Author Archives: SHG

4th Amendment Doctrine: Does It Matter Anymore?

Orin Kerr at  Volokh provides a very lengthy discussion of a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. McCreary, argued but not yet decided, dealing with whether the old, common practice of using pagers to send messages is disclosable via subpoena or warrant.  I know, pagers are dead, but this still matters because the same idea will apply to a variety of current communication methods. 

Orin raises three questions:


First, does the legitimate user of a text pager system generally have a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his messages? Second, if so, do the facts of McCreary’s usage of the pager system fall within that general rule of Fourth Amendment protection? And third, if the Fourth Amendment protects the pager messages, did the subpoena violate the Fourth Amendment?

Believe it or not, Orin’s  discussion of these questions is really quite interesting and worth the time to read.  Rarely are such academic discussions as comprehensible and worthwhile.  When you’re done, unfortunately, you find yourself in the same place as where you started.  There are good reasons to go subpoena.  There are good reasons to go warrant.

I hope the court requires warrants.  I know, what a shock.  But I actually have a semi-doctrinal basis for coming out with the obvious answer.  The sender and receiving of the communication expect it to be confidential, notwithstanding the technological capacity of the third party carrier to access anything and everything.  While Katz may not create a general right of privacy, it does hold that the reasonable expectations of the parties prevail. 

If the Ninth Circuit looks to the reasonable expectation of normal people, as opposed to engineers in the employ of communications carriers or government lawyers, the issue becomes clearer.  Normal people believe, and want to believe, that their communications, whether over copper, fiber optic, radio waves, whatever, are their and theirs alone.  It is not unreasonable to expect that government would keep its nose out of your happy birthday call to Aunt Mary.  It may be technologically unreasonable, but as Justice Scalia can remind us, the founding fathers didn’t have email addresses.

But I have a counterview as well.  Given the pace of technology, combined with the evisceration of the 4th Amendment in general, there is little expectation that this will really amount to much at the street level.  While it would make for a fascinating classroom discussion, it has little to do with real life.

Can you imagine explaining to your client, in Spanish, the nuances of McCreary with regard to his technological choices?  Or how about training Officer O’Reilly on the topic?  Both want to know the same thing:  Yes or No.  Can I do it or not.  It reminds me of the many discussions about the “automobile exception,” as each new decision would expand the power of the cops into another container or area, until the rule finally became cops an search cars whenever they damn well please.  (Only kidding, sorta).

So let’s go down the brightline test road, because these doctrinal discussions of how the fourth amendment applies to ever-changing technology makes it impossible to know what to tell clients, and for clients to know what their rights are.  Sure, I would prefer a bright line test that says that all the communications, regardless of the fact that they are stored in somebody’s mainframe somewhere, are still private.  But I frankly expect some courts, if not all, to go down the convoluted doctrinal path that will not only eliminate warrant requirement, but make it so unclear that nobody quite understands the law anyway.

So, while Orin Kerr indulges in a very thoughtful and well-conceived academic discussion on whether subpoena will do or a warrant need be obtained, it seems that Philistines like me just want something we can rely on when we deal with our clients and our cops in the trenches.  Given our low expectations, just tell us that the 4th Amendment applies to transmitted communications the same way it applies to automobiles, and we’ll get the message.  It may be totally wrong, but at least we’ll know what to do.

The End of the Age of Innocence

The University of Pennsylvania Law Review (chill out, don’t let this scare you) post at Concurring Opinions deals with an important issue for the practical blawgosphere.   It’s all about responses to Ronald F. Wright’s article, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79 (2005).  Wright questions whether plea bargaining distorts the outcomes that would come from a healthy legal system, where guilt would be better determined (at least some of the time) after trial.

Professor Bowman, in his Response, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the Gradual Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, picks up on one of Professor Wright’s key findings: “the curious fact that the rate of acquittals in federal criminal cases has declined even faster than the rate of guilty pleas has increased.” Professor Bowman goes on to suggest that “acquittals may be vanishing in part because a once-common courtroom denizen—the true trial lawyer—is becoming an endangered species,” and worries that the system has created “ever-greater disincentives to trying the kind of cases in which acquittal is a live possibility.”

Nothing like making me feel like a dinosaur.  How are you feeling, Bennett (who just happened to post today about how to become a federal criminal defense lawyer)?

For those of you who have followed Simple Justice (and Mark Bennett’s blawg, Defending People) for a while, these are themes that show up over and over.  In federal practice, real trial lawyers are few and far between.  The impact of the federal sentencing guidelines, obstruction of justice enhancements for exercising basic constitutional rights and cooperation has made the cost of losing too high, and the alternative of snitching too easy. 

