Author Archives: SHG

Because It’s A Cross (Update)

The Supremes will hear oral argument today in Salazar v. Buono, the Mojave cross case.  In case you weren’t watching, Lyle Denniston at SCOTUSBlog sums it up:


The Mojave National Preserve is a massive tract of land — about 1.6 million acres, or 2,500 square miles — in California’s San Bernardino County.  About ninety percent of it is federally owned.  On top of an outcropping known as “Sunrise Rock,” in a remote site on federal land, there is a Christian cross.  It can be seen from about 100 yards away as one motors along Cima Road.  It is modest in size, no more than eight feet tall.  It, like several earlier versions that preceded it, serves as a memorial to individuals who have died in military service.  The original cross was put up in 1934 by the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

There are a bunch of collateral issues, ranging from Buono, a former assistant Superintendent of the Preserve, lacking standing to a land swap so that the land beneath the cross is owned by the VFW rather than the government.  Assuming, arguendo, that the Court addresses the primary issue and doesn’t punt, it’s your basic Establishment Clause argument.

The New York Times comes out with an editorial that the cross has to go.  No shock there.  But it’s rationale is curious.


On the merits, the appeals court was right that the cross must come down. By allowing a Christian cross, and not symbols of other faiths, on federal land, the government was favoring one religion over others. Also, Congress has designated the cross as a national memorial, which means that it continues to have official government endorsement.

There’s nothing intrinsically unappealing about the shape of a cross.  It’s a great shape. A perfectly good shape. But it also happens, under the right conditions and in relative proportions, to symbolize Christianity.  As such, it shouldn’t be in a United States National Preserve.  There are a ton of places where it would look terrific and inspirational, just not there. No biggie.

But why would it be more appropriate for a Christian symbol to perch atop the Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve if there was a Jewish Star, or a Buddha, nearby?  To the Times, it apparently makes all the difference in the world, providing some sort of religious equivalencies that reduce the establishment impact of the cross.  The argument that they can’t allow one religious symbol without allowing others is made all the time.  It’s a false solution.

The Establishment Clause forbids Congress from making any law respecting an establishment of religion.  This has come to be expressed as the separation between church and state.  It shows no less favoritism to include symbols from two, or ten, religions than just one.  The inclusion of any religious symbol, by definition, favors religion over agnosticism or atheism.  And then there are the multitude of less favored religions, and religion substitutes.

This has nothing to do with office holders having their own personal religious beliefs.  This has to do with the government confusing its secular role with that of religions.  We no more want government telling churches how to run a mass than churches telling government to legislate its moral teachings.  There are an abundance of places where religious symbols belong, and can stand as a beacon of belief.  Just not on government property.  Not if it’s a cross, or a star, or any other religious symbol.

Believe in God all you want.  Dedicate your life to your faith. That’s fine. Just don’t confuse your faith with your government.  The cross in the Mojave National Preserve shouldn’t be there.  Nor should a Jewish Star. Nor should both of them, even with a Buddha next door.  There shouldn’t even be a question, and it’s appalling that we are still arguing about the propriety of religious symbols on public land.  Yet, the Supreme Court finds this worthy of its time. 

The rule should be simple. No religious symbols on public lands.  Having one is wrong. Having ten is ten times as wrong.

Update:  From the WSJ Lawblog, this is from today’s oral argument:



But perhaps the most interesting — and perplexing — exchange occurred between Eliasberg and Justice Scalia. Scalia disputed the premise behind the lawsuit, telling Eliasberg that it was unfair to view the cross merely as a Christian symbol.

“The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of the dead,” he said. “What would you have them erect? Some conglomerate of a cross, a Star of David, and you know, a Muslim half moon and star?”

Responded Eliasberg: “I have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew. So it is the most common symbol to honor Christians.”

“I don’t think you can leap from that to the conclusion that the only war dead that that cross honors are the Christian war dead,” Justice Scalia said. “I think that’s an outrageous conclusion.”
The old “a cross isn’t a religious symbol” gambit.  It’s not Christian. It’s just a cross.

The Cruel Discipline of Twitter

When first I was told of twitter, I scoffed.  Obviously, it was for people whose thoughts fit within 140 characters.  I meant that in a pejorative way.  You wouldn’t find me on twitter.  That was a few thousand twits ago.

