Author Archives: SHG

Judge Posner Knows His Salad Dressing

Not that it’s rare for a Circuit Court to acquit a defendant for the abject failure of the government to prove a crime, but to give the prosecutor a good “dressing down” in the process is something that shouldn’t be missed.   Even if the crime is the alleged mislabeling of salad dressing.

In United States v. Farinella, a 13 page decision from the 7th Circuit, Judge Posner takes us on a whirlwind tour of the world of salad dressing labeling, all the while exposing how the government played bait and switch with the very heart of its argument, that the “best if eaten by” date is the same thing as the “expiration date” on the label.  As it turns out, it’s not, and the salad dressing has a shelf life similar to that of Twinkies. 

There are some gems in this decision that could well be applied to many cases, and are worth keeping in your bag of tricks for future reference.  At one point, the government called an FDA “expert” to testify what he thought the law should be.  To this, the Court said:

If there is a requirement that the FDA’s approval must be obtained before a “best when purchased by” date may be changed, it would, to be a lawful predicate of a criminal conviction, have to be found in some statute or regulation, or at least in some written interpretive guideline or opinion, and not just in the oral testimony of an agency employee. It is a denial of due process of law to convict a person of a crime because he violated some bureaucrat’s secret understanding of the law. “The idea of secret laws is repugnant. People cannot comply with laws the existence of which is concealed.” Torres v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1998); see George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Chao, 463 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190-91 (D. Conn. 2006); Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 388 F. Supp. 326, 335 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1974).
(My emphasis, because it would be wrong to miss the incisive use of the word “bureaucrat” in any judicial opinion.) Certainly a classic point of law, applicable to so many other things, given the pervasive government reliance on “expert” opinion.  And we’re not done yet.

After noting that the AUSA mislead the jury by arguing “expiration date” rather than “best by” date, Judge Posner related a question from oral argument (proof yet again that oral argument is always worth your time):

We asked the government’s lawyer at argument what an appropriate sanction for the prosecutor’s misconduct might be. We are not permitted to reverse a judgment on the basis of a lawyer’s misconduct that would not have caused a reasonable jury to acquit, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1983); United States. v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1995), but in this case, had the government presented enough evidence to sustain a conviction, we would have reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor’s misconduct. That sanction is not available only because the government presented so little evidence that the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. That does not detract from the gravity of the prosecutor’s misconduct and the need for an appropriate sanction. The government’s appellate lawyer told us that the prosecutor’s superior would give her a talking-to. We are not impressed by the suggestion.

And finally comes the Court’s coup de grâce:
Since we are directing an acquittal on all counts, the sentencing issues are academic and we do not address them, beyond expressing our surprise that the government would complain about the leniency of the sentence for a crime it had failed to prove

True, it was only salad dressing, but for any white collar practitioner dealing with fraud that’s predicated upon the government’s “interpretation”, this decision is gem.  And a fun read to boot.

Should the Legal Proletariat Unite?

Eric Turkewitz at New York Personal Injury Law Blog doesn’t think much of Eric Johnson’s push at PrawfsBlawg for Biglaw associates to unionize.  No really, Johnson argues that the downtrodden associates should unite to fight the system.



Law-firm associates should unionize. I don’t know why they haven’t already, except that they are, on the whole, rather gutless.


Think about it. Associates at big law firms are perfectly suited to unionize. They are overworked and underpaid. And partners utterly depend on them. If associates actually used their latent collective bargaining power, it seems to me they could extract huge concessions from partners.


Johnson then goes on to state, “[n]ow, I know nothing about labor law.”  But he doesn’t let that stop him for an instant.  Before anyone screams, “logical fallacy, appeal to ignorance,” cool yer jets.  This is fun stuff, and no reason to let logic stand in the way.  And he called them gutless, not me.

Johnson’s suggestions comes at a time of Biglaw devastation of the associate base, with all the mewling cries of foul by those who didn’t get the law review payoff to which they were entitled.  As Turk says:

And what happened to BigLaw with the oodles of money and perks they were throwing around? A big-time contraction. Their clients, it seems, decided that in a Great Recession it might be wise to watch the bottom line, and shelling out piles of dough to BigLaw so they could bill out young associates at ridiculous hourly rates no longer seemed like such a hot idea.

Johnson points out that it’s those evil Biglaw partners, sucking up all the profits that would otherwise be spread across the next generation, at the root of the problem. 


Let me note that when I say associates are underpaid, I do not mean that they are impoverished and we should feel sorry for them. But, compared to the amount that the partners bill clients for associate hours, the portion associates receive is trifling. Why should they surrender more than three-quarters of their billable rate to pay for the partners’ rainmaking services and office overhead?

Put aside the plethora of problems that arise with the concept, like supervision of non-legal staff, conflicts with clients, even (oh no!) professionalism and merit.  After all, teachers say they are professionals and look how well unions worked for them, making our schools the envy of the world.

How can anyone miss the similarities between Biglaw associates and the Haymarket Affair, when McCormick workers were locked out for seeking an eight hour workday, after being beaten by Pinkertons, only to be killed by Chicago police when they opened fire on the crowd in Haymarket Square.  It’s almost the exact same thing!

The point is best made by this letter, contained in an anonymous comment to Johnson’s post:



Dear [Clinton appointee on the Southern District of New York],


I write to implore you to find that “Biglaw Associate” be considered an “employee” under the NLRA. Let me tell you about myself. I am currently a law student at a tier 1 law school and will work at an AmLaw 100 law firm this summer. In preparation for this associateship, I now regularly wear argyle sweaters and driving loafers. For lunch, I enjoy the turkey and brie sandwich with cranberry demi-glaze from Cosi, which I can buy for a mere $8. For dinner, I usually stop at Whole Foods where I can purchase a tray of pre-made sushi for $12. This way, I ensure that I won’t gain weight and that my seersucker pants will still fit properly.


This summer, I plan to use my $3100/week salary to upgrade from a Tag Heuer watch to either an Omega Seamaster or a Rolex Submariner (automatic movement, of course). I really like the Submariner, but they are just so common among law firm associates today! Assuming I receive a full-time offer, my first year I will be paid more than the following people: (1) my parents; (2) every other union member in the country with the exception of Jon Stewart; and (3) you. So, I implore you to liberally construe the NLRA (I’m sure you’ll have no problem doing so) and be sure that my rights are vindicated!


Sincerely,


Pretentious Law Student


Power to the People!

P.S.:  Anybody want to buy a slightly used Tag Heuer wrist watch?

Prosecutor: Better Than A Good Night’s Sleep

Recently, I posted about a very controversial sentence imposed on a mother who beat a man with a bat because he was listed as a sex offender.  Lawyers were appalled.  Mothers were delighted.  On the heels of Tammy Gibson’s three months comes Anthony Cappuccio’s home detention.  It seems that Cappuccio abused his position as a church youth leader:


[Cappuccio] provided alcohol and smoked pot with some of the teens at concerts, then let them drive home. He engaged in a lengthy sexual relationship with one of the boys. He viewed pornographic images of young males on his office computer. He cheated on his pregnant wife, once cutting short a vacation for a rendezvous with the teen boy….

It might seem to some that he was a prime candidate for Tammy Gibson’s bat, right?  Yet not only did Cappuccio not get a good beating, but he was allowed to serve his 3 to 23 month sentence on house arrest.  Did I mention that Cappuccio was a prosecutor? Hence, sentencing maven Doug Berman’s question: Do prosecutors gone bad often get breaks at sentencing?

The answer, it seems, is a very loud and clear “yes”.  It seems to be very helpful to have friends in the system, and far more painful for those friends to impose a sentence even approaching what an outsider might receive.  Consider another prosecutor, this one working in one of the most serious United States Attorney’s offices in the country in a District known for its lack of mercy and harsh sentences, Daniel Perlmutter.


A former Federal prosecutor was sentenced to a three-year prison term yesterday for stealing drugs and cash from the United States Attorney’s office in Manhattan.

The sentence was imposed on Daniel N. Perlmutter, who had pleaded guilty in October to taking $41,800 and five pounds of drugs from the office while working there as a prosecutor. He was arrested and fired when the theft was discovered last May.

Judge Charles E. Stewart Jr., calling it a particularly difficult sentence, imposed the prison term and five years of probation on Mr. Perlmutter, who will be eligible for parole after one year in prison.

The judge said the requisite words that Perlmutter had disgraced his office.  Perlmutter said the requisite words that he disgraced his officer.  Consider all those drug mules doing 10 year mandatory minimum sentences out of the Southern District of New York, and ask yourself, did Perlmutter get off easy?


Rudolph W. Giuliani, the United States Attorney for the Southern District, which includes Manhattan, said later that 12 years would have been the ”appropriate sentence” in view of Mr. Perlmutter’s ”personal betrayal” of his office and colleagues.

Never one to miss an opportunity at self-aggrandizement, Rudy ignored the fact that the maximum was 10 years.  But that aside, the sentence imposed on Dan was shockingly light. 

Conceptually, a prosecutor who commits a crime inherently commits two offenses to society.  The first is the crime itself, or in Cappuccio’s case, many crimes against boys who were placed in his care as a church youth leader.  The second is the violation of his oath, of the power and trust placed in him as a prosecutor.  It would seem that he should receive a sentence of sufficient severity to reflect both wrongs.  Instead, we see the role that connection plays in the sense of what constitutes an appropriate punishment, how a judge “feels” about the person standing before him for sentence.

Just yesterday, I submitted a very substantial pre-sentence memorandum to the court in a case coming up for sentence.  After reading it, my client thought it was great, but asked me the relevant question.  “Do you think it’s going to make a difference?”  I told him that I hoped it would, that it should, that it was something we had to do in order to make the judge understand and appreciate the propriety of the sentence on this particular human being.  But I then told him, “Of course, I would trade it off in an instant if I could guarantee that the judge gets a good night’s sleep the night before.”

So do prosecutors who commit crimes get a break?  You betcha.  It’s even better than a good night’s sleep.

But She Knew He Was A Professor

There is a wonderful allegory where a woman finds a frozen snake, takes it home and nurses it back to health.  That night, the snake bites the woman.  As she lays there dying, she asks the snake how it could do such a thing after she took it in and nursed it back to health.  The snake responds, “But you knew I was a snake when you took me in.”

Massachusetts District Court Judge Nancy Gertner’s innate sense of fairness and belief in the Constitution has made her a star in the federal judiciary.  So when the RIAA suit against Joel Tenenbaum was wheeