Author Archives: SHG

Marty Tankleff Finally Gets A New Trial

For almost 20 years, Marty Tankleff’s conviction for the murder of his parents has been cause celebre.  Marty was the poster boy for false confessions, obtained when a tough detective deceived and manipulated a teenager whose parents were just murdered into giving a false confession.  Back then, the notion of a false confession was considered laughable.  Just another defense lawyer scam.

Over the years, a handful of lawyers contributed their time and effort pro bono to help Marty, who is no longer a kid but has somehow maintained a remarkably even keel about his life in prison for a crime few believe he committed.   His primary lawyer, Bruce Barkett, is one of the most tenacious guys I know.  He is a true zealot for lost causes, some of which I find abhorrent (he defends killers of abortion docs, as a matter of principal).  But that same blind faith made him stick by Marty Tankleff.

With the help of an investigator, Jay Salpeter, who also refused to give up, they developed evidence showing that Marty’s parents were killed by a business partner with the help of a couple of local mutts.  But mutts being what they are, later started talking about how they helped Jerard Steuerman, who faked his own death and fled to California a week after the killings, kill Arlene and Seymour Tankleff.  Steuerman owed Seymour about half a million dollars.  Naturally, detectives put their best efforts into thinking this through and decided that all the evidence points to the Tankleff son, Marty.

As related by Newsday,


Homicide Det. K. James McCready faked a phone call to himself while interrogating Tankleff, then told him — falsely — that his father had awoken from a coma and implicated him in the attack. Tankleff asked if it was possible that he did it while he was blacked out, and police told him that was possible. He then confessed, police said, but recanted right away and never signed a written confession.

Why bother with investigations when you can nail down a confession from a grieving kid, right?

After many years, Barkett was able to get a hearing before Suffolk County Judge Stephen Braslow.  With the prosecution fighting tooth and nail, including refusing to grant immunity to one of the mutts who admitted that he did Steuerman’s dirty work (why not grant immunity for the murder, if you say the witness is a liar), the judge denied the post-trial motion with a scathing decision.


In a March 2006 ruling, Braslow dismissed the new witnesses as a group of “nefarious scoundrels,” many with extensive criminal histories.

This decision shocked the public and legal community alike; It wasn’t a slam dunk that the defense had put together proof that Marty was innocent, but they had made every aspect of the case that put Marty Tankleff in jail smell so bad that no reasonable person could have faith in this conviction.  By definition, this doesn’t put Judge Braslow into the “reasonable person” column.

Finally, someone who matters agreed.  The Appellate Division, Second Department, not one of those pushover courts inclined to let the defense run wild, reversed Judge Braslow and granted team Tankleff a new trial.


“It is abhorrent to our sense of justice and fair play to countenance the possibility that someone innocent of a crime may be incarcerated or otherwise punished for a crime which he or she did not commit,” four appellate justices — Reinaldo E. Rivera, Gabriel M. Krausman, Anita R. Florio and Mark C. Dillon — wrote in a unanimous, 21-page decision.

Full decision can be found here.  In reversing Braslow’s remarkably harsh and overly doctrinaire denial, the Appellate Division recognized for the defense what is so often employed for the prosecution.  They held that Braslow wrongfully


“in effect, applied a blanket disqualification of all of the defendant’s proffered evidence. … dismissed, outright, the possibility that witnesses with criminal records, drug addictions, and/or psychiatric issues may nevertheless be capable of testifying truthfully.”

That’s the problem when the defense gathers evidence against the real murderers.  They are rarely candidates for sainthood.  Neither are prosecution witnesses at times, but they have access to much better robes to wrap their witnesses in to conceal that they are really scum.  The defense finds its witnesses wherever it can, and they stand before the court in all their prison orange jumpsuits.  When it’s the defense, there’s no choice in the matter.

The game isn’t over for Marty Tankleff.  He now gets a new trial, and it will be up to a jury to decide whether all of these facts require a different outcome.  Bruce Barkett, for all his tenacity, tends to try a “scorched earth” case, a by-product of his zeal.  It’s open warfare, take no prisoners, with Bruce at the helm, and this may have been a reason why the prosecution and court took such firm positions against Marty Tankleff.  But you have to take the good with the bad when it comes to a fight that lasts this long.

Having paid careful attention to the evidence presented, and knowing a little of the inside evidence of this case that never saw the neon lights of the courtroom because of games played by the prosecution, I feel certain that Marty Tankleff should be acquitted.  Let’s hope the right result happens for a kid who didn’t deserve to spend the last 20 years in prison.  And Kudos to the defense team for keeping up the fight.

The Wiki of the Practical Blawgosphere

A couple of guys sitting around their computers one night decided it was time to start a Wiki of the Practical Blawgosphere.  Why?  Bordedom.  Unused bandwidth?  Nope.  Other blawging groups have formed as a way of letting their brethren know they exist and to provide a central point for some new readers and blawgers to see who and what already exists among the new guard of the blawgosphere.

If you’re a blawger, established or not, go to the wiki and make your presence known.  As the practical blawgosphere expands, this will serve as the clearing house for what’s out there in the wonderful wide world of the world wide web.  This is not just about criminal law, but all practice areas in the practical blawgosphere, from personal injury to tax certiorari.  If you practice and blawg, then your blawg should be listed here.

And if you’re looking for blawgs that suit your needs and interests that are done by and for real practicing lawyers, this is the place to start your search.  Don’t blow by some terrific blawgs because you just didn’t happen to stumble across them.  Check it out, and be a part of helping it to grow.

And if anybody is any good at computer type stuff (which to me means anyone who can remember how many backslashes come after “html”),  add your thoughts to what’s up there.  The practical blawgosphere is for the people, and that means YOU!

Just Want Everyone To Know, Part 3

This post by David Tarrell at  In the Moment is really worth the read.  Not because it is the worst thing our sensitive and deeply caring border collies guards have done, but because it really captures the feeling of what America has become.  Imagine yourself going to Europe and being treated this way.  The harmlessness and naivete is overwhelming.  How terribly sad it is.

It occurs to me that I might tell you what David’s post is all about to entice you to read further.  It’s about a nice woman from Iceland who came to visit and spend her money in the US, and how we welcomed her with open arms, and cuff and leg irons, because she had overstayed her tourist visa during her last US visit by a few weeks.  That’s right, she’s a danger to our way of life.  Suffice it to say that she will not be the Icelandic poster girl for American tourism.

The Power To Do Justice

The case of Matthew Jones is one of those that reduces the criminal courts to a bit of a joke.  You remember Jones, who was charged with  the crime of standing around Times Square.  After three years, the Court of Appeals  finally held that standing was not a crime.

At Judicial Reports, the Jones case was traced back to its start, where defense counsel moved to dismiss the complaint for facial insufficiency.  The Judge sitting at arraignments that day was Abe Clott.  Judge Clott is a smart judge and one of my favorite choices for the criminal court bench in a while.  He was smart when he was a federal defender in the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn, for people in Nebraska), where he was dedicated, enthusiastic and hard-working.  And he kept those qualities when he put on the robe, unlike some others.

Now one would think that if any judge would have tossed the Matthew Jones complaint out on its ear, it would be Judge Abe Clott.  And that was the original position at Judicial Reports. 

Then, somebody whispered in their ear that it wasn’t Judge Clott’s fault, because he was precluded from tossing the complaint for facial insufficiency by Criminal Procedure Law 170.30.  This parenthetical then appeared:


(Since the initial publication of this story on December 19, new information has come to Judicial Reports’ attention, as follows: Whether or not he agreed that the disorderly conduct charge was facially insufficient, Judge Clott was prohibited from dismissing it on those grounds at arraignment.

New York Criminal Procedure Law 170.30 states that motions to dismiss on such grounds can be submitted only after arraignment. Court records show that Jones pleaded guilty at arraignment after Clott denied Dorsch’s motion, effectively closing the option of dismissal on grounds of facial insufficiency. Ultimately, as the question of dismissal was moot once Jones took a plea, the Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on grounds that the charge was facially insufficient.)

