcement culture developed to hold anything so dear. Still, every schoolchild across the country is aware of one immutable fact: There is nothing that impacts more deeply the core of a police officer’s psyche than when pointless harm befalls them.
Is it cultural? Is it there beforehand, or does it happen later? Perhaps it’s taught at the police academy, or just one of the many tricks of the trade that is enforced by the peer group pressures. I really can’t say.
But there is no doubt that this image can cause the toughest, meanest, most hard-nosed police officer to weep. It moves me to tears as well. If you’re squeamish, this is not for you.
Such a horrible waste.
The Prison-Industrial Complex
Jamie Spencer posts about a New York Times article addressing the reasons for closing, and the reasons for keeping, our nation’s prisons. Ask the average taxpayer, and she’ll tell you that we need all those prisons to protect us, to lock away the bad guys so we can sleep at night without fear of a line outside the door of criminals waiting to break into our homes, rob us blind and do other really bad things to us.
Well, there’s a whole different reason why prisons exist, having far less to do with our “protection”. For depressed rural areas, they are a gold mine. For politicians from depressed rural areas, they are a guarantee of re-election. For anyone who doesn’t live in a depressed, rural area with a brand-spanking new prison, they are a dirty little secret of the redistribution of wealth from your pocket to the pockets of the people who live in those depressed, rural areas. This might best be called “Republican Welfare,” though the Democrats are not above it either.
As rural economies across the country crumbled in the 1980s and the population of prison inmates swelled, largely because of tougher drug laws, states pushed prison construction as an economic escape route of sorts. Throughout the 1960s and ’70s, an average of four prisons were built each year in rural America; the rate quadrupled in the 1980s and reached 24 a year in the 1990s, according to the federal Agriculture Department’s economic research service.
The boom, experts say, provided employment, but it also fostered a cycle of dependency. Depressed rural communities came to rely on the prisons as a source of jobs, economic sustenance and services, with little effort devoted to attracting other viable businesses.
See, and you thought there was no silver lining behind those dark clouds of drug crime.
The problem now, however, is that the numbers of prisoners are beginning to dwindle. It’s a huge economic misfortune for these prison-dependent towns that people just aren’t committing enough crimes to keep the prisons full and the towns afloat. Darn criminals. You can’t even count on them for economic prosperity.
It’s long been widely acknowledged that putting and keeping people in prison is an expensive proposition for the taxpayer. We’ve been sold on its value by hearing the non-stop virtues of law and order, and incarceration as the cure for so many of society’s ills. Isn’t it worth it to know that your family is safe at night from violent criminals? All those people working in the prisons in rural towns are shaking their heads like bobble-head dolls, “yes it is, yes it is.” They have car payments to make, you know.
It’s not that people have stopped supporting the ever-increasing length of incarceration as the magic bullet that will safeguard our children and stop crime forever. Indeed, even as crime continues to drop dramatically, the media and politicians continue to play on our fears to keep us interested and believing that the threat is real and omnipresent.
Now I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the demands for ever-higher prison sentences and creating crimes that never before existed is entirely a scam on the public. At the very least, so many people support this approach that our tough and tougher on crime politicians feed off this tact for years. But just so you aren’t mislead into thinking that the funding spent on prisons is primarily intended for the good of society, don’t forget that there are depressed, rural areas across America who appreciate your support.
It will be interesting to see how they argue for the need to keep these empty prisons open and well-guarded until they are needed again. After all, who knows how long it will be before driving with tinted windows will command a state prison sentence. And once it is, we’re going to need prisons to house those dastardly criminals.
Boucher Redux (Again) and the 5th
The Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett, in the finest tradition of the criminal defense bar, has sunk his teeth in the Boucher discussion and won’t let go until it’s been ripped to shreds. Mark raises some very worthy points, both in his post and subsequent comments (a lousy place to have a discussion).
Since the issues raised by this case involve a path less traveled, but one that may well prove to come up with far greater frequency in the future as computer crimes as the interplay between old law and new technology requires us to confront an ever-changing landscape, it’s worth some additional discussion and debate.
