Author Archives: SHG

Miranda: Offer Valid For 14 Days

The Supremes had a wide open field when it came to deciding how long an invocation of Miranda rights would last in Maryland v. Shatzer.  The range was 10 seconds to eternity.  I made my position clear up front, though others disagreed.  The Supreme Court has now spoken, and, ironically, has finally done what I have often criticized it for not doing.  It actually gave a clear answer :  14 days.

It figures that the Supremes would finally actually decide a case, and provide a bright line test, when it serves to burn the defendant. But the decision by Justice Antonin Scalia, the originalist philosopher, makes the line as bright as can be:


Held: Because Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks between the first and second attempts at interrogation, Edwards does not mandate suppression of his 2006 statements.

The question, of course, is how the Supremes arrived at this two week bright line.  Orin Kerr, who’s become remarkably snarky lately, tried his hand at explaining.


And how did the Justices know that 14 days would be about right? Based on their extensive experience being arrested, perhaps? Presumably not. But no matter. Fourteen days seemed about right, and so the 14-day rule became the law.


As Orin notes, the utility of arriving at a hard and fast rule is clear, given that police in the field (or “on the fly,” as Orin calls it, just in case they had no opportunity to think about their actions in advance of a custodial interrogation) can’t be expected to comport with some complicated balancing act, the new professionalism notwithstanding, is clear.  It’s hard to disagree with the need to a clear mandate, even though the Constitution doesn’t include an expiration date on rights.  Seriously, if the invocation of rights lasted forever, we would have the anomalous situation of police never being able to coerce confessions.  How would we ever convict anyone?

Orin also offers an affirmative reason for Justice Scalia’s opinion containing the 14 day rule, and it’s pretty interesting as well.  As he notes, Scalia hates Miranda, it being a wholly judge-made rule, which he called a “prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, producing a veritable fairyland castle of imagined constitutional restriction upon law enforcement.”  So when this opportunity arose to place an arbitrary limit on the duration of the invocation of Miranda rights, Scalia was there.



But if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em. Or at least join ‘em if that means you get to write the opinion that substantially limits the effect of the Edwards rule. And if you’re going to write an opinion that you see as merely “prophylactic,” presumably you’re not bound by your usual approach to constitutional interpretation. With apologies to Chief Justice Marshall, it is not a Constitution you are expounding. So explicitly policy-based rulemaking becomes more understandable, even if it’s jarring coming from Justice Scalia.
On the bright side of this bright line test, at least we can forewarn defendants that their invocation of right to counsel has a shelf-life of 14 days.  After that, rinse and repeat.  Or, if they prefer not to keep an eye on the calendar, they can always just follow the prime directive.  Say the magic words (I want to speak with my lawyer) and then shut up.

The Anti-Slackoisie

Last night, a phone call came in from California.  It was Dan Hull of What About Clients? fame, who got a few minutes off from practicing for Dancing with the Stars.  He told me that his office was running low on teletubbies, following a spate of paper cuts and a tragic flip-flop accident.  

Hull asked what I thought about importing some new ones from the Big Apple.  I didn’t think it was a great idea.  More expensive, more self-important, no better work ethic.  It was like recruiting from Above The Law’s commentariot, a fate worse than death for real lawyers.

But the real problem for lawyers who seek to raise the next generation of fighters and thinkers isn’t whether a change of venue will solve their problem, but that the Anti-Slackoisie aren’t sitting in their mommy’s basement whining on JD Underground about the misery of the profession.  They’re going out and being lawyers.

Wajahat Ali, in one lengthy but heartfelt story, proved that he’s got the stuff to be a lawyer.  Recognized by Walter Olson, Brian Tannebaum and Mark Bennett, Ali was too busy to bemoan the fate of Biglaw opportunities because he was busy representing a client.  He hit walls, and he pushed through. He had his doubts, and he pushed through.  As it happened, his persistence paid off, but even if it hadn’t, he demonstrated the fortitude that makes for a real lawyer.  No time for whining when you have a client to represent.

And Brian Tannebaum found another one, Brett Luskin, who decided that he wasn’t satisfied with leaving a permanent butt imprint in his parents’ couch.  Instead, he established a practice defending against traffic tickets.  While not the sexiest niche, he showed his stuff beating the City of Aventura, Florida, on the legality of red light cameras.  Not too shabby.