True, but wrong.  While the statute provides for a mechanism to move for dismissal, it has nothing to do with the most fundamental gatekeeper responsibility of a judge sitting at arraignment.  The first thing a judge must do is determine that jurisdiction exists to exert the power of the state over the individual.  To do that, the judge must make the basic decision that the allegations against the person standing before him constitutes a facially sufficient crime.

The issue of a dismissals based on facial insufficiency was at the heart of Fitzpatrick v. Rosenthal, here Syracuse city court judge was attacked by the local district attorney for not agreeing to be a rubber stamp to his underhanded tactics.  When Judge Kate Rosenthal was going to dismiss a complaint, and discharge the defendant from custody, for facial insufficiency, the DA wanted to tell the judge “secret facts” to convince her that the complaints were not facially insufficient, with the proviso that she keep the “secret facts” to herself and not reveal them to defense counsel.  Judge Kate wasn’t biting, so the District Attorney, William Fitzpatrick, decided to bite Judge Rosenthal instead.

As discussed in this Fourth Department decision, it is a basic function of the arraigning “neutral magistrate” to make a threshold determination that the allegations facially constitute a crime, before subjecting someone to the jurisdiction of the court.  Kate Rosenthal understood this.  Did Judge Clott?

And just in case someone is wondering, so why didn’t anyone in New York think to put something about this in the statute if it’s such a basic thing, they did.  Criminal Procedure Law 140.30 provides:


If a local criminal court accusatory instrument  filed  with  a  local
  criminal  court  pursuant  to  section  140.20,  140.25 or 140.40 is not
  sufficient on its face, as prescribed in  section  100.40,  and  if  the
  court  is satisfied that on the basis of the available facts or evidence
  it would be impossible to draw and file an accusatory  instrument  which
  is  sufficient  on  its face, it must dismiss such accusatory instrument
  and discharge the defendant.

So just in case any of you judges think that you lack the authority to toss a garbage complaint and subject a person to the rigors of prosecution, to incarceration or bail, to hiring counsel and going to court lest a warrant be ordered, you don’t.  You have not only the right, but the duty, to throw out a complaint like the one in Jones, and save some human being from being put through the judicial saw mill needlessly.

Telecom Immunity: But What About The Really Illegal Stuff?

I’m not a big fan of the idea that Big Corporations, at the moment Telecoms, have become a branch of the Justice Department to “protect us” from whatever we need protecting from at the moment.  Put together, we have Telecoms working for the government protecting us from communists terrorists.

I know this isn’t the sexiest story around, but it’s one of the scariest.  The impact to privacy, per lawprof Kerr’s model of “private laws,” demands the highest level of scrutiny.  The government has gotten the phone companies to let them listen in on our personal conversations, people.  Does this not concern you?  I know that I don’t want my conversations with my kids, filled with all that lovey-daddy stuff, heard by anyone else.  It’s embarrassing.

Lawprof Mike Dorf thinks this is a problem.  He’s posted an interesting theoretical conversation to make his point:


Suppose an FBI agent approached a generally law-abiding citizen that I’ll call “Shmerizon,” and the following conversation ensued.

FBI Agent: I’d like you to whack Shmarlos the Shmackal. He’s a terrorist.

Shmerizon: By whack, you mean . . . .

FBI Agent: You know what I mean.

Shmerizon: Uhm, isn’t that illegal?

FBI Agent: I’m with the government. If I tell you to do this in the interest of national security, it’s not illegal. Understand?

Much as I love this little exercise, it’s not quite analogous.  At first blush, it’s hard to ignore the difference between the malum in se aspect of murder, compared to the malum prohibitum nature of eavesdropping.  With a piece of paper, eavesdropping turned from a bad thing to law enforcement at its most effective.  Murder is a little different, as long as you don’t think about capital punishment too hard.

Lawprof Kerr thinks it misses the boat because the Telecoms acted pursuant to a “certification” from the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii)(, meaning that granting the Telecoms immunity just preempts a lot of wasteful, losing litigation.  Oddly, I wonder why Orin didn’t question the propriety (not to mention constitutionality) of this certification?  Since when does Congress get to pass laws eviscerating our rights under the Fourth Amendment?

But my problem with all of this is different.  Regardless of the validity of this certification argument, the discussion relies on our acceptance of a blatant falsehood:  That they are only eavesdropping on communications for the purpose of stopping terrorism. 