While lawyers won’t mention it in the initial consultation, where they are busy persuading the defendant or his family how much they care and how hard they’ll fight, the sad truth is that they haven’t done a federal trial in many years and have no plans to ever try another case in federal court.  Clients are misled into believing that their lawyer offers the full panoply of options to fight their case.  They don’t.  The weapons of the defense run from plea to cooperation to safety valve.  Trial is no longer an option.  But they conceal this truth.  It’s a disgrace.

Personally, I refuse to be cowed by the guidelines and, client willing, will be the last lawyer trying cases if that’s what it takes.  For the reasons discussed below relative to the points made by Wright and Bowman, it is critical that lawyers continue to put the government to the test at trial, both for our individual clients as well as the integrity of the system.  I call on all lawyers to put down the plea agreement and go to trial when you have a triable case.  Stop your appeasement of the government. 

The failure of the federal criminal defense bar to be ready, willing and able to stand up to the government and take a case to trial has indeed created a “distortion”, as Professor Wright calls it, in the federal courts.  The government assumes that they can charge and convict people at will, and the only question is what guideline level will they demand at sentence.  They have no fear of being challenged.  This happened because the criminal defense bar put their tails between their legs and ran.

As a result, there is no longer, in the minds of the government, a potential that anyone accused will be acquitted.  You can’t be acquitted unless you go to trial.  Thus, if they aim their sights on you, you are by definition guilty.  Take a look at the statistics.  It’s all there.

We are all painfully aware of our clients telling us how the agents lied, or coerced, or abused them.  So what do you do about it?  Too many just respond, “that’s how it goes.”  This is not good enough.  It is downright unacceptable.  Fight the feds. 

I take a federal criminal case like any other.  I take it with the intention of defending my client and going to trial.  This has ramifications, since prosecutors know that I’m not going to do the waltz with them and then ultimately fold my tents and beg for a deal.  They know that I won’t push my client to rat out his brother or mother or whoever.  When I seek discovery, it’s in preparation for trial, not just to keep busy and put on show for the client.  I do not pretend to defend.  I mean it.  And they know it.

I don’t mean to suggest that the only two trial lawyers left in America are me and Bennett.  There are others.  Just not enough.  The majority can no longer call themselves trial lawyers.  But there is a handful that are entitled to use that honorable title.  We don’t look any different from the others, and we can’t advertise that we are the real McCoy while the others are just pretenders.  If I were a client, I don’t know how I would be able to tell one from the other.  Until it was too late.

At Pennumbra, the next step in this academic review comes from Michael O’Hear:


Professor O’Hear, in his response, What’s Good About Trials?, questions whether trial distortion represents a significant problem. Professor O’Hear believes our main focus should be on “mak[ing] plea bargaining processes look more like trial processes.” According to Professor O’Hear, “The trick is to find ways of injecting the values of voice, neutrality, and respect into the plea bargaining process without robbing plea bargaining of its efficiency advantages over the trial process.”

O’Hear’s view is what one would expect from someone out of touch with reality.  There’s no dignity in the plea bargaining process without the threat of trial and acquittal as the leverage.  When the prosecutor says take 121 months or else, what does O’Hear think the defense lawyer can do?  Complain that the AUSA wasn’t polite enough?  Plea bargaining, as an option, is only viable if the defense has meaningful recourse to trial.  Otherwise, it’s just prosecutorial largess and the defendant eats the deal because his lawyer’s not going to trial no matter what.  Some bargain.

Another response comes from Daniel Richmond:


Professor Richman, in his Response, Judging Untried Cases, applauds Professor Wright for attempting to determine whether “the inexorable reduction in trials actually reflects an impairment of the federal criminal system’s truth-finding function.” However, he notes that Professor Wright overlooked one important factor in his analysis: the extent to which “the vanishing acquittal rate reflects an increase in the [federal] adoption of well-established ‘local’ cases.” Without more information, Professor Richman concludes, “aggregate caseload statistics are . . . hard to interpret.”

I guess this is what happens when you view federal criminal defense based on statistics rather than life in the trenches.  Sometimes I wish that these professors, if they wanted to have a real feel for how things worked, opened a dialogue with real lawyers rather than engaged in these circle jerks, where they talk amongst themselves without any of them having a clue.  Didn’t they ever learn about the “risky shift” at Yale?

This “truth-finding function,” by which I guess he means trials, exists only in the minds of academics.  Trials are unfair street fights where they try to convict and we try to acquit, but they have all the guns.  We have nothing but our wits and skill, and while they try to bludgeon us to death with their tailored testimony, manufactured evidence and solicitous judges (and caselaw), we try to surgically excise enough of the cancer from the legal system to save our patient, the defendant. 

