Author Archives: SHG

Does Asserting Rights Equal Reasonable Suspicion?

Orin Kerr at VC has unearthed an old 7th Circuit case, Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 2006), that offers a fascinating view of what constitutes cause for a Terry stop, frisk, search and seizure.  Rather than rewrite the whole magillah, I’m going to steal shamelessly borrow liberally from Orin’s write-up:


Here are the facts. Cady had filed a civil suit against a police officer, and he showed up at a Cook County courthouse in Bridgeview, Illinois sometime between 6:15 and 6:30 a.m on August 22, 2001, to serve process on the officer during an early morning shift-change. He was carrying a briefcase, and his clothes were dirty and wrinkled. He stood outside the courthouse by the sidewalk and waited for the shift change so he could serve process.

  An officer approached Cady to see what he was doing, but Cady apparently declined to answer the officer’s question. The officer alerted another officer, Lucio, and Lucio decided to investigate. Lucio approached Cady and asked what he was doing; Cady responded that he was “a federal process server.” Officer Lucio asked for Cady’s ID. Instead of giving the officer an ID, Cady engaged in a legal discussion with the officer of whether was any law requiring him to have identification with him. In fact, there wasn’t. The facts aren’t totally clear, but it seems that Cady had chosen not carry an ID that morning because he had researched the law and knew he was not required to do so.

  After a few minutes, Cady asked to speak with Lucio’s supervisor. Sargeant Barbat arrived on the scene and asked Cady why he was there and asked to see his ID. Cady stated that he would not reveal his identity “unless he was assured that it would not be used against him in a future criminal prosecution.” (This is the Fifth Amendment standard, in case you’re wondering.) He also asked Barbat whether “Barbat was making a Terry stop, and if so, what crime he suspected Cady was committing, was about to commit, or had committed,” tracking the language of the Illinois Terry stop statute. Cady bolstered his many legal questions and discussion points with supporting legal documents, including a law dictionary and a copy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that he retrieved from a briefcase he was carrying.

  Now we get to the interesting part from a Fourth Amendment standpoint. One of the officers present took the briefcase from Cady and placed it on the hood of a squad car. Then two officers searched the contents of the briefcase. They found a Sullivan’s Law Directory, a Bible, an address book, and a pen. No weapons were found. The officers started looking through the books for a name so they could figure out who Cady was. Inside the Bible, they found a name. The officers then closed the briefcase and placed it in their squad car.

Cady was also personally frisked at this time, but no weapons were discovered. The officers then ran the name that appeared in Cady’s Bible through their squad car computer:



Finding that a name was not enough to identify Cady, the officers pressed Cady for more information. Officer Margalus stated that if Cady did not comply, he could be arrested for obstructing a police officer. Officer Jacoby took out his handcuffs and told Cady to put his hands behind his back[.]


  Faced with the threat of arrest for refusing to disclose more information, Cady told the officers his name and date of birth. The officers ran that through the computer and found there was no warrant out for his arrest. They then gave him back his briefcase and sent him on his way. The entire incident lasted “between twenty and thirty minutes.”


Aside from the obvious, that being that Cady need only have cooperated in the first place to avoid the mess, this scenario poses some great questions.  What aspect of asserting his right to be left alone implicates wrongdoing or a threat?  If a person has a constitutional right to be left alone when he is doing nothing illegal, is he wrong to assert it?  Is the easy answer, comply with police commands no matter what, the right answer?

The 7th Circuit held that the police were justified in their actions, as there was reasonable suspicion.

In the course of a Terry stop, an officer may conduct a protective search for weapons of an individual’s person, and area within his control, if “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” [Terry v. Ohio] The officers in this case were faced with an individual who was lurking outside a courthouse well before it opened to the public, was shabbily dressed, had not showered, carried a briefcase, and claimed to be serving federal process on a Sheriff’s officer. Cady was evasive in response to the officers’ questions, and repeatedly reached into his briefcase. Under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent officer would be concerned for the safety of the officers and civilians in the area, as well as for Cady himself.

The court further held that the length of the stop was Cady’s fault, since he could have just cooperated in the first place and made the cops’ lives easier, as well as his own.

This decision strikes me as one of those horrific throw-away rulings where the court recharacterizes the facts to suit the outcome, and basically tosses the guy to the wolves because he’s just too wacky to worth much, if any, thought.  And this is borne out by the fact that this isn’t Cady’s first time as a pro se plaintiff, making him a known quantity.  But aren’t odd-balls protected by the Constitution too?

