Author Archives: SHG

Follow-Up on the “Big Shove”

In last week’s “But for Video” post, I had the honor of presenting a little home town magic as a video camera caught a police officer nail a bicycle in mid-flight during the Critical Mass cycle protest down 7th Avenue.  In that post, I was critical of the fellow officer who watched and enabled the officer who performed the “Big Shove,” noting that one animal doesn’t get away without the help of the rest of the pack.

Now it’s time to make note of how this “Big Shove” video reveals fundamental flaws in the criminal justice system.

From The Smoking Gun comes the criminal court complaint in the case of People v. Christopher Long.  The deponent, our pusher, turns out to be rookie Police Officer Patrick Pogan, who is referred to as the deponent in the complaint. 



So we start out with a complaint by a police officer, notably with the recitation at the bottom that “false statements…are punishable as a class A misdemeanor.”  This legend is included in place of an oath, having the same affect as the officer swearing under penalty of perjury.

At this stage, we have a cop who has violently attacked a cyclist.  We have a Manhattan Assistant District Attorney named Mardirossian who has drafted this complaint in the ECAB unit for P.O. Pogan.  According to the court computers, Mr. Long was represented by an unnamed legal aid lawyer, and it all comes before Judge Larry Stephen on July 26, the day after the “Big Shove.”  If you would like to look it all up for yourself, the Docket Number is 2008NY055086 and access to the file can be found at Webcrims.

With all the players lined up, and the accusatory instrument and evidence to the contrary in hand, let’s see how this plays out in the finest criminal justice system that society has ever created.  Mind you, this is with “knowledge aforethought” of the Reasonable Scalia Rule, that the video leaves no doubt that Officer Pogan is a liar ab initio.

Pogan provides his information to ADA Mardirossian at ECAB, the “Early Case Assessment Bureau” in the District Attorney’s office, who’s job it is to vet the cases and draft the complaint.  Per the info, the ADA has no reason to toss the charge, though given the allegations from Pogan, it appears that the ADA didn’t exactly buy them either, as such a vicious attack on a police officer as claimed by Pogan seldom ends up charged as a misdemeanor.  Had the ADA really bought into Pogan’s claim that Long rode his bicycle into him, my bet is that he would have charged a felony assault.

About a day after the “Big Shove,” the body and the papers make their way to Judge Stephens.  No doubt the Legal Aid lawyer countered the charge by asserting that Pogan attacked Long, not the other way around.  But here we have a cop swearing that he was the victim of the vicious and disrespectful cyclist.  What’s a judge to do?  The defendant is released on his own recognizance (meaning, without bail) and the case is adjourned to September 5.

The normalcy of what happened after the “Big Shove” in the course of ordinary criminal court proceedings is clear.  The cop lies and the rest of the dominoes fall into place.  The cops partner isn’t going to come forward.  The ADA has no way of knowing that the cop is lying.  The judge has no way of knowing the cop is lying.  The case proceeds in the normal course of affairs.

There is no magic to this system.  There is no secret way that all the players can discern truth from outright fabrication.  If a cop is willing to lie, then system will accept and adopt it and the defendant will be pushed through to the other side.  The defense attorney may rant about the wrong done the defendant, but no one, ever, will believe what he says.  The word of a cop is enough.  

Absent the video, the case will be assigned to an ADA for prosecution before September 5.  On that date, a plea offer will likely be made, and Long would have to chose whether to accept the plea, and admit to guilt for a crime that never happened, or go to trial.  Likely, the plea will be to disorderly conduct, an “infraction” rather than a crime, meaning he will have no criminal record.  He will receive a sentence of conditional discharge with community service.  The alternative is to role the dice and go to trial.  He will be advised to take the plea, as it is inconsequential and he runs a serious risk of losing at trial.  It’s the proper advice.  As it happens, absent the video, it is fundamentally wrong.

What this discloses is the inability of the criminal justice system to accommodate a lying cop.  While this case is the oddball, since there is a video, the scenario otherwise is unbearably normal.  Cop says crime.  Crime it is. 

Mark Draughn at WindyPundit, provides a story of when he was a juror in a case where the defense was that he was attacked by the cop without provocation during a traffic stop. 


We convicted him because his story wasn’t believable for a number of reasons, one of which was his claim that the cop attacked him out of the blue without provocation. That just seemed unlikely.

