Author Archives: SHG

A Win for Juries: They Can Be Told

When Eastern District of New York Judge Jack Weinstein took 236 pages to explain in US v. Polizzi why he had failed to fulfill his duty as a judge by instructing the jury as to the sentencing consequences of its decision, few expected it to hold up.  It’s not that he wasn’t right about the problem, jurors denied an understanding of the full picture of what they are doing by being told of the mandatory minimum sentence that would flow from their verdict, but that precedent was strongly against him.

And when the Second Circuit issued its decision reversing Judge Weinstein’s vacatur of the verdict and grant of a new trial, it came with two elements that turn this reversal into a striking vindication of Judge Weinstein, as well as some significant benefit for Polizzi as well.

As to Polizzi, who was convicted of 12 counts of possession of child pornography, resulting in sentence stacking that would require the imposition of a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence per count, the Circuit held:


Because the defendant’s possession as charged in the indictment constituted a single unit of prosecution and because the district court erred by granting defendant’s motion for a new trial on the counts charging receipt of child pornography, we vacate the April 9, 2008 order of the district court granting defendant’s motion for a new trial and remand this case to the district court to vacate all but one of the possession convictions and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a huge functional change, holding that this possession was a”single unit” despite the government have charged it separately in twelve counts, thus fundamentally altering the government’s ability to manipulate the sentence by the manner in which it indicts.  This appears to signal that smurfing counts, breaking up a crime into components and charging each separately, as if an independent crime that requires an independent mandatory minimum sentence, will not longer be tolerated.  The Circuit has taken back the authority to determine the crime, and hence the sentence, from the government.  This is huge.

But it’s not all that the Circuit had to offer in its reversal.  While it did not sustain Judge Weinstein’s holding that it was error to deny the jury instructions as to the mandatory minimums to be imposed, it nonetheless approved of the trial judge, in his discretion, doing so.


[W]e do not conclude, as the government urges, that a district court may never instruct the jury on an applicable mandatory minimum sentence. Rather, without deciding whether it would have been within the district court’s discretion to instruct the jury on the applicable mandatory minimum sentence in this case, we find that the district court acted beyond its proper discretion when it ordered a new trial at which the jury would be instructed on the applicable mandatory minimum. The court submitted the case to the jury without instructing the jury on the mandatory minimum sentence, a course that was certainly within its discretion and the jury rendered a verdict upon the error-free trial. Absent a strong justification for redoing a properly conducted trial, the interests of finality, as well as respect for the jury’s verdict, counsel against requiring retrial.

The rationale, of course, was that the failure to do so, it being a discretionary decision, did not render the trial infirm, thus entitling the defendant to a new trial. On the other hand, had the judge chosen to do so, that would have been fine as well, and within the judge’s discretion.  This too is huge.

It appears that judicial antipathy toward mandatory minimums is far more pervasive than expected, sufficient to push precedent to the limits (and maybe beyond).  This is an outstanding result, putting the political grandstanding of mandatory minimums to the test of a jury’s verdict.  No longer will it be deemed as required that juries be told not to worry their pretty little heads with such details as sentence, but the decision will be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  Sure, that could be the rub, but at least it’s now an option.

While those who have a finer appreciation of the slavish adherence to precedent may find this decision disturbing, not so much because they disagree with its policy but because stability is an end in itself, the Second Circuit’s reversal of Judge Weinstein’s order, but approval of his ideas, could be one of the most significant improvements in jury trials in a very long time.

Imagine.  A jury being told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.  For once.

H/T Doug Berman and Orin Kerr

Criminal Summary Judgment; Way Too Painless

Norm Pattis, the galloping ghost of the blawgosphere, questions why summary judgment, the stop-gap of wasteful civil action, isn’t available in criminal prosecutions. 


There are occasions in which the criminal justice system is misused. A complaining witness can bring what is essentially a civil complaint to prosecutors and huff and puff about how they’ve been defrauded. The prosecution swears out a warrant. The defendant is arrested and then what?

The catch here is in the details.  In New York State courts, the judge has the authority to inspect the grand jury minutes, and dismiss or reduce the indictment.  The power is there, though rarely exercised.  In federal court, there is no equivalent animal at all.  Once a defendant is indicted, the prosecution plays out to its conclusion, whether plea, trial or dismissal/deferred prosecution, as the government desires.  Coupled with Sol Wachtler’s oft-quoted observation that a prosecutor could indict a ham sandwich, and the criminal defendant finds himself in for the long haul, with all the cost, damage to reputation and ancillary harm that comes along for the ride.

In many instances, this may not seem to be much of a problem.  After all, if the defendant is accused of murdering someone or dealing drugs, then the issue may well need to be played out to its natural conclusion.  Not that there aren’t pervasive problems, but the allegations tend to be sufficient to go to the mats, and it’s then up to the court at trial to do its job.

But Norm properly points to a somewhat different arena, where conduct that could just as easily, and might well have ordinarily, been addressed in the civil arena ends up forming the basis for an indictment.  In white collar crime, this is pervasive, with claims of fraud or mundane regulatory violations are transmuted from everyday disputes between warring tribes into crimes. 

