Author Archives: SHG

Privacy Ends at the Border

Whether it’s a laptop computer, a Blackberry or a cellphone, confusion by Circuit Courts combined with the blurring of rationales is on the verge of ending whatever privacy you thought you had in your personal information, according to Adam Liptak.

I  recently posted about the case of Sebastien Boucher, who learned the hard way about coming across the Canadian border, ah?  As that case resolved around a password-protected computer folder, it was somewhat unusual in terms of the basic issue of privacy at stake. 

Liptak writes about another case, Michael T. Arnold, flying into Los Angeles from the Philippines with his trusty laptop in hand.  A customs officer decided to take a look-see at the files on his computer.  Arnold wasn’t a suspected terrorist.  The laptop didn’t set off alarms that it emitted the odor of plastic explosive.  The customs officer was just checking, because he could.

The LA district court judge, Dean Pregerson, had it right.


“Electronic storage devices function as an extension of our own memory,” Judge Pregerson wrote, in explaining why the government should not be allowed to inspect them without cause. “They are capable of storing our thoughts, ranging from the most whimsical to the most profound.”

The Circuit, Liptak predicts, views it differently.


The three judges who heard the arguments in October in the appeal of his decision seemed persuaded that a computer is just a container and deserves no special protection from searches at the border. The same information in hard-copy form, their questions suggested, would doubtless be subject to search.

This simplistic assessment is yet another example of remembering the rubric while forgetting the rationale, a favorite endeavor of courts when trying to avoid any novel thought and hide behind the wall of precedent. 

While border searches have long been a free for all, it developed that way for a reason.  The rubric was that there was no expectation of privacy at the border, thus letting everyone crossing a border know that they were subject to search.  But this was the end product of the analysis, not the beginning.  The purposes behind this free-search zone was both safety and revenue.  Whether it was weapons, or bug-infested coconuts or untaxed Rolexes, there were legitimate interests at stake giving rise to the limited expectation of privacy.

None of these rationales for the wholesale elimination of privacy applies to an individual’s private information stores on his hard drive.  As Judge Pregerson noted,


Computer hard drives can include, Judge Pregerson continued, diaries, letters, medical information, financial records, trade secrets, attorney-client materials and — the clincher, of course — information about reporters’ “confidential sources and story leads.”

What legitimate border-related interest does the government have in knowing about financial records?  Clearly, none.  It’s just old rules applied to unforeseen circumstances resulting in unintended consequences.  By elevating the rule above the rationale (which only seems to happen when it favors the government’s authority to intrude), the court could create quite a dilemma.

If there is no privacy as to the content of a computer hard drive, will the next logical step be for the government to download all hard drives at a person passes through customs for inspection at a more convenient time, thus letting the government maintain a complete record of the contents of every laptop that crosses a border?  If it’s encrypted (and you’re not as stupid as Boucher by giving it away for free), can customs either command that you enter the password or refuse you entrance to the United States?  Or can they simply impound your computer upon refusal?

Thinking further down the road, we are not at the out limit of technological advancement yet.  I hesitate to think what is coming down the pike, but I suspect that the amount of private information now available on a laptop barely scratches the surface of what will be available in the future.

But the rules are being written now, and it will only be baby steps to apply the same rubric to new technology as it comes online.  Just as the Circuit appeared enamored of the simple container analogy, everything is a container if one wants to call it that, including that bony part of our anatomy surrounding the brain. 

In the old days, traveling abroad was a very big deal.  Today, it’s barely different than going to a neighbor’s house.  Would federal judges feel as warmly expansive to the government if their private thoughts on cases, government officials and people they don’t know in varying states of undress become the favored reading material of border agents? 

I can think of a bunch of good reasons why border agents won’t be able, or inclined, to hassle a federal judge coming back from his Bermuda junket with laptop on hand, leaving them to have only the limited appreciation of intrusiveness that can be seen from a big bench.  I have no expectation to enjoy any such courtesy.  I hope there’s no file on my computer that suggests a Kodak moment.