Even as I tap at the little keys, I can hear the smart alecks at ATL and JD Underground sneer at Ali and Luskin. How de classe to wallow in such low-life endeavors, such crap-law, when they have dreams of a partnership in Mergers & Acquisitions, a million dollar salary and a pair of matching Ferraris in the six car garage.  There’s plenty of time to dream while waiting for someone to praise your comment on the internet.  It’s so much more honorable to hold true to your belief that some law firm will appreciate your unique genius and snatch you off the couch and plant you in the corner office.  Just keep sitting there, and pray the Doritos don’t run out.

The problem Dan Hull faces in trying to find new lawyers who want to work, want to serve clients, want to be real lawyers, isn’t one of location.  They are out there, likely in every city across the country.  The problem is that they aren’t waiting for the phone to ring, or sending out their one millionth resume.  When opportunity didn’t plop in their lap, they went out and found it.  They created their own success.

The Slackoisie hate being told that they’re miserable failures.  Nothing is their fault.  They are entitled to fabulous lives, and it’s all because of their evil elders that they’ve been denied their birthright.  The anti-Slackoisie, like Ali and Luskin, aren’t worrying about it.  They’re too busy being lawyers.

A Plea For A Child In A Coma Isn’t Voluntary

The combination of a defendant who can’t make bail and his child in the hospital in a coma is a toxic mix, ripe for coercion.  This didn’t bother the plea judge, who was happy to offer the defendant, Homer Brown, a special deal of a three week furlough to see his son, lying in the hospital with gunshot wounds in a coma, if only he would take a sentence of 2 to 4. 

This didn’t bother the Appellate Division, affirming the conviction by relying on the plea colloquy, saying “defendant’s allegations of duress and coercion are belied by the statements of defendant during the plea colloquy, wherein he knowingly and voluntarily admitted that he committed the crimes to which he was pleading guilty.”  In plain language, that means the plea was knowing and voluntary because, when the judge asked if it was knowing and voluntary, he said yes.

It did, however, trouble the Court of Appeals, which unanimously reversed in a decision by Chief Judge Lippman.  The facts are straightforward:


Defendant, under indictment for one count of robbery in the third degree and one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree, was unable to post the $10,000 bail and was held in custody while awaiting prosecution. From the time of his arrest on April 11, 2005 until his June 29, 2005 guilty plea, defendant consistently maintained his innocence and so testified at the grand jury. Shortly after his indictment, the parties learned that defendant’s son was in the hospital and in a coma as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. At the outset of the next court appearance, the court informed defendant that a proposed plea bargain would require him to plead guilty to both counts of the indictment in exchange for a 2 to 4 year sentence, and then stated, “[y]our attorney told me [that] you were interested in taking the plea if I were to give you a furlough for three weeks to allow you to see your sick child,” who was still in the hospital. Defendant responded in the affirmative, and the court agreed to the furlough, warning defendant that if he did not appear on the scheduled date, he would receive an increased sentence.

What would a father do to get out of jail to see his comatose son in the hospital?  For most fathers, pretty much anything.  Answer “yes” to the voluntariness of a plea?  Sure.  Admit to the Lindbergh baby kidnapping?  Why not?  This is a cruel system, one that would hold a presumptively innocent person on bail without allowing him to visit his son in the hospital. 

The charge here was larceny.  Not a pretty crime, but not a crime of violence.  It wasn’t that the trial judge worried, even though it should never have entered his mind, that this defendant might harm someone if he released him to see his son.  There’s no mention of why bail, whether $10,000 or 2 cents, was justified, but assuming it was, there is always the alternative of having the defendant brought, while in custody, to his son’s bedside.  That would just be humane, but apparently not in the cards here.

But Homer Brown was sufficiently trustworthy to be allowed to cop a plea to 2-4 and then, knowing he would be going to state’s prison, allowed to go free on furlough pending his surrender on the sentence.  It’s amazing how much more trustworthy people are when they know they’re going to spend years in prison than when they are presumed innocent.