What isn’t seen is that claims such as this are a dime a dozen in civil actions, and then one gets plucked out of the middle and ends up the subject of a criminal prosecution.  As every white collar criminal defense lawyer has heard, “why me?”  We hear that everybody does it, it’s pervasive, everybody knows about it, and yet this one in a hundred (million?) time it moves from your basic civil suit over money into a criminal prosecution over freedom. 

Norm attributed this to the degree of huffing and puffing a complainant can muster, getting prosecutors to take on a case that would otherwise never find its way onto the federal agents’ agenda.  It’s often a matter of juice, when a complaining witness has some greater influence with somebody in government that enables him to catch a friendly ear and persuade the prosecutor that his nemesis is a public enemy.  Frequently, the goal of the complainant is to get the government to do its dirty work for it, to obtain the judgment (conviction) and recovery the damages (restitution) with a hand far heavier than the complainant could muster. 

These cases pose an entirely different issue for criminal prosecution, as there is such great overlap between the civil and criminal realms in white collar crime that it seems no more than sheer kismet that one ends up a defendant in a civil action rather than a criminal prosecution.  Neither is any more heinous than the other, and in many instances not heinous at all. 

In fact, what constitutes criminal fraud to a jury may be nothing more than standard hard bargaining to a seasoned industry executive.  Jurors may not know the game, but those who play it daily know it all too well.  Prosecutors likely don’t know the game either, but then it’s hard to know much when you come to the job with such narrow life experience.  The commonplace can appear outrageous when you’ve never seen it before.

The difference for these white collar defendants is that they play on a level field in civil proceedings, including being given as much faith by the judge as the plaintiff.  Ironically, judges don’t have nearly the disdain for civil defendants as they do for criminal, even when both are accused of engaging in the exact same conduct.  And of course, the civil defendant has the opportunity, after he’s obtained a wealth of discovery to which no criminal defendant in his wildest dreams would be entitled, can seek to put a quick stop to the proceedings if there’s nothing behind them.

So why shouldn’t this be available for the criminal defendant as well?  Not that it would be granted often.  It wouldn’t.  Not that it would likely be applicable in most instances.  It wouldn’t.  But when it would, when it should, why put the criminal defendant through the entire system, soup to nuts, with no stop gap when the prosecution is running on empty?

The experience of being the defendant in a criminal prosecution is punishment in itself.  It’s not just the destination, but the journey.  Regardless of the outcome, criminal defendants are compelled to endure the journey, whether they deserve to or not.  If there was summary judgment, a means of cutting short the trip, it would make the journey far too painless.  We can’t have that.

Not Without A Lawyer

There isn’t a competent lawyer in the practical blawgosphere who hasn’t warned defendants to remain silent and invoke their right to counsel.  Immediately. Every time.  No matter how smart you think you are, or what they say to you to get you to talk.  Don’t do it.

The rule of Edwards v. Arizona is that once a suspect has invoked right to counsel, the police cannot continue to interrogate in the absence of counsel, and the defendant cannot un-invoke his right to counsel without an attorney present.  In Michigan v. Jackson, the Supreme Court extended the rule to post-arraignment interrogations as well, where the defendants requested counsel at arraignment but were interrogated again by police nonetheless.  While the protection shifted from the 5th Amendment to the 6th Amendment, the rationale was the same.

None of this seems like striking constitutional law today, yet there is a move afoot to change it.  This alone might not be terribly shocking, but for the fact that the move comes from the Obama Department of Justice and Solicitor General Elena Kagan.  From the AP :


The Obama administration is asking the Supreme Court to overrule long-standing law that stops police from initiating questions unless a defendant’s lawyer is present, another stark example of the White House seeking to limit rather than expand rights.

The Justice Department, in a brief signed by Solicitor General Elena Kagan, said the 1986 decision “serves no real purpose” and offers only “meager benefits.” The government said defendants who don’t wish to talk to police don’t have to and that officers must respect that decision. But it said there is no reason a defendant who wants to should not be able to respond to officers’ questions

Like a ten year old on Christmas morning, we know that there’s no Santa Claus but still want so desperately to believe.  We want to believe that Obama’s Justice will be different than his predecessor’s.  That Elena Kagan could argue with a straight face that “there is no reason” is laugh-out-loud silly, as if this was some Harvard Lampoon parody of how the Justice Department should behave. 

What purpose is served, SG Kagan?  We have extremely vulnerable defendants, having just been arraigned, learning of the steep charges and severe potential sentence, and detained by the government.  He’s confronted by agents permitted by law to lie and manipulate him into talking with pseudo-promises they can’t and won’t keep.  He’s feeling hopeless, friendless, overwhelmed and scared to death, and the only voice with unfettered access is that of a smooth-talking government agent who jingles the keys to the prison cell in his hand.  What purpose indeed.

It seems that our government’s policies on civil rights and freedoms range from bad to worse.  Bad is the best we can expect, even from the administration of President Obama.  For the memory impaired, the concern for the Constitution wasn’t a whole lot better under Bill Clinton.  It was just worse with George Bush, which made Clinton seem not nearly as bad.  But he wasn’t anything close to good.