Orin sees this decision as “incredibly lame,” essentially lacking in any principled constitutional basis.  While he’s absolutely right, I would take this a step farther.  This is what happens in cases that fly under the radar where the attitude toward the party is “who cares.”  No one was rooting for Cady.  There was no one to scrutinize the legitimacy of the decision.  So when the court thinks it can get away with a cheap one, and make an annoyance go away, this is the sort of result-oriented decision we get.

So even though no one is likely to argue that Cady’s the sharpest knife in the drawer, he did nothing more than assert his constitutional right to be left alone.  Did he get what he deserved?

I’m Not a Judge but I Play One on TV

When I first saw Joesph Wapner presiding over his television show, The People’s Court, I thought to myself that this is what a judge is supposed to be like.  He looked like Norman Rockwell’s perfect image of a judge.  He sounded soothing and calm.  He was firm yet likable. 

Sure, he was really just a small claims court arbitrator, but it was a way for ordinary people to sit on their couch, watch someone pretend to be a judge and feel confident that there was a legal system that worked. 

Since then, however, the genre of TV courts has exploded.  And finding ways to distinguish one judge-show from another, producers have sought out appearances and temperaments that push the envelope to the edge.

The relatively benign and silly Judge Ed Koch, former NYC mayor, morphed into the woman who revitalized the genre, Judge Judy Sheindlin, who became increasingly venal with every new show.  Judge Judy is the only person I’ve ever seen who can tell if someone is lying before they even utter a word.  The worse her temperament, the better her ratings.

Judge Joe Brown Judge Hatchett Judge Judy Judge Maria Lopez Judge Greg Mathis

But if you happen to watch television on a weekday, you will see that there are now a host of new judges, particularly in the area of black-exploitation judging.  These are the ones who enjoy some strange affectation of Amos & Andy-type intonation while substituting a morality play for a courtroom. 

Lest Hispanics feel neglected, there’s another judge named Maria Lopez from Massachusetts whose proclaimed purpose is to use her “street smarts” to bring “justice to the oppressed.”  But she’s actually Cuban, and a graduate of Smith and BU law school. I’ve never seen her show, but the reviews are just awful.

Adding to the mix is “Judge” Janine Pirro, whose show has yet to air, but Geraldo called her “Judge Janine” when she was doing some color commentary on Fox News the other night.  We can only hope that a sale at Loehmann’s will divert her attention before the premier.

What brought about all this was the news of yet another new TV judge, because the dream of having a TV judge for every person over 21 in the United States has yet to be fulfilled.  The newest is
Fulton County Georgia State Court Judge Penny Brown Reynolds, according to the New York Lawyer.

Naturally, your first question is, “what’s her hook?”  God?

ATLANTA – Writing that “God has called me to a higher place,” Fulton County State Court Judge Penny Brown Reynolds on Monday notified Gov. Sonny Perdue that she would resign, effective Oct. 22, to embark on her new career as a television judge on “Family Court with Judge Penny.”
It’s not entirely clear to me, but is she saying that she hears voices?  Or is it just that Los Angeles is a “higher place” than Fulton County?  Somehow, I sense that there’s going to be a bit of religion in her voice as she delivers her sermon.

One of the hardest, and easiest, things to understand is why all these people chose to walk away from the real bench to sit atop the TV bench.  Ego, cash, frustration, boredom, ego.  But how does one go from presiding over actual murder cases to these vapid demands for the return of a $348 loan to buy crack?  It’s ludicrous.

In the beginning, the notion of the TV court genre had some potential, both as entertainment as well as information.  People could watch real people argue their way into and out of their own stupidity, while a judge could do a little ad hoc legal instruction to help ordinary people conduct their lives. 

But these shows bring nothing constructive to the table.  And most of these performers are no Judge Judy.  What do they plan to do when their shows get canceled? 

9/11 There’s No More to My Story

Last year on this date, I posted about September 11th, 2001 from my perspective as a New Yorker whose office was on the 51st Floor of the Woolworth Building, next door to the WTC.

I can’t think of anything more to say on the subject, so I’m putting this to bed.  If you want to read more about it, you will have to go elsewhere.  If you would like to comment, consider this an open thread.  If you’ve had enough of it as well, I understand.