This is why I believed that the New York Times story, where our highly trustworthy government officials admitted that this was a fabrication, intended to calm the frayed nerves of gullible public, was so critically important.  Now that our government camel has its nose under the Telecom tent, they are spying on us for the purpose of general criminal conduct.  Screw terrorism, they are listening to whatever they want.

While the certification argument may well prove accurate if we accept the fantasy that this is all about terrorism, suddenly lawprof Dorf’s point is looking a lot better when we step back and look at the reality of what our beloved government is really doing.  By combining the deception that is being perpetrated on the public by the government under cover of terrorism, with the invasion of our private communications, it comes much closer to the evils of murder than the benign “administrative” approach of the AG’s certification.

While I don’t blame the lawprofs for considering this issue from a purely legalistic approach, it would be far more useful if they were playing with a full deck of facts rather than adopting the government’s fictional approach that this only has to do with protecting us from terrorist attack.  Given that the government quietly concedes that they can’t stop themselves from enjoying unfettered access to private communications, like a bunch of lawyers on information heroin, can we still dismiss the role of the Telecoms in this so easily?  Not in my view.

Spector to Robert Shapiro: You Sucked and I Want My Million Back

The Phil Spector murder case had drama on all sides, not the least of which was Spector’s unhappiness with his choice of counsel.  When the cops snapped the cuffs around his wrists, Phil turned to his friend and Hollywood criminal defense lawyer to the stars, Robert Shapiro. 

You remember Bob Shapiro, OJ Dream Team leader (at least in the beginning) who later ended up in a war of egos with Johnnie Cochran over whose was bigger (yeah, a Jewish guy and a black guy; guess who [deservedly] won). Well, Phil Spector paid Shapiro a $1,000,000.00 retainer.  Shapiro gave him the “close personal friend” discount.

Now Phil wants his money back.  Phil had earlier commenced an action to recover the retainer, but discontinued it without prejudice.  Now that Phil’s first trial ended up with a hung jury, he’s got some free time on his hands and, according to this New York Lawyer piece, he’s going after his pal Bob.


The new lawsuit makes allegations similar to the first, claiming Shapiro “took unfair and unscrupulous advantage of his friendship and position of trust with Mr. Spector, and decided to use Mr. Spector’s arrest as an opportunity to make a financial windfall and garner publicity for himself.

These allegations strike me as curious.  Spector gets arrested, hires his buddy Shapiro (who happens to be a criminal defense lawyer, though of disputed quality) and pays him.  There isn’t much here that sounds wrong, no matter what rhetoric you use to characterize this as evil.  To the extent that Bob Shapiro wasn’t the best lawyer for the job, nobody put a gun to Phil Spector’s head to force him to retain Shapiro. 


Spector also alleged he was pressured into signing an “engagement letter” with Shapiro and the firm at a time when “he was laboring under a tremendous amount of mental stress that comes with being arrested for murder.”

 But criminal defense lawyers are typically retained during times of extreme duress and emotion.  People don’t hire us when life is going great.  When life if good, we’re pariahs.  It’s only when this defecation strikes a whirling blade that we’re needed, and then we’re suddenly their best friend.  It’s the nature of the business.

On the other hand, if Phil Spector’s argument is that people should retain criminal defense lawyers when they have no charges pending, I’m with him 100%.  I think everyone should have a criminal defense lawyer on retainer.  You never know, right?

But it’s not all roses and kudos for Shapiro, either.


Shapiro’s attorney contended that Spector tried to break his contract with Shapiro by trying to get back some of the retainer after switching lawyers.

So what?  Ethically, a client can discharge his lawyer at any moment, for good reason or no reason at all.  The ability to freely contract is different for lawyers than for anyone else.  We cannot force our clients to continue to be represented by us if they decide otherwise.  It’s the client’s right.  It’s always the client’s right, and there is nothing we can (or should be able to) do to change that.  If they don’t like our tie, they can fire us.  Irrational, perhaps, but still the client’s right.

