Author Archives: SHG

Too Big to Fail, Too Small to Succeed (Update)

It’s difficult to find the words to express, or perhaps explain, why our government’s efforts, our candidates’ promises, seem as if they must somehow be in our best interest, yet don’t make us feel much better about our prospects.  Anne Michaud at Viewsday has put together some of these nagging doubts in a way that seems to capture the problem.



One of the most insightful comments on where our country is headed came from a recent “Doonesbury” cartoon. In response to the U.S. Treasury bailout of banks, one character noted that America is privatizing wealth and nationalizing risk. In other words, people at the top are extracting riches from the financial system, while the taxpayers hold a safety net under those same institutions when they fail. They’re “too big to fail,” right?


These days, we middle-class householders seem too little to succeed. The trend has all been toward handing us more risk for our own financial futures — and that became all too clear last week as the Dow plummeted.

Truth be told, most of us kibbutz kibitz about the economy but have no real understanding of what to do about it, or more importantly, how to protect ourselves.  We rely on the “experts”.  The problem is, it’s the “experts” that got us into this mess.  This leaves us no savior.

As we side up to candidates, we do so based more on rhetoric, how much they love us and how deeply they care about us, rather than which one has a plan to save us.  As more of our money is “infused” into Wall Street, we rationalize why this is going to be good for us, because we can’t really figure out how exactly throwing more of our money at the people who lost it in the first place is going to help. 

The fact is that we can’t change how the Treasury Secretary is going to act.  He hasn’t asked me my opinion, and I’m betting you haven’t gotten a call from him either.  Not that I have anything substantive to suggest.  My Wall Street friends talk in Wall Street jargon about what went wrong and how it should be fixed, but they really have no ideas other than how to keep their jobs intact and what would make traders happy over the next five minutes.  After that, it’s a crap shoot.

The government has one asset that we lack.  They have us, the bottomless pit of resources from which to extract taxes to pay for their schemes.  If one doesn’t work, like the $700 billion bailout, then they can just try another, like the $250 billion infusion. 

We bear the risk of our government’s financial blunders.  We bear the weight of cleaning up Wall Street’s blunders.  And as Anne Michaud reminds us, we’re too small to succeed.  But we’re just the right size to hold the safety net under Wall Street and banks, and as everyone keeps telling us, we have to do this because they’re too big to fail.

Who’s got the answer to all this?  Beats me.  The financial wizards certainly don’t.  The economists, even the Nobel Prize winning economists, don’t.  The talking heads on television obviously don’t.  The government doesn’t, nor do the candidates for President.  But one thing is for sure.  No matter what happens over the course of this “crisis”, you and I will pay for it. 

My expectation is that we will do no better with these many schemes than we would do with no schemes at all.  The markets eventually right themselves because they have no option to do otherwise.  And we will feel the pain either way.  McCain and Obama may love us dearly, but we’re still just 300 million pockets to our government.

Update:  On CNBC, all kinds of potential deals in the works, but nobody to finance them.  The whisper is, let’s ask the treasury to finance it, meaning that the treasury gets a piece of each deal.  When the dust settles, it turns out that the United States of America owns a share of all these major businesses.  Share in the equity, America!

Let’s see, government owns major businesses.  Why does that sound familiar?  Oh yeah!  Now wouldn’t it be ironic if the last gasp of the Bush administration turns this country communist?  From each according to his abilities. To each according to his needs.  Well that will never work.

Chief Justice Roberts Fiddles, Troy Davis To Die (Update)

The last execution date, September 23, ended with a stay pending determination of his application for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  That came after a public outcry over the fact that most of the material witnesses against Troy Anthony Davis have since recanted their testimony. 

That wasn’t enough for the State of Georgia.  It’s not enough for the Supremes either.  According to the AP, the Supreme Court denied cert to Troy Davis, removing the final roadblock to his execution.  Apparently, the whole recanting witness thing was not sufficiently troubling to stand in the way of a prompt execution.

But that wasn’t the big news at the Supreme Court, yesterday.  In fact, it barely made it onto the back page.  Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand, made a huge splash with his judicial noir dissent to the court’s refusal to grant cert to another case, Pennsylvania v. Dunlap.  It’s huge news when a Supreme writes something prosaic. 