The decision does not hold, however, that a defendant, with the potentially coercive concern being played as here, cannot enter a valid plea of guilty.



We do not mean to suggest that a plea bargain granting a furlough is per se invalid. While we acknowledge that such pleas may require special scrutiny by the court prior to accepting it, we adhere to the general rule that so long as the totality of the circumstances reveals that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, it will be upheld. Indeed, no abuse of discretion will be found where the court, recognizing the potentially coercive nature of the plea terms, conducts a thorough inquiry to establish that defendant is pleading guilty willingly after considering other legitimate alternatives. Moreover, where a careful scrutiny of the motion to withdraw reveals that defendant’s allegations fail to raise a legitimate question as to the voluntariness of the plea, the court may deny the motion without a hearing. Here, however, the circumstances raise a genuine factual issue as to the voluntariness of the plea that could only be resolved after a hearing.
This is thin ice, where the court appears to skirt the problem for the benefit of both sides.  If it held that no viable plea bargain could be cut while a conflict existed, defendants might be denied the opportunity to agree to an acceptable deal as no prosecutor would offer a plea knowing that the defendant could reneg after getting the benefit of the bargain.  How a court’s “thorough inquiry” would show true voluntariness, however, is unclear.  Defendants will say anything they have to say under coercive circumstances.  That’s the nature of coercion.  If the plea judge asks whether the plea is voluntary 25 times, the defendant will say yes 25 times.  It changes nothing.

More interesting, though, is the inclusion of the words “after considering other legitimate alternatives,” suggesting that the plea judge must not only recognize and acknowledge the coerciveness of the situation, but make a legitimate effort to ameliorate the coercion.  Here, Homer Brown could have been offered a trip to the hospital with his own police driver to see his comatose son in lieu of a guilty plea.  Had that alternative been available, would Brown have “voluntarily” agreed to the plea?  Unlikely.

The Brown case involves one of the more obviously coercive guilty plea scenarios around, since few defendants have a comatose child in the hospital.  But the Court’s holding, requiring that the plea court acknowledge special coercive circumstances and consider legitimate alternatives before accepting a plea, is important.  Nobody should cop a plea with a gun to their head, or because they fear they might never see their child alive again.

H/T Brian Shiffrin at New York Criminal Defense

The Revolution Will Not Be Forced

A new blawg, Public Defender Revolution, has joined the blawgosphere, with an interesting 6 year old tale of being pushed to trial unprepared.  By the somewhat anonymous carol d, a 15 year veteran of the trenches:


Six years ago, when a judge ordered me to conduct a trial for which I was not prepared, I was shocked. . .  Before that day, I knew that a judge would respect the fact that I had conducted over 100 jury trials, and that when I said I wasn’t ready, I wasn’t ready.  And if I wasn’t ready, it would be unconscionable to order me to trial.

The judge rejected her request for time.


When the judge denied my motion to continue, I was dumbfounded–the judge had just been appointed to the bench and had never practiced criminal law, but I didn’t know what to do when he said, “I understand why you are not prepared, Ms. Defender, and I find it is not your fault, but the citizens of Washington have the right to have this matter resolved, and you have to start the trial on Monday.”

Her reaction to this order was to post a “panicked” inquiry to the Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, an association she had recently joined, looking for “support and advice.”


 After considering the advice–most of which was to proceed with trial while making a careful record–I decided that I was going to refuse to conduct the trial.  

She then explains:


This post isn’t about that decision process (because many of the factors were case-specific), but my philosophy can be summed up by the “You Can’t Make Me” icon:  You can’t give me too many cases, too many clients, too many prosecutors, and then tell me I have to conduct a farce of a trial when you know I am not ready.  A system that will force me to betray my client by failing to represent him adequately at trial, is a system I won’t play along with.  You can’t make me fail my client.

Ultimately, carol d’s trek through judicial coercion, panic and bad advice to the ultimate decision to put the client’s interest first, to not “fail [her] client,” isn’t unique, but a fascinating insight into the fortitude required of the criminal defense lawyer and the obstacles in the way.

The story bears similarities to the Portage, Ohio public defender who was ordered to go to trial on one day’s notice and refused. He was held in contempt and jailed for his insolence.  But the differences stand out more than the similarities.  Fortunately for Carol, another lawyer came to her aid, and her judge backed down, allowing her 6 weeks to prepare. 