Padilla and Yoo: Lawyer Approved Torture

By now, everybody knows about the lawsuit filed by Jose Padilla against former DOJ lawyer (now lawprof at Cal Berkeley) John Yoo.  According to this Liptak article, Yoo’s lawyer says it’s ” ‘a political diatribe’ that ‘belongs, at best, in a journal, not before a federal court.’ “

Yeah?  So?  You’ve got to admit, American citizen cum enemy combatant Jose Padilla has probably brought us more great law on the limits of terrorist prosecution than any other defendant. 

Padilla’s suit seeks damages in the amount of one dollar.  Attorneys fees are no doubt also available on the back end, but I doubt that’s a major motivator here.  This is an opportunity to challenge Yoo, who wrote the memorandums that made the Cheney administration smile, providing legal approval to such potential Olympic sports as waterboarding.

The new suit against Mr. Yoo makes more novel claims. 

“A lawyer who gives the green light to clearly illegal conduct is an accomplice to that conduct,” Mr. Freiman said in describing the theory of the case.

Next time someone asks you at a cocktail party how you could defend “those people,” now you can respond, “Well, at least I’m not John Yoo.”

It would appear that this suit is not just another blind shot in the dark across the administration’s bow, but has support from another insider in the DOJ who was less than thrilled with Yoo’s willingness to give the seal of approval to anything the administration wanted.

The suit is based in part on a recent book by Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor who, while serving in the Justice Department in 2003 and 2004, disavowed some of Mr. Yoo’s work. In the book, “The Terror Presidency” (W.W. Norton), Mr. Goldsmith wrote that two of Mr. Yoo’s memorandums were “legally flawed” and “tendentious in substance and tone.”

Will there be a new cause of action for “tendentiousness“?  There certainly should be, and it should include treble damages.  You’ve got to appreciate Jose Padilla.  Since the demise of Bill Kuntsler, somebody has to be willing to mount a credible challenge to our government’s love of circumventing the Constitution.  Plus, it could be a load of fun to watch some lawprofs rolling in the mud.

The Cottage Industry of Snitching (Update)

Ethan Brown has just released a new book,  Snitch: Informants, Cooperators, and the Corruption of Justice, (PublicAffair, December 2007).  I haven’t read the book yet, so I can’t tell you about how Ethan’s incisive brilliance has settled all debate over the propriety of snitching in general, and its viability as an alternative path for legitimate defense strategy. 

But the squibs are interesting, and will hopefully bring about some further debate amongst the public (you remember them, our jurors) about the trustworthiness of the ubiquitous snitch.

From the  Amazon description of the book:


Our criminal justice system favors defendants who know how to play the “5K game”: criminals who are so savvy about the cooperation process that they repeatedly commit serious crimes knowing they can be sent back to the streets if they simply cooperate with prosecutors. In Snitch, investigative reporter Ethan Brown shows through a compelling series of case profiles how the sentencing guidelines for drug-related offenses, along with the 5K1.1 section, have unintentionally created a “cottage industry of cooperators,” and led to fabricated evidence. The result is wrongful convictions and appallingly gruesome crimes, including the grisly murder of the Harvey family in Richmond, Virginia and the well-publicized murder of Imette St. Guillen in New York City.

My initial reaction to this promotional description is that it falls into the same old, tired trap of attributing that level of “savvy” that makes desperate defendants into evil geniuses.  This is what comes from seeing the end result without having any real knowledge of the people involved.  As we deal with defendants daily, and lie with their varying levels of brilliance and the occasional epiphany of a new way to play the system, this hyperbole is harder to swallow.

Nor does this description address the role of the government, both law enforcement and prosecution, in creating, fostering and supporting productive rats in the name of justice. 

And of course, does it matter that Ethan described the occasional “appallingly gruesome” crime, as if things would be acceptable if snitches only produced wrongful convictions and ordinarily gruesome crimes?  Or what about ordinary crimes that weren’t gruesome at all?