North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike Force, was working the morning shift. Under­ cover surveillance. The neighborhood? Tough as a three­ dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five years on the beat, nine months with the Strike Force. He’d made fifteen, twenty drug busts in the neighborhood. Devlin spotted him: a lone man on the corner. Another approached. Quick exchange of words. Cash handed over; small objects handed back. Each man then quickly on his own way. Devlin knew the guy wasn’t buying bus tokens. He radioed a description and Officer Stein picked up the buyer. Sure enough: three bags of crack in the guy’s pocket. Head downtown and book him. Just another day at the office.
What feel.  What passion.  What a dark yet vibrant description of a cop’s life on the mean streets of South Philly.  The CJ will never again be viewed as a guy with a cheap haircut, but as a man who spent far too much of his youth watching reruns of Dragnet.

I almost forgot.  So what was CJ Roberts’ legal point?  This:

That was not good enough for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held in a divided decision that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. The Court concluded that a “single, isolated transaction” in a high-crime area was insufficient to justify the arrest, given that the officer did not actually see the drugs, there was no tip from an informant, and the defendant did not at­ tempt to flee. 941 A. 2d 671, 679 (2007). I disagree with that conclusion, and dissent from the denial of certiorari.

Stepping back from his enthralling prose, the sense of a problem courses through my veins.  There’s something wrong here.  Something hidden within the finely turned phrases, like “tough as a three dollar steak.”  What could it be.  What could it be.

Could it be that his judge noir dissent dismisses the efforts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as some sort of idiocy, a joke that any child could understand to be obviously wrong.  No, that’s not it.  Sure, the dissent was dismissive and reduced the efforts of the state Supreme Court to ridicule.  But that’s nothing new.

Could it be that he cavalierly bought into the “high-crime area” scenario, the one that justifies anything by any cop in any city once one adopts simplistic descriptions in lieu of facts, those troubling things that stand in the way of letting good cops do their job.  No, that’s not it.  The use of “high-crime area” has become so ubiquitous as to become part of the legal vernacular, at least to any respectable lawyer whose career was mostly spent on the public teet.

Could it be that he has openly promoted an arrest based on nothing more than a “hunch” by a cop, proclaiming Devlin, with his overwhelming 5 years on the job, “knew” what was going on, despite the absence of actually seeing any drugs, or even a pattern of people engaged in a transaction with his “lone man on a street corner.”  No, that’s not it.  Obviously our Chief Justice falls into the category of judges who believes that police officers possess mystical powers that allow them to smell a crime a mile away, and don’t need no stinking observation of drugs to know exactly what some mutt is up to.

No, these things aren’t raising the hairs on my arm.  My problem is that Chief Justice John Roberts chose to put in the time to write this very interesting, very curious, very gimmicky passage in a case where he wanted so badly to have the chance to reverse the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding that an arrest based on nothing more than a hunch violated the Constitution, while the Supreme Court of the United States of America decided that it wasn’t worth their time to hear the appeal of Troy Anthony Davis, a man who may not be guilty of the murder of an off-duty police officer, thereby condemning him to death.

Roberts’ fascinating dissent bought him attention from CNN, two posts by Orin and one by Eugene at VC.  At least Steve Vladeck at PrawfsBlawg took issue with the substance of Roberts’ dissent, while others were blinded by the CJ’s writing skills or endorsed the “hunch” theory of policing.  The only saving grace is the Roberts was in the dissent, along with Anthony Kennedy, so that the correct decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will stand.

If only the life a person receive this much attention. 

Update:  Paul Horwitz at PrawfsBlawg offers a particularly good description of CJ Roberts’ views (after he soundly criticizes his future potential as a mystery [or legal] writer):


. . . Roberts ultimately mentions only paragraphs later: that probable cause requires naivete from neither police officers nor judges, that it was most reasonable in the circumstances to conclude that this was a drug buy rather than some other transaction, and that the costs in resources and risk of life entailed in requiring closer observation outweigh the interest in greater certainty.

Nicely put, wasn’t that?  That’s another way to say that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court need not concern himself with such naive things as facts or evidence, because he “knows” what’s up.  Why not just proclaim, “we know who the bad guys are, and if they didn’t do this crime, they would do some other crime.  No harm, no foul.”  Now there’s a money-saving philosophy. 

How exactly did the Senate miss this during his confirmation hearings?

What’s Wrong with Propensity Evidence Anyway?