As for the money, New York does not permit nonrefundable retainers in criminal cases.  In re Cooperman. 83 NY 465 (1994).  Many other states have followed suit.  Why?  Because it becomes a “contract” of financial adhesion, where you can fire the lawyer but, if you can’t recover the unused portion of the retainer, you have no money left to hire the new lawyer and feel compelled to stay with a lawyer you don’t want for financial reasons. 

Did Bob Shapiro “earn” his million?  That’s another issue.  He may well have, given the nature of the case and the defendants.  I doubt it, but that’s just my personal speculation.  It’s the only real issue in this matter, and should serve to warn all Hollywood criminal defense lawyers not to commit to buying that new Bentley too soon.

Should Crime Victims Get Their Own Seat In The Well?

From U.S. News and World Report, via CrimProf Blog, the good news is that the government lost an appeal.  The bad news is that it wasn’t to the defense, but to the victim. 

[Victim W. Patrick] Kenna made his anger clear during the father’s 2005 sentencing, but when the son’s day in court arrived three months later, the federal judge denied Kenna’s request to speak. “I listened to the victims the last time,” Judge John Walter said. “There just isn’t anything else that could possibly be said.” Kenna was furious. “We didn’t feel that the judge was taking into consideration the victims in the case,” he says. So he turned to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ordered the judge to let Kenna speak at a new hearing.

In their passion to pander to the sympathetic victim, and thereby blur the distinction between civil and criminal law, Congress gave victims standing to appeal in 2004.  Of course, nobody actually expected anyone to do so, since the cost and burden would dissuade them as their anger subsided over time.  But not Mr. Kenna.  He was pissed, and he followed through.  You’ve got to give the guy credit for persistence (or holding a grudge).

Mark Godsey, the crimprof himself, offers little commentary about this case, but would appear to be on the victim’s side based on his inclusion of this quote:


 “What our goal should be is to put the victim back into the position as if no crime had been committed,” says Paul Cassell, a former federal judge who resigned this year to advocate for victims.

As an aside, notice how Paul Cassell’s name is everywhere lately.  Clearly, he’s having more of an impact as a former federal judge than he did on the bench.

We  previously posted about how this “victim’s rights” movement skews the nature of criminal prosecutions in an inappropriate direction.  But Paul Cassell’s position goes much further, and (let me be as clear as I can about this), his position is absolutely, totally, fundamentally wrong.  Horribly wrong. Disastrously wrong.  Not right at all.

Criminal law is not about returning the victim to the status quo ante.  There are various civil causes of action that exist to serve that purpose, and they should be employed to do so.  But not the criminal law, which exists to vindicate the public’s interest in deterring criminal conduct.  Hard as it is to imagine for the victim, criminal prosecution is not intended to provide free legal services to the victim against the defendant.  It is not a substitute for the victim’s concerns in whatever happened, and the prosecutor does not represent the victim in court.

But should he?  No (I would have thought that was already clear).  Society has interests at stake in making conduct criminal rather than simply a compensable wrong.  We give the prosecution a ton of power because of these societal interests at stake.  These interests include making sure that the defendant’s constitutional rights aren’t violated, and that the publics’ interest in a fair, speedy, public trial isn’t impaired.  None of these things are in the victim’s interest, nor should they be.

It’s rather disturbing that Paul Cassell is deeply involved in the further blurring of the distinction between civil and criminal law.  That he cares for victims is completely understandable, even laudable.  But that he supports a shift in the mechanics of criminal law that impedes the protection of constitutional rights is harder to understand. 

Nowhere does the Constitution provide a right to crime victims to have any say in criminal prosecutions.  The very legitimacy of the power conferred upon the government to prosecute crimes in the name of society is undermined when a particular individual’s personal interests are at best equal, and at worst superior, to that of the People who have given their government that power. 

This is not about being “anti-victim,” no matter what anyone says.  It is about politicians and advocates not using this transitory social sympathy to play around with the nature of criminal law, whether to capture a few extra votes or because you are willing to turn a blind eye to intellectual honesty in the name of achieving a desired goal.  You might also think that crimprof Godsey would have some doubts about giving the victim a seat in the well, between the prosecutor and the defendant.  Unfortunately, it appears that this suits him just fine.