The Turk alerted me first to this new book.  Do I commend it, particularly given our love/hate relationship to the topic?  I can’t say since I haven’t read it yet.  Maybe Ethan will have me review it, if he wants to know how well it meets the perspective from the inside rather than the sensationalist outsider view.  It’s hard to work off of the publisher’s promo, since that’s directed to the general audience seeking melodrama, without regard to accuracy.  Will it offer anything to the criminal defense bar?  Maybe.  I wouldn’t just a book by its cover.

In any event, I thought you should know that it’s out there considering how many words we spend on the subject of snitches.

Update:  I just heard from Ethan Brown’s publisher, who is sending out a copy for my book review.  Will this pass muster in the real world?  Stay tuned.

One Hand Giveth, The Other Hand Kills

Orin Kerr is  running a poll of readers on whether the death penalty is (1) an appropriate policy choice and (2) constitutional in the case of a rape of a child under 12.  The issue arises because of the Supreme Court’s grant of cert in  Kennedy v. Louisiana.  In Coker v. Georgia (1977), the Court held that the death penalty for rape (of an adult) was unconstitutional.  But this is different.

As we are constantly fighting the tide of originalism based on evolving standards of decency, or the “living” Constitution, this situation reminds us that it’s a two way street.  Whether it’s  Brown v. Board of Education or Roe v. Wade, society doesn’t always see things the way we want it to, and while the evolution may trend toward the more civilized and thoughtful at times, it sometimes takes a step or more backwards toward brutality. 

One comment to Orin’s survey struck a nerve. 


I don’t see why the death penalty can’t be on the table for all violent felonies. If a prosecutor + jury + judge all agree a criminal deserves to die for a particularly heinous crime, why deny justice just because he didn’t happen to commit a homicide?

Why not?  This isn’t to suggest that I want this to be the case, as I am against the death penalty per se.  Nor does this implicate the imperfect outcomes of trial such that innocent people may be executed or one group, such as black men, are far more likely to receive the death penalty than others.  This addresses a separate side of the issue, why the death penalty should arbitrarily be limited to homicide, treason and espionage. 

From a policy perspective, the idea that there be graduated punishments for incrementally worse offenses forms the basis to object to the death penalty for the rape of a child.  If the same punishment applies for a child’s rape as murder, then it’s an incentive to murder the raped child to eliminate the witness.  This is a bad policy choice.  But is it Constitutional?

The problem is that we cannot rely on a societal majority to always tip in favor of a kinder, more civilized, society.  Ultimately, the choice between what is too cruel and barbaric and what is not is nothing more than a transitory whim.  As pressure build, whether because of the perception that crime is out of control, or perhaps even the economy is in the toilet and people are feeling the pinch, frustration tends to compel people to seek simple, harsh solutions to the problem.

I’ve  argued here many times that simple solutions to complex problems are almost always wrong, but I only get one vote (two if no one is looking).  Others disagree with me, and they’ve elected a president who has appointed judges who don’t always share my sensibilities.  So if state legislatures vote to impose the death penalty for jaywalking, who are we to say that it’s wrong?  Sure, it offends my sense of justice and morality, but so what?

Since the mid-1980s, many of us have been scared by the tension between the right and left, fearing that society has turned ugly and mean, and has given up hope that our clients are salvageable.  We watched as guidelines put our clients away for decades for no discernibly legitimate reason, except the hobgoblin of consistency (meaning everyone had to match the worst and lowest the legal system had to offer). 

Anyone who reads Simple Justice regularly knows my feelings about crimes committed against children, and I’ve been chastised by many for my refusal to represent defendants accused of such crimes.  But that doesn’t impair my reasoning when it comes to distinguishing between my visceral reaction to such crimes and my intellectual ability to recognize the assault on proportionality.

So does our meaner, nastier society get to devolve standards of decency back to the point where the death penalty should be available for a wide berth of crimes?  How do we distinguish the evolving standards of decency with some fair degree of intellectual integrity so that we move forward and not back?  Of course, even my phrasing betrays my bias.  What becomes of us when proponents of the death penalty for a multitude of crimes reflect the sensibilities of our society?  This is another tough one.