Following the discussion of Molineux, the use of prior bad act evidence against a defendant at trial, Gideon at A Public Defender posted an exceptional discussion of the Connecticut Supreme Court decision in State v. DeJesus :


we further conclude that evidence of uncharged misconduct admitted under the liberal standard of admissibility ordinarily does not reflect the existence of a genuine plan in the defendant’s mind. Nonetheless, because strong public policy reasons continue to exist to admit evidence of uncharged misconduct in sexual assault cases more liberally than in other cases, we will maintain the liberal standard, but do so as a limited exception to the prohibition on the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence in sexual assault cases to prove that the defendant had a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive criminal sexual behavior.

So what’s the problem with propensity evidence?  For those who may be unfamiliar, propensity evidence is evidence that a person engaged in prior bad behavior and is therefore more likely to engage in bad behavior again.

Propensity evidence comes in two flavors.  Uncharged prior bad acts and prior convictions.  Each presents different problems because it comes into play under different circumstances.  Uncharged prior bad acts can be used affirmatively against a defendant.  Prior convictions, on the other hand, are generally used against a defendant if he testifies, though it is theoretically limited to crimes that reflect upon credibility rather than crimes that suggest that the defendant is a criminal and acted in conformity with his prior criminal  behavior.

The irony of this dichotomy is that uncharged prior bad acts are unproven by definition.  The court is supposed to act as gatekeeper, only admitting those prior bad acts that are shown by “clear and convincing evidence” to have occurred and were performed by the defendant.  This sometimes creates a “trial within a trial,” which puts a defendant in the position of not merely defending against the charged offense, but disproving the uncharged offense as well.

While there are many tactical issues surrounding the fight against prior bad act evidence, one thing is certain.  It is neither proven beyond a reasonable doubt, nor subject to the rigors of due process.  It’s an ugly aside, tossed against a wall to see if it sticks.

In contrast, a conviction is, by definition, proven, even if claimed to be the product of the coercive nature of the system compelling an innocent person to accept guilt rather than fight.  A conviction is a done deal.

But whether the prior bad act is uncharged or a conviction, it has the prejudicial impact of showing that the defendant is a bad person.  It is compelling evidence.  It removes any concern from a juror’s mind that the defendant may be what most people consider an “innocent” person, which is limited to a person who has never committed any “real” wrongdoing.  Once a defendant is a wrongdoer, the step toward conviction is a baby step rather than a giant leap, if for no better reason than he deserves to be punished anyway. 

This is how most of us live our lives and make decisions, including the most important decisions, as jurors are instructed by the court when charged with deciding the burden of proof.  We assume.  We lack both the time and ability to know everything for sure, and we jump to probable conclusions.  We do so without real fear of error, and without any meaningful concern that we are wrong.  Probability rules our decision making process of necessity, and we are quite used to it and comfortable with it.

When a jury is told that the person before them has previously engaged in criminal conduct, it removes a major hurdle from their deliberative process.  They no longer have a reason to doubt that a person is willing to take that step from ordinary person to criminal.  They know that he has already done so. 

Over the years, the expression of this willingness has been refined to frame it in the fashion most damning to the defendant.  While evidence that a defendant had once sold drugs may not be terribly persuasive in a trial for bank robbery, the same evidence framed to show that a defendant is inclined to put his personal financial advantage over the interests of society brings both crimes into alignment.  One suddenly becomes more relevant to the other, and clarifies for the jury why the commission of one suggests the commission of the other.

In short, propensity is incredibly strong evidence of guilt, because we are inclined to adopt simplistic bases for deciding what we believe about others.

So what’s wrong with this?  The fact that a defendant committed 10 prior murders does not mean that he committed this murder.  The duty of the prosecution is not to show that the defendant is a person inclined to murder, but to prove that he committed this specific murder.  This is a variation of Captain Renault’s command to “round up the usual suspects.”  Once it becomes too easy to assume guilt by prior conduct, it eliminates the expectation that any particular crime be proven.  The “usual suspects” become guilty for no better reason than they are the usual suspects.

This helps neither the individual defendant nor society.  Society is not protected when the wrong person is convicted, and obviously the defendant who is innocent of this specific crime isn’t too thrilled about it either.  While it makes for a quick and dirty shortcut to conviction, and one that satisfies the conscience of many a juror, it fails to fulfill the purpose of making certain that the right person is convicted of the specific crime.