Though I’m hardly convinced that twitter is the moneymaker that social media gurus claim, I have come to a realization about it that makes twitter enormously useful.  Twitter demands discipline.

Some twitterers post their message in serial twits, taking three or six twits to make a single point.  They miss the point of twitter. They refuse to accept the nature of a twit, limited by 140 characters, and insist on using every word in their arsenal no matter how many twits it takes.  These are often the same folks who find the 3000 word limit on comments intolerably limiting.

Some twitterers use abbreviations to cut down on characters, such as “U” for “you”.  This is perfectly acceptable if you remain below the age of majority, but for twitterers of a certain age, it’s about as intellectually satisfying as a faux leopard-skin miniskirt.  They may not says so, but serious people laugh at you.  No, they really do.

Some twitterers send out twits that just don’t make much sense.  Sometimes it’s because the end of their thought is cut off.  Other times it’s because they, well, just don’t make much sense for organic reasons.

But twitter is cruel.  It only allows 140 characters, no matter who you are or what your reason for wanting more. You can’t argue with it, cajole it, implore it, beg it.  It doesn’t care.  It’s 140 characters max. 

What this does is impose discipline on twitterers.  To cut out painfully verbose comments down to 140 characters, we must hone our thoughts to their core.  We must use active verbs that precisely match our message.  There’s no room for the passive tense or the tangential aside.  Adjectives are limited to the truly applicable, and flowery language discarded.

A well-written twit is a work of art.  It’s clear and concise.  The harms caused by years of public school instruction in the English language are stripped away.  Any word that doesn’t enhance the twit must be rejected.  Twitter demands that we construct sentences that express our thoughts in the most frugal way, the way we should always write.  I’ve written some excellent sentences because of twitter.  As this blog shows, I wouldn’t have done so otherwise.

Many decry modern technology for hastening the death of language.  If so, then twitter may be its savior.  Provided it’s used properly.

And So I Told Justice Alito…

Not having argued a case before the United States Supreme Court, the best I can do is read about the questions asked of counsel at oral argument and play the “what would I have said” game.  It’s exactly the same thing, aside from the lack of pressure, time to think, consider and reconsider, and opportunity to start over when I dig myself into a hole.

As Maryland v. Shatzer was argued on the first Monday in October, 2009, a case which presents the disconcerting notion that the invocation of the right to counsel may make a cop’s job slightly more difficult, and one about which I’ve had some thoughts previously, there was a nagging need to find out how things went.  Not great, according to the Washington Post.


Justices seemed generally supportive of [Maryland Attorney General Douglas F.] Gansler’s point that police should have been allowed to question Shatzer again, but they had a hard time agreeing on how the rule should be changed.

But not terrible either.


Roberts worried that police could repeatedly question and dismiss a suspect who asks for a lawyer.

“You know, just sort of catch-and-release, until he finally breaks down and says, ‘All right, I’ll talk,’ ” Roberts said.

A very astute observation by the Chief. Impressive.  And then there’s Justice Sam Alito.


Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. posed this hypothetical: What if someone was arrested for joy riding in Maryland, invoked his Fifth Amendment protection, and was never convicted? Could police in Montana question him as a murder suspect in Montana 10 years later?

When [Public Defender Celia A.] Davis said no, Alito replied: “And you don’t think that’s a ridiculous application of the rule?”

Oh, man. She should have seen that slow pitch coming from miles away, and hit it out of the park.  Instead, she whiffed.  Of course it’s a ridiculous application of the rule, whether you’re Justice Alito or pretty much anybody else.  A single invocation of the right to counsel isn’t going to immunize a defendants from questioning on any subject, any crime, anywhere, forever.  But there are so many conceptual ledges to hang on to that Davis shouldn’t have feared the slippery slope.

So is there a better response? You betcha.


Of course, Justice Alito, the police in Montana could have questioned him as a murder suspect, despite his invocation.  Not because 10 years had elapsed, or that the person traveled from Maryland to Montana, but because the subject matter of the questioning was entirely unrelated to the subject matter for which the person invoked right to counsel. 

Some might argue, as apparently Davis does, that a single invocation covers a person for all purposes for all time.  What this highlights is two separate paths along which the constitutional right can flow.  One attaches to the particular offense, the purpose for which the police seek to interrogate, while the other attaches to the person without regard to the subject of the interrogation.  I see no constitutional quandary in the latter, though the former would offend constitutional protections.