A Personal Indulgence (Or Dip into Stagnant Waters)

Forgive me this post, but it’s my blawg and I’ll post what I want.  I don’t usually get too personal, but this one was just so incredibly stupid that I had to share.

I’ve got nothing against conservatives.  Really I don’t.  William F. Buckley is one of my heroes (sorry, Gid).  But in googling myself this morning (no, it’s none of your business why I had to google myself; NO, I didn’t forget who I am.  I’m not that old), I came across my name on some neo-con blog, and just laughed myself silly.  This goes back about a month, but don’t blame me because nobody I know reads this crap.

The blog is by a fellow named Keith Burgess-Jackson, and demonstrating his breadth of imagination, he named the blog after himself.  Now this fellow is, according to his about page, a professor of logic, ethics and philosophy at the University of Texas at Arlington.  Bennett, a friend of yours?

He picked up on a  letter to the editor of mine in the New York Times, relating to a Times editorial that included, as a component of their justification for supporting a judicial pay raise, the argument that


In judging, as in most lines of work, competitive salaries are important for attracting the best work force.

As I’ve written here numerous times, this is false argument designed to appeal to people who can’t conceive of a reason to pay judges that wouldn’t apply to themselves.  Accordingly, the gravamen of my letter was that


No one should sit in judgment of others because the money is good. To suggest that salaries are the motivator for exceptional people to assume the bench is to denigrate the integrity of the judiciary.

Does this strike anyone as being that difficult to follow?  Well, apparently it was for this professor and his readers.  Now I understand that this guy is an arch neo-con, the type who  posts that “we here in the United States kill murderers because we value innocent human life. We demonstrate this value in two ways: first, by exterminating those who destroy innocent human life; and second, by preventing additional murders. What’s barbaric is not killing murderers but valuing the lives of murderers as highly as, or more highly than, the lives of the innocent.”

So the letter, characterized as “bizarre” by this neo-con Texas professor, is sufficiently understood by the New York Times editorial staff to find its way to publication, but is so incomprehensible to him and his readers that one writes “I have now read this letter 4 times, and I still cannot figure out the point the writer is trying to make.”

In an effort to level the playing field, I hereinafter promise to type slower so guys like this can keep up. I hate to write something and find that even after 4 reads, they still can’t get it.   And people let this guy near college students?  Talk about scary.

This Is Your Brain On War

Even though Robert Guest at  I was the State never returns my love (I think it’s a Texas thing), he’s got some good stuff.   His post about a  Kentucky legislator who has sponsored a bill to allow soldiers under the age of 21 to drink alcohol raises that old Vietnam War era argument about being old enough to die for your country . . .

Robert has a hate for MADD, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, because of their knee-jerk “histrionics” against all things alcoholic.


Kentucky Mothers Against Drunk Driving executive director Angela Criswell said it’s not really a “rights and responsibility issue” ” as Floyd argues ” but instead a public safety issue.

It seems that MADD is deeply concerned with the impact of alcohol on the under-developed brains of people under the age of 18.  Unfortunately, the Mothers’ concern doesn’t go so far as to include the impact of a bullet to the brain.  I firmly believe that a bullet to the brain is harmful as well.

Maybe this is just a throwback to the old days, when somebody got the bright idea that if kids were old enough to be killed for their country, they were old enough to vote for the people sending them to be killed.  I really don’t disagree with the idea that drunk driving is a bad thing, though it has long since gotten way out of control and lost all sense of proportionality with the degree of malevolence attributed to it.

I’m not much of a drinker, so I can opine with a clear conscience.  Many otherwise good, law-abiding people drive with a drink too much in their bodies at some point in time.  They make it home just fine and go to work the next day.  A few get into accidents that harm others, and this is a horrible thing.  Of this few, there are some who are truly heinous in their abuse of alcohol, and they should be dealt with according to the seriousness of their reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others.

But allowing kids to taste the “forbidden fruit” of alcohol before they put their young lives on the line isn’t really a drunk driving issue at all.  Drinking and driving may well be a serious issue, but it’s one for all of us and there is no magic about the years between 18 and 21.  Sure, these are developing years of maturity, but there are a multitude of dumb things that kids can do for those three years that have the potential for harm.  Why is drinking different?


Criswell said alcohol affects the brain of a person in the late teens and early 20s differently than someone older. “There is a very real neurological difference,” she said.

It’s not that there is a pressing need for 18 year olds to drink.  It’s that this Mothers’ concern for the welfare of children apparently stops at the point where they pick up a gun and put themselves in the line of fire.  If you want to argue that drinking is bad for 18 year olds, then don’t be hypocritical.  If drinking is bad, bullets are worse.

As long as our society is prepared to accept 18 to 21 year olds as having sufficient maturity to serve our nation in war, then we cannot brand them as incapable of handling a beer.  Teach them safety in both arenas, but either allow them to come of age in all things or none.  If you think the possibility of dying in a drunk driving accident is bad, consider the much higher possibility of dying in a Hummer in Baghdad.  Let them be grown ups before they die.

The Other Side of the Judicial Pay Raise Debate

As the demand for higher salaries for New York judges falls on deaf ears, the federal bench has been getting far better play out of Congress.  So naturally, somebody who has no horse in the race wants to be contrary and controversial by giving the top three reasons why judges shouldn’t receive an increase.

Scott Baker, a lawprof at North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law, has  an op-ed in the LA Times arguing that there is “no correlation between judicial performance and judicial pay.”  And who ever said there was?  And if there was, how would you know?

Baker offers three arguments in favor of raises, which (shockingly) he then beats into the dirt. 


The first — that our federal judges will leave the bench for the more lucrative private sector if we do not raise their pay — is easily addressed. In the last seven years, only 15 out of 810 active judges have left the bench before qualifying for retirement, according to the Federal Judicial Center. If anything, the problem is not too much turnover, but too little.

This presumes that federal judges’ are out there stumping for the job because of the pay.  No one said you have to go on welfare to be a federal judge, which might be the tipping point for leaving the bench for better pay.  But the fact that money isn’t the driving motivator for judges doesn’t mean that the compensation is adequate.


The second argument is that our best-paid, and presumably most-talented, lawyers would make good judges, and these attorneys won’t join the bench because it costs them too much. Partners at some law firms earn more than $1 million a year. A federal judgeship pays less than $200,000. Only by raising judicial salaries, the argument goes, will we have a prayer of enticing any of these lawyers to become judges.

Who says Biglaw partners are the “most-talented?” Most of them haven’t seen the inside of a courtroom in years, and some couldn’t find the courthouse with a map.  They make partner because they make rain.  Duh.


Finally, the specter is raised that, without higher salaries, all our federal judges will come to the bench from lower-paying government or public-interest legal jobs, and we will lose the perspective of lawyers from the private sector.

Here’s a newsflash for you, lawprof.  There’s a whole wide world of private sector lawyers out there who don’t work for Biglaw.  Did they suddenly cease to exist?  Or are you just another biglaw sycophant who concludes that anybody who doesn’t have 1200 associates and work for multinational corporations isn’t a “real lawyer.” Sheesh.

Now that Baker has knocked down his straw man arguments, let’s deal with some reality.  There is not now, nor will there ever be, a direct correlation between the salary paid to judges, whether federal or state, and their performance.  The notion of productivity as a basis for salary increases is just foolish.  While proponents need to push ideas that fit into the common-man’s paradigm as the reason for raising judicial salaries (because otherwise there won’t be any sympathy for judges at all), the truth is that federal judges cannot earn less than first year Biglaw associates because it is demeaning to their role in the system.

You want an easy standard?  Try this:  Judges salaries should be fixed at the going rate for first year associates (including bonus) plus 10% and a free robe (just black, no arm stripes) a year.  That will bring those Biglaw partners into the fold in droves, right?