For those who believe that the system of convicting people is too burdensome, and are comfortable with the notion that anyone arrested is likely guilty, and are prepared to suffer the potential that some innocent citizens need to “take one for the team” in order to move things along promptly, propensity evidence is the perfect weapon.

For those who believe that it’s important that we not convict the innocent, but demand that only those guilty of the particular crime charged, propensity is a nightmare. 

Of course, my experience is that most people are happy enough to sacrifice a few innocent defendants in order to achieve safety and security from crime, and speed along the process of putting the bad guys in prison.  But then, when asked whether they are willing to be the sacrificial lamb of the legal system’s imperfections, they drop their eyes, shuffle their feet, and pretend they don’t hear.  People are so predictable.

No Joy for the Legal Satyr

Marc Randazza at the Legal Satyricon has posted a decidedly un-Satyr-like video of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, D-RI, former United States Attorney, former Rhode Island Attorney General, on the subject of the “Protect America Act.” 

As has become fashionable in Washington, naming laws in such a way as to suggest that disagreement is unAmerican, and that disagreement reflects a lack of will to protect Americans in the ongoing war against whatever we are at war with today.  This is one such law.



This isn’t a new video, though it’s new to me.  But it’s an awfully good reminder that with all the vague and fuzzy discussion of freedom that has filtered through the media lately, we still have some legal issues to address and, hopefully, correct.  Lots of them.

Terms of Endearment

My spry friend, David Giacalone at f/k/a, raised the issue of younger people calling elder people “dearie” and “sweetie,” condescending references to those who had either grown too old to be worth the bother or to diminish their dignity and dehumanize them.  But this isn’t a problem only with the elderly. 

Name-calling has become epidemic lately, and much has been written about who’s at fault.  The lawprofs at Volokh call it [Insert Name] Derangement Syndrome, where ideological passion manifests as increasingly outrageous name calling.  Even cuter is Orin’s reference as Newton’s Law of Political Derangement: For every overreaction, there is an equal and opposite overreaction.

From my position, this seems to be a natural outgrowth of the rejection of the rules of basic normative decency that guided us for centuries.  In the 1960s, we viewed the formalities of titles and protocol as a yoke of oppression to be thrown off to free ourselves of domination by our elders.  And it was, but that doesn’t mean that we didn’t need some basic societal norms to limit our wildness and provide a format to address the world around us.  This was a problem with many of the best ideas of the era.  We identified a problem and arrived at an answer that didn’t quite work.

Putting aside the divisive question of which political candidate’s supporters calls the other worse names, which is a pointless effort since each side knew with absolute certainty that it is right and the other wrong and there’s no benefit to discussing it since neither will yield, consider this in our everyday lives.

When was the last time a person you don’t know, with whom you’ve never spoken in your life, with whom you have neither need nor desire to converse, pushed their way into your personal sphere and immediately addressed you by your first name?  No mister or missus, but John or Mary.  Who invited them to use such an informal manner of address?

This is commonplace with telephone solicitors, store clerks, even other people’s children.  Rarely does anyone respect formal modes of address, as if the choice of address is entirely up to them.  In some respects, this is an egalitarian effort, removing the walls of formality because we are all equal, all the same, and no one is entitled to be treated more deferentially than anyone else.

This, of course, is nonsense.  The same formalities would apply in either direction, as the sale clerk would be addressed as Mr. Jones as well. 

Formalities are also used as a mechanism of control by some, to assert their superior position while diminishing others.   The most obvious example are teachers, who routinely introduce themselves as “Mr. Smith,” yet address parents by their first name, to command respect and assert their relative position. 

Once the basic formalities are lost, we similarly lose general respect for others.  We no longer think in terms of protocol, but rather in terms of familiarity, and the contempt that goes with it.  There was a time when we would never discuss a governor of a state by freely using her first name, if for no other reason than the fact that she was a governor, a high executive office which was worthy of respect regardless of whether we felt that she was a particularly good governor or a mediocre one.  This is no longer the case.

Marc Randazza posts a video today, in a post that is intended to remind us that those of us writing or reading blawgs (or reading much of anything actually) don’t represent the whole of America.  Not that Marc is one to feel particularly bound by protocol, but the content of the video should bring despair to anyone with a high school diploma. 