The traditional application of the 5th Amendment is to preclude compelling a person to make incriminatory statements. As this is how most people, and most lawyers, think of the 5th, it tends to box us in when it applies in a less traditional fashion. What the 5th provides (in relevant part) is:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..
On its face, the 5th has no such limitation to statements, but its interpretation by courts makes it both broader and narrower than some might think. It speaks to being made “a witness against himself.” While one might well believe that taking a defendant’s blood (or fingerprints, DNA, voice recordings, handwriting exemplars, etc.) compels a person to be a witness against himself, courts have held that these do not violate the privilege.
The distinction under the 5th Amendment has been defined as “testimonial”: Does it require a defendant to provide knowledge he possesses or speak his guilt. While the latter is what people normally understand to be within the privilege, the former presents a concept that is often misunderstood by lawyers and laypeople alike.
The Boucher decision rests upon the “testimonial” nature of the “act of production” of a password. By compelling Boucher to produce a password, it provides evidence that Boucher (1) knows the password, (2) has access to the kiddie porn on the computer, and (3) demonstrates his control over the computer. The Boucher decision rejects the government’s argument that these are not testimonial, and hence unprivileged.
Mark was getting bogged down by the distinction between compelled incriminatory statements and compelled incriminatory “testimonial” acts. This leads to the effort to try to plug all 5th Amendment privilege issues into the Miranda paradigm, which just doesn’t work. These are just not statements.
The failure to fit non-statement testimonial evidence can be seen by the government’s various offers in Boucher to “overcome” the testimonial nature of the password. They offered everything from letting the defendant (or someone on his behalf) input the password in private to granting use immunity. Mark argued that this would solve the situation:
If Mr. Boucher had not moved to quash the subpoena, or if the magistrate judge had denied the motion to quash, he could have taken the Fifth before the Grand Jury. Then the government could have given him immunity (technically or practically [by getting Judge Niedermeier to order him to answer the question]) and forced him to answer the question or go to jail for contempt (which might be less onerous than going to prison for possession of child pornography).
Because this didn’t require Boucher to give statements, this shows why it is critical to understand the difference between testimonial acts and testimony. Not only was Boucher not subpoenaed to appear and give testimony before a grand jury (the typical grand jury subpoena situation), but he could not have invoked the 5th a second time after having a ruling from the court to the contrary. True, Boucher could have refused to comply with the subpoena, but the court could have jailed him until such time as he complied, and then he would have been prosecuted for the porn. This wouldn’t have provided much of a solution.
But Mark astutely notes why the invocation of privilege matters so much:
If Mr. Boucher had been compelled to provide his password and Agent Curtis became unavailable for trial, the only evidence the government would then have of the contents of the hard drive would have been derived from Mr. Boucher’s compelled testimony, and would therefore have been inadmissible.
This is the reason why Judge Niedermeier rejected the government’s proposal to give use immunity, but be permitted to enjoy the fruits of derivative use, the computer files accessed after the password was provided. Additionally, the strength of evidence against Boucher, Agent Curtis’ testimony about a file that he claims to have seen on Boucher’s computer versus presenting the actual file to the jury, is substantially different. Clearly, the latter is far more damning than the former.
Mark is also correct in noting that the implicit assumption that Boucher input the password, unseen by Agent Curtis at the border, may not in fact have happened.
[D]rive Z may already have been decrypted and mounted when Mr. Boucher woke his computer from sleep at the crossing. After seeing the suspect images, according to Magistrate Judge Niedermeier’s opinion, “Agent Curtis arrested Boucher. He then seized the laptop, after shutting it down.” This would have triggered the encryption software’s unmount of drive Z.
This is a plausible explanation, though somewhat problematic since it is up to the defendant to raise his factual disputes, and we indulge in fiction when we engage in post hoc factual recharacterizations to support our positions. In other words, since this isn’t what Judge Niedermeier found to be the facts, it isn’t the fact for the purpose of discussing his decision.