A Scholarly Approach To Search & Seizure That May Actually Work

When Orin Kerr  announced that his law review article on a new approach to 4th Amendment jurisprudence was published in the Stanford Law Review, I knew I would break my solemn rule of never reading anything from the left coast or with the letters L.Rev. in the citation.  I couldn’t help myself.

But the title was interesting: Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection.  I like Fourth Amendment protection.  In fact, it’s a very interesting subject for me.  Plus there was the symmetry thing, four models and fourth Amendment.  How could I not take a quick look.

It started out a little slow.  A bit jargonistic, using that scholarly affectation that makes lawyers wonder why academics can’t just say what they mean in the first place.  But Orin caught me with his frank discussion of Supreme Court 4th Amendment jurisprudence. 


Among scholars, this state of affairs is widely considered an embarrassment. The Court’s handiwork has been condemned as “distressingly unmanageable,” “unstable,” and “a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that [the Court] has left entirely undefended.” Treatises and casebooks struggle to explain the test. Most simply announce the outcomes in the Supreme Court’s cases, and some suggest that the only way to identify was an expectation of privacy is reasonable is when five Justices say so. The consensus among scholars is that the Supreme Court’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” cases are a failure.

See, already we agree on something.  This was going swimmingly.

Up to now, the Supremes have developed a bunch of rules and exceptions that apply to particular situations, together with a lot of words that give little if any guidance if one treads anywhere beyond the specifics of prior cases.  What they had not developed was a cogent means of deciding cases that lower courts, and police on the street, could follow to know whether they were violating the Constitution. 

By going through the caselaw, and the varying approaches used to justify the desired outcomes, Orin developed these four models:



  • The Probabilistic Model

  • The Private Facts Model

  • The Positive Law Model

  • The Policy Model

If you want a short explanation of what each of these models is, you’re going to have to read the 439 pages of explanations and examples that I went through.  (Only kidding, the explanations are only 47 pages).  They reflect three approaches to search and seizure cases that are dictated by the nature of the case and issue, and an overarching model that applies to all, and in the absence of any other viable theory. 

Here’s Orin’s overview:


The failure of any one test to consistently distinguish police practices needing Fourth Amendment regulation from those that do not has led to the mixed system that exists today. Although the courts speak of a single “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the one label masks several distinct but coexisting approaches. Four approaches predominate, together reflecting four different models of Fourth Amendment protection. The first three rely on proxies. The probabilistic model considers the likelihood that the subject’s information would become known to others or the police. The lower the likelihood, the more likely it is that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. The private facts model asks whether the government’s conduct reveals particularly private and personal information deserving of protection. This approach focuses on the information the government collects rather than how it is collected. The positive law model considers whether the government conduct interferes with property rights or other legal standards outside the Fourth Amendment. When courts apply the positive law model, an expectation of privacy becomes reasonable when it is backed by positive law such as trespass. The fourth and final model, the policy model, reflects the direct approach. Courts applying the policy model focus directly on whether the police practice should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment.

Reading through the lengthy explanations and discussions and examples and more discussions of the model, I was certain that this was going to prove to be a big circle that ultimately ended where it started, with a Supreme Court able to pick whatever model gave them the rationale to reach whatever result 5 justices wanted.  In other words, we would maintain a consistent 4th Amendment jurisprudence:  always result oriented.

Well, you could have knocked me over with a feather.  Orin, at the very last minute, pulled the entire discussion together to arrive at a fully conceived, cogent and (amazingly) viable method of applying the four models that would produce a consistent and explainable approach to search and seizure cases.  This way, lower courts would have a road map as to which approach was required by a particular fact pattern or scenario, and how that approach should be consistently executed.


Explicit recognition of the different models would help the process work more effectively. The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions sometimes have a shotgun quality: the Justices use any model they can to justify the selected result. The Court should realize that when it applies the reasonable expectation of privacy test, it faces a critical choice as to which model or models to use. The Supreme Court’s choice of models in one case won’t bind future courts to the same choice; rather, the Court must always make a context-sensitive selection of which model to use to explain the Court’s result in a particular case. The Court should pick the model that in context best distinguishes less troublesome police practices that need not be regulated from more troublesome practices that are only reasonable when accompanied by a warrant or special circumstances. Furthermore, the Court’s choice of model should be as clear as possible. By choosing the model or models, the Court’s opinion will help frame the choice of models in analogous cases decided by the lower courts. To facilitate lower court decision making, Supreme Court opinions should pick models clearly.