Americans need boundaries to remind them that the execution of social norms keep our lesser instincts in check, and force us to maintain a certain level of human decency despite our inclination to show none.  Whether it’s calling an elderly person “dearie” even though they have spent a lifetime earning the right to be addressed by their name, or a person running for high political office with whom you might disagree, or even a person answering the telephone from a unwanted solicitor, the protocol of using a title unless and until being invited to address them informally would force a return to some degree of respect and dignity.

Until we are entitled to employ a term of endearment, let’s return to the use of a title of respect.  Perhaps then we will stem the tide of derangement at the bottom of the slope of familiarity.  At the very least, it will make for a more restrained conversation.  We could use some of that right now.

No Way For a Lawyer to Steal

Some stories about attorney misconduct just beg the question, how could this guy be such a yutz and make it past the bar exam?  From the Hartford Courant via the ABA Journal, this is one such story.


The case against [Robert Karanian, 56] grew out of a claim by Daniel Chiulli, a client, that the attorney had told him he would get a suspended sentence in a drug case pending in Superior Court in New Britain if he gave $12,000 to a charity. Chiulli, now 41, gave the money to Karanian, but there was no mention of it at Chiulli’s sentencing and no record of it in the court file.

According to the arrest affidavit for Karanian, the attorney did not give the money to charity but deposited some of it in his personal checking account and a portion into an account of his law firm. In addition to the $12,000, Chiulli paid Karanian $7,500 to represent him in the case.

So let me see if I can piece this together.  The client has an extra $12,000.  The lawyer wanted an extra $12,000.  So the lawyer told the client that if he gave it to charity, he would get him a suspected suspended (h/t to J-dog for pointing out that my slip was showing) sentence, but kept the money instead.

Now a lawyer cannot guarantee an outcome or take a contingent fee in a criminal case.  But where does this whole charity thing come in?  Why employ this involved subterfuge when this is all about glomming an extra $12k from a drug dealer?

I have to assume that Karanian already had a promise of a suspended sentence before he hatched this scheme, since doing all this and then not producing the guaranteed sentence would have been a certain problem.  But if your purpose is to try to get some extra cash out of a client, even if its almost double the amount you charged the client for representation in the first place, why go through this elaborate charity hoax?

The client obviously wanted the suspended sentence very badly, $12k badly.  So did Karanian figure that he would cough up the cash if it was for a suspended sentence but go to charity, versus the suspended sentence and go in Karanian’s pocket?  Was he a particularly charitable drug dealer, willing to break the law provided there was some charitable benefit to it?

Since the $12k was supposed to go to charity, it obviously wasn’t the old “buy the judge or prosecutor” scam that some scoundrel lawyers use to shift wealth away from clients.  So the client’s complaint was not that he was scammed out of $12k, but that his cash didn’t go to the charity as Karanian said it would, but to Karanian himself.

Isn’t it bad enough that everything about what transpired between Karanian and Chiulli stinks.  Does it have to be pathologically stupid as well.  For God’s sake, man, if you are going to engage in flagrantly unethical behavior, at least avoid being a moron while doing so.

Mind you, the jury at Karanian’s trial acquitted him of the theft of the $12,000, but convicted for bribing and tampering with the witness against him, Chiulli, who had recorded the conversations.  The jury returned a note saying that they found Chiulli’s uncorroborated testimony not credible.  I find the whole thing incredible.

Molineux Redux: Common Scheme or Plan

South Carolina criminal defense lawyer Bobby Frederick has posted about the South Carolina Supreme Court’s consideration of State v. Wallace, addressing the use of prior bad act evidence in a case involving the sexual molestation of a child.  The prosecution introduced at trial evidence that the defendant had previously molested another child as an uncharged prior bad act, under South Carolina Rule of Evidence 404b, which is an offshoot of the 1901 New York decision in People v. Molineux, possibly one of the worst understood and most abused decisions ever.

This quote from the Molineux decision has wound its way across a multitude of jurisdictions:


Generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.

Taken alone, it has caused enormous problems.  The holding of Molineux was not the establishment of exceptions to permit certain types of evidence that, as it also happens, shows the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.  The subsequent explanation in Molineux makes clear that the circumstances where these exceptions would apply are meant to be highly circumscribed, and even then subject to final balancing test of probative value against prejudice.  Molineux was a preclusive decision, meant to weed out all but the most limited use of prior bad act evidence.  Instead, it’s become the roadmap for admitting propensity evidence under another name.

After argument by appellate attorney C. Rauch Wise, the intermediate appellate court reversed, and held that it was insufficient that the two offenses by merely similar, but that they must be “legally connected” before the prior bad act would be admissible under the “common scheme or plan” prong of Molineux.

In the interim, the South Carolina decided another “common scheme or plan” case, State v. Gaines, where it held:


Where there is a close degree of similarity between the crime charged and the prior bad act, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have held prior bad acts are admissible to demonstrate a common scheme or plan.

As Bobby points out, this doesn’t bode well for the review of Wallace.  So what’s missing here?

The Molineux decision, which includes in its laundry list of potential exceptions, common scheme or plan goes on to explain, in detail, what it meant and why it’s there.  One would think that nobody has read the full decision since 1901 based upon how this prong has been utilized since.  And, as is so often the case, the phrase has taken on a meaning of its own that has completely divorced it from its original purpose.

The inclusion of “common scheme or plan” in Molineux was directed toward one extremely specific, extremely rare, circumstance:  where the intended crime involved multiple acts committed in seriatim to accomplish an ultimate goal. 


To bring a case within this exception to the general rule which excludes proof of extraneous crimes, there must be evidence of system between the offense on trial and the one sought to be introduced. They must be connected as parts of a general and composite plan or scheme, or they must be so related to each other as to show a common motive or intent running through both. Underhill in his work on Criminal Evidence (Sec. 88) thus states this exception to the general rule: “No separate and isolated crime can be given in evidence. In order that one crime may be relevant as evidence of another, the two must be connected as parts of a general and composite scheme or plan.

In short, they didn’t use the words “common scheme or plan” for no particular reason.  It says exactly what was meant.  And since then, it has been used to mean something entirely different.

The abuse of the common scheme or plan prong has caused it to be turned into a secondary means of negating a defense issue of intent or identity, the other exceptions of motive and lack of accident or mistake being just variations on the intent theme, more attuned to legal doctrine as it existed in 1901 than today.  The concept that common scheme means a subpart of a whole crime has long since been lost, and there are literally thousands of decisions across the country that hold common scheme and plan to mean some greater or lesser degree of similarity of crimes, with some greater or lesser degree of connection between them. 

The Wallace reversal followed another South Carolina decision from 1923, People v. Lyle.


Under Lyle, a common scheme or plan is one “embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish proof of the other.”

While this is obviously an offshoot of Molineux, it falls under the old adage of “remembering the rubric while forgetting the rationale.”  Taken without Molineux‘s underlying rationale for including common scheme or plan in the list of exceptions, it leaves the amorphous test of “so related” as the basis for admissibility, whatever that means.  From here, it’s a mere hop, skip and jump to mere similarity of crimes, which harkens back to the intent and identity elements exceptions.

Clearly, Molineux never meant to suggest that crimes that were “so related,” regardless of what that relationship might be, fell within the “common scheme or plan” exception.  More to the point, whether one uses the phraseology of “so related” or “legally related,” it has no clear meaning and is open to interpretation that bears no connection to its original purpose for inclusion.

When it comes to the future of “common scheme or plan” of Wallace before the South Carolina Supreme Court, there are two potential paths.  The first is to pursue the original doctrinal purpose of this exception from its root in Molineux, showing how it’s been lost over the years to misinterpretation and misapplication.  This approach, while intellectually pure, has a few problems.  First, the rule applied in South Carolina is statutory, and thus breaks from direct reliance on Molineux and can be interpreted without regard to the original Molineux purpose. 

Second, because there are literally thousand of decisions eschewing Molineux’s original rationale in favor of this amorphous connection theory, this becomes a situation of one against the mob.  Why should a single ancient decision be right and thousands of decisions thereafter be wrong?

Bobby argues in the comments,


To be admissible as a common scheme or plan, there should be a connection between the two acts (Molineux), that would make them a continuous transaction (Lyle in S.C.).

While I wouldn’t describe them as merely a “connection” that would make them “a continuous transaction,” and I do not read Lyle to have the conceptual clarity that was needed because of its use of such vague language, his basic thrust is right on target.  But will the South Carolina Supreme Court be willing to make such a marked shift in its decision to return to the real purpose of the “common scheme or plan” exception after all the water under the bridge, and with such a weak precedent as Lyle to rely on?

Or, should Rauch Wise pursue a course of using the current state of the law, as enunciated in Gaines, to link common scheme or plan as the mechanism to negate the issue of lack of intent, and argue that introducing a similar uncharged prior bad act is merely a backdoor for propensity unless there is something so unique about it that it shows that it’s “so connected,” as the phrase has been misused, to make it relevant to the instant charge?

In a pure doctrinal argument, I would vote with Bobby, as I find it terribly disturbing when courts forget why exceptions were born and use them mindlessly because of historic misapplication of precedent.  However, the less intellectually honest approach is probably more pragmatic, and has a greater chance of success because it doesn’t require the South Carolina Supreme Court to reverse itself as well as all those cases that misused the exception over the years.

It’s a tough call, but this is a very important issue.  Prior bad act evidence is a killer at trial, and no matter what argument is used, its real purpose is invariably to show the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime, the very purpose that is never permitted. It is such potent evidence of guilty to a jury, even though it is so fundamentally wrong.  Funny how that happens.

Change to F.R.E. 502 Protects Against Inadvertant Waiver of Privilege

From Crime & Consequences, a change has been made to Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to protect against the inadvertent waiver of privilege.  In essence, before any waiver can be found, the court must hold that the waiver was intentional and not a mistake.  While we were all watching our portfolios dwindle, the government was actually doing some work, and on September 19, 2008, the President signed this change into law, effective immediately.

The full text of the new rule can be found here, and the important parts state:

(A) DISCLOSURE MADE IN A FEDERAL PROCEEDING OR TO A FEDERAL OFFICE OR AGENCY; SCOPE OF A WAIVER.—When the disclosure is made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a Federal or State proceeding only if:

(1) the waiver is intentional;
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and
(3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.

(b) INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE.—When made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if:

(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(.

Also included is that the rule change prevents the Elkins “silver platter” scam, moving the case from federal to state court to get the benefit of waiver, by extending the reach of new Rule 502 to prevent waiver if the case is moved in either direction.

According to the Senate Judiciary Committee report, the genesis of this change is the problems encountered in massive electronic data discovery, where in the course of providing thousands of pages of disclosure, a page of privileged communication finds its way in.  Previously, this might constitute a wholesale waiver of privilege though it was clearly a mistake.  The old answer was, “hey, then don’t make mistakes,” but that didn’t help much since stercus accidit.

In criminal proceedings, only good can come from this rule change.  While in most street-type crimes, like drug conspiracies, there is no discovery provided by the defense, that’s not always the case in white-collar prosecutions where there is a far greater possibility that the defense will seek to introduce documents or offer witnesses at trial and that some disclosure will be required.  For those who don’t often provide disclosure, and even for those who do, this will provide a measure of protection if a mistake happens.

The key that must be borne in mind is that it remains incumbent upon the defense to take “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure,” and, more importantly, take “reasonable steps to rectify the error.”  In other words, should it happen and you become aware of it, you must immediately note that it’s privileged and demand the return of the inadvertently disclosed privileged communication.  Let it sit and you can be up the creek.

But For Video, Volume 32

Jonathon Turley posted about a video of a car being stolen behind a police officer as he was giving an interview to CNN, answering the age-old question, “where is a police officer when you need one.”

I love watching these videos, and I find that the “related videos” on Youtube provides a wealth of stuff that I might otherwise never know about. So from Turley’s video, I came across some others that are great fun and want to share them with anyone who enjoys a funny video as well.

This one is just great.  Not that I would recommend anyone try it, but you’ve got to admit that it’s the sort of thing you secretly wish you were capable of doing.



Now I can be critical of police on rare ocassion, but there is nothing I have every written, nor could write, to compare with what happened in this video.



There are plenty of other related videos, so check out the Youtube offerings and enjoy your Sunday.

Note to Jailhouse Lawyers: Don’t Expect Me to Lie

A package arrived from the appellate court the other day containing a former appellate client’s latest set of papers.  Having represented this client on appeal, and having prevailed on a substantial sentence reduction, though not on having his conviction reversed, my client was dissatisfied.  He wanted more, and I don’t blame him.  Even though my work was done, the client had enough time on his hands to give it a go.

There is nothing unusual about a client persisting, after the appeals process has wound to a close, in trying to obtain more relief.  Courts generally hate it, as their efforts clog the system and their work product is generally painfully bad, difficult to read and comprehend and replete with strange allegations that demonstrate why they are in prison.  Still, some have real grievances, and they are every bit as entitled to a fair hearing on their claims as they would be if represented by a lawyer.  It’s not about the lawyer, but about the client.

The papers that arrived on my desk claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  That would be me.  They alleged that I had failed to raise a half dozen arguments that the defendant now sought to raise, and that I was ineffective by having not raised every possible argument he thought had merit. 

As a matter of principle, I will happily accept the allegation by a client that I failed to raise a valid argument.  If the court thinks that an argument that I neglected is one that would justify reversal, then the client is absolutely right that I failed him, and winning his freedom always predominates over any explanation I could offer for my choices.  While it has never happened yet, it could and I will support it.  My reputation is of no consequence when it comes to obtaining justice for a client.

As a matter of courtesy, the court forwards the papers to appellate counsel when the papers allege ineffective assistance.  It has only happened 3 times in my 25 years of practice, which surprises me as I would expect it to be far more common.  I would expect every client to keep trying, even after my services are completed, but most realize the futility of the effort and spend their time doing more productive things.  Some don’t want to hurt my feelings, as they appreciate the effort I’ve put in on their account.  If they asked me, however, I would tell them not to worry about me, but to do anything they can to help themselves.

This set of papers, however, presented a problem.  This particular client fancied himself to be quite smart, despite his lack of formal education.   During his trial, by another lawyer, and his appeal, by me, he sought to contribute by sending caselaw and theories, demanding evidence and argument, and becoming what is commonly called a jailhouse lawyer.  This is the fellow who believes that he can read lawbooks as well as any lawyer, and is smart enough to work the system.  He believed that he had the juice to win.

In his effort to get his series of new arguments before the court on a writ of error coram nobis, he claimed that I refused to include his meritorious arguments because I would only include a certain number of argument for the fee paid.  This is where my client wades into troubled waters.  Naturally, the prosecution wants to know if I will provide an affidavit stating that the client is a liar. 

It comes as no surprise that a client is happy to throw his lawyer under the bus to save himself.  This is a basic tenet of being a criminal defense lawyer.  But when the client alleges something that implicates the lawyer’s ethical obligations, claiming an affirmative wrongdoing on the part of the lawyer, he steps into a problem that few clients appreciate.  He relieves the lawyer of the privilege and he places the lawyer in an adversary position.  As much as the client may think his plan brilliant, it has its pitfalls.

The lawyer cannot ethically lie to help the client.  Just because your desperate notion of how to get your case back before the court implicates some impropriety on my part doesn’t mean that I can support a lie.  I can’t.  I won’t.  I cannot back you up on this scheme, and you’re now on your own.

I won’t, as a matter of principle, respond to the papers.  I am not a party to the action, and the claim of impropriety against me should be obviously ridiculous to the court.  Worse still, it wasn’t necessary for the client to seek a writ, since any failure on my part to present a meritorious argument would be sufficient, regardless of reason.  The client, of course, doesn’t realize this, and that his lie was totally unnecessary.

But should the court ask, I will be forced to tell the truth.  And that will kill any chance the client may have had.  He will then be branded a liar, and may well be held accountable as a perjurer.  I am offended to be put into the position of providing evidence of a crime against my own client.  Should it come to that, the client’s doe-eyed stare, pleading at me not to add to his troubles, to lie for him by affirming that his lie is true, I will make every effort to refuse to answer.  But if I am forced to do so, I will tell the truth.  I will not lie to a court.

Lying clients are hardly a novelty in the criminal justice system.  Some will say anything to get out, and some of the things they say are just wild.  These lies never work in the clients favor, and almost invariably backfire.  Badly. 

So before a client, or a jailhouse lawyer, or both when your client thinks he is the jailhouse lawyer, comes up with some brainstorm that he can craft some lie against his lawyer to save himself, think again.  Don’t expect the lawyer to lie to help you, and understand that your lie has now placed your lawyer into an untenable position.  It’s enough that you have one adversary to fight in your uphill battle to win a post-appellate writ.  Don’t make it two.  Don’t expect your lawyer to lie for you.