Just as people are capable of committing more than one offense in their lifetime, and some can commit quite a few, each is an individual affront to society.  Assume that the person may be innocent of one, guilty of another, happy to talk about the second but not about the first.  Each alleged offense demands an investigation, and each offers the individual a separate opportunity to invoke, or not, his rights.  What they are not, however, is the use of continued attempts at interrogation to “break down” a defendant, as Justice Roberts notes.  Or any of the other words that have been used to describe the wrong of ongoing or perpetual interrogation.

One crime; one change to question.  If the suspect invokes right to counsel, that’s that.  No second dips at this well, but that has nothing to do with a person suspected of poisoning some other well. 

And for all those who thought our newest Latina justice was too liberal, check out whose lead she followed:



When Alito raised the hypothetical ante to a crime committed 40 years later, Sotomayor joined in.

“He is arrested for joy riding, he is let go, and you are saying that for 20, 40 years he is now immunized from being re-approached by the police?” Sotomayor asked.

Notice the word “immunized”?  Would that be from the swine flu? 

Plea Bargaining 201

Maybe it’s just me, but almost every academic analysis of the propriety and efficacy of plea bargaining reflects a basic misconception of the dynamics.  A new article by Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, entitled “The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma,” appears in Summer 2009 issue of The Journal of Legal Analysis. via Doug Berman, does it again.  Here’s the quote from Doug’s post, broken up for readability:


How can a prosecutor, who has only limited resources, credibly threaten so many defendants with costly and risky trials and extract plea bargains involving harsh sentences?  Had defendants refused to settle, many of them would not have been charged or would have escaped with lenient sanctions. But such collective stonewalling requires coordination among defendants, which is difficult if not impossible to attain.  Moreover, the prosecutor, by strategically timing and targeting her plea offers, can create conflicts of interest among defendants, frustrating any attempt at coordination.  

The substantial bargaining power of the resource-constrained prosecutor is therefore the product of the collective action problem that plagues defendants.  This conclusion suggests that, despite the common view to the contrary, the institution of plea bargains may not improve the well-being of defendants.  Absent the plea bargain option, many defendants would not have been charged in the first place.  Thus, we can no longer count on the fact that plea bargains are entered voluntarily to argue that they are desirable for all parties involved.

Anybody want to take a guess what’s missing from this description?  That’s right, the criminal defense lawyer.  Plea bargaining isn’t a staring contest between prosecutor and defendant.  At least it isn’t supposed to be.

Defense counsel should be well aware of the limited resources available to try cases, and this should be incorporated in any discussion about a plea offer with the defendant.  The problems arise from two independent sources.  First, that defense counsel can’t try a case.  Second, that even if defense counsel is fully capable of trying a case, enough other defendants will cop a plea freeing up sufficient resources for the prosecutor to call the bluff.

First things first. There are a ton of criminal defense lawyers, yet very few cases tried in New York.  Very few indeed.  If you ask lawyers, most of them will tell you war stories about their glorious trial victories and their vast experience in the trenches.  The problem is that the numbers don’t add up.  If only ten cases were tried in New York County in a given week, then 100 lawyers claiming they were on trial doesn’t work.  In other words, they are lying through their teeth.

Some years ago, I did an evidentiary hearing before Judge Kimba Wood in the Southern District of New York on a habeas motion, where the defendant had a great defense but was pushed into a plea in a New Jersey case with the lawyer misstating the consequence on his federal parole.  The Jersey lawyer took the stand.  On cross, I asked him whether he told his client that he was a very experienced criminal defense lawyer.  With his chest puffed outward, he proclaimed that he was indeed a very experienced lawyer.

I then asked him to tell the judge how many felony cases he had tried to verdict before a jury as a defense lawyer.  He hemmed.  He hawed. I asked whether he had a problem, and he muttered that he was thinking.  Judge Wood grew impatient, and finally, said, “So how many?”

His answer was spoken so softly that if could barely be heard,  “None”.  Of course, he never informed his client that he was highly experienced in pleading his clients guilty, but nothing more.

That not all trench lawyers are what they purport to be is a hard, cold fact of life in the trenches, though Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar do not appear to recognize it as a pervasive problem and integral part of the analysis.  And it leads to the second missing factor, that defendants can’t seem to coordinate themselves sufficiently to call the prosecutors’ bluff.

For those of us who can and do try cases, it’s foolish to place our clients at the mercy of pretenders.  The prosecutors know who won’t try a case.  So do we.  They may be full of bravado when the prosecution isn’t ready, but they shrivel up like a dip in freezing water the minute the judge calls for a jury panel.  If they push the envelope far enough, the prosecutor has no choice but to use his scarce resources to go to trial, and they will.  Game over for the pretender.

Even amongst ourselves, the assumption that the defendants would subjugate their personal liability to the good of the whole smacks of a lack of realism.  Some defendants are offered sweet pleas, and they take them.  They should.  No defendant is going to risk a decade plus in prison for the benefit of the collective whole.  They serve their time alone, and it’s hardly heroic to take one for the team.  No one will throw them a party when they get out.

Coordination is a wonderful goal, but the criminal defense bar is feral at best.  We won’t be herded.  We don’t play well with others. When it’s been proposed via our hapless specialized bar associations that we put our collective might together, a group always emerges that rejects the idea.  Sometimes they scream “antitrust”, and other times they just see it as an opportunity to take advantage of the fools who will allow their clients to be used for the cause, giving them an opportunity to cut and run for the benefit of their own clients.  But it never happens.

Many of us who have the willingness to try a case have tested the theory of scarce resources.  I have never had a prosecutor, when pushed to the limit, run away.  The plea offer may be sweetened considerably at the last minute, but when rejected nonetheless, the case goes to trial. 

This should come as no surprise: One of the primary reasons for signing up to prosecute is to get trial experience.  In other words, the individuals who serve as prosecutors want to try cases.  The problem with a systemic shortage of resources isn’t their problem, so what do they care?  Let the administrators wring their hands over where the courtrooms are going to come from.  They only need one courtroom to try one case.

Moreover, the worst that can happen if they try a lousy case is that they lose. Unlike the defense, a loss doesn’t mean someone goes to prison.  Granted, the other assistants may make fun of them at the bar after the verdict, but that’s why they go to bars afterward.  By the third round, all is forgotten.

The lawprofs posit that “[a]bsent the plea bargain option, many defendants would not have been charged in the first place,” This assumes that rational prosecutors would exercise their discretion to avoid charging defendants upon whom they wouldn’t want to waste scare trial resources.  Or more defendants would plead to the charge and get stiffer sentences. Or they would increase the resources to try more cases.  But that would require criminal defense lawyers to be capable of trying cases.

The problem with the conclusion is that the now-defendants who wouldn’t be charged if there were no plea bargains are the ones who get trivial sentences, not the harsh sentences that the lawprofs believe are “extracted”.  The defendants receiving the harsh sentences would be the ones forced to trial, to whom scare resources are allocated, and would, if they are convicted, receive even harsher sentences.  And that assuming the existence of the rational prosecutor. Wanna bet your client’s life on the rational prosecutor?

Plea bargains are outlets, safety valves for the innocent and guilty alike.  If it’s bad for an innocent person to go to prison for 5 years, it’s worse for ten.  Not every defendant has the risk tolerance for trial, and not every innocent defendant has a defense.  Don’t blame the plea bargain for the coerciveness that pushes a person to willingly slam the prison door on himself.  Blame a system where innocent people get convicted, where judges smile as they ignore the Constitution and where criminal defense lawyers pretend they can provide
effective representation when they intended to plead the case out from the very first “hello”.

When a scholarly analysis of plea bargaining takes the harsh reality of the trenches into account, wake me up. In the meantime, we’re better with ugly plea bargains than no option to trial at all.

Things Not To Say To The Judge

At the South Caccalacca Criminal Defense Blog, Bobby Frederick wrote that attorney Ben Webb was acquitted of contempt.  His offense was to refuse to answer the judge’s questions as to why his client wasn’t present in court. 



Judges and prosecutors get used to defense attorneys freely telling them the substance of communications with their clients, regarding when they appeared in court, whether the attorney told them to appear in court, and their client’s criminal history, and may not know what to do when a lawyer says no. The problem is that the court is trying to balance the lawyer’s duty to preserve confidentiality with the lawyer’s duty of candor to the court.