A Real American Hero Outside the RNC

There have been numerous videos posted following the Democratic and Republican National Conventions showing the treatment of Americans exercising their right to free speech and association under the Constitution.  Some have shown some questionable conduct by protesters.  Most have shown some ugly conduct by police.  But none have shown the fortitude of this one young woman.

The word “hero” is used with such frequency that it’s become nearly meaningless.  When cops actually do the job they are trained and paid to do, they’re called heroes.  When people survive tragedy, they’re called heroes.  The word has been cheapened, but that doesn’t mean that there are no heroes left.

The young woman in this video is a hero. 

This is bravery.  This is fortitude.  This is integrity.  In the manner of Gandhi or King, she stood firm.  Watch as the police “heroes” push their bicycles against her, gas her, shove her to the ground.  See how they serve and protect us from the likes of one young woman?  Aren’t we filled with pride in our cops?

This is the willingness to suffer, and suffer again, for the right reasons.  This is one of the most moving videos that I’ve seen in a long time, and I’ve seen quite a few.  She is an unnamed, 21 year old woman from Madison.  That’s all I know about her, except that she’s a hero.   I hope you feel the same.

H/T Joel Rosenberg.  I’ve tried to embed the video in this post, but my skills fell far short.  If anybody can help with this, I would greatly appreciate it.

American Express: Scam “Member Projects” Contest Exposed

There are few scams that I find more disturbing than those in the name of good, charitable causes.  American Express, to promote how wonderful it is for humanity and to suck in as many people on the internet as possible to vote for the causes that are near and dear to their hearts, has just pulled off a whopper with its “Member Projects” promotion.


Members Project is your chance to join a community that’s passionate about making a positive change in the world. Show your support and vote on which projects get $2.5 million in American Express funding. The possibilities are endless. The decision is yours.

Well, no.  The decision is theirs.  According to the promo, Am Ex is giving $2.5 million, not exactly a huge sum for a company like AmEx, but nothing to sneeze at for many of the projects that serve to eradicate disease or misery and are in desperate need of funding.  But it’s a sucker game.

The promo purportedly works this way.  Projects are proposed and then voted on by the public to see which the public believes to be most worthy of support.  Based upon these votes, the top 25 projects are then voted on again, with the top 5 to receive funding.  Or so they say.

I followed this scam closely, because a project was proposed that I strongly supported, to find a cure for Fragile X Syndrome.



Fragile X is the most common inherited cause of mental impairment and the most common known cause of autism.

In my book, this is a very worthy cause, and the Fragile X Research Foundation is possibly the single best-run charity there is, with 97% of all money raised going directly to research to find a cure.

Back to the AmEx scam.  Cure Fragile X was submitted as one of the proposed projects in this contest, and the voting began.  At the end of voting, Cure Fragile X was number 5.  That’s right, NUMBER FIVE.  By most accounts, number 5 falls within the top 25 projects.  But not by AmEx’s accounting procedures, apparently.

When the Top 25 were announced the next day, Cure Fragile X was nowhere to be found.  It simply disappeared from the list, as if it never existed. Poof.

I will not, and do not, denigrate any other project on the list, whether it made the top 25 or not, as all are worthy.  But within the universe of worthy causes, there are some that are more dire, and some that are extremely close to being cured/resolved/fixed, but for completing existing research.  Fragile X Syndrome is one of those that, with one more decent push, is so close to being cured.  But it won’t get that final push from American Express, because it no longer exists on the AmEx list even though it was voted number 5.

So where did it go?  AmEx hasn’t responded to inquiries.  My best guess is that it wasn’t somebody’s pet project over there, and based upon the top 25 list, the whole deal has been skewed to make sure that this whole contest turns out to be one big scam promotion, with the end game being to fund pre-ordained projects while enjoying the benefits of appearing to be benevolent to all.

While it might appear that AmEx shouldn’t be called out because it’s just doing a good deed, this is baloney.  This is hard-core self-promotion, using $2.5 million from its advertising budget to paint itself as some wonderful benefactor while spreading its advertising as far as it can. 

I don’t begrudge AmEx taking advantage of self-promotion by this method, provided it really ends up helping some good causes.  I do, however, take issue when the promotion turns out to be a scam.  And the Member Projects promotion by American Express is a scam, and it should blow up in their faces.