Now that he’s thought about the videotape of Pogan attacking Long, the verdict doesn’t seem as clear.  The prosecutor, I would suspect, argued, “Why would Police Officer Jones just attack the defendant without any reason?  He doesn’t know him.  He has nothing against him.  It just doesn’t make any sense.”  It’s a good argument, and we’ve all heard it many times. 

The problem is that police officers are empowered to act out their frustrations, their anger, their prejudice, their impulses, because they can.  For most of us, there are constraints on any violent impulse we might have.  For cops, there are none.  These may be the same cops who save a life the day before and are proclaimed a hero.  Or given a medal for not killing an innocent person.  But if something annoys them, or they just feel like shoving a cyclist off his bike, they can.  They know that they need only fabricate a simple story and not only will they get away with it, but they can add a whole new level of misery to the cyclist’s life. 

The system has no way to stop this from happening.  The ADA can’t tell.  The judge goes with the odds, no matter what the defense lawyer has to say about it.  Once the cop swears it’s true, the wheels of justice grind.

The District Attorney has the power to advance the case and move to dismiss it, thus removing the burden of Long having to return to court and having this hang over him until September.  Curiously, it hasn’t happened.  Yet. 

But Christopher Long is one in a million.  He’s got a video to make his case.  Judge Stephens probably feels awfully lousy about not listening to Long’s lawyer, and the ADA wonders whether his legal career has just come to crashing halt because of his failure to recognize a lying cop.

While it’s easy to blame Pogan and feel better with the knowledge that “one bad apple” has been outed by a video, it misses the big picture.  What this case reveals isn’t limited to rookie cop Pogan.  It is an window into a system that simply does not do what it purports to do.  It cannot distinguish truth from fiction.

 That’s the moral of this story.


Still in Jail? Blame the Cellphone

The message is left:  “Greenfield, this is bzzzgropppth, My husband got hjustttshsssssh. Call me immediately at 917-deesssstrrrrgh-374.  We need you desperately!”

Guess what?  You’re not getting a call back.  It’s not that I don’t care.  It’s not that I don’t want to be your lawyer.  It’s that you called on a cellphone.

Here’s a newsflash for those of you who think cellphones are just the coolest thing going: They aren’t entirely reliable.  Calls get broken up.  Messages are garbled.  Even if it’s only one digit in the telephone number, I can’t call you back. 

Forget all those really great commercials on TV about how the cellular company’s love you and are doing everything in the world to make your cellphone service spectacular.  It’s just a commercial. 

So as you sit in the holding cell, thinking that your wife has reached out to me and that I’m on my way to get you out, you will be disappointed.  I cannot help you because I have no clue who you are, how to reach your wife or what happened.  Don’t blame me.  Blame your cellphone.

And for all of you who are so enamored of the fact that you can make and receive calls wherever you are, whenever you must, under the mistaken belief that convenience trumps function, when you leave a message for someone, you have absolutely no idea whether your message was recorded in an audible fashion or is just a bunch of garbled sounds.  The miracle of the cellphone leaves much to be desired.

Sorry.  If I can’t understand your message, I can’t be there for you.

Clearly, It’s Obvious

One of my long-time pet peeves is the use of language like “clearly” and “obviously” in the government’s briefs and memoranda.  As much as I strain, I can’t recall papers that don’t engage in such machinations to challenge defense allegations.  “Clearly, the indictment provides all necessary allegations of fact to allow the defendant to fully prepare for trial.”  “The probable cause was obviously overwhelming.”  These words are almost always used in conjunction with some hyperbolic claim that is wholly unsupported by fact.

It’s troubled me that judges not only buy into this non-substantive pap, but repeat it in their decisions.  “Clearly” and “obviously” are not arguments, but conclusions.  If they are warranted by the facts or evidence, then rely on the facts or evidence.  At no time does the conclusion serve as a substitute for substance. 

Was I alone in thinking this?  So it seemed until Eugene Volokh posted this paragraph by Judge Powell in
Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co. v. Sasser, 61 S.E. 505 (Ga. App. 1908):

“Obvious” is a pretty strong sounding word. Its chief juridic employment, so far as my observation goes, is by judges of courts of review, who generally pronounce obvious those propositions (evolved, perhaps, with many concealed misgivings) which they are able to support with but sparse array of precedent and which they are unwilling to put forth as an original dictum without the supporting influence of some strong, impressive, faith-bearing word; for a proposition weak in substance is oft aided in appearance by the strength of sonancy, and “obvious” is a sonant word.
This was in 1908, and captures the essence of the problem so well.  Granted, it’s about the use of such language by courts rather than prosecutors, but the same concept applies.