But in the Portage case, the PD didn’t post a panicked email to a listserv.  The PD said no, he would not sell out his client, and took the hit.  He didn’t need support and advice.  He knew what his duty was.  Ironically, the predominant response Carol received from her WACDL colleagues, by her description, was to cave in to the pressure.  Make a “careful record,” but go with the flow.  How very defense lawyerly of them to be so circumspect with the defendant’s life by suggesting she make a careful record as he was railroaded. 

To her credit, Carol didn’t heed those for whom CYA is the first rule of criminal defense.  It may have taken her a bit longer than necessary to recognize to whom her duty was owed, but she did.  That a fellow member of the bar came to her aid is a much finer reflection of what it means to be a criminal defense lawyer.  It’s a shame that others on her listserv would urge her to place her own interest above that of her client’s, but that’s the nature of listservs, plenty of advice, most of it horrible.  Nothing reveals a lawyer’s inadequacies, and causes a loss of respect, more than reading his “off the cuff” responses on a bar association listserv.  And yet, this is where lawyers seek friendly advice.

After recounting her story, Carol launches into her pitch against excessive caseloads for PDs:


We have to refuse excessive caseloads, and to do this, we have to be bold, but smart. First, we already have powerful legal authority to support refusing excessive caseloads–ABA Formal Opinion 06-441 not only permits us to refuse to accept too many cases, it requires us to refuse them when the excessive nature prevents effective assistance of counsel.

When refusing additional cases, we should also get an expert opinion from an ethics professor and/or a statement from an organization like NACDL to support the refusal to accept cases.  I hope to recruit a number of criminal law and ethics professors who are willing to assist us.

Then, when we say, “You can’t make me!”–whether we are making this point to a compromised boss, or a court, or a department of assigned counsel, we need to have lawyers with us to help enforce not only our client’s right to have effective assistance of counsel, but also our right to render it, and to show that we mean business.

Yep, we can!
While the concept isn’t exactly treading new turf, given how public defenders offices have threatened, and in fact refused to accept new cases in the face of their crushing caseloads that preclude their ability to provide effective representation, I guess every lawyer has their epiphany in their own time, no matter how well-worn the path.  But she shouldn’t wait for some ethics professor, or worse still, a statement by the NACDL (as if that will carry the day), to do the heavy lifting for her.  

The whole point of that “zealous defense” thingy is that one person, a criminal defense lawyer, is charged with the duty to stand between the defendant and the world.  Panic won’t help you nearly as much as keeping an extra toothbrush in your bag.  Just in case you have to be a criminal defense lawyer today. 

COA To Lege: Man Up on Judicial Pay Raises

There was great doubt as to whether this day would ever come, with far too many good reasons for the New York Court of Appeals to punt a decision that was political as it gets.  But they didn’t, to their credit, and despite the reluctance of so many judges to believe it was worth what was consistently called an “unseemly” effort, the court decided that the Legislatures failure to consider raising the pay of judges without tying it to their own or otherwise stuffing appropriations add-ons into the mix was unconstitutional.

The decision, in the three consolidated cases, was 5-1, with Chief Judge Lippman recusing himself as he was a plaintiff from back when he was the state administrative judge.  Judge Eugene Pigott wrote the majority opinion, with Judge Robert Smith dissenting.  Though rejecting most of the claims, the court held:


Although a function of the Legislature is to approve the compensation of each of the three branches, this fact underscores only the checks and balances of the system; it does not rebut the fact that the compensation to be paid to members of each particular branch must be determined separately and distinctly from the others. Indeed, whether the Judiciary is entitled to a compensation increase must be based upon an objective assessment of the Judiciary’s needs if it is to retain its functional and structural independence. Simply put, by failing to consider judicial compensation increases on the merits, and instead holding it hostage to other legislative objectives, the Legislature “[w]eaken[s the Judiciary] . . . by making it unduly dependent” on the Legislature.



The court noted that while the Governor and Legislature may haggle over budgetary issues, the judicial branch can’t engage in such political squabbling.


Judges and justices, on the other hand, are not afforded that opportunity. They have no seat at the bargaining table and, in fact, are precluded from participating in politics. The judicial branch therefore depends on the good faith of the other two branches to provide sufficient funding to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities. Given its unique place in the constitutional scheme, it is imperative that the legitimate needs of the judicial branch receive the appropriate respect and attention. This cannot occur if the Judiciary is used as a pawn or bargaining chip in order to achieve ends that are entirely unrelated to the judicial mission.

Recognizing that the Lege has used judicial compensation as nothing more than a bargaining chip in efforts to obtain its own goal of increased legislative compensation, a perpetually unpopular political cause that stymied raising judicial salaries, the court held:

But by failing to consider judicial compensation independently of legislative compensation, the State defendants have imposed upon the Judiciary the same restrictions that have been imposed on the Legislature, and have blurred the line between the compensation of the two branches, thereby threatening the structural independence of the Judiciary.

The decision is enormously bold, given how wrapped it is in the nature of both Albany politics and the open reluctance of judges to appear self-serving in deciding their own pocketbook issue.  But it had to be done. 

In dissent, Judge Smith doesn’t so much dispute the point of the majority, as recognize that the failure to increase judicial pay hasn’t resulted in the inability of the judiciary to find qualified people or the failure of the judiciary to perform its function.  Thus, he’s constrained to conclude that it hasn’t affected judicial independence. 

The last pay raise received by New York judges was a COLA increase in 1998.  Since then, the caseload increased from 3.5 million to 4.5 million.   The net result was a de facto reduction in spending power of one third.  While this doesn’t constitute a salary reduction, which itself would be unconstitutional, it highlights how using the salaries paid to a co-equal branch of government became a political football for the others.  It was wrong.  It was manipulative.  And left to their own devices, there is no reason to believe that the political branches of government would have changed their evil ways.

Despite the fact that the court’s decision is open to criticism from a variety of different directions, I applaud the court for making it, as I’ve no doubt it was painful to do.  No judge wants to put him or herself directly in the political crosshairs, and yet that’s precisely what they’ve done.  The Court of Appeals called out the Legislature, as well as the Governor, and stated that it is unconstitutional for those branches to screw with this branch.

Of course, paving the way for a freestanding decision on judicial salaries, unencumbered by the weight of collateral political issues, doesn’t guarantee the judiciary of a pay raise.  The court didn’t order the Lege to raise salaries, and the Lege may still, whether as payback or given the state’s budgetary shortfall, decide that judges get squat. 

Should the Lege either refuse to increase judicial salaries, or provide some insignificant increase just to shut the judges up, however, at least it will be a based solely on judicial compensation rather than as part of some general appropriations mashup.  And if the people aren’t happy about it, or the judges aren’t happy with it, they will bear the political consequences of their decision.  No more hiding their own pay issues behind judicial salaries, and this is how it should be when it comes to performing a constitutional duty for a co-equal branch of government.

Guess Who Got Screwed? (Update)



Answer:  All three of them.

Liptak at the New York Times writes about the unbearably unseemly Texas death penalty case of Charles Dean Hood, where it was learned after Judge Verla Sue Holland dropped the gavel hard upon his head that she was letting the prosecutor, Thomas S. O’Connell Jr., have some ex parte time with her.

Naturally, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals saw nothing wrong with this, deflecting the nastiness by hiding behind the time bar.


Texas’s highest court for criminal matters, its Court of Criminal Appeals, considered all of this and concluded that Mr. Hood should be executed anyway. In a 6-to-3 decision in September, the court told Mr. Hood that he had taken too long to raise the issue of whether a love affair between a judge and a prosecutor amounted to a conflict of interest.

Was it a “love affair?”  That makes it sound so very romantic, as was more fully described in the Texas decision.


Judge Cochran took a stab at characterizing the relationship in a footnote. It was misleading, Judge Cochran wrote, to say that Judge Holland and Mr. O’Connell had “an intimate sexual relationship,” though she conceded that the phrase was “literally true.”

“Theirs was hardly the torrid relationship of romance novels,” Judge Cochran clarified. It was, rather, “a close personal relationship that, on a few rare occasions, dipped into intimacy.”

Spare me.  What a shame that they didn’t let Hood in on the elicit love, so he could challenge it earlier.  Perhaps they could have had a ménage à trois.

The Hood case is one of the most absurd imaginable.  Even for Texas, where sleeping lawyers provide effective assistance of counsel.  The defense has sought review of the affirmance by the United States Supreme Court.


Mr. Hood has asked the United States Supreme Court to hear his case. On Thursday, 21 former judges and prosecutors filed a brief supporting him. So did 30 experts in legal ethics.

“A judge who has engaged in an intimate, extramarital, sexual relationship with the prosecutor trying a capital murder case before her has a conflict of interest and must recuse herself,” the brief from the ethics experts said. “Of all the courts to have considered the issue, only the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in this case failed to recognize this imperative.”

You think?  This may be one of the most embarrassing failures of the law in years, made all the more hilarious by the efforts of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to white wash the problem.  Except it’s not likely as funny to Charles Dean Hood, the fellow who was sentenced to death after oral argument. 

Update:  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has reversed Hood’s death sentence and sent it back for resentence.  Why?  Hint, not because Judge Verla Sue Holland wears support hose:



The new hearing has been ordered by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals because the court found that Hood’s jurors did not have an adequate opportunity to consider circumstances that would call for a sentence other than death – circumstances such as Hood’s family background and allegations that he was abused as a child.
And not a word about the nookie.  Now that’s the way for a dignified court to act.  I’m still waiting for them to give Hood a new trial before a judge who isn’t naked under the robes.  Or at least a bit younger.

H/T Ed at Blawgreview

The Other Death Penalty

For those who believe that the death penalty is a brutal, wrong, racist, unconstitutional punishment, a primary argument against it is the availability of life without parole as a substitute.  Should a defendant later be proven innocent, as happens with unfortunate regularity, they can be released from a sentence of LWOP.  They can’t be resurrected.

Via Doug Berman, it appears that the argument in favor of LWOP rather than death has created a conflict.


This new press release provides further evidence that the pro-life-imprisonment advocacy by the anti-DP crowd is not appreciated by everyone.  This release is headlined “The Other Death Penalty Project Announces Letter-Writing Campaign to Anti-Death Penalty Groups”, and here excerpts:

 


Today, thousands of prisoners around the country will be mailing letters to numerous death penalty abolitionist groups asking them to stop advocating for life without the possibility of parole as a supposedly humane alternative to lethal injection.

The Other Death Penalty Project, a group comprised solely of prisoners serving life without possibility of parole — the other death penalty — categorically rejects this hypocritical position taken by too many death penalty abolitionists.  Death at the hands of the state, whether by lethal injection or lethal imprisonment, is the death penalty.


Challenges to LWOP as being some sort of gracious alternative to death was the subject of a post by Jeff Gamso, where he pointed out that it was as much a death sentence, but only took longer to execute.

Taken individually, it’s easy to understand how one could support both the abolition of the death penalty as well as life without parole.  But from an intramural perspective, it’s clear that the anti-death penalty forces are undermining the anti-LWOP forces.  To do otherwise is to take away their best argument, and to demand a stretch in reasoning, that not only should those who would otherwise be executed be allowed to live, but allowed to someday walk free, that much of the public would find wholly unpalatable.  While they may believe it, they can’t sell it, and they know it.


The Other Death Penalty Project plans to call these anti-death penalty groups out to a public accounting by speaking for the close to 40,000 men and women sentenced to face “worse than death,” in the words of New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson.  These prisoners live on the much bigger, much less well-publicized, death rows all around this country.
The numbers don’t lie.  Nearly 40,000 prisoners serving life without parole dwarfs the 3,279 on death row.  Clearly, there’s more bang for the buck in fighting LWOP.  On the other hand, the arguments against capital punishment are far stronger than those against LWOP.  While some will argue that Bill Richardson’s assessment, that it’s “worse than death,” is true, that’s a value judgment that few of us are equipped to make.  My sense is that neither side has the moral upper hand on this point.