So what is this “distortion” thing they are all talking about?  For me, it’s the pretense that all these guilty pleas reflect an accurate representation of guilt of crime, and an end result of justice.  Nope.  It’s a scam played on the America public.  Defendants plead guilty to things they didn’t do every day.  Defendants admit, under oath, the commission of crimes that never happened every day.  Why?  Because they believe they have no option to do otherwise.  But it’s under oath, you say?  Surely you don’t believe that a defendant who is facing 240 months is worried that he’ll get nailed for perjury by admitting guilt to a crime he didn’t commit, do you?  On what planet?

So the federal criminal practice has become mired in legal fiction and fantasy, with neither a “truth-finding” function nor a meaningful threat of trial to protect the innocent for most people.  Is this what the American people want from their federal courts?  Do they want the government to be that powerful?  Do they want innocent people to pretend to be guilty rather than face obscene consequences?

The criminal defense lawyer is supposed to be the one who stopped this from happening.  A handful of us isn’t good enough, because the government knows that the vast majority will show up at its door, hat in hand, begging to put the defendant in jail on some deal.  How much more “distorted” can it get?

Conflict of Interest, Smart Choices and Biglaw, Part 2

Back in the old days, when Bernie Kerik was just a regular guy, like any other Police Commissioner of the City of New York, he was represented by a criminal defense lawyer, Joe Tacopina. 

Joe got his start doing work for the police union, where there was always plenty of criminal defense work to go around.  That meant that Joe could be trusted to hold confidences within the blue wall, a requisite for being trusted by a cop.  Even though Bernie had risen to the point of disproving the Peter Principle, he was a beat cop at heart and knew his duty.

Joe did  a great job of buying Bernie out of his Bronx charges, where he paid over the money he should have paid in the first place and got to drive home in his black BMW.  But when Bernie was indicted by the feds, Joe Tac was nowhere to be found.  It appears that he was the first victim of the government’s deep and loving concern over Bernie’s conflict-free legal representation, according to New York Magazine.

So “no Joe,” where do you go?  Strangely, Bernie went the anti-Tacopina route, to former federal prosecutor cum Biglaw partner, Kenneth Breen.  Breen spent a decade in the Eastern District of New York, just across the Brooklyn Bridge from the courthouse at 500 Pearl Street in the Southern District, where he was Deputy Chief of the Business and Securities Fraud Section.  It would certainly seem like he would know something about how the government operates, right?

And as with all important prosecutors who have dedicated their lives to the welfare of the American people and the maintenance of law and order in society, Breen left the United States Attorneys office to become a partner at Biglaw, first Fulbright & Jaworski  and then to Paul Hastings.  Could this have something to do with Fulbright & Jaworksi  suing Kerik for $200,000 for work Breen did while there?  There must be a new rule, “When stiffed, change firms.”

So why this paradigm shift from criminal defense lawyer Joe Tac to Biglaw, former prosecutor Breen?  The gut reaction is that Breen’s insider knowledge of the workings of the DOJ make him the right man for the job, notwithstanding my numerous  polemics about how former prosecutors do not bring inherently make competent defense lawyers.  Having heard nothing on the street about Kenneth Breen’s formidable skills in the defense of criminal charges, it seems reasonable to take a quick look around.

From Concurring Opinions, an old post that gives us a fairly good picture of Kenneth Breen’s vision of the function of white collar criminal defense:

Kenneth M. Breen, a partner at the New York law firm Fulbright & Jaworski, held a seminar for corporate lawyers one recent evening to explain the “significant risks for the non-compliant” in government counterterrorism investigations. A former federal prosecutor, Breen said failure to provide the required information could create “the perception that your company didn’t live up to its duty to fight terrorism” and could invite class-action lawsuits from the families of terrorism victims. In extreme cases, he said, a business could face criminal prosecution, “a ‘death sentence’ for certain kinds of companies.”

Excuse me?  The secret to success is to capitulate to the government lest the potential target invite “class-action lawsuits?”  Well that certainly doesn’t make me feel all warm and fuzzy in the protective cocoon of Breen’s representation.

So what about the pre-indictment stage.  Certainly an insider should know just what to do to kill a pending indictment and show the government how much you love them.  This is what Breen had to say :


“We are confident that whomever at the Department of Justice reviews this matter will conclude that there is no case here.”