The line between candor and confidences really isn’t all that fine, but as Bobby notes, it’s become muddled by lawyers themselves refusing to toe it.  Lawyers cannot deceive or mislead the court, but simultaneously cannot tell the court of the communications that took place between lawyer and client. 

In Webb’s case, he refused to respond to a question about whether his client was, or was not, in court on a particular date.  It’s not quite clear to me why this fact question, reflecting nothing about a communication between lawyer and client, implicated the privilege, but then there is almost always far more nuance involved than appears from the media reports.  Under the circumstances, I will assume that the dropped charges, and order of acquittal, happened for a good reason.

The real problem arises when the judge becomes infuriated with the lawyer who holds to his duty to his client, and informs the judge that he cannot answer his question.  If all the other lawyers tell, what makes this lawyer think he’s special?  Lawyers find themselves caught between disclosing privileged communications and angering the judge with their recalcitrance.  When they deem the nature of the privileged communication to be “not too big a deal,” they talk rather than fight.  That becomes the norm of ordinary injustice.

Over the past couple of weeks, a number of instances of “foot in mouth” disease have crossed my path.  While the disclosure of privileged communications carries separate ethical considerations, these instances involved lawyers angering judges for no good reason whatsoever.  Heck, if you’re going to piss them off, make it worthwhile.

One instance involved a lawyer doing a tap dance in open court for the benefit of his client, to show him what a brilliant lawyer he was and how hard he was working for the defendant’s benefit.  The court appearance was routine, with the attorney handing over a discovery demand letter to the prosecution.  Normally, one would state on the record that he has done so, but not this lawyer.  He made a five minute dissertation (only a slight exaggeration) about the nature of the letter, the statutory bases (included the numeric citations) of the discovery and bill of particulars statutes, and then the caselaw relevant to the prosecutor’s constitutional duties to disclose.  The content of his dissertation was as basic as it gets.

We all stood there silently.  He’s entitled to make his record.  When he was done, the judge asked the attorneys to approach the bench, where he looked the attorney in the eye and thanked him for taking five minutes out of his busy day to explain how discovery works, since he might not be fully aware of this basic procedure after his 25 years on the bench.

Dumb move?  It got worse.  The lawyer then asked the judge, whose arm was in a sling, if he hurt his arm, appearing sincerely concerned for the judge’s physical well-being.  The judge asked he was a PI lawyer too.  Ouch.  Did I mention that the lawyer’s client was no criminal court virgin, and was also familiar with basic discovery?  He wasn’t impressed either.

In fairness, the lawyer is a good lawyer, whose mouth got a few steps ahead of his brain.  Once he started down the pedantic path, he couldn’t figure out how to stop.  Next time he appears before this judge, I trust he will save his breath for something more substantive.  After all, you only get one chance to make a second impression.

In another instance, the lawyer found himself being told by the judge that his written submission was contemptuous.  He was shocked at this, not recognizing why his argument, contained within a footnote, would offend the judge.  The footnote related how the judge employed language from an unpublished decision, which was improper, but that he would not do so.  This, the lawyer explained, was offered as merely the fact.

That a judge may indulge in some impropriety isn’t exactly shocking when viewed from the defense table, but there are two things you shouldn’t do unless you plan to go to the mattresses.  First, don’t directly accuse the judge of facial impropriety unless you want to go to war.  Second, don’t rub his nose in it by pointing out that you won’t engage in similar impropriety, even though the judge did.

This lawyer truly didn’t believe that his statement was offensive, or would be taken as offensive.  He had no intention of going to war over it, and thought quite well of the judge.  But he failed to consider how it would be read by the guy on the big bench.  There’s a certain sensitivity on the part of people whose position demands that they not engage in unethical or improper behavior.  They’re funny that way.  The off-hand note by the lawyer, that just happens to implicate impropriety by the judge, is almost always going to evoke a bad reaction. 

A buddy of mine who used to serve in the Kings County District Attorney’s office loves to tell a story about a judge who asked him, following a snide comment on the record, whether he was being contemptuous.  He responded, “Not at this time, Your Honor.”  There are times when we must take a stand and refuse to comply with the demand of the judge, though every criminal defense lawyer should have a few handy expressions in his pocket designed to both maintain client privilege while deflecting the anger of the court. 