Could this be the way to eliminate the zillion exceptions that retain the rubric but forget the rationale?  Would this force courts to stop their resort to knee-jerk rules to permit invasive conduct when a warrant could easily be obtained?  Could this restore meaning to search and seizure limitations that have been so long ignored that search warrants have been placed in museums?  Maybe.

As for cops, they would have a means (if they would bother to read or learn it) to know exactly when they were violating constitutional rights.  So at least when they did it from now on, they would know they did it.  It would be a shame to violate rights and not even get the enjoyment of knowing it, right?

Defense lawyers would find this approach interesting, in that the qualitative decisions of “reasonableness” that courts generally use to deny our suppression motions would be constrained to fit within a larger rule.  It may well produce a far more rational way of arguing search and seizure violations, and make it a little more difficult for courts to just yell “denied” to make us go away.  Of course, that would also depend on their bothering to read or learn it as well.  It might take a generation or two of judges before such a change would filter down to the trial courts.

If you are incline to give some serious thought to a very interesting, and surprisingly viable, way to deal with search and seizure decisions, this article has much to offer.  You can cruise through the middle, which is not intended for consumption by real people, and cut to the end where Orin tells you who killed Col. Mustard in the library with a search warrant.  It’s worth the read.

Update:  I just found out about Ken Lammers reviewof an earlier version of this article here.  His explanation of the four models is much more succinct than mine (which explains why he’s a prosecutor now), but I have to disagree with Ken’s point that the “positive facts” model is a subset of the “policy model.”  The former deals with the end product of the seizure, such as private diary, whereas the latter deals with the police conduct in seizing it.  As noted, the “policy model” is always an overarching concern.  But I agree with Orin that there are some things that, by their nature, demand a level of special protection and heightened scrutiny.  It would similar, to my mind, to the special protection afforded a residence, which has not become riddled with exceptions.  But of course, that’s my view because I’m a defense lawyer. 

Is the Patient Stable?

Dan Solove at  Concurring Opinions and Orin Kerr at  Volokh Conspiracy are discussing whether the blawgosphere has stabilized.  According to Orin,


The major new blog was David Lat’s Above the Law, which has quickly become highly trafficked. But there were surprisingly few new blogs that took off, and many more blogs that looked bright in 2006 but became mostly or entirely dormant in 2007. Most of the major blogs have kept going, and readership on the whole has been roughly stable. But my sense is that there hasn’t been a lot of growth in overall law blog postings and readership.

Dan largely agrees:


I think Orin is right — partially. Here’s where I think he’s right. Many blogs have very small audiences. Only a few law blogs have more than 1000 readers per day. My guess is that the number of law blogs with more than 1000 readers has not increased dramatically over the past few years. There are so many blogs that a person can read, and many folks have found their favorites now and are content. Of course, there’s always the possibility of an exciting new blog on the block that will quickly attract an audience. But in our experience at Concurring Opinions, it takes time and lots of work to build an audience.

This discussion, of course, is one amongst the big boys, the A-list of the old line blawgosphere.  To give you an idea of what this means, when Orin post a link to one of my posts here, I saw a jump in reads to the tune of 3500.  Let me tell you, that’s a huge number, and it was clearly a product of being linked over there. 

But I think that both Dan and Orin, perhaps because they are now old line blawgers or perhaps because only the broader interest law blogs find a permanent place on their radar, have underestimated the worth of niche blawgs in the practical blawgosphere, of which Simple Justice is proud to be a member.

When I started, less than a year ago, I was thrilled to reach the 100 reads a day level.  This exceeded my expectations, and I really had no idea whether anyone would bother to come and read anything I wrote.  Today, my reads typically exceed 1000, usually in the area of 1500 a day.  Granted, this is a minute fraction of the potential audience, even for the niche of criminal defense law, but this reflects 1500 people who could spend their time doing something else, but choose to stop by, see what’s here, and spend a few minutes reading.  It’s really very gratifying, and I consider this experiment a huge success.