American Express Logo








Your ideas. Your decision. Our money.
membersproject.com




Members Project American Express
    

Judge Lippman Wins 2008 Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence

The National Center for State Courts has announced that its 2008 Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence goes to our very own Jonathon Lippman, Presiding Justice of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. 


One of the most prestigious judicial honors in the country, the Rehnquist Award is presented annually to a state court judge who exemplifies the highest level of judicial excellence, integrity, fairness, and professional ethics. Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts will present the award to Justice Lippman at a ceremony on the evening of November 20th at the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.

Aside from my own ignorance, since I’ve never heard of this award before, and I swear that I’d remember an award for judicial excellence that was named after William Rehnquist, who will always loom large in my mind for his flash of brilliance in his Geduldig v. Aiello opinion, holding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination because not all women want to get pregnant, my chest was filled with pride.  Of all the judges in all the courts in the whole country, they picked mine.

But why, I wondered?  I try to keep up on the happenings of my favorite appellate court, and Justice Lippman in particular, ever since he grabbed me by the throat with his opinion in People v. Packer, with its unforgettable language, “appreciable diminution of the coercive sequelae of prior illegality.”  I still get goose bumps whenever I read it.  Plus, he’s only been at the A.D. for about a year.  Not much time to make such a big splash.

The press release from the NCSC (you remember the place, the one that promotes cooperation between courts and law enforcement in being an active player in removing drunk drivers from the road) explains:


NCSC President Mary C. McQueen said Justice Lippman was selected for his “unparalleled ability to promote and achieve reform in the state courts. His leadership in the New York courts has contributed to numerous improvements in that state’s justice system and has served as an example for courts across the country.”

As Chief Administrative Judge, Justice Lippman was cited for effectively mobilizing judges and court staff to reopen 10 key court facilities and administrative offices in Manhattan following the 9-11 terrorist attacks; being instrumental in making New York one of the leaders in problem-solving justice; overseeing efforts to overhaul New York’s jury system; and expanding access to justice, among many other accomplishments.

Wait a minute.  Lippman won for being a bureaucrat?  He reopened the courts after 9/11?  That was in 2001, seven years ago.  And frankly, the only issue with the courts was that they lost telephone service.  It’s not like they were in the red zone, like some other people’s (ahem) offices were.  BFD.

If this constitutes an “unparalleled ability to promote and achieve reform in the state courts,” then we are in deep, deep trouble.  All the other judicial bureaucrats must really suck if they can’t come up with a single concrete reason to give the award to Justice Lippman.

Now I have no particular issue with Jonathon Lippman winning an award.  He’s done a pretty good job as PJ at the first department, and he proving to be a darn good judge now that he’s out of the administrative offices and sitting on the big bench instead.  But this award is tantamount to damning with faint praise.  There has got to be something substantive they can say about him.  Anything?

Maybe that’s why they call it the Rehnquist award?

Junk Science: Lie Detection Outsourced to India

As everyone knows, polygraphs are inadmissible in court.  While there are some who swear by them, when properly administered and limited in their use, they have never risen to the level of certainty necessary to become absolute and irrefutable, like say little black boxes that provide conclusive proof of blood alcohol content even though they are replete with problems.

But polygraphs are so yesterday.  As Adam Kolber reveals at PrawfsBlawg, the newest, bestest, coolest has just made its debut in Pune, Maharashtra, India.  It’s brain-based lie detection called the Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature test, or BEOS.


The test was based on electroencephalography and appears to be related to so-called “brain fingerprinting”  technology developed by Lawrence Farwell in the United States.

But it’s not like anybody actually believes it works.  Except in India, where a woman was convicted of murder based on it.  From the International Herald Tribune :


The various technologies, generally regarded as promising but unproved, have yet to be widely accepted as evidence – except in India, where in recent years judges have begun to admit brain scans. But it was only in June, in a murder case in Pune, in Maharashtra State, that a judge explicitly cited a scan as proof that the suspect’s brain held ”experiential knowledge” about the crime that only the killer could possess, sentencing her to life in prison.

Psychologists and neuroscientists in the United States, which has been at the forefront of brain-based lie detection, variously called the Indian application of the technology to legal cases ”fascinating,” ”ridiculous,” ”chilling” and ”unconscionable.”


So how does BEOS works?