The different here is that our President taught Constitutional Law.  Our Solicitor General was a Harvard law prof and Dean, and clerked for Thurgood Marshall.  Did she learn nothing?  I can’t believe that, but can’t imagine that she could expect to retain credibility after making statements challenging the obvious, as if a prosecutor through and through.  They simply must know better, yet choose to play the government game.  After all, now they’re the government, and as with all government’s, the Constitution is in their way.

A buddy of mine who holds elected officer has the “hat” theory.  As soon as elected officials put on the “hat” of office, it squeezes their heads so tight that they can no longer think.  They forget all they knew before, of the wrongs and the remedies, of why somebody decided to vote for them in the first place, and assume the position dictated by the hat.  He says they can’t help themselves because it’s the hat. 

New Kids on the Block in Austin, Texas (Gov’t Juice Edition)

There are new lawyers hanging out shingles and groups of lawyers combining and uncombining all the time, so it would impractical to recognize them. But when a special group joins hands to form a law firm, it’s the sort of thing that one needs to notice.  And via Tex Parte Blog, such a new bunch of guys have gotten together in Austin.


Johnny Sutton has a new gig at a new firm. Sutton, the former U.S. attorney for the Western District of Texas, has announced that he’s starting Ashcroft Sutton & Ratcliffe in Texas. And yes, the Ashcroft in the firm’s name is John Ashcroft, U.S. attorney general during George W. Bush’s first term as president and the former Republican U.S. senator from Missouri who now heads the Ashcroft Group, a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm.

According to the story, Austin will be Sutton’s base of operations. I wonder if Jamie Spencer has an extra office to rent? Sutton is probably quiet, and won’t take up too much time on the copy machine.  Of course, being a start-up, he may have some problems with getting the rent in on time.

So let’s add this up.  We’ve got a couple of United States Attorneys and an Attorney General.  They were all prosecutors of one stripe or another.  Prosecutors.  No longer prosecuting.  What do prosecutors do when they get the boot?

Murray Newman, can you be of any help on this one?  How about you, Robert Guest?  Any ideas?  Maybe Ken Lammers can add some insight?  Well, maybe not.

What makes this truly special to me is the creation of a firm made up of former government officials who wore the mantle of the righteous, dedicated to putting evil-doers in prison, which appears to offer flagrantly improper inside access to other government officials, if not the secrets within the Justice Department, for sale.  They are selling the benefits of their governmental connections.

But if that doesn’t work, they can always try to squeeze some DUIs out of Jamie, if he would toss them some of his leftovers.  They better treat Jamie well if they expect his help with their start up, of course.

More from the Wall Street Journal, which notes that with all the former Republican prosecutors unable to find legitimate jobs, the competition for selling governmental access is getting fierce. 

Things Found in Justice Breyer’s Underpants

Imagine a legal system where a final arbiter of law based his decisions upon a peculiar personal experience that occurred many decades earlier and formed his sense of normalcy?  One man.  One man’s experience.  And the entire system of law turns upon it.

Imagine that this experience serves to provide the basis for people you don’t know to force your child to remove all her clothing and expose her genitals.

Imagine that this experience allows people you don’t know to take this action because, in their absolute and sole discretion, it seemed like a good idea at the moment.  There would be no clear standard by which this demand would be judged, and no review of this discretion by someone dissociated with the event before your child was forced to do so.  The only criteria was that an adult, one single adult, whose judgment in such matters is given near absolute deference though it’s subject to no tests or challenge in anticipation or preparation for making such a decision, decided that it was a good idea.

Imagine that, finding nothing hidden in undergarments or on the surface of your child’s genitalia, your child was then subject to being probed and exposed in their genital cavities.

Imagine that there was nothing, absolutely nothing, you could do to stop this from happening to your child.

Given what happened during Tuesday’s oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States of America, this may well be the outcome of Safford Unified School District v. Redding. one of the most horrific scenarios to present itself to the court in a long time.  Liptak at the New York Times captures some of the more interesting quotes:

“What this school official did,” Mr. Wolf [ACLU lawyer arguing for Redding] said, referring to the male assistant principal who ordered the search, “was act on nothing more than a hunch — if that — that Savana was currently concealing ibuprofen pills underneath her underpants for others’ oral consumption.”

“I mean, there’s a certain ick factor to this,” Mr. Wolf said.

Without intimating a view on the ickiness of what Mr. Wolf had described, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. suggested that the law might treat different undergarments differently. “The issue here covers the brassiere as well,” he said, “which doesn’t seem as outlandish as the underpants.”

An “ick factor?”  I don’t think “ick” quite captures the problem.  But then I question whether the Chief Justice demonstrates sufficient respect for the physical integrity of teenage girls when he parses undergarments and cavalierly dismisses brassieres.  Who is he to decide what part of a young woman’s body means so little when exposed to strangers?


Justice Antonin Scalia challenged him on the first point.

