Maybe it’s just me, but almost every
academic analysis of the propriety and efficacy of plea bargaining reflects a basic misconception of the dynamics. A new article by Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, entitled “The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma,” appears in Summer 2009 issue of
The Journal of Legal Analysis. via
Doug Berman, does it again. Here’s the quote from Doug’s post, broken up for readability:
How can a prosecutor, who has only limited resources, credibly threaten so many defendants with costly and risky trials and extract plea bargains involving harsh sentences? Had defendants refused to settle, many of them would not have been charged or would have escaped with lenient sanctions. But such collective stonewalling requires coordination among defendants, which is difficult if not impossible to attain. Moreover, the prosecutor, by strategically timing and targeting her plea offers, can create conflicts of interest among defendants, frustrating any attempt at coordination.
The substantial bargaining power of the resource-constrained prosecutor is therefore the product of the collective action problem that plagues defendants. This conclusion suggests that, despite the common view to the contrary, the institution of plea bargains may not improve the well-being of defendants. Absent the plea bargain option, many defendants would not have been charged in the first place. Thus, we can no longer count on the fact that plea bargains are entered voluntarily to argue that they are desirable for all parties involved.
Anybody want to take a guess what’s missing from this description? That’s right, the criminal defense lawyer. Plea bargaining isn’t a staring contest between prosecutor and defendant. At least it isn’t supposed to be.
Defense counsel should be well aware of the limited resources available to try cases, and this should be incorporated in any discussion about a plea offer with the defendant. The problems arise from two independent sources. First, that defense counsel can’t try a case. Second, that even if defense counsel is fully capable of trying a case, enough other defendants will cop a plea freeing up sufficient resources for the prosecutor to call the bluff.
First things first. There are a ton of criminal defense lawyers, yet very few cases tried in New York. Very few indeed. If you ask lawyers, most of them will tell you war stories about their glorious trial victories and their vast experience in the trenches. The problem is that the numbers don’t add up. If only ten cases were tried in New York County in a given week, then 100 lawyers claiming they were on trial doesn’t work. In other words, they are lying through their teeth.
Some years ago, I did an evidentiary hearing before Judge Kimba Wood in the Southern District of New York on a habeas motion, where the defendant had a great defense but was pushed into a plea in a New Jersey case with the lawyer misstating the consequence on his federal parole. The Jersey lawyer took the stand. On cross, I asked him whether he told his client that he was a very experienced criminal defense lawyer. With his chest puffed outward, he proclaimed that he was indeed a very experienced lawyer.
I then asked him to tell the judge how many felony cases he had tried to verdict before a jury as a defense lawyer. He hemmed. He hawed. I asked whether he had a problem, and he muttered that he was thinking. Judge Wood grew impatient, and finally, said, “So how many?”
His answer was spoken so softly that if could barely be heard, “None”. Of course, he never informed his client that he was highly experienced in pleading his clients guilty, but nothing more.
That not all trench lawyers are what they purport to be is a hard, cold fact of life in the trenches, though Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar do not appear to recognize it as a pervasive problem and integral part of the analysis. And it leads to the second missing factor, that defendants can’t seem to coordinate themselves sufficiently to call the prosecutors’ bluff.
For those of us who can and do try cases, it’s foolish to place our clients at the mercy of pretenders. The prosecutors know who won’t try a case. So do we. They may be full of bravado when the prosecution isn’t ready, but they shrivel up like a dip in freezing water the minute the judge calls for a jury panel. If they push the envelope far enough, the prosecutor has no choice but to use his scarce resources to go to trial, and they will. Game over for the pretender.
Even amongst ourselves, the assumption that the defendants would subjugate their personal liability to the good of the whole smacks of a lack of realism. Some defendants are offered sweet pleas, and they take them. They should. No defendant is going to risk a decade plus in prison for the benefit of the collective whole. They serve their time alone, and it’s hardly heroic to take one for the team. No one will throw them a party when they get out.
Coordination is a wonderful goal, but the criminal defense bar is feral at best. We won’t be herded. We don’t play well with others. When it’s been proposed via our hapless specialized bar associations that we put our collective might together, a group always emerges that rejects the idea. Sometimes they scream “antitrust”, and other times they just see it as an opportunity to take advantage of the fools who will allow their clients to be used for the cause, giving them an opportunity to cut and run for the benefit of their own clients. But it never happens.
Many of us who have the willingness to try a case have tested the theory of scarce resources. I have never had a prosecutor, when pushed to the limit, run away. The plea offer may be sweetened considerably at the last minute, but when rejected nonetheless, the case goes to trial.
This should come as no surprise: One of the primary reasons for signing up to prosecute is to get trial experience. In other words, the individuals who serve as prosecutors want to try cases. The problem with a systemic shortage of resources isn’t their problem, so what do they care? Let the administrators wring their hands over where the courtrooms are going to come from. They only need one courtroom to try one case.
Moreover, the worst that can happen if they try a lousy case is that they lose. Unlike the defense, a loss doesn’t mean someone goes to prison. Granted, the other assistants may make fun of them at the bar after the verdict, but that’s why they go to bars afterward. By the third round, all is forgotten.
The lawprofs posit that “[a]bsent the plea bargain option, many defendants would not have been charged in the first place,” This assumes that rational prosecutors would exercise their discretion to avoid charging defendants upon whom they wouldn’t want to waste scare trial resources. Or more defendants would plead to the charge and get stiffer sentences. Or they would increase the resources to try more cases. But that would require criminal defense lawyers to be capable of trying cases.
The problem with the conclusion is that the now-defendants who wouldn’t be charged if there were no plea bargains are the ones who get trivial sentences, not the harsh sentences that the lawprofs believe are “extracted”. The defendants receiving the harsh sentences would be the ones forced to trial, to whom scare resources are allocated, and would, if they are convicted, receive even harsher sentences. And that assuming the existence of the rational prosecutor. Wanna bet your client’s life on the rational prosecutor?
Plea bargains are outlets, safety valves for the innocent and guilty alike. If it’s bad for an innocent person to go to prison for 5 years, it’s worse for ten. Not every defendant has the risk tolerance for trial, and not every innocent defendant has a defense. Don’t blame the plea bargain for the coerciveness that pushes a person to willingly slam the prison door on himself. Blame a system where innocent people get convicted, where judges smile as they ignore the Constitution and where criminal defense lawyers pretend they can provide
effective representation when they intended to plead the case out from the very first “hello”.
When a scholarly analysis of plea bargaining takes the harsh reality of the trenches into account, wake me up. In the meantime, we’re better with ugly plea bargains than no option to trial at all.