This latest Indian attempt at getting past criminals’ natural defenses begins with an electroencephalogram, or EEG, in which electrodes are placed on the head to measure electrical waves. The suspect sits in silence, eyes shut. An investigator reads aloud details of the crime – as prosecutors see it – and the resulting brain images are processed using software made in Bangalore.


The software tries to detect whether, when the crime’s details are recited, the brain lights up in specific regions – the areas that, according to the technology’s inventors, show measurable changes when experiences are relived, their smells and sounds summoned back to consciousness. The technology claims to be able to distinguish between memories of a deed merely witnessed and a deed actually done.


Sounds very scientific, doesn’t it?  And it’s not like the Indians don’t know their way around technology.  Yet, the test has never been peer reviewed or replicated, and according to an academic in the United States who has reviewed the literature, it looks “shaky”.

That didn’t stop an Indian court from convicting a woman for murder based upon it, however.  And it looks like the Brits think it may serve as a handy-dandy tool in the post 9/11 war on everything.


”According to the cases that have been presented to me, BEOS has clearly demonstrated its utility in providing admissible evidence that has been used to assist in the conviction of defendants in court,” Keith Ashcroft, a frequent expert witness in the British courts, said in an e-mail message.

And if it’s okey-dokey with the Brits, it’s just a hop, skip and jump over the pond to American courts.  While we may not see BEOS in a court near you anytime soon, don’t be surprised when they start hooking electrodes to your clients’ head and tell him a little story to see if he has some “experiential knowledge” buzzing around in there.

Sounds crazy?  Well, if it’s good enough for Maharashtra, what makes you think it’s not good enough for you?

Judge Cassell’s Latest Modest Proposal

One might argue that there can be no “victim” until a crime is proven.  But that doesn’t seem to phase former federal judge, now Utah Lawprof, Paul Cassell.  And no one beats the victim drum as hard as he.

His latest idea is to reinvent the federal rules of criminal procedure to make it a tripartite gameplan, with the victim integrally involved on par with the prosecution and the defense. 


In this paper, which recently appeared in the Utah Law Review, I argue that it is time to fold crime victims into the federal rules. I develop a rule-by-rule analysis of changes that should be made, including: 1. Ensuring that crime victims’ attorneys can appear in court (Rule 1); 2. Providing for victim participation in the plea bargain process (Rule 11); 3. Protecting victims’ addresses and telephone numbers from improper disclosure (Rule 12); 4. Guaranteeing victims the right to attend criminal depositions (Rule 15); 5. Protecting victims from having personal and confidential information improperly subpoenaed (Rule 17); 6. Considering victims’ interests when cases are transferred or when a bench trial is ordered (Rules 21 and 23); 7. Integrating victims into the sentencing process (Rule 32); 8. Articulating victims’ right to discretionary appointment of counsel (Rule 44.1); 9. Giving victims the right to be heard at bail decisions (Rule 46); 10. Requiring victims’ views be considered before a case is dismissed (Rule 48); 11. Protecting victims’ right to a speedy trial (Rule 50); 12. Giving victims notice of court proceedings and of their rights in those proceedings (Rule 60(a)(1)); 13. Guaranteeing victims the right to attend court proceedings (Rule 60(a)(2)); 14. Guaranteeing victims the right to be heard on bail, plea, sentencing, and other issues important to victims (Rule 60(a)(3)).

Now I notice that he keeps throwing around the word “rights”, but what “rights” is he talking about?  The defendant is given rights by the Constitution.  Nowhere are rights of the victim mentioned in there, as criminal law is a two-sided adversary system, with a prosecution and defense.  It’s criminal, rather than civil, because of the authority granted by the People to the government to maintain order in society. 

The entirety of the victims’ rights agenda is predicated upon misguided and unprincipled use of sympathy and visceral anger in lieu of reason.  By elevating our concern for the victims of crime to a place equivalent to the state’s interest in maintaining the social compact, advocates like Paul Cassell seek to trump the defendants’ constitutional rights by putting the victim in the well alongside the other two parties, as a matter of right.

This is an obvious and flagrant play on emotion and sympathy, and would be easily dismissed if a proposal such as this didn’t come from the hand of a former federal judge.  Sure, everyone feels badly for the victim of crime.  But there is simply no principled explanation why the purported victim should have any say in matters such as bail.  What could they possibly add, other than a plea to make bail punitive, which is precisely what bail is not intended to be.