Will I ever reach the exalted levels of Davit Lat?  I doubt it.  His blawg draws from a very different universe of readers than mine.  And the reason people go to ATL is very different as well.  If I was a biglaw associate, I would read Lat’s blawg religiously.  It has the dirt that I would want to know.

But enough about me.  There are a bunch of blawgs in this niche, listed on the sidebar, that are alive and healthy.  For the most part, they are all newbies like me, started within the past year and thriving.  I suspect that Dan and Orin are too high on the mountain to see us little niche blawgs so far below them.  But guys, we’re here, we’re expanding out reach and our voice, and we’re doing just fine.  We aren’t going to interest the broad groups that others reach, because we focus on our own little corner of the blawgosphere, but we have established a place for ourselves and are becoming firmly, and happily, entrenched.

So before you dismiss the blawgosphere as being stable, and conclude that there’s no new life down here, don’t forget about us little guys, toiling away in the practical blawgosphere.  Even though we may not command a huge audience in the blawgosphere, we are as big as anyone else in the courtroom, and what we bring from there to here matters as much as what anyone else has to say.

I want to be a solo because . . .

Susan Cartier Leibel has started a new contest!  Unlike the beauty pageants that we’ve grown to used to (and bored of), this is an essay contest.  The prize is a 2 hour “consultation” with Susan, a value too high to state publicly.  There is no mention of whether Susan’s consultation  includes cocktails.

The contest is requires one to answer the following question:  “I want to open my own solo legal practice because___________.” 

Don’t you bother thinking about, because I’ve got this nailed.  Here’s the winning essay:

       I want to open my own solo legal practice because I enjoy sitting at my desk on a slow day, making sure none of my paper clips escaped, while waiting for the phone to ring so that I know that I will have at least one more new paying client to feed my family for the coming week.  I want to deal with the copy machine man, the telephone man, the computer woman, the supply guy, and elevator man, the building manager, whenever they need to talk to somebody.  When it’s my practice, I’m finally somebody.  At least to them.

        I want to hear about how one secretary does all the work, and how the receptionist hates her, and how the para talks on the phone all day.  I want to hear about how the associates are mean to them, and about their children’s illnesses, and why the consequences of every bad decision they ever made is mine to fix.  I care deeply about people, and people care deeply that I prove it to them day after day.

        I want to explain to the judge why I’m not happy sitting around her courtroom for hours while waiting for the 30 seconds of face time before being told to come back some other day, all the while having another client and judge in another courtroom across the city waiting for me impatiently, because there aren’t two of me to be everywhere whenever a judge demands.  I want to return to my office to spend the night doing a brief on an obvious issue so that the judge could shut me down for having been so rude as to raise another problem for her to deal with.  I want to speak with my Lexis representative to find out why my bill is higher than the gross national product of smallish countries.

        I want to answer the telephone when no one else does, because it may be important and I’m the only one who cares.  I want to turn off the lights alone every night, after searching for health plans, cutting checks and trying to figure out why my telephone bills never add up, while other people who live off my flesh keep sticking their heads into my office to ask why I’m still here.   I want to know why I either get 10 new cases in a day, far too many for me to handle, or not a single new case in a month, even though bills keep coming in the mail.

        When the phone is ringing off the hook, and the clients are paying their bills on time and everybody is filled with love and admiration for me because I’m such a terrific guy, I want to still be able to worry that it could all end at any moment, with the phone silent and the verdict guilty and the client angry and the staff at war.  I want to wake up in the middle of the night and remember how it felt to only have to be a lawyer, without being the chief financial officer and toilet cleaner because no one else would even consider doing it.  I want to watch as staff tosses out redwelds, at $3.59 apiece, because they keep messing up the names on the labels.

        I want to open my own solo legal practice because, no matter how much work, aggravation and anxiety it will cause, it will be mine.  It will be done my way.  It will survive or fail because of the lawyer I am.  And when I shut the lights off as the last one out at night, I will say goodnight to my practice, for better or worse.