Rarely are we faced with an intramural dispute between sides with which agree, but which present such a clear and insurmountable internal conflict.  I don’t want to side against either position, but realize that taking such a position is just a cop out since one undermines the other.  In the past, dealing individually with the issues arising from each sentence, it was unnecessary to pick sides.  The Other Death Penalty Project forces the issue, and it’s understandable that they do. 

While my gut is that life without parole, the death penalty prolonged, is a horrible fate, execution is worse.  But it’s no longer as clear to me as it was before.  This is a real dilemma.

The Fisc Isn’t Much Better For Prosecutors

On the defense side, forces are scrambling to come up with both a means and reason to preserve the existence of 18b in New York City in the face of an RFP that, on its face, would appear to spell the death of a mainstay of the financially viable criminal defense practice.  While the posturing pits various interest groups within the defense bar against each other, and today’s president wants only to be loved by all in his effort to offend no one, it took an old-timer, NYSACDL past President Larry Goldman, to spell out the problem.

Of course the City’s goal is to save money.  By shifting the work from 18b to institutional defenders, especially via an RFP that compels them to provide an array of important ancillary services to their clients that suggests that the City has a meaningful concern for defendants and which 18b lawyers are incapable of providing, the City hopes to do right by indigent defendants as well as its taxpayers.  There’s nothing wrong with that.  In fact, from a removed position, it’s quite an admirable goal.

At the same time, the move will have a severely adverse impact on a broad swathe of the criminal defense bar.  Some suggest it’s about time.  Others disagree.  I’m amongst those who disagree, though it would be much better if this opportunity was used to substantially improve the mechanics of 18b to eliminate that segment of the 18b bar that no one wants to admit exists.  That would take strength and honesty, two virtues that are long forgotten.

But these concerns all stem from one side, the defense.  Larry asks why the other side would care.  While today’s President George Goltzer wants to present a stinging rebuke to the City for not caring enough about the welfare of NYSACDL members, it didn’t dawn on him that the City doesn’t care, has no reason to care, and owes its fealty elsewhere. 

Past President Lisa Schreibersdorf called George’s resolution “simplistic”. George called it “simple” in a “stick your head in gravy” sort of response,   George backs up his argument with war stories about himself.  Lisa wins, and Larry’s question remains unanswered.  Why should the City care more about providing a revenue stream for lawyers than providing indigent defense at the lowest possible cost?

The point is made clearly by Ken Lammers, who left the side of truth and justice to work for the dark forces of the Commonwealth of Virginia.


Please, Gentlemen and Ladies of the General Assembly and Mr. Governor, if you are going to cut my pay, just cut my pay. You can give me extra vacation – you can even mandate it if you want. However, a slight cut every two weeks beats a forced furlough wherein I have a significant portion of my salary for that month disappeared and have to figure out how to pay my rent, gas, food, etc. with a weeks’ pay missing.

I understand that packaging it as a furlough allows you to keep everyone’s salary up and may actually be better for me in the longer term. Therefore, I suggest a reduction in salaries with a two year sunset provision and any bonuses or raises linked to what salary will be after the sunset law has passed.

I’m not really against your proposal. I hope it saves jobs. I just would like to see it implemented in a better form.
While Ken’s preference as to where they suck the lifeblood out of his personal economy doesn’t quite jive with the fine political distinctions of furlough versus temporary pay cut, or any other variation on a theme, the fact remains that Ken is a prosecutor and the State is going to tap dance on his wallet just like everyone else’s. 

No one needs to convince the Legislature why prosecutors are necessary and important to their law enforcement function.  They would be more inclined to build a shrine to prosecutors than do anything to make their lives unpleasant.  Yet money is tight.  For everyone.  In New York City, criminal defense lawyers fear the loss of their entitlement.  In Virginia, a prosecutor wonders how he’s going to pay for food during the furlough.  The difference is that Lammers understands that he’s a part of the whole in a government that needs to bridge a budget gap, much as it may love and appreciate what he does otherwise.  He’s willing to take the hit, though he would prefer it be done in a fashion less harsh than more.

In New York City, the 18b lawyers worry about their future.  Lofty expressions of purpose are used when reality is too harsh to face.  There is no discussion of how the system can be reformed or improved to both maintain its basic existence (and its positive attributes) while providing greater value and economy to a cash-strapped city.  Such a discussion would require lawyers to admit that things aren’t wonderful, and they aren’t wonderful.  If you want to be loved by all, you don’t concede that there are problems.  Anyone who says otherwise is an enemy of criminal defense.

It’s unlikely that Ken’s complaint about the furlough plan will change the way his pay cut is handled.  It’s unlikely that a stinging resolution that the evisceration of 18b will reduce the number of people who want to pay dues to the NYSACDL will change the City’s RFP.  Of the two, Ken’s position is more persuasive to the government because they care more about keeping their prosecutors happy than about the number of members willing to shell out cash to the Association.  And yet the dialogue remains all about what’s good for criminal defense lawyers who rely on 18b to survive.

Who’s Who, Police Version

With all the sophisticated means available to law enforcement to identify individuals, the norm remains your name.  If the police are looking for someone named Joe Smith, and you happen to have a name like Joe Smith, the police may be looking for you.  So what if you aren’t that Joe Smith.  Arrest first and let the courts sort it out.

This is what happened to Denver’s Christina Fourhorn, as she was about to pick up her daughter from school.



(CNN) — Three police cars pulled into Christina Fourhorn’s front yard one afternoon just before she was supposed to pick up her daughter at school. The officers had a warrant for her arrest.

“What do you mean robbery?” Fourhorn remembers asking the officers. Her only brushes with the law had been a few speeding tickets.

She was locked up in a Colorado jail. They took her clothes and other belongings and handed her an oversize black-and-white striped uniform. She protested for five days, telling jailers the arrest was a mistake. Finally, her husband borrowed enough money to bail her out.
As it turns out, the warrant was for a woman named Christin Fourhorn from Oklahoma.  Oops. Sorry.  Accidents happen, you know.

The ACLU took this case as part of their effort to demonstrate that misidentity arrests are commonplace and require changes.  It took Christina almost two years to have her record expunged after her case was dismissed for mistaken identity.  The problem, of course, is multifold, as one would surmise that even if the cops were so sloppy and incompetent as to arrest the wrong person based on something so clearly capricious as the same, or in this case similar, name, the rest of the system would immediately crank up to correct the error.  No such luck.

It’s not that people arrested for mistaken identity don’t let anyone know about it.  They invariably do, and loudly.  It’s that the system, from cop to court, would rather err on the side of covering their butt than believing the “perp”.  Better to keep the potential defendant in jail than risk the front page of the paper for letting the bad guy go free. 

While this concern might serve as impetus for being a bit more cautious in exercising discretion in the first place, like arresting someone based on a warrant that’s close (but no cigar) only after doing everything possible to ascertain whether they’ve got the right person, the fact remains that it happens with some regularity.  Whether based on a name, a variation of a name, an alias or some other indicator that reduces a law-abiding citizen to a wanted murderer, once the cuffs are slapped on, the presumption is that you’re the bad guy and it shifts to you to prove otherwise.  This is often difficult to do from a jail cell, or without knowing anything about the real perp, or without having evidence beyond the mere fact that you just aren’t someone else. Proving the negative is always a problem.

As the CNN story notes, this problem is significantly exacerbated by the prevalence of identity theft, where names have become fungible and may be widely bought, sold and used. 

The gut reaction to these fiascoes is that we should, given technology, be able to absolutely identify people through more reliable methods, such as fingerprints or DNA.  Yet the unintended consequences of such notions, providing the government with a vast database of “inside information” about people is rife for abuse, both now and in the future.  Further, these “more reliable” methods aren’t nearly as reliable as people assume, and can lead to the same mistaken identity problems, but are even harder to correct.

My solution is decidedly low tech:  Think harder before doing something stupid.  In almost every instance, there are a variety of factors available to police to ascertain whether they have the right person or not.  Rather than rely on only one factor, name for instance, check all the descriptors, check the person you are about to nab to find out if they have been an upstanding member of the community for the past 30 years and never lived in Oklahoma. Just think before you act.

For those police officers who shrug off these mistakes as an unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence of trying to do their job, I offer one thought.  You wouldn’t be so cavalier if it was your wife who was arrested, or your daughter who was left at school waiting for mom to pick her up.  Would it kill you to try a little harder not to cause as much harm as possible?