The gist of this strange agenda is that the prosecution isn’t, in the eyes of the victims’ rights advocates, sufficiently harsh and vehement, and fails to demonstrate sufficient sensitivity to the peculiar wants and desired of victims.  Of course, each victim would seek to reinvent the system to serve his or her personal vision of justice, with neither knowledge nor appreciation of such details like due process and equal protection.  But hey, who cares about such technicalities when you can put some weepy victim on the screen to emote about themselves.  Surely, the prosecution can’t be trusted to do its job, so we need the victim (and the victim’s lawyer) to wield the big sword when the prosecution doesn’t lunge hard enough to make the victim happy.

There is a role for the victim of crime in the criminal justice system, and it involves cooperation with the prosecution on the victim’s side and sensitivity to the victim’s concerns on the prosecution’s side.  But the victim is not the prosecution’s client.  The prosecutor represents the People, including but not limited to the victim.  The power to prosecute a person criminally derives from society’s interest, not the personal vindication of each victim’s interest.  If that were the case, there would be no criminal law at all.

I’ve discussed Paul Cassell’s arguments in favor of victims’ rights a number of times before, and they make absolutely no sense.  Long on rhetoric and nothing on substance.  But there’s much to fear despite the absence of any principled basis for his push.

There’s political benefit to be gained in extolling the “rights” of victims, since the public lacks any comprehension of principle but loves victims.  Never underestimate the cynicism of lawmakers when it comes to buying a vote at the expense of reason.

With someone of Paul Cassell’s background, and his obvious persistence in pushing this misbegotten agenda despite its utter lack of principle, there stands to be a fair chance that he will eventually capture the interest of some down-on-his-luck politician looking to find a way to make a name for himself at the expense of society.  What better way than to become the champion of victims?  As Cassell keeps throwing his excrement against the wall, eventually something will stick.

Not only would proposals such as these fundamentally undermine the nature of the criminal justice system, but they would have to rebuilt all the courthouses to make the well big enough to fit in a third table.  After all, it’s not like the victim wants to sit with any of the extant parties, or like they want to sit with the victim.

Utah AG Attacks Lawyers for a Vigorous Defense

From Gideon at A Public Defender, the Attorney General of the Great State of Utah has decided that it’s not enough to just argue an appeal, but he’s had enough of lawyers raising arguments he doesn’t like and he’s trying to make them pay.  From KUTV :


The Utah Attorney General’s Office has asked for the sanctions, claiming that about a third of the 120 claims made by defense attorneys Edward K. Brass and Lynn Donaldson on behalf of Michael Anthony Archuleta were already decided by an earlier appeal or not supported by either factual evidence or law.

Assistant Attorney General Thomas Brunker said the misstep — a violation of Rule 11 — was pointed out to Brass and Donaldson in January 2004, but the attorneys failed to correct it within the 21-day time period allowed.


There are ethical proscriptions that apply to the defendant with regard to raising arguments where there is adverse precedent, so that the court is not deceived, the obligation is to alert the court to the existing precedent and then argue that it should be reversed or distinguished.  The mere fact that an issue has already been decided against you does not mean that it can’t be challenged again.


Brass and attorney Richard Mauro, who represents Donaldson, deny any impropriety or unethical behavior and contend that they only sought to preserve every possible avenue of appeal for Archuleta.

The issue was argued before the Utah Supreme Court on appeal Thursday. A 4th District Court judge already held a daylong hearing and ruled that Brass and Donaldson made no deliberate attempt to deceive the court.

Brass said he thought justices should give deference to the 17-page opinion from Judge Donald J. Eyre, who found “there was no deception, there was no unethical behavior that he wasn’t deceived and there wasn’t an effort to deceive him.”


But what does the AG care when he’s got a lesson to teach.  After all, you can’t have those darn defense lawyers raising every issue under the sun and making the state work harder than it should have to.  After all, throw enough against the wall and something might stick.

This effort raises two independent issues.  As Gideon notes:


Decisions are reversed all the time, precedent is overturned with some regularity. If that were not the case, the law would be stagnant, reflecting a time long gone and incapable of dealing with evolving society.

Fortunately for us (and unfortunately for the Utah A.G., I suspect), such is not the case. Lawyers should be free to challenge existing caselaw and should be free to seek reversal of precedent.