No self-respecting criminal defense lawyer would have said “whomever,” I can tell you that.  And by the way, Ken Breen blew that call, big time.  Now if this was just a matter of typical defense lawyer hyperbole, it would be business as usual.  But this comes from the inside out, making it a dubious commentary on the path down which Bernie’s defense is going.

And now the government wants Breen off the case.  From what I can see, this can’t arise from any boast that he’s never lost a criminal trial as defense lawyer, as I can’t seem to find any case he’s ever tried as a defense lawyer.  Nor can it come from his inability to get along with prosecutors, thus making meetings with the government too unpleasant, since it’s nearly impossible for a defense lawyer to be any closer to the government than a member of the club like Ken Breen.  So what’s upshot? 

It’s hard to fathom why Bernie, a street guy made good, then better, then bad, would wrap himself up in a world where he at best is tolerated, especially when he doesn’t pay his legal fees.  Maybe it’s because no real criminal defense lawyer would take the case until the check cleared?  Maybe it’s because big time guys like Bernie require Biglaw representation like Kenneth Breen? 

Going out on a limb here, Kenneth Breen would be the lawyer I would chose if I wanted someone who could march me into 1 Saint Andrews Plaza and know his way around, saying “hi, how are you” to everyone he meets along the way.  But if I had some desire to not have my fall from grace require me to wear an orange jumpsuit and sensible sneakers, my choices would be somewhat different.

In the meantime, it should be a pretty good show watching the government explain why they can’t have Kenneth Breen represent Bernie Kerik.  With Marc Mukasey, son of the new Attorney General, law partner of presidential candidate Rudolph Guiliani, former Southern District of New York Assistant United State Attorney, making sure that his former officemates leave America’s Mayor and Bernie’s former best friend out of the mix.

Conflict of Interest and Free Choices, Part 1

The New York Times  reports that the government is trying to  Curcio out former America’s Police Chief Bernie Kerik’s lawyer, Kenneth M. Breen.  While it’s difficult to spend too much time worrying about the mess that poor Bernie, former chauffeur to America’s Mayor, Rudy Guiliani, created for himself while trying to fly too close to the sun, this side note raises too many important issues to ignore.

First is the choice of counsel dilemma.  Bernie, like any criminal defendant, has the right to counsel of choice, with certain provisos.  He can afford Breen, and Breen wants to represent Bernie.  So what’s the problem?  Well, the government wants to stick its nose into the relationship between lawyer and defendant, under the guise of “the defendant’s own good.” 

You see, the potential conflict of interest motion is to protect the defendant, not the government.  After all, the government’s job is to do justice, and what greater justice can there be than to separate a defendant from his attorney of choice, for his own good.  It is manipulative paternalism at its best, and the fact that it happens to have the side benefit of disrupting the defense and the relationship between attorney and client, well, stuff happens. 

The purported reason for the government’s deep abiding concern for Bernie’s welfare is that they might call Breen as a witness in the case.  Key word is “might”, and key question is witness to what?  Witness to his privileged communications with his client?  Witness to his public statements in the media?  Certainly Breen wasn’t writing Bernie’s checks out for him or filling in his tax returns (and even if he would have considered such involvement, Breen has associates to do that). 

So to connect the dots, the government announces that it might call Breen as a witness, which gives rise to the theoretical potential for a conflict of interest, which would possibly compromise the attorneys undivided devotion to his client, which would interfere with the client’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, which requires the government to intervene on behalf of the defendant to protect his constitutional rights.  Is this a great government, or what?

Having personally enjoyed the attention of the prosecution when the word “Curcio” was mentioned, the nefarious nature of the government’s largess is quite plain.  This is the way to throw a wrench into the workings of the defense, disrupt its forward momentum and, if they plan it out really well, sow a seed of doubt in the mind of the defendant that his lawyer might sell him out down the road to save his own butt. 

In its most offensive form, the screams of “house counsel,”  first used against the successful John Gotti lawyer, Bruce Cutler, and which was hurled against me a few times as well, are purely designed to punish a criminal defense lawyer for doing his job too well.  The government certainly doesn’t want a guy like that on the case.

While it’s all too easy to sit back and watch the unfolding Bernie Kerik drama, with its cameo appearance by Rudy (under heavy security, no doubt), even Bernie deserves to the right to be defended by his choice of counsel without the government’s interference.  Turning Curcio from a shield (protection of an unwitting defendant with a conflicted lawyer) into a sword (impeding the defendant’s free exercise of his constitutional right to counsel of choice) is a cynical and insidious move. 

Does the government truly believe that either Bernie Kerik or Kenneth Breen lacks the capacity to grasp the existence of a true conflict of interest?  Not likely.  This isn’t the situation, as in Curcio, where two defendants with potentially conflicting defenses (the other guy did it) want to use the same lawyer to save a few bucks and protect themselves from the other being coerced into flipping on their partner in crime. 

Rather, this bit of governmental concern falls under the old canard of one of the three biggest lies:  I’m from the government and I’m here to help.  Thanks, but no thanks.

Part 2:  What does the government have against Kenneth Breen anyway?

Simple Justice Named to ABA Top 100

There’s blawgs and there’s blawgs.  And Simple Justice is definintely a blawg.  Or so they say.

Anyway, I am honored that Simple Justice has been named to the ABA Journal Blawg 100.  According to the ABA email I found in my spam folder, I no longer have to use a token to get on the subway, though it does mention something about a metrocard in the small print. 

And there’s a competition to boot for criminal law blawgs.  It includes our good buddy Scott Henson over at Grits (who has a post over there that doesn’t mention Simple Justice, or any of the other blawgs, and leads me to think that Scott really, really wants to win this, so go vote for Grits as it will make Scott very happy), as well as Capital Defense Weekly, Blonde Justice, Crime, Clews The Historic True Crime Blog, Crime Scene KC, Meeting The Sin Laws,  Sentencing Law and The Chicago Syndicate.

The word on the street is that if The Chicago Syndicate doesn’t win, people we love will begin to disappear until we have no one left.  I love my family.  Please don’t vote for Simple Justice.  For the sake of my kids, please don’t.

Rudy Guiliani LOVES Indigent Defense Funding

All you  Gideon v. Wainwright aficionados, rejoice.  Ben Smith at  Politico reports that your biggest fan in funding the defense for the poor is none other than America’s Mayor (and love machine), Rudy!

Well, maybe not exactly the way you would like it.  See, from 1999 to 2001, Rudy spent a ton of money making these rendezvous with his hottie, Judy Nathan.  But he was still married to TV star,  Donna Hanover.  Now it’s not like she was his second cousin, of course, but still he wanted to keep his trips on the sly.  What to do when you’re America’s Mayor?

It seems that Rudy buried the costs of his trips, and we are talking about some very expensive trips. to what are described as “obscure” city agencies. 

The expenses were discovered in 2001, at the end of Giuliani’s term, when a city auditor noticed $34,000 worth of travel expenses buried in the accounts of the New York City Loft Board.  Another $10,054 was billed to the Office for People With Disabilities, $29,757 to the Procurement Policy Board and about $400,000 to the Assigned Counsel Administrative Office.

Did you catch that last one, the one that was charged $400,000?  That’s right, Assigned Counsel, meaning the good folks who administer the funding for payment of lawyers who take assignments (called 18b assignments in New York) to represent the indigent when the Legal Aid Society is conflicted out.  And you wondered why there was a shortfall in their budget, or why Rudy was so vehement in his opposition to increasing the 18b rates.

Here’s a copy of the New York City Comptroller’s letter to Michael Bloomberg obtained by  Politico via the Freedom of Information Law.  And here are Rudy’s AmEx bills.  Note that items 28-31 and 41 all were incurred before I realized that Rudy was a Republican. (Oops, never mind.  I just realized that they referred to Greenfield, WI, and not any covert representation for unlawful conduct that I had anything to do with).

Now it’s not like Rudy’s marriage to Judy, widely admired amongst New Yorkers her firm hand in guiding Rudy to morally just positions, means that he’s altered his views on the representation of the poor.  No, he still believes they should get a fair trial before their life sentence is imposed. 

My thought is that he’ll be strong supporter for increased funding for assigned counsel, because you never know when Rudy’s going to meet someone even hotter than Judy, and need a little funding for his next daliance. 

And you thought his being pals with Bernie Kerik was a problem.

Sometimes, It’s Not Just The Cross-Racial ID

Off of  Gideon’s “worth reading” sidebar, posts about a black man, Doug Glen Flack, being convicted of punching a white woman, Tenisha Bright, at both  EvidenceProf Blog and Eyewitness Identification Reform Blog, I have to conclude that the problem may not have been the cross-racial ID.

In the typical case, a white victim picks out a black suspect based on one or more of a variety of biases.  That’s not what happened here.  Sure, the victim at trial points to the only black man at counsel table and says with utter certainty, “that’s the man.”  But that doesn’t tell the whole story.