Whenever the words “clearly” and “obviously” are used, it’s a red flag to cover the fact that there’s nothing behind them.  They are cover-up words, designed to convey certainty beyond question in the absence of any substantive showing to make the point.

How do we know this?  Simple: If the government had facts to make its point, then it would use those facts and make the point.  It would not resort to rhetorical gamesmanship and risk blowing the deal if there was anything hard behind the claim. 

The question remains why judges allow prosecutors to get away with this sort of garbage, and encourage it by parroting the government’s pseudo-argument in their decisions.  The answer, I fear, is clearly obvious.

That’s Why They Call Them Rats

Buzzing across the blawgosphere is the outcome of the Minneapolis swat team’s raid on the Khang family.  Windypundit, Mark Bennett, Radley Balko and Jonathon Turley have posted their takes on this stroke of genius.  It was bad enough that they came into the wrong house shooting, but the error was elevated to the surreal when the cops got medals for their screw up.

The official police position is that they did everything right.  It was the informant that fed them the wrong house.


Minneapolis police spokesman Sgt. William Palmer said Tuesday the department has acknowledged the raid was a mistake and has apologized to the family. But he said the officers “performed very bravely under gunfire and made smart decisions.”

By smart decisions, I assume that means that their shots missed the Khang children.  It’s unclear how bad aim is attributed to smart decisions, but logic is rarely the primary focus when police are given their “merit badges,” as Balko characterizes it.  Radley’s point is well taken; They get paychecks for doing their jobs.  Do they need small pieces of metal to feel better about themselves?

But the crux of this massive screw up was the rat.  The cops point to the rat’s bad information as the cause of this embarrassing moment in aggressive policing.  It’s not their fault; blame the rat.

Bennett nails the problem:


How about this: the buck stops with the cops. If the cops trust the wrong informant and make the wrong call, they didn’t do everything right. In fact, they screwed up.

You see, the use of the rat’s information doesn’t happen in some amorphous vacuum, distinct and separate from the good, thoughtful, kindly police initiative.  The warrant must meet the Aguilar-Spinelli test, a two-prong test that requires the cops to show that the rat has a basis for his claimed information, and that the rat is a reliable source of information. 

The reliability prong of the test is invariably met by a cop vouching for the rat’s credibility.  He’s worked with the rat, the rat has provided verified reliable information in the past, and the like.  What it does is place the officer’s credibility on the line, asking a judge to accept the officer’s belief that the rat is reliable.  In other words, some cop told some judge that he should accept the rat’s word because the officer vouches for him.

So it isn’t just the rat after all.  It’s the cop who ran the rat.  It’s the cop who wants to use what the rat has to say who makes the representation that the judge should sign off on the rat’s word.  It’s the cop who sells the judge on the rat being a credible source of rat-formation. 

The problem is that the rat is a rat.  This is a person who has placed his personal self-interest above others when he engaged in crime in the first place.  He then placed his personal self-interest above his fellow criminals when he chose to sell out his buddies to try to skim some time off his sentence.  He has proven that he’s got no integrity whatsoever, and that he will do anything to save himself.  

Does a person for whom honesty and integrity have had no meaning suddenly become the poster boy for integrity as he tries to buy his way out of prison?  Or is he a lying, manipulative user, seeing what he can sell the cops to save himself?  And if he has nothing left to sell, why not scam the cops, or better yet let the cops use him as their whipping boy whenever they need an excuse to break down a door.

In the Khang’s case, the rat’s scam was readily apparent.  But they are often molded into such upstanding liars when their information is a little better and they give up someone who was engaged in crime, like their mother or brother.  The rat then puts on a manufactured act for the benefit of the judge and jury and our prosecutors do everything in their power to perpetuate the scam by arguing that they only get the benefit of the deal if they testify “truthfully”, one of the most laughable arguments ever made but invariably successful with juries.

A system that depends on the use of liars, and does everything possible to conceal the fact that they are, without a doubt, liars, is a system that lends itself to shooting up the Khangs.  While you might not feel as badly when they frame the guilty, the Khangs didn’t deserve this.   But nobody gave the Khangs any medals.