At the same time, we need to exercise sufficient discretion to know when the sound emanating from our mouths, just noise really, suggests that the person to whom it’s directed is so ignorant that he requires us to explain in excruciating detail the most obvious and basic aspects of his job. 

And finally, we need to know the difference.  If you’re going to anger the judge, make sure it’s for a good reason.

The Orphan of Tenaha

When last we passed through Tenaha, Texas, they had a pretty good gig going.  Stop black drivers and make them an offer they couldn’t refuse: Forfeit whatever property of value they had on them or get arrested.  No, there wasn’t anything to arrest them for, but they would spend a night or more in jail and have to defend themselves.  Finally, somebody sued :


According to the lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court, officers would stop non-white motorists for no legal reason, order them out of their cars, search their cars, call out dogs to search the cars, find nothing, interrogate the motorists, ask them if they had any money, seize the money, arrest them for “money laundering”, and then threaten to hold them prisoner and prosecute them for money laundering unless they would agree to forfeit the money.

This put Shelby County District Attorney Lynda K. Russell in the crosshairs, and in a delicious twist of irony, Russell sought to use the proceeds of these “forfeitures” to pay for her defense.  As Radley Balko explains,


Here’s the crazy part: Russell is attempting to use proceeds from the county’s forfeiture fund to pay for her legal defense. That is, she wants to raid the fund she’s accused of stealing from motorists to fund in order to defend herself from accusations that she stole from motorists to fund it. The ultimate irony here is that when law enforcement officials freeze a suspect’s assets in anticipation of a drug prosecution, the suspect isn’t allowed to use any of those assets to pay for his own legal defense.

Russell’s quandary arises from her being disowned.  It seems that the folks who signed her paycheck, the ones who gave her the authority to come up with this wonderful revenue raiser, no longer love her.  According to  the ACLU, which is opposing Russell’s application, the Shelby County Commissioners and the State of Texas have refused to provide Russell with a defense. 

How convenient.  When the cash is flowing, everybody loves Russell.  But when the bright lines shine on Russell, nobody knows her.  No doubt that argument is that she was performing her duty only when she did so legally and properly.  When she stepped over the line to abuse her authority and become party to the wrongdoing, she did so on her own.  No respondeat superior here, sister.

But the ACLU is arguing “no dice.”  Not only does the state and county clothe Russell with the authority to do wrong, but they are responsible for overseeing her performance of her duty while she enjoys the authority they’ve conferred.  They can’t love the cash but disclaim responsibility for its source.

According to Lisa Graybill, Legal Director at the ACLU of Texas:


“ Texas has a long history of having its law enforcement officials unconstitutionally target racial minorities in the flawed and failed war on drugs and it is of paramount importance that those officials be held accountable.”
Russell is at the front of the line.  But the line drags on behind her, and includes all those fine officials who have happily allowed conduct like this to go on in Tenaha, and elsewhere. 

Personally, I don’t care whether Shelby County or the state pays for Russell’s defense.  It would be sweeter if Russell had to give up a few trinkets of her own to cover the cost.  But by no means does that mean that everyone, from the cop pretending to be Diane Ross, on up, isn’t responsible for what happened in Tenaha.  And each should be held accountable, whether for being actively engaged in quietly complicit.  Without touching the very funds that were stolen from passing black motorists.

Lawyer Marketing, Plan B

It was one thing when the expression, “lawyers walking the street,” was used metaphorically.  But when the going gets tough, lawyers wear hotpants.  Remember the good old days when lawyer shows were about guys named “Perry” and guys in wheelchairs (who looked remarkably like guys named “Perry”)?  Well, times change.



Personally, I think they should have stuck with the working title: ABA Legal Rebels.

H/T Jeremy Richie

At Least One Lie Against Gotti

As John Gotti, called Junior in the media but not by anyone who knows better, sits for his fourth trial because the last three have failed to prove the government right, his latest accuser is singing his heart out.  This one, John Alite, who went by the name Aletto before because it sounded much more Italian, is singing for his life.

One might wonder where this “witness” was in the last three trials, being a good citizen and all, and just trying to tell the truth because he’s a truth-telling kinda guy.  But we know that he’s not singing because he wants to tell the truth, but wants to please his masters by doing what his predecessors were unable to do.  Nail John Gotti. 