But similarly, Orin’s (and my) acceptance of the implicit idea that Boucher had affirmatively input the password is not a hard finding by Judge Niedermeier either, meaning that I’ve done the same thing as Mark, overlayed my understanding of the facts which are not expressly stated. I stand corrected.
The problem, for purpose of the Boucher decision being upheld or reversed, is that the computer somehow went from being observable by Agent Curtis to locked by a password. One way of the other, it implicates Boucher’s involvement with a password, whether by inputting it originally or having a password protected computer that locked up upon shutdown.
Either way, Boucher finds himself responsible for the existence of a password, unless he contends that this was not his computer at all. Since that’s not the case, we’re still stuck with the password problem, that Boucher’s computer is password protected, but was accessed by Boucher at the border. Somehow, Boucher ends up having the password that the government needs, and this fact remains proven by the earlier conduct.
This is where the final, and most important part, of the Boucher decision comes into play. Even though it is clear (at least to me, though Mark would disagree) that Boucher has already shown that he had the power to access the contents of his password protected computer, the contents of which are clearly not privileged, does Boucher have the constitutional right to invoke his privilege against disclosing the password and allowing the government to access the contents the second time around?
Orin argues that a waiver happened when Boucher allowed Agent Curtis to see the content of his computer the first time around. Mark argues that Boucher can invoke the 5th regardless of what happened the first time around. The court held that because the password is not a physical thing but rather something that exists in Boucher’s mind thus rendering it testimonial, it cannot be compelled.
This disagreement revolves around the question of whether a privilege once waived can be restored or recaptured. Unless we indulge in the fiction that Agent Curtis is lying about having seen the content of the computer (a place where Mark is willing to go but I am not since it was never raised or argued in Boucher), Boucher waived his right once by allowing access to the contents of his computer. Having let the horse out of the barn, the genie out of the bottle, whatever trite phrase you prefer, can he now put (horse, genie, whatever) back in?
Judge Niedermeier never expressly deals with this. Mark says he doesn’t have to. Orin says this is a huge gap in the decision.
In his first post on Boucher, Mark analogizes the scenario to sex (agreeing to sex once doesn’t mean that it’s agreed to forever). This has superficial appeal, but simply isn’t the law. There are waivers that put an end to the issue, and waivers that don’t. Mark then analogizes it to having initially agreed to answer police questions, but subsequently invoking the 5 to refuse to the same questions again (say with a video, just to explain why they would want to do this).
This is where Mark’s analogy has legs. While it deals with statements rather than non-statement testimonial acts, the waiver aspect is essentially identical. Both are testimonial, yet the defendant cannot be compelled to “do it again” just because he did it once.
Orin, I suspect, would argue that because there is no harm to Boucher by doing it again, having already created the proof of production via his initial waiver, and since it is not the password but the computer content that is the object of this search for evidence, the testimonial nature of the act of production should be subject to waiver analysis and, indeed, deemed waived for this purpose.
But Mark has sufficiently, and correctly, shown why there is harm to Boucher, whether because Agent Curtis is later unable to testify or because the Agent’s testimony is of lesser weight than the actual computer files themselves. It is important, however, to note that this is hardly as cut and dry as it might appear based on Mark’s application of the privilege relating to statements as opposed to the act of production.
While I agree with Mark’s conclusion (and I hope the reviewing court in Boucher does as well), the path taken to reach it was more than a little dubious and misdirected not recognizing the difference between statements and non-statement testimonial evidence under the 5th Amendment.
The point of all this (again) is that criminal defense lawyers, dealing with application of old law to new technologies, need to understand the nuances if we are going to mount successful opposition to the government’s efforts to intrude on a digital world. Getting stuck in a simplistic and erroneous analysis, even if we accidentally arrive at the right conclusion, opens the door to the creation of bad law as well as the conviction of a defendant. We need to appreciate the subtleties so that we can successfully defend the Constitution in the face of novel applications.
The Editorial Advertiser
What’s killing me about Susan Cartier Liebel’s latest “tip of the week” is that she’s absolutely right. Susan borrows from Paramjit Mahli over at Profiting With Public Relations to urge lawyers to consider the public relations value of sending letters to the editor.
I am a huge fan of letters to the editor. They present ideas that the op-ed writers, far too brilliant in their own agendas, often miss. At the very least, they reflect the trend of public opinion, often showing that the public disagrees with the institutional views adopted in editorials and articles. If the letters section wasn’t there, one would never know how ideas play out in the forum of public opinion. We would be limited to the medias perspective, which may not reflect the public’s issues and concerns. I truly appreciate hearing a broader wealth of views than those whose opinions are bought and paid for by the publisher.
Given my appreciation of the letters, Susan’s point cut me to the quick. It’s bad enough in the blawgosphere that so many so-called blogs are popping up for no better reason than to pump one lawyer or another. So many blogs, so little content. Give me thought or go away. I may not agree, but at least it makes me think.
But the letters, pristine and honest. A truthful and accurate reflection of the voice of the people. Unless, of course, it becomes yet another dumping ground for people who want to get their name in the paper for untoward purposes.
Should the letters to the editor become the latest, greatest craze in self-promotion? My knee-jerk reaction is, PLEASE NO! PLEASE DON’T DO IT! PUUUUHHHLEEEEEAAASSSSEEEE!
But then, I’m a dinosaur (as has been roundly acknowledged by all who know me) and I’m generally the last in line to recognize a trend, except as to lawyerly fashion where I remain cutting edge. Given the lack of opportunity for lawyers to say or do something to show to the world (or at least the universe of potential clients) that they know what they’re doing and are worthy of the public trust, why not speak their mind publicly?
I certainly (and obviously) believe that lawyers are every bit as entitled to express their personal views as anyone else in society. Indeed, our perspective often adds greatly to the discourse and dissemination of ideas. We see and live things that others don’t, and our education, training and experience allows us to consider consequences of action much farther down the road than many other people. Perhaps our lack of expressing views has been a contributing factor to many poor political decisions.
Why do we keep our ideas to ourselves? My guess is that the biggest factor is fear that the expression of views may drive away potential clients who disagree. A commitment to a point of view scares people who depend upon a broad array of people to use their services. No one can maintain a law practice while driving clients away in droves.
If this is true, then writing letters to the editor may prove a dangerous thing for those seeking to get a little free press out of it. Unless they espouse views of such utter inoffensiveness that no one will be scared off, the plan could backfire on them. But if the letters say nothing, then no one will publish them. After all, newspapers get plenty of letters and have room for very few. They have to pick and choose the ones that will interest readers, rather than the ones that make the writers happy because their name is attached.
So after some calm, deliberate thought, Susan’s idea offers greater promise of public benefit than first appeared from its flagrantly self-serving purpose. Lawyers, write as many letters as you want. If your letters do nothing beyond promoting yourself, they will find their way into the circular file where they belong. The newspaper isn’t there to give you free advertising on the letters page. Either your letters cut the mustard, or they get tossed.
As for clogging the works with an avalanche of self-promotional letters, I doubt that will end up being a problem. Writing letters takes more work than most self-promoters want to do, and that immediately cuts down significantly on volume. People write when they care. Self-promotion just isn’t a strong enough motivator. Moreover, those who do submit letters, but find that nobody has the slightest interest in their letters, are going to quit trying very soon. When the return on the investment of effort is too small, they will drop like flies.
If the letters are found to be worthy of publication, then you’ve done something to contribute to the public discourse, whether its added some facts, brought a different perspective or caught some lame-brained editorial in flagranti delicto. If you can slide your letter past the vetting process, you’ve earned the right to be published. And if you’ve earned the right to be published, then you deserve whatever degree of self-promotion comes with it.
While I tend to be the wet blanket on all those blogs that hype lawyer marketing, much to Susan’s chagrin, she’s turned me around on this one. The only advice I can add is that if your letter says nothing, somebody is bound to notice. If your letter is foolish and somehow manages to get in the paper, then your killing your own credibility. So write letters as often as you like, but use them as tools to build your credibility and worthiness by proving that you have something substantive to add to the conversation. If you do this, get published and gain widespread fame and fortune, I salute you. You’ve earned it.