Stealing the Intangible Right to Honesty

Former NBA referee Tim Donaghy claimed that the NBA used its ref’s to manipulate games to make them more exciting.  This didn’t save him from an extended visit to Club Fed, when he was sentenced by Eastern District Judge Carol Amon to 15 months imprisonment.  Still, it was better than the guidelines sentence of 27 to 33 months.  And Donaghy’s refusal to meet with an independent investigator appointed by NBA Commissioner David Stern makes a Rule 35 reduction appear unlikely.

Donaghy’s allegations, however, go the heart of the charged offense against Donaghy.  Not gambling.  Not bribery.  But a scheme to defraud the NBA by depriving it of the intangible right to his honest services under 18 USC 1346.  Many will say, “huh?”  Yes, there is such a crime.

A 28 word amendment slipped into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created the crime, a congressional response to the Supreme Court’s holding in McNally v. U.S. that a scheme to defraud did not cover “intangible rights.”  Well, Ronald Reagan fixed that.  It reads:


For the purpose of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

The crime was directed toward political corruption, as a weapon against politicians who sold their good office and thus denied the public their honest services.

But crimes have a funny way of spinning out of their intended orbit, as imaginative prosecutors see the words applicable to a host of other circumstances.  If a politician owes honest services to the public, doesn’t an employee owe honest services to an employer?  Or course, this line of reason could be pushed a lot further, with a husband owing honest services to his wife, perhaps?  Maybe a teacher to his student, should he neglect to teach intelligent design/evolution (pick your side)?  How about the physician who refuses to recommend treatment to a patient based on his religious beliefs, or the pharmacist who refuses to fulfill a prescription for a pill that crosses his personal boundaries?  You get the picture.

The crime of deprivation of honest services is another of the “prosecution’s darling” offenses because of its breadth in criminalizing conduct between private parties based upon a theoretical breach in the rules of the private relationship.  It circumvents the normal coterie of crimes to create a catch-all type offense, facilitating conviction when direct proof of a crime may fall short.  Like the crime of conspiracy, it’s a back door means of proving a crime because it’s too difficult to open the front door.

Over the 20 years since Section 1346 was slipped into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, it has been the subject of controversy.  Should our government be in the business of criminalizing the conduct of an employee for dishonesty toward his employer?  Think about that the next time you ‘borrow” a pencil from your boss, or use a few minutes of work time to check your personal email.  While it’s unlikely that the feds will burst through the door, the conduct is still a crime since you’ve failed to give your employer your undivided loyalty and honest service. 

But isn’t loyalty and honesty a two-way street?  If an employee owes such a duty to his employer, what duty is owed by the employer to the employee?  Sorry, no sale.  This crime only applies to the employee, not the employer.  Despite the legal obligations that flow both ways, only one side could be staring down the prosecution’s gun for the failure to adhere to their employment duties.  The employer may be subject to civil suit, but rest assured that it will be the employee who sees the back side of an indictment.

Despite all this, a scheme to deprive an employer of honest services remains a viable and potent crime available to keep the little people in line, lest they anger the taskmasters.  In Donaghy’s case, notice that it’s not the feds independently investigating his claims that the NBA has been fixing games to pump its ratings, but the NBA itself.  Doesn’t the NBA owe its fans and its players the intangible right of its honest services?  Not under section 1346 it doesn’t.

New York Times to Sex Offenders: Drop Dead (Sorta)

When the New York Times is willing to sell out the amorphous groups collected under the heading “sex offender,” you know they have zero support.  This editorial shows how bad the problem is.


However useful [Megan’s Law may be], the law has always carried great potential for danger, and now a New Jersey court has taken a step toward making it a more sophisticated instrument of public safety.

A disturbing new development is the proliferation of local ordinances that go beyond the reporting requirements of legislation like Megan’s Law by restricting where sex offenders may live.

These bans can do more harm than good. They will not deter a determined predator. Many law enforcement officials, including parole officers, have observed that they tend to bunch sex offenders in drug-infested, rundown neighborhoods that are poorly suited for anyone trying to turn around a life.

We have long supported the registration requirement. But we also believe that officials should be aware that in the wrong hands, this information can lead to harassment or worse. And the decision about where a sex offender should live properly resides with law enforcement agencies.