Chief Judge on “Let’s Make a Deal”

This is getting really embarrassing.  Now that her last 5 ultimatums have been ignored, Chief Judge Judy Kaye has shifted gears and is now trying to horse-trade her way to a judicial pay raise, according to the New York Lawyer.  I mean, seriously, what happened to dignity?

Her latest gambit is to back off retroactivity to 2005 and tie the pay for New York judges to their federal counterparts.


A new judicial pay raise proposal offered yesterday by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye would surrender some ground on retroactivity while tying future increases to salaries and cost-of-living adjustments given to federal judges.

Did I miss something?  Was this the problem that stymied the New York legislative process?  I don’t think so.  If memory serves me (a stretch, I concede, but that’s why I put so much in writing), the issue here has nothing to do with judges.  Everyone agrees that judges should get a raise.  That’s not the problem.  The problem is that legislators want a raise too, and the public will have them high if they give it to themselves because, well, they don’t do much of anything worthy of a raise.  And so, by tying their raise to judicial raises, they want to sneak in the back door.  In other words, you can’t get one if they can’t, and they can’t, so you won’t.

This is where too much time on the bench is getting in your way.  Judge Judy, you’ve forgotten some of the basic rules of negotiation.  Rule number 1, don’t negotiate against yourself.  They haven’t put a dime on the table for judges, even though you’ve been pushing this raise thing for years now.  There’s been no argument that they would give judges raises if only you were more reasonable.  So why give ground?  It’s not going to get you a raise, but it will cut down the negotiating room when it finally comes on the table.

It will happen.  Eventually.  Maybe not in your life time, but eventually.  Remember, it tok 17 years to increase 18b rates above $25 out of court, and the judiciary didn’t get too bent out of shape about that.  Your day will come.

What?  You can’t wait that long?  Bummer.   Okay, let’s figure out how to speed this process up a tad.  Have you considered putting on a charity event where judges across the state can be auctioned off?  How about adopt a judge’s kid and put her through college?  True, this won’t be particularly dignified, but to tell you the truth, neither is your latest salvo, following upon your last ultimatum, following upon you threat to sue, retraction of threat to sue, and embarrassing the handful of judges who have tried to do something about it despite their not sticking with your program.  Could it be that they don’t think you’re approach is very effective? Could it be that you obviously don’t think your approach is very effective either, judging from your shifting positions every couple of weeks?

It was one thing to have some fun with judges in the beginning, giving you a bit of “the business” to remind you that the judiciary couldn’t have cared less about us ordinary lawyers feeding our kiddies when the shoe was on the other foot.  Hopefully, you learned something.  But this has gone on too long, and frankly, is just demeaning.  When the judiciary looks bad, it makes all of us look foolish.  I don’t want to look foolish.  Do you?  Time to stop putting out press releases, take matters into your own hands (you are the judges, you know) and come up with a well-conceived and effective plan to put this puppy to rest.

Aside to Kathryn Grant Madigan, president of the New York State Bar Association:  Would you please stop sending me letters asking me to pay my dues. 


Our biggest concern is that if this doesn’t happen in the relative near term, this could have to wait until after the fall elections,” Ms. Madigan said

This may be your biggest concern, you suck-up, but it is NOT my biggest concern.  The judges will have to wait until after the next election to get a raise?  And this impacts my life how?  We all agree that judges need a raise, but I will not weep for fear that judges may have to darn their robes lest they sit on the bench naked. 

For 25 years, I’ve waited for the NYSBA to do something, anything, for the private criminal defense bar.  The only time you love me is when you want me to pay my dues.  Enough with the platitudes and the noblesse oblige crap.  If you want my money, do something for it.  I’m tired of contributing to an association that has never done a thing for the solo private criminal defense bar.  Get your dues from someone else and leave me alone.