“You search in the student’s pack, you search the student’s outer garments, and you have a reasonable suspicion that the student has drugs,” he said. “Don’t you have, after conducting all these other searches, a reasonable suspicion that she has drugs in her underpants?”

“You’ve searched everywhere else,” Justice Scalia said. “By God, the drugs must be in her underpants.”

Fresh off announcing his strong support for the 4th Amendment in Gant, it appears that Justice Scalia used up his constitutional quotient for the day, and returned to the basic default position of when in doubt, search away.

The winner of funny statement of the day was Justice Stephen Breyer, via Tony Mauro from Legal Times:


Breyer said, “In my experience, people did sometimes stick things in my underwear.” As the audience erupted in laughter, Breyer quickly corrected himself: “Or not my underwear. Whatever. Whatever . . . I mean I don’t think it’s beyond human experience.”

Mistaken pronoun or Freudian slip?  Childhood experiences return at the most inconvenient times.  But the scariest assessment of the day was uttered by Justice David Souter:


“My thought process,” Justice Souter said, “is I would rather have the kid embarrassed by a strip search, if we can’t find anything short of that, than to have some other kids dead because the stuff is distributed at lunchtime and things go awry.”

From this rationale, we can demonstrably prove the value of stripping young women of their undergarments and having their genitalia inspected by strangers, since every time it happens and a kid doesn’t die over lunchtime, they’ve saved another life. They have to do it for the children.  They have to do it to your child.  They just have to.

I can’t wait to find out what other things were found in Justice Breyer’s underpants.

Did Gant Create a New Test?

Reading the majority decision in  of four Arizona v. Gant by Justice John Paul Stevens, this sentence raised hackles because of its inexplicable separation of an evidentiary search from its original rationale:


[W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.

In my post-game analysis, the unusual phrase, “reason to believe,” was noted but not given thorough consideration as reflecting a new test, heretofore unknown in criminal law, to be applied to evidentiary searches of automobiles incident to arrest.


More confusing is Justice Stevens’ “reasonable to believe” language, since (as reflected in Scalia’s sentence) probable cause used to be the threshold for a search, even under the automobile exception.  Does this reflect a change in the requisite quantum of belief necessary to conduct an evidentiary search of a vehicle, even after the occupant has been seized, secured and stashed in the squad car?  I don’t think the language is intended to signal a change, but it’s wording like this that opens the door to further confusion and potential rulings permitting cops to search for evidence, if not weapons, at will.

To me, “reasonable to believe” is such a vague and meaningless phrase that I could not believe that it was intended to signal a massive change, a fundamental change, in what is required to conduct an evidentiary search.  After all, Justice Stevens did not go any length at all to note or highlight that these words signaled a new test.  Nor did he explain what this test might conceivably mean, other than the obvious, that a search would not be permitted when it is unreasonable. What a great idea, all warrantless evidentiary searches incident to arrest are good unless they are unreasonable.  The would really put a crimp in the cops’ style.

Of course, if we divorce the evidence related to the basis for arrest and include evidence generally, then it would always seem reasonable to search anything one can when arresting a person, since that would be the most efficacious time to do so.  You never know what you might find, and  given that level of intrusiveness of a full arrest, a little search of a car hardly seems unreasonable at all.  And then, there are always the pretextual stops, which makes the entire “reasonableness” and “relevance” spectrum seem plain old goofy.  Imagine having greater latitude with a pretext stop than a stop for true cause?  Wouldn’t that be a hoot?

But then, others may differ.

It didn’t take long before Orin Kerr opened the debate at Volokh Conspiracy on what the “new test” meant.  I suspect that Kerr is one of those people who believes that every word of a Supreme Court opinion is imbued with special powers, chosen for its precise and consequential meaning.  In other words, it wouldn’t be possible for the “reasonable to believe” language to be descriptive rather than conclusively a new test.  Regardless, Orin doesn’t ask if this reflects a new test, but rather what the new test means.  Oh crap.

The problem is that he’s given away half the battle already, starting with the assumption that it must indicate a new, different test to be applied. 


At first blush, my thought was that “reasonable to believe” surely can’t mean probable cause: Under the automobile exception, the police can search any part of a car that might store evidence if they have probable cause to believe that evidence is in the car. That’s true without an arrest, and it’s why the police almost never get a warrant to search a car. Notably, Justice Alito in his dissent assumes that “reason to believe” is different from probable cause. (Alito asks, “Why, for example, is the standard for this type of evidence-gathering search ‘reason to believe’ rather than probable cause?”) But if it’s not probable cause, what is it?

If Orin is correct, or more importantly, if judges seize upon this vague language to hold that a new test was created and then decide for themselves what it means since the Supremes neglected to define it, we’re right back to the good, old wild west of 4th Amendment evidentiary searches whenever a decent excuse can be proffered.  Worse still, once an evidentiary search incident is held to be constitutionally permissible based upon a “reasonable to believe” test, how long will it take for the inevitable slide down the slippery slope to the “reasonable to believe” test to find its way into collateral scenarios, replacing probable cause for the automobile exception perhaps?

Contrary to Orin’s assumption, I cannot believe that Justice Stevens, having “clarified” Belton after a mere 28 years of lower court misinterpretation, actively decided to create another source of massive confusion by casually tossing out a new test to be applied to the now clarified search incident. 

The problem is that, given Justice Alito’s having pointed out the language in his dissent, one would expect Justice Stevens (or one of the other justices in the majority) to have either modified the language, responded to the criticism, defined the phrase or done something to eliminate the confusion that this language could potentially create. They didn’t.

I’m not prepared to accept at face value that this “reasonable to believe” phrase is necessarily a new test, of some ill-defined nature, with which the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures will not be held captive.  But I similarly find it hard to explain it away either.  For now, I’m sticking to the position that it is merely descriptive, but I fear that the debate opened at VC will filter down to those who are looking for a backdoor to allow searches whenever possible, and this may be just the thing to start a new round of problems.

Like I said yesterday, Gant ain’t great. 

Gant is Good; Gant Ain’t Great

There were parties across the practical blawgosphere last night, following the Supreme Court’s shocking decision in Arizona v. Gant.  From Grits to Bennett, Spencer to Guest, Even Gideon and the  Pope. That our very own Supreme Court of the United States restored to the people a liberty that had been lost since 1981 is cause for celebration.  That my simpatico buddy, Antonin Scalia, wrote a separate concurrence to complain that the four justice majority led by Justice Stevens had not gone far enough in restoring rights to the people, was worth a party in itself.  I could hear Hosannas in the distance all night long.

When first I learned that cert was granted in Gant, it was not a happy moment.  Gant had already prevailed in the Arizona Supreme Court, and the implication was that there would be no need for the Supremes to use up space on their very busy (and very small) docket to hear a case where justice already prevailed, and with such a lousy set of facts.  As sometimes happens, my thoughts found their way into writing.

Arizona v. Gant is a great case to test the integrity of the Supreme Court.  There is no rational justification for permitting this search under any existing exception.  No threat.  No search incident to arrest.  No inventory search.  No risk to preservation of evidence.  Nothing.  If they uphold the search, then they will prove that they have abandoned the 4th Amendment as to cars entirely, removing all reason from the equation.  It will take some mighty efforts to explain away that one, but they are smart cookies.

The facts in Gant were ugly, with Gant taken from his own car, parked in his own driveway, arrested, cuffed and placed in the squad car.  The police then searched his parked car.  For many lawyers, and all cops, this might not seem surprising, given that the equation has long been “automobile + arrest = search.”  This equation is derived from the confluence of two exceptions to the 4th Amendment, the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest exception. 

The automobile exception is based on the notion that a car, being readily mobile, inherently presents “exigent circumstances” that preclude a police officer from obtaining a search warrant when there is probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime.  The search incident to arrest exception, crafted in  Chimel v. California and applied to car stops by New York v. Belton, allowed police to search the “grabbable area” around the suspect to make sure that there were no weapons that could be used to harm officers, and to preserve evidence that the suspect might otherwise destroy.  These, in conjunction with a few other exceptions, like inventory search coupled with inevitable discovery, sealed the deal.  There were just too many ways to approve a warrantless car search to make a judge take a challenge seriously.

Some of that changed yesterday, when the 4 plus 1 majority held that:


We hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. 

That’s the good stuff.  As Justice Stevens wrote, the court “tethered” the rationale for the search incident exception back to the facts that justified it in the first place.  Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argued that even this give-back, allowing any search incident for weapons, was too much since it was obvious that the better, more effective and easier cure was to do exactly what the cops did to Gant, cuff him and remove him from the scene.  Why sacrifice constitutional rights when the problem is better solved by better police practice?

But inexplicably, neither Justice Stevens nor my brilliant yet surly compadre, Justice Scalia, could bring themselves to make it right all the way to its logical conclusion.  The majority held:

We also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.

It appears that many of my brethren were so swept up in the moment that this sentence didn’t receive their full attention.  Nor did this sentence from Nino’s concurrence:

I would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto “reasonable” only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.

So many nuanced problems wrapped up in these sentences, sucking the air from the party balloons.  As the search incident to arrest exception, pertaining to the dual threats of harm and destruction of evidence, has now been “clarified” a mere 28 years later (and to all you folks who are still sitting in prison based upon a mistaken application of Belton for almost three decades, sorry), what conceivable reason can there be to obviate the exception for weapons yet retain the exception for an evidentiary search?  Once the suspect is secured, he is no more capable of destroying evidence than he is of grabbing a toothpick and jamming into the cop’s SolaPlexus.  The suspect is secured.  The vehicle is secured.  End of exigency. 

More confusing is Justice Stevens’ “reasonable to believe” language, since (as reflected in Scalia’s sentence) probable cause used to be the threshold for a search, even under the automobile exception.  Does this reflect a change in the requisite quantum of belief necessary to conduct an evidentiary search of a vehicle, even after the occupant has been seized, secured and stashed in the squad car?  I don’t think the language is intended to signal a change, but it’s wording like this that opens the door to further confusion and potential rulings permitting cops to search for evidence, if not weapons, at will.