[A] month after she was assaulted in 2004, Bright picked out someone other than Flack at a police lineup.  At a subsequent police lineup, however, Bright did pick out Flack as her assailant.  At trial, though, even with Flack sitting right in front of her in the courtroom, when presented with an assortment of mugshots, Bright picked out the mugshot of another man as her assailant.  When asked to point to her assailant, however, Bright was able to identify Flack, the only African-American man sitting at the defense table.  During trial, Flack’s attorney attempted to question a detective about the problems with an eyewitness of one race identifying a person of another race, but Judge Kenneth F. Irvine Jr. precluded this line of questioning.

That’s one view of the hard facts of the case. 


[T]he victim attempted to identify her attacker from a photo in court, she picked another man — even with Mr. Flack sitting directly across from her at the defense table. In the initial police lineup a month after the assault, she also picked someone other than Mr. Flack. The only time she identified Mr. Flack was when the prosecutor asked her if her attacker was sitting in the courtroom, at which point she pointed to the only black man sitting at the defense table. In the words of her attorney:  “I’m sorry, that’s not an identification,” he said in his closing argument. “She’s one for three, that’s less than 50 percent.”

In other words, there was a massive showing that Ms. Bright blew the ID.  And defense counsel exploited the fact that she blew the ID, as well he should. 

The use of an expert, providing a scientific basis for mistaken cross-racial identifications, should be permitted everywhere, as the phenomenon is well know and accepted by everyone who still doesn’t think the Scopes Monkey trial was a waste of time.  But the need for an expert is to provide explanation and context where a jury would not be capable of understanding the point without expert testimony.

The Flack case was not one where there was a consistent, and erroneous, eyewitness ID that had to be knocked down externally because it was strong, clear and consistent internally.  Just the opposite.  The eyewitness’ ID was horrible.  It sucked.  It was subject to be ripped to shreds by an effective cross and skewered in summation, as it appears defense counsel did.  Yet the jury convicted.

This conviction smells very different.  This smells like a bit of Tennessee racism.  While I agree with the premise that the court’s refusal to allow counsel to question the witness about cross-racial IDs was generically wrong, there’s no level of concession about the inherent problems with eyewitness identifications that will overcome the even more fundamental problem of racism.

The Definitive Answer: Age Over Beauty

I don’t know how  Gideon finds these things, but he has come up with scientific proof that experience makes the difference.  Apologies to all those moms and dads who mortgaged the farm to get junior into Harvard on a subprime 110% refi, but it’s not like you can buy the kid experience.  Nosireebob (only a guy with some snow on the roof gets to use words like “nosireebob”).  The plain truth is that we do better. 

In a masterful study, with the incredibly catchy title of The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, David Abrams and Albert Yoon give us the backup to claim what we intuitively knew:  Defendants with experienced lawyers do better.  A lot better, in fact. 


Attorneys with longer tenure in the office achieve better outcomes for the client. We find that a veteran public defender with ten years of experience reduces the average length of incarceration by 17 percent relative to a public defender in her first year.

See that.  Seventeen percent.  So if your defendant was sentenced to 100 years with some kid, he’s only get 87 83 year with me.  Hey, wait a sec.  That doesn’t sound so great.  87 83 years is still a long time.  And if they die of old age before getting out, what difference does it make how many years they had left.  Let’s try again.


Experienced attorneys achieve substantially more favorable outcomes for their clients (defendants) than less experienced attorneys. Defendants represented by more experienced attorneys are more likely to avoid a prison or jail sentence, and those who do receive a sentence serve shorter terms on average.

Now we’re talking.  No jail.  That’s the ticket.  Hire me and I’ll set you free!  That should really be on my business card, not that it’s scientifically proven.  But what exactly do they mean by “substantially more favorable outcomes?”  Well, it’s never made quite clear exactly what that means, except some discussion about how a month or two doesn’t seem like a lot, but it’s significant to the authors.  Not that I disagree at all, but I was hoping for something with a lot more beef than that, if you know what I mean.

Then comes the flip side of the study.  What about the child geniuses from the Tier 1 law schools?


We do not, however, find any statistically significant differences in sentencing based on the attorney’s legal educational background.

Attorneys who attended higher-tier law schools (based on 2005 U.S. News & World Report law school rankings) do not obtain better sentence outcomes for their clients than their peers who attended lower-tier schools

I’m sorry.  I didn’t hear that.  Could you repeat it please?  We do not, however, find any statistically significant differences in sentencing based on the attorney’s legal educational background.  All you Biglaw partners reading this (and I know you do, though you’ll never admit it), are you getting anything out of this?  Anything at all?
I’ll translate this into language that you Hahvahd guys and Elis can appreciate, It Doesn’t Matter!  You Did It For Nothing!  You coulda gone to the beer blasts and partied like it’s 1999.