Why Law Reviews Don’t Fascinate Us

Even though some lawyers secretly scan law reviews in private, most haven’t looked at one since law school.  The reason for our massive revulsion toward law reviews is simple:  Total, abject, bordering on pathological, irrelevance to the real world. 

But Jeffrey Lipshaw’s  act of desperation at Concurring Opinions opens the window on the secret world of why academics work so incredibly hard to produce work of such utter pointlessness.  Jeff did the unthinkable for a scholar.  He wrote something informative.  Okay, not exactly informative for those who practice law, as that would constitute academic heresy and require him to tee off with his pants below his knees, but something that would be of interest to a select group of aging, experienced and (apparently) offensive practitioners.  Jeffrey produced “a 9,000 word essay on SSRN entitled “Memo to Lawyers: How Not to Retire and Teach.”   

Just stop it now.  Stop laughing, pick yourself up off the floor and settle down.  What would possibly make you think that he did something wrong, just because he used up 9,000 words when 2,496 would do?  He’s a professor, for goodness sake.  Get a grip.

The abstract (a mere 4,239 words [only kidding]) is just the sort of teaser that makes you want to gobble up every word of it.


Many long-time practitioners muse about what it might be like to retire and teach, not realizing there is no more galvanizing phrase to their counterparts who have long toiled in the academy, nor one less likely to enhance the prospects of the unfortunate seasoned applicant who utters the phrase. I intend this essay not for law professors (though it may either amuse or irritate them), but for those in the practice who aspire, after all these years, to return to the academy. With a good deal of humility acquired along the way, I offer some realistic advice to job seekers, concluding that wistful phrase is precisely the opposite of the true sine qua non of success: demonstrating the capability of, and commitment to, being a productive scholar.

So what’s the problem?  It’s been downloaded “well over 1,300 times, making it the number 8 all-time paper in the Legal Education journal. At one point over the summer, it was number 4 in all of SSRN.”  This is a hot property, right?  Well, apparently not.

Jeffrey’s piece has been rejected over and over by law reviews nationwide.  He probably has a better chance of getting into the Guinness Book of World Records for most rejected law review article than having this tome see the light of day.  So finally, shedding all vestiges of pride, he begs:


Any law review editor looking to fill out a volume with something that people actually read and spare me any more sheepish responses ought to drop me a note.

I feel quite badly for Jeffrey, but I believe I may have an explanation for why such a fine piece of scholarship has failed to grab any law review editor by the scruff of his Abercrombie & Fitch shirt collar.  I offer this in the spirit of camaraderie, and because I, as a detached and neutral observer, can spot the fly in the ointment.

Jeffrey, the problem isn’t you or your essay.  The problem is that law review editors are 12 years old and, despite their firm belief that they have their dirty little fingers on the pulse of the legal nation, don’t have a clue what anyone who isn’t deeply concerned with who will win “America’s Next Top Model” wants to read.  These kids have delusions that under their watch, an article that will force a paradigm shift in America jurisprudence will jettison them from unknown law student to the frontrunner for the next opening on the Supreme Court.

There is no child more pompous and self-important than one with the power to smack a lawprof upside the head by turning down publication his work for publication because it failed to meet his idea of worthiness.  This is the first step to legal prominence, just like their mommies told them.  Sure, they will eventually get their ticket, but it unlikely that they will ever get on the bus to the courthouse.  So why would anything so mundane as the practice of law, or the transition out of it, hold any interest for them at all? 

Your offering, Jeffrey, is custom made for a butt-whupping.  An essay about old lawyers?  Why not an essay about courtroom fashions in the 1970s while you’re at it.  This means nothing to law review editors.  While old time lawyers (like me when I get older) may find your essay fascinating, that’s only because we have shoes older than these law review editors. 

So here’s my advice.  Change the retiring lawyer part to three playboy playmates, known benignly as the “Girls Next Door,” analogizing their televised shenanigans to the long-time practice of law, and comparing and contrasting the relative merits of cosmetic surgery to scholarship, and I guarantee you get published.  No need to thank me.  I’ve just got my finger on the pulse of youth.