While on the surface, it would appear that the Times is standing up for “sex offenders,” it conceals the fundamental position that Megan’s Law is good and that post-sentence “sex offenders” should live their lives as societal pariahs, to be herded into whatever areas they’re told by “law enforcement agencies.”

I note that I am no fan of people who do harm, sexual or other, to children, and I do not represent such defendants unless I am convinced that they are innocent.  My brethren in the defense bar think my position in wrong-headed, but it’s mine and I’m sticking with it.  However, I put the words “sex offenders” in quotes because it’s a characterization that is grossly misleading and pejorative.  And it continues to expand far beyond the caricature of the child molester that’s used to justify these restrictions.

It’s no surprise that lawmakers enjoy playing this card to prove their toughness.  It’s no surprise that the general public doesn’t comprehend what is actually happening, as a vast swath of defendants who pose neither risk of recidivism or harm to children have their lives ruined by being tossed into the same hole as those who in fact pose a threat. 

But one would expect just a little bit more thought from the New York Times.  Like I said, when the Times can’t be bothered to think it through, we know that there’s no hope for this group.  Eventually, this is going to catch up with us as more and more people become lumped into the social pariah class, and we have no place to put them and they have no place to go.

Doug Berman Needs a Break!

Douglas Berman is one of the hardest working lawprofs in the blawgosphere, bringing us fascinating decisions from across the country so that trench lawyers like me don’t have to scan the advance sheets daily to know what’s happening.  And isn’t he entitled to a vacation?

So while he’s enjoying a two week cruise, Doug has arranged for others to keep us in the loop in his absence.  Who, you ask?


We are attorneys at the firm of Proskauer Rose, where we practice across several different practice groups, including Corporate Defense & Investigations, Corporate Governance/Corporate Defense, and Securities Litigation & Enforcement.  We share a special interest in the world of sentencing, both as defense lawyers and commentators.  We are also great fans of the criminal law blogosphere, which unites academics, practitioners, politicians, jurists, and others interested in the field of criminal law and policy and encourages them to share their insight and experience.

Is there another blogosphere that no one told me about?  Is there a hidden group of defense lawyers that no one told me about?  Who are these people and what they doing in Doug Berman’s house?

The group of vacation-blawgers consists of Mark Harris, Anna Kaminska and Jennifer O’Brien, with “summer associate” Katie Gerber chipping in with color commentary.  Except for Katie, who signs her name to her posts, the rest go anonymous under the “guest bloggers” handle.

So why do I bring this up?

Doing my normal rounds of the odd and curious things in the blawgosphere, I happened upon a post at Sentencing Law & Policy about an 8th Circuit affirmance of a sentence of probation for a “major crack dealer.”  The first thing I noticed was that the post failed to provide the case name, which happens to be U.S. v. Pinkey McFarlin.  What a great name, I said to myself. A combo of Pinky Lee and Spanky McFarland. Who could leave out a name like that?  But I digress.

Pinkey pleaded to selling 102 grams of crack.  Whether I would put him into the category of “major crack dealer” is highly questionable.  While 102 grams may sound like a lot, it is .224871 lbs (or 3.59 ounces).  Major?  Not really.  But major is qualitative, so given an extremely limited depth of experience, I guess someone could think of Pinkey as a major dealer if they’ve never actually seen a real dealer before.

But Pinkey, as a result of extremely poor health, age, obesity, and having been installed as a preacher in the Church of God and Christ in Newport, Arkansas in the interim, was sentenced to 3 years probation.  Now this is interesting and instructive, as it tells defendants that if they want probation, they should become a preacher, gain a few hundred pounds and allow themselves to deteriorate to desperate physical condition. 

As the Circuit decision notes up front, they “affirm the sentence of probation upon these unique facts.” 

So what is the gist of the guest bloggers’ post on poor/lucky Pinkey?

While some may find such extensive health departures to be controversial, the Eighth Circuit’s case is proof that departures on these grounds are available to all, regardless of the type of offense, as they should be.

Say what?  Available to all?  Has Proskauer Rose moved its New York offices to a different planet?

Now I realize that “special interest” falls a little shy of having actual experience in criminal law, leaving some observations and conclusions in doubt.  But I thought that Biglaw types could brief a case like there’s no tomorrow.  Boy, was I disappointed.

I don’t plan on beating up on this subject any more than I’ve done here, and I certainly don’t begrudge Doug taking a vacation.  God knows he deserves one.  But I’m sure going to miss the ability to rely on what’s posted at Doug’s blog until he comes back.