But here’s the one piece of the study that really blows me away:  Hispanic lawyers get 26% better outcomes than other racial groups.  Now that’s significant.  The study attributes it in part to selectiveness, by dint of the ability to communicate directly with Spanish-speaking defendants.  But it doesn’t come anywhere near explaining this disparity adequately, and the authors can’t come up with a viable reason.  Uh, maybe they’re just damn good lawyers inclined to pursue careers in criminal defense because Alberto Gonzalez already got, and blew, the AG job?  Notably, Hispanic attorney were compensated lower than Asian and white attorney, though a lot better than black attorneys.  At least there’s something you can count.

So there you have it, amigos.  Quen es el mejor abogado del Nueva York!  Viejito Greenfield!

What If The Cellphone Didn’t Ring? Judge Restaino’s Folly

The blawgosphere was awash with the tale of Niagara Falls Judge Robert Restaino.  I’d add some links, but go to any blawg you like and you’ll find the story there.  The absurdity of putting 46 defendants in jail because somebody forgot to turn off their cellphone (my bad) is too alluring a story to miss.  Of course, I acknowledged it only in an addendum to  another story of judicial impropriety, and left it at that figuring that there were just too many upstate judge stories for one day.

So now that everyone knows the story, it’s a good time to think about what’s wrong with the story.  It was my ferverent hope that someone, perhaps the lawprofs (because they’re scholars) would do a little more than repeat the headlines on this stupid story.  Unfortunately, no one did.  So I will, even though it means that I have to post again about New York judges doing bad things.

When the story came out that Robert Restaino closed the courtroom and held around 70 people in custody during Captain Queeg imitation, everyone got to see that there was something very wrong with this guy.  But the story isn’t what makes a judge like this a problem.  My sources from the cold north of New York tell me that Judge Restaino had issues long before he went wacky.  The locals knew all about it.  This was a bad dude, and he had no place on the bench.

So it’s wonderful that our King of the Mist showed his true colors when a cellphone sparked that synapse that makes a bad judge go public, but what of the thousand lives this guy controlled before?  Judge Restaino worked the domestic violence part of the court before cellphonegate (I know it doesn’t really work, but I rarely get a chance to use “gate” after another unrelated word, so I figured I’d take a chance).  There’s a whole lot of damage that a judge do in a place like that.  

Should we engage in our legal fantasies of presuming that he was absolutely normal, judicious, maybe even Solomonic, before cellphonegate, and that was a mere aberration (as Chairman Raoul would have us believe) because the judge “snapped”?  That would save everyone a ton of effort in trying to figure out all the times he “snapped” before in deciding what would become of people’s lives, but never made the headlines.  And then, we could all roll over and go back to sleep without having to worry that there are a thousand people in jail because they let some crazy judge onto the bench.

Now I might be inclined to buy into that part of Chairman Raoul’s position that this conduct was aberrational, but for the fact that those who appeared before Restaino say that the judge was always a bad seed.  Cellphonegate was just the tip of the iceberg, and nobody wants to look under water.  To do so would be an admission that the system, “which may not be perfect but it’s the best there is” (platitude du jour), failed and nobody noticed.  This doesn’t make our guardians of justice look very good.

I realize that it sounds like I’m harping on the subject of bad judges, and I’ve made the disclaimer many times already that this doesn’t reflect all judges so I’m not going to do it again, but the hard, cold fact is that the position of judge carries far too much power and impact over the lives of others to be so cavalier about who gets to wear the robe.  It’s not acceptable to have this constant stream of “aberrations” flowing through New York courtrooms.  Nor, Chairman Raoul, is it your job to get all touchy-feely about the personal issues that judges present in mitigation of their improprieties. 

These are judges, not defendants.  Defendants at best get to walk out of a courtroom to breath fresh air.  Judges get to use the power of the State to issue orders that can destroy lives.   We can be very sympathetic to their stresses, personal issues, disabilities on a personal level, but they still don’t get to ruin people’s lives because of it.  Where’s Jackie Mason to explain it to Chairman Raoul with a Yiddish accent?  Maybe then it will sink in.

Inductive Reasoning Means Murderer Walks

The exoneration of Lynn DeJac, reported in the New York Times, brings good news and bad news.  First the good:  For the first time, DNA evidence has exonerated Lynn for the murder of her 13 year old daughter, Crystallynn.  She was convicted in 1994, but her attorney, Andrew C. LoTempio, never gave up.  This raised the number of exonerations to 209, according to the Innocence Project.