Yet Justice Scalia, while remembering to use the magic phrase “probable cause,” ignored the tether altogether when it came to searching for evidence.  But he didn’t stop there, further ignoring the existence of a nexus between the reason for the stop and the basis for probable cause to search when he added the disjunctive.  This, of course, plays into the Whren pretext stop, which wholly untethers the exigency rationale applicable to automobiles from the police interest in a warrantless evidentiary search.  In other words, wait until the guy you’re after gets into a car and violates one of the zillion traffic regulations, then stop him on a pretext and search for evidence at will.

So is Gant a winner for the 4th Amendment?  You betcha.  But if we dig a little deeper, and remember way back when police weren’t given carte blanche to search automobiles whenever they wanted, it’s not nearly as much of a winner as intellectual integrity might require. 

Hope everybody enjoyed the party last night.  Sorry I went to bed early. 

Waiting For The Checks To Roll In

The Wall Street Journal wouldn’t lie, right? So when it announced that blogging is America’s newest profession, I polished my black shoes so I would look very professional when I went through my mail for the day, plucking out the fact juicy checks that a professional like me should be getting.  I am, if nothing else, a blogger.

The barriers to entry couldn’t be lower. Most bloggers for hire pay $80 to get started, do it for about 35 months, and make a few hundred dollars. But a subgroup of these bloggers are the true professionals who work at corporations, serve as highly paid blogging consultants or write for sites with substantial traffic.

Pros who work for companies are typically paid $45,000 to $90,000 a year for their blogging. One percent make over $200,000. And they report long hours — 50 to 60 hours a week.

As far as the $75,000, the Technorati report says that of those bloggers who had 100,000 or more unique visitors, the average income is $75,000. True, it’s not the median, but it is the average. We can quibble about how easy it is to make this kind of money — but the point is, the huge potential is there.

Now I’m not saying that $75k is something to sneeze at, but that’s not enough to get me a Porsche so I can drive around like a middle-aged proctologist.  So if I want to be a player, it looks like I need to be in that one percent who snag the big bucks. 

They work long hours?  Again, I’m not quite impressed.  Working 50 to 60 hours might seem like a great burden to some, but most lawyers consider that half time.  We work as long as we need to work, and then we work a little more to make sure our work is done right. 

So what is it that distinguishes this mega-bloggers from the lesser bloggers?  Advertising, according to the Journal.  That’s where the big bucks are, getting enough desirable readers and then getting you readers to do something, like click on an ad, would turn me from one of the unwashed mass of bloggers into a font of vast blogging wealth. 

Yet even the biggest boys in the blawgosphere are less than sanguine at the prospect of raking in the dough.  Orin Kerr at Volokh says:


The Volokh Conspiracy is a pretty popular blog, but we tend to earn less than minimum wage for our time blogging here.

If VC can’t keep Eugene in champagne, then what chance do I have?  Plus, with almost half a million claiming to earn their full time income from blogging, it seems like the profession is getting pretty crowded already.  I guess I’ll stick to lawyering.  My kids still like to eat, and I never really wanted to look like a middle-aged proctologist anyway.

Fair Use and Freeriding

And they say nothing good ever happens on Twitter.  Oops, I said that.  Well, never mind.  Something good did indeed happen on twitter yesterday, when the Texas Tornado, Mark Bennett, noticed that a lawyer from Puerto Rico had lifted a post from Brent Trout, lock, stock and barrel.  Of all people Brent does copyright and internet law at BlawgIT, so of all the guys around to steal a post from, Brent should not be your first choice.

A discussion ensued, with the lawyer about his lifting the post wholesale.  Now I suspect that it didn’t help that this was over-the-top self-promotional, billing itself as “Puerto Rico’s Premier Bilingual Law Blog” even though there’s no evidence that a contest was ever held.  Indeed, to call it a blog is an indulgence, but I hesitate to be judgmental as I have no idea how others in his neighborhood promote themselves.  Maybe it’s just self-preservation.  What do I know?

In any event, the lawyer posed first whether it was sufficient to mention the name, maybe throw in a link, in order to legitimize his theft of the post.  The response was “nope”, Brent’s post remained Brent’s post, and mere attribution (with or without link) didn’t absolve the lawyer from copyright infringement.  Rather than knock around the extent of fair use of content, paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, the lawyer (to his credit) removed the post altogether.  Maybe he’ll write something of his own for his blog?  It could happen.

All of this raises a point that needs making every once in a while.  The blawgosphere, even including those blogs whose sole purpose is marketing, thrives on the synergies created by cross-linking.  No, not the linking to build SEO page rank, but the linking of posts and ideas that creates conversation and discussion.  People want to read interesting, timely, substantive posts.  Nobody wants to read about what a really great lawyer/humanitarian you are.  Nobody.

But that doesn’t mean you can glom entire posts that someone else wrote and use them to create something of interest on your own blog.  Just as I can’t publish Moby Dick even if I put Herman Melville’s name on the cover, no other blogger can lift an entire post wholesale, regardless of attribution or link, without permission. 