The last thing you want to see happen is to have a major reversal in the law, and find yourself precluded from benefiting because of waiver by failure to raise the issue.  As Heller made clear last term, even the most long-standing precedent is subject to change, and it would be a nightmare to miss that train.

And as noted by the attorneys in the case, the AG isn’t going after the message, but the messengers.



After the hearing, Mauro said the state’s actions against Brass and Donaldson are part of an effort to dissuade defense attorneys from taking death penalty appeals cases.


“This is a personal attack on lawyers who do this work,” Mauro said. “That’s what our big concern is with this filing. The state now is not attacking the message (the appeal). They’re attacking the messenger and that is the lawyer.”


The trend toward putting the lawyer at personal and professional risk for doing his job too well is a potent weapon in the hands of the state.  After all, if the state can get the lawyers to run scared, it’s far, far easier for the government to maintain control.  Lawyers are just a huge annoyance to the state, getting in the way all the time.


Brunker doesn’t deny the Brass/Donaldson case addresses a larger concern about post-conviction appeals that typically include the filing of massive petitions.

“We want to use it to curb abusive litigation and filing of these mega petitions, he said. It’s just slowing it down and we’re trying to stop that. That is our motive.”


Of course, if the state thinks the “massive petitions” are abusive and frivolous, why not just ignore them and leave it up to the court to decide?

Hopefully, the Utah Supreme Court will turn the tables on the AG, sanctioning the state for its effort to interfere with the defendants’ 6th Amendment right to counsel.  But that might be a bit much to expect of Utah. 

Double Deference Brings an Angry Dissent

There are dissents, and then there are dissents.  But never have I read a dissent like this, from Tucker v. Palmer, out of the 6th Circuit.  This was an appeal from the district court’s  grant of habeas under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA’), which allows de novo review of the district court decision.

Tucker was convicted of a home invasion (what we used to call a burglary) based upon the homeowners observation of the Tucker climbing over a fence and running away from the house.  He was convicted after a jury trial, and lost his appeal due to delay, but the appellate court held that there was no issue worthy of excusing the delay.  Tucker sought a writ in federal court, which was granted based upon the magistrate’s report concluding that the evidence was insufficient, which was approved by the district court judge.

The 6th Circuit, showing the curious application of the AEDPA, applied the doubly-deferential standard to the case.  What this means is that, while the Circuit gives no deference to the decision of its own magistrate or district court judge, it does show deference to the decision of the jury and the Michigan appeals court.

At the end of the day, the 6th Circuit by 2-1 reversed the grant of habeas corpus.  And then the sparks flew.  From the dissent of Judge Damon J. Keith:


The majority’s opinion flagrantly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore vehemently DISSENT. It is “[b]etter that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries at 358. This powerful and wise axiom reveals that a court commits the ultimate injustice by convicting and imprisoning a person based on insufficient evidence. Such a judicial transgression contravenes the most important right our Constitution affords the accused: “the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Apparently neither the state trial judge nor the majority ever read or understood the Constitution, for in the instant matter, they recklessly disregarded this fundamental requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by convicting Defendant Raymond Tucker of home invasion without any evidence sufficient to prove his guilt.

Holy guacamole!  Did he just accuse his brethren on the Circuit bench of having never read or understood the Constitution?  Why, I believe he did! 

The entire dissent is like this (and definitely worth a read), and Judge Keith reiterates that he “vehemently and vigorously dissents,” which I take to be akin to “strenuously objects” since he’s in the dissent.  But the judge clearly has been pushed over the top by this conviction of Tucker on the theory of “when there’s smoke, there’s fire” evidence.

One of the most offensive parts of the AEDPA is its deference, intended to shut most defendants out of habeas relief, whether procedurally or substantively.  In this case, where the magistrate, district court judge and one of three circuit judges believed that there was insufficient evidence, more specifically no evidence that the defendant ever entered the home he was convicted of invading, the absurdity of the double-deference as an excuse to ignore the lack of proof of guilty becomes clear.

Judges, like lawprofs, tend to show great courtesy to one another, even in disagreement as a matter of collegiality.  It appears that collegiality wasn’t the first thing on Judge Keith’s mind here.  I can’t say for certain that this is the strongest, perhaps even the wildest, dissent ever, but it is definitely up there.

Nice to see that some judges actually care about convicting innocent people, to the extent that they will go to the mats over it.

H/T  Orin at Volokh.