Some murder accusations are worse than others.  While Lyn DeJac was not, according to the story, a model mother by any stretch, being accused (not to mention convicted) of murdering her own daughter is about as bad as it gets.  The trial consisted largely of evidence by Lynn’s neighbors about what a lousy human being she was and how much they didn’t like her.  I’m sure the judge allowed it as “background” or some less than cogent Molineux (other crimes) theory.  (Aside: Yet another opportunity to opine about how Molineux, which was held to serve as a shield to protect defendants from evidence to show propensity to commit crimes, is used routinely as a roadmap to circumvent its fundamental purposes by judges who just refuse to comprehend the basic rule).

So bad girl Lynn DeJac became the cops immediate target.  The closest family member is always the person who committed the murder.  Just ask any cop, they’ll tell you.  This is where  inductive reasoning comes in. 

Normal people assume that the police first gather the evidence, sift through it, investigate it and then, upon the completion of these tasks, identify the person they believe committed the crime.  First they have evidence.  Then they have a target.  But that’s merely what normal people think.  Not cops.

Cops decide who the perp is.  They then collect evidence to prove themselves right.  Evidence that disproves their theory is rejected, explained away or just deep-sixed.  After all, it’s bad evidence since they already know who did the deed.  They ignore leads that take them in a direction away from the perp, because that’s just a waste of their precious time.  They embrace witnesses who support their theory, and convert witnesses who don’t to the truth. 

Why do cops know who the perp is before the evidence is gathered?  They just do.  They’re cops.  They have a “sixth-sense,” street-wise experience, whatever phrase newspaper writers like to attribute to the flea-bitten detective who can small a criminal half-way down the block.  It’s a very romantic notion. 

Other times, cops just go with the odds, as courts invariably do.  If a wife is murdered, 90% of the time it’s the husband.  Therefore, arrest the husband and you’re right 90% of the time.  What about the other 10%?  Well, it’s not a perfect system, you know. 

It’s no different for the judge, except the odds aren’t as clear.  Let’s say 97% of all defendants are guilty, at least of something.  So if a judge finds the police testimony credible by default, then he’s right 97% of the time.  That’s a pretty good statistic, and will keep him off the front page of the New York Post as the Worst Judge in New York.  But don’t bother asking any judges about this.  Most are in denial. 

So a case as built against Lynn DeJac, heavy drinker and really bad neighbor.  No doubt it was based on “compelling evidence,” as prosecutors love to say.  Sure, it’s meaningless, but that phrase always ends up in the papers and inexplicably makes reporters and readers alike think it must be true.  The only problem is that she didn’t do it. 

Now for the bad news.  Lynn DeJac’s boyfriend, Dennis P. Donahue, was the murderer.  DNA is a two-way street, you see.  So why is this bad news?  Ah, there’s the rub.

In their zeal to convict the heinous Ms. DeJac (who cops just knew was the culprit), Donahue (who doesn’t get a “Mr.” in front of his name because he’s undeserving of such gratuitous formality) was called to testify against her in the grand jury.  Now, for those of you unfamiliar, while the feds give stinky little testimonial immunity for grand jury testimony, New York gives broad transactional immunity.  Since Donahue was called by the prosecution before the grand jury to testify, and was questioned about the murder, he gets to walk.  The prosecution gave Donahue a free ride on murder.

Before anyone comes up with the brainstorm that the problem is transactional immunity, bear in mind why Donahue gets a pass while DeJac gets hosed.  This, not immunity, is the lesson of this case:  The rush by police to decide who dunnit, and then the effort to collect evidence to support their induction.  It would strike any thinking person, even a jaded criminal defense lawyer, that the cops really ought to take a look at the potential killers, and consider the full significance of the potential evidence, before picking one and framing them.  But no, that’s just not effective law enforcement work.  We’re the police.  We know what we’re doing.  Trust us.

And as long as we’re on the subject, consider the importance of what the neighbors thought of Lynn DeJac.  After all, being some drunken party-girl is almost the same thing as being a murderer, right?  The taint of allowing evidence to come before a jury with no real purpose other than to besmirch a defendant’s character is strong stuff.  People love to hate people who others love to hate.  Show us some bad character and we’ll happily attribute all sorts of evil to them.  A little two dimensional, perhaps, but we’re too busy to think hard about things, so a rush to judgment (like we do in our everyday lives, as the jury instruction goes) makes for swift justice.

Not quite the way you want the system to work, you say?  Then judges, give it some thought before you bend over backwards to find a Molineux exception to let irrelevant bad acts evidence in through the back door to smear a defendant.  It wouldn’t kill you to make the prosecution actually prove it’s case directly, now would it?

Welcome back the world, number 209.