Now I’m pretty liberal about fair use, taking paragraphs from others and including them in my posts, and having others take paragraphs from me.  In fact, as I wrote in the ignominiously titled, Steal This Post,


I write it and click on a button and it suddenly appears here, for all to see.  If I didn’t want you to see it, I wouldn’t do that.  It adds (in my wildest dreams) to the body of ideas in the world and some of these ideas will be worthy of repetition.  That’s why we have ideas.  If no one wants to use them, then they really aren’t worth very much.

The point of the post was to ridicule the efforts of those who don’t want anyone taking anything, and I mean anything, from their site upon pain of death.  I want people to take ideas from Simple Justice.  Discuss them all you want.

But there is a point where even the most liberal fair user draws a line, and that’s when the post is taken in its entirety to provide free content for someone else.  That’s not fair use, nor a contribution to the discussion, but freeriding. 

There isn’t a blawger worth a damn who hasn’t had a post lifted wholesale, myself included.  Anyone who creates original content will eventually find that someone (or something) has stolen it and published it for their own use.  Many time, it’s robotic, and neither attribution nor links are included.  You would be amazed how often this happens, and there really isn’t much to be done about it short of litigation since there’s no one to talk to at these commercial parking sites.

But when it happens that there’s a live person behind the blog, it’s different.  It seems that this is a problem not so much of intent to steal or violate copyright, but ignorance and selfishness.  The people who steal posts think that it’s okay to do so and part of the game.  They tend to be the same people who think blogging is just a big marketing scam anyway, so what’s the problem with glomming up some free content and beefing up their own blog at someone else’s expense?

I can’t define the parameters of fair use, and I doubt anyone else can give a definition either.  But I can state without hesitation that taking someone else’s blawg post, in its entirety, without permission, and publishing it on their own blog, isn’t fair use but freeriding.  It’s wrong.  It stealing.  It reflects poorly on the thief and deserves whatever bad press it gets. 

If you like someone else’s post, then take a couple of paragraphs and add something of value to it.  If you want to use the whole thing, then get permission first.  Most of us, by the way, will agree to allow it since we’re generally a genial bunch.  But don’t just steal the whole thing without asking.  It’s not okay, and it’s likely to get you noticed in the blawgosphere for being a thief, which isn’t going to do much to help your marketing message.

And if you are really ambitious, maybe you should consider creating your own substantive content.  It will save you a lot of headaches and maybe even attract some real attention to your blog.

The Debate About CCR Commentgate Continues (Lawprof Reaction Update)

Just when you thought it was safe to post a comment again, the debate over the closed comments at the CCR Symposium reignited.  Paul Horwitz revisited his Uneasy Feeling post over at PrawfsBlawg in order to address some of the backflap received on his original post.

Though couched in benign terms, and with the requisite caveat that he’s not saying it applies to this situation, Horwitz states:


At times, legal bloggers will suggest, gently or otherwise, in “confidential” back channel communications that one ought not criticize one’s fellow law-bloggers in public.  The reasons for this range from professional courtesy, to politeness, to the occasional veiled threat of professional consequences.  These arguments strike me as unpersuasive, and in some cases counter-productive; I assume that any half-way virtuous scholar, if she is told not to write about something, will put that topic at the top of her agenda.

Though he refers to “legal bloggers,” he means law professor bloggers.  These are the double-secret rules that frame the way that some lawprofs expect of their own, and on their blogs.  Horwitz was attempting to make clear that he’s not telling others what to do (as he was accused of doing by those who asserted the right to chose to close comments), but that he’s entitled to express his view on his blog about the impact of another blog’s choice.  His view was the closing comments produced a weaker format and allowed argument by fiat that defied peer scrutiny.  That was his view, and he’s sticking to it.

And just as Horwitz felt the need to address the reactions to his uneasy feeling, so too did Dan Solove, one of the proprietors of Concurring Opinions.  In a comment to Horwitz’s post (note irony), Solove let loose:


Regarding your comments about law professor bloggers not wanting criticizing other law professor bloggers, I have no problem with strong disagreement. I welcome vigorous disagreement, and I think many do as well. What I find particularly unproductive are commenters who make rude and insulting remarks, who believe that everybody who disagrees with them is stupid or fascist or malevolent.

And it gets stronger:


This whole discussion makes me feel like an old curmudgeon defending manners. I cling to a perhaps outmoded belief in thoughtful reasoned discourse, with people disagreeing yet treating each other with respect. How old fashioned of me! Maybe I should join the club — “Paul, you’re an idiot! Your views are moronic! Despite the fact you allow me to comment here, your entire blog is anti-free speech and you and all your co-bloggers are just dumb. [Insert crass generalization about law professors here.] Don’t you dare delete or ignore me, or else you are close-minded and not willing to engage with those who disagree with you. So there, you buffoon!”

Both barrels ablazing, Dan made his point.  First, let me note that the curmudgeon reference is assumed to be Dan’s application for admission into the club.  It’s taken under advisement, though this is a particularly good showing. 