The Next ATL Blawging Star

Shoot me for slumming, but this is just too funny.  David Lat, who if nothing else knows how to tell a joke (hey, he was an AUSA, after all), has taken the law into the gutter, to the delight of every Biglaw associate and summer intern wannabe.  But when David got kicked upstairs, it left a gaping hole in one of the few valuable properties in the blawgosphere.  What to do?

Welcome to the Above the Law Idol Contest!

Lat has selected six finalists to replace him as Hottie-Master in Chief of Above the Law.  While the contestants range from Biglaw refugee to Biglaw reject to recovering Biglawyer, you have to give them credit for their will to leave the suits behind and hitch their wagon to Lat’s star.  Their mothers must be dying.

Following the tried and true formula, the three “celebrity” judges will be:

    • Ann Althouse, Robert W. & Irma M. Arthur-Bascom Professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School, and author of her eponymous blog, Althouse;
    • Tom Goldstein, head of the D.C. litigation practice and co-head of the firm-wide Supreme Court practice at Akin Gump, and founder of SCOTUSblog; and
    • Dahlia Lithwick, senior editor of Slate (where she blogged at Convictions), author of two books, and a contributor to the New York Times and the Washington Post (among many other publications).

Already the judges are jockeying for position, with Lithwick edging out Althouse for the “Paula” position.  It’s unclear whether Goldstein is Randy or Simon, but breaking with the ATL tradition of gender confusion, he will not be “Paula”.Above the Law gets about 3 Million page views a month (which is at least 27 more than Simple Justice…in my dreams), which is an astounding number of reads.  So whoever gets the gig will have some big shoes to fill, not that I’m saying that Lat has extremely large or peculiar feet.  I have no idea what type of feet he has.  But you get the point.

While I may have had some fun with Lat in the past, I’ve got to say that this is just hysterical.  How he came up with this idea is beyond me, but Lat has got an incredible vision for the blawgosphere and may ultimately prove to be one of the most significant visionaries as far as fulfilling the promise of the blawgosphere.  Maybe not, but at least we should get one heck of a good laugh out of it.  Compared to my boring polemics, Lat is a star.

I sincerely tip my hat to David Lat.  You are my idol.

Message or Messenger?

Had any other blawger written this post, it would have, at best, been ignored and, at worst, ripped to shreds for its shocking superficiality and lack of substance.  Instead, it was worthy of note by Bob Ambrogi.

Am I the only one to think this?

Has the blawgosphere become more enamored with the messenger than the message?

And will I get skewered for not praying at the alter of a superstar?

One Lecture By a Cop with Many, Many Lessons

Lawprof Dan Solove has posted a series of three videos at Concurring Opinions of a lecture given by Newport Beach Police Officer (and 3L student) George Bruch to a law school class.  I was mesmerized by the lecture, both for the underlying truth of it and for what it says about the nature of law enforcement.

Bruch provides enormous insight, much of it in ways that he is incapable of appreciating, about how police obtain statements and confessions from defendants.  The moral of his lecture is that defendants should keep their mouths shut. But as he points out numerous times, they have little chance when manipulated by cops, “professionals” in obtaining statements.

Over and over, Bruch emphasizes that “defendants are stupid,” meaning that they are so easily manipulated into talking to the cops, even though there is nothing they could do that is more damning to their cause.  That’s a cop talking.  What he is really saying is that defendants are people, and people are flawed.  That they fail to recognize that silence is in their best interest is not a reflection of their stupidity, but a reflection of their frailty, a trait which the cops take advantage of and capitalize on.

But there is one great message throughout this lecture that Police Officer cum law student Bruch fails to understand:  He speaks of his desire not to prosecute an innocent person, and is proud of the fact that when he believes a person being interviewed (he never says interrogated because, as he explains, that makes it sound bad), he will not manipulate them into making a confession but cut them loose. 

In other words, Bruch, the cop, decides on his own who is guilty and who is not, and if he decides that the person is guilty, then he will use every weapon at his disposal to extract a confession, overpowering their will and reason, to make a slam dunk case.  Bruch shows neither doubt nor remorse, nor even the slightest recognition, that he might possibly be wrong in his assessment. 

It takes a while to get through the three videos, but this is worth the time and certainly instructive:





Does this restore your faith in justice?