Alite’s song includes new lyrics that no one has heard before, including names like the goofy self-promoter, Bo Dietl, who wrote a book claiming to have single-handedly saved New York from crime, much to the surprise of the rest of the NYPD.  Alite says Dietl fed information to the Gambinos.  Dietl says he can’t even spell Gambinos.  Having read his book, I side with Dietl.

But Alite’s latest accusation is one that is so ludicrous that any lingering doubt that he’s up on the stand lying his heart out is dispelled.  From Newsday, Alite testified:


Alite, the star informant who was a former top deputy to Gotti, described how he, Gotti and another man were arrested for [?] after a bar rumble outside a Long Island nightclub in 1989. Gotti, he said, assured him that the Gambino family was going to “take care of it, make sure nobody comes to court.”

That’s just what happened. Alite said he didn’t know the details, but “it got thrown out.”

All three of them, he said, were represented by a lawyer named Richard Rehbock, whom Alite described as the lawyer Gotti required him to use to make sure he didn’t step out of line.

Together, Alite said, he and Gotti visited Rehbock’s office “dozens of times,” and Gotti was given access to all the lawyer’s client files – including not only those of Gambino family members, but also of members of other families.

“John Gotti Jr. would go into all of Richard Rehbock’s files and read the cases of all the mob guys,” Alite testified. “. . . He was looking to see who was a rat and who wasn’t.”

This is just plain stupid, and if the government had a clue, there would be absolutely no doubt that the star witness was lying, at least about this.

I’ve known Richie Rehbock for a long time, and have no doubt whatsoever that Richie wouldn’t let anyone rifle through his files.  And appropriately, Richie responded to this ridiculous claim by saying as much:


Rehbock, reached at his office in Jericho, said in a phone interview that Alite’s words were a total fabrication.


“John Alite’s making all this up,” Rehbock said. “John Alite is lying. I take great offense. I have great concern in abiding by ethical rules.”

He said Alite was a former client and that he had represented Alite and Gotti at arraignment on the assault case, but Gotti had only been in his office “one or two times.”

“That’s absolutely not true,” Rehbock said of Gotti reading other case files. “It never happened. I never, ever share with any client another client’s matters. Never in a million years. I wouldn’t do it.”

But there’s no reason to take Richie’s word for it, or my vouching for Richie’s ethics.  The idea of it is absurd.  Richie, like me, didn’t represent rats.  It’s not that clients didn’t occasional seek to cooperate, or that we didn’t inform clients of that possibility, but that we didn’t represent them if they chose to do so.  They would have to obtain representation elsewhere, and there was no shortage of lawyers who were happy to sit for hours with their hands across their laps while their clients made up stories to buy their freedom.  But Richie didn’t do it. 

Why do you think Richie was one of the go-to lawyers?  It wasn’t just his skill as an advocate, which was extraordinary, but his reputation as a stand-up lawyer.  Get Richie talking about cooperation, and his face contorts, he starts spitting, and you’ve just lost an hour of your life listening to Richie rant about its evils and the complicity of the criminal defense bar in the ruination of the criminal justice system. 

And the government knows this very well.  They know that Richie Rehbock never walked anybody through the doors of 1 St. Andrews Plaza.  They know that Richie Rehbock never sat across the conference table from them as lies were spewed. They know.

The idea that Gotti would come to Richie’s office “dozens of times” to look through files is crazy.  Even if Richie would do such a thing, and by definition it could only happen once, nobody would be able to find evidence of it in his files.  But then, nobody would be so foolish as to waste their time trying, and certainly Gotti wouldn’t spend his time going through Richie’s files. 

In a blurb in the New York Law Journal, the story gets even crazier.


[D]uring the 1990s attorney Richard Rehbock of Jericho, N.Y., allowed Mr. Gotti to look at files of the competition—members of the Lucchese crime family who had also retained Mr. Rehbock.
While Richie would no more represent a rat from the Lucchese’s than the Gambino’s, and everybody knew that to be the case, no lawyer would allow one group to know about another. That would have been begging for trouble, and no legal fee would have been sufficient to make it worthwhile, if you get my drift.  These are things that would simply never happen, no matter whether the lawyer had the strong ethics of a Richie Rehbock or no ethics at all.  This is just more crazy talk.

I can’t speak to the many, and I mean many, allegations of crime that have come from Alite’s testimony, but if there’s any vitality to the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, his credibility is shot.  This testimony about Richie Rehbock is just plain ludicrous, and it’s impossible to believe that the government doesn’t know it.  But that hasn’t made anyone jump up and, in all candor, inform the Court that this government rat is lying on the stand.

Some say that there are no more “men of honor,” as mobsters once called themselves.  The question now is whether there are any Assistant United States Attorneys of honor who will concede that their star witness, John Alite, is lying on the witness stand about Richie Rehbock.  And I have no doubt but that this testimony about Richie Rehbock is a lie.

Thank You, Firefighter Patrick Joyce

Much time is spent here being critical of people in the government’s employ, but there is one group that truly serves solely for the public benefit at great personal risk.  Firefighters.  Last night, one who entered a room because of a report that there was someone inside died for his attempt to save the life of another.  This firefighter was Patrick Joyce.

From CBSNews :


Fire officials announced that Patrick Joyce, 39, a veteran Yonkers firefighter, died after reportedly leaping along with two other firefighters from the third floor of a burning house on Waverly Street.

“Three guys got trapped on the third floor and they had to bail out of a third floor window,” said Yonkers Fire Chief George Kielb.

Joyce was pronounced dead about 2 a.m.
I’m not sure what makes a person want to be a firefighter.  They don’t get to boss people around on pain of a good tasing.  They don’t get to steal from drug dealers or get free coffee and donuts from the corner store.  They just help people and sometimes lose their life.

I don’t think about firefighters enough, or appreciate what they do enough.  When I heard about Joyce being forced to jump from a third story window to escape a superheated room, I thought about what a crazy job it is.  Yet there are people willing to do this crazy job to save people like me.  Thank God that the two other firefighters who jumped survived and are in stable condition.  I am deeply sorry that Patrick Joyce didn’t survive.  I appreciate all of them.

Maybe we can take this opportunity to remember what firefighters do for us and appreciate them.  I do.

A Law Too Ugly

Few of us believe that any legislator ever met a new “tough on crime” law they didn’t like.  Maybe this is the first.  From Orin Kerr at Volokh Conspiracy, the House Judiciary subcommittee hearing on the proposed Megan Meier Cyberbullying law did not go well.


Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-California) lobbied fellow lawmakers of a House Judiciary subcommittee to back her proposed legislation dubbed the “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act.” In its first congressional hearing, Sanchez said the proposal was designed to target the cyberbullying that led to the 2006 suicide of the 13-year-old Meier of Missouri.

“Bullying has gone electronic,” Sanchez testified before the Subcommitttee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security. “This literally means kids can be bullies at any hour of the day or the night, or even in the victims’ own home.”

From the outset of the 90-minute hearing, however, committee members from the left and the right said they thought the measure was an unconstitutional breach of free speech. “We need to be extremely careful before heading down this path,” Bobby Scott, a Democrat from Virginia and the committee’s chairman, said during the hearing’s opening moment.

Rep. Louie Gohmert (R-Texas) said the legislation “appears to be another chapter of over-criminalization.” He quipped, however, that the law could target the “mean-spirited liberals” in the blogosphere that are attacking himself and his family regularly.

About 30 minutes later, Gohmert said that not all prosecutors would exercise good judgment, that they might “harass the harasser.”
First, it’s gratifying to know that our Congressfolk not only know about the first amendment to the Constitution, but can use it properly in a sentence.  As previously noted, this particular bill goes way off the charts on finding criminal liability under any and every rock.  But then, as we learned from the Lori Drew prosecution, the government would be ill-inclined to find itself with someone they want to prosecute and no law readily available. 

The hearing will still be receiving testimony from “experts” who will both explain why it’s critical to create a new crime and why it is unconstitutional.  Don’t forget the contentiousness of the Cyber Civil Rights Symposium of recent vintage, where many, perhaps even the bulk, of the lawprofs were more than happy to trade off the first amendment for criminal sanctions as soon as bullying was redefined as gender discrimination.

The fight is hardly over yet, but maybe this time, this one time, Congress has finally found a bill named after a dead child that is just too butt ugly to enact?  Maybe.