More to the point, however, is that Solove found the tone and manner of discussion unacceptable.  But what I saw, as opposed to what Dan saw, was entirely different.  I assume, for the sake of discussion here, that the unspoken distinction is in the way in which lawprofs express their views as opposed to the way non-lawprofs handle things.  For purposes of this discussion, I’m going to adopt Randazza as a non-lawprof, since he has issues with playing the lawprof game.

This has been a huge problem for me, personally, since I began blawging.  I find many things posted at the lawprofs’ blogs interesting, and some downright fascinating.  They taught me much and made me think.  These are some very smart and interesting people, and their posts have added enormously to my understanding of the law.

The problem is that I don’t express myself the way they do.  I can’t even conceive of doing so.  It’s just not in me.  I’m using myself as the example not because I’m necessarily the norm, but to avoid impugning anyone else in the process.

I don’t mean to be rude or offensive.  Perhaps it’s because, as a trial lawyer, I express myself in a clear, strong manner.  Perhaps it’s because I personally enjoy humor and think that a bit of snarkiness is funny, but I can occasionally be sarcastic.  I don’t use academic jargon because (1) I don’t know it, (2) others who read what I write won’t have a clue what I’m talking about, and (3) I find it obfuscates the point more than clarifies it. 

I admit that I indulge in “crass generalizations” about law professors.  With regularity.  But then, they are so often proven true that it’s hard to avoid.  Let’s be honest about this, there are some things that are pervasive amongst the lawprof bloggers (note that it doesn’t mean that the shoe fits every lawprof, or that it’s even a smear), and by chiding lawprofs I hope to make a point.  Some of the bigger issues:



  • Use of jargon when your ideas can be expressed in clear language
  • Constant equivocation, as if disagreement is an inherent evil, and the requisite exculpatory clause
  • The need to preface even the mildest disagreement with a compliment, no matter how insincere, thereby confusing rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the point
  • Over sensitivity to any challenge

What’s ironic is that Dan Solove’s comment to Paul Horwitz’s post is harsh, yet entirely comprehensible.  Finally, we’ve got a clear idea of what the problem is.  We’re Philistines.  And we are, indeed, Philistines in the secular world of law professors. Oops, there I go again, making a crass generalization.  I just can’t stop myself.

But I also think that I’ve come to appreciate something about Dan’s perspective.  Within the Academy, there is (was?) a level of gentility and courtesy that framed discussion, including dispute, that would be lost if they modified communication to adopt the ways of us barbarians.  I can admire this, to some extent.  It’s expressive entropy, and Dan and others are fighting it.  They do not want their level of discussion to devolve to ours.  As a curmudgeon myself, I can well understand this.  Some of my complaints are likely designed as a barrier to entry to those they want to keep out, and they do their job well.

I realize now that the problem may well be mine, not the lawprofs.  I want to join in their conversation when I think it interesting, and they don’t want me there.  Perhaps it’s because my ideas are unworthy, or lack sufficient depth, or just aren’t that helpful to them.  Perhaps it’s just because I can’t express myself (or control myself) sufficiently to meet their sensibilities.  Or maybe they are angry with me because my snarky comments are offensive, and they just can’t take a joke?  Granted, I’ve been particularly harsh with some lawprofs, but then I believe that they deserve it.  In spades.  Being a lawprof doesn’t immunize someone who’s a total jerk.  Or maybe the law professors just don’t care whether trench lawyers participate, read or engage with them, and they are happier without us?

For as long as I’ve been blawging, I’ve enjoyed and appreciated the content of numerous lawprof blawgs.  This should be pretty clear from my posts linking to them, some of which are critical but most of which reflect my admiration of their efforts.  While some walls have been broken over this time, lawprofs and lawyers still live in two separate walled villages, and rarely find common ground.

I believe that trench lawyers, vulgar though we are, have tried to embrace and engage with the law professors.  I believe that most law professors refuse to slum with the trench lawyers.  I believe that this has made both of us poorer.

I think Dan’s description of how we behave is a bit exaggerated, and although we tend to use words that most law professors would never type out, they are not pure invective and reflect ideas that are worthy of consideration no matter how ugly they are phrased.  But I do realize that our “forthright” language can go over the top, even if we think it accurate. 

Can we find no common ground? 

Update:  Aside from Randazza, the silence is deafening. I know from my stats that at least some folks from the referenced law professor blawgs have stopped by to read this post, but nary a word from them.  Is that the answer to my question?

Lest anyone suggest it, obviously no one is required to respond, and I have no plans for injunctive relief.  But it was a serious question and I had hoped for a serious response.  This is about that dialogue thing that we’re always talking about, with me hoping that we can clear up the hard feelings between branches of the blawgosphere to engender greater communication for everyone.

I suspect that someone might have responded, but for Randazza’s comments that still have his “bite”, and the fear that any response would devolve to Dan Solove’s worst nightmare.  No one wants to be subject to attack, or walk into an ambush.  But then, any fear of what could happen in my comments could be averted by a post on your own blawg (with comments open or closed as you think best) where there is a measure of protection in a more secure environment.  This can still be done.  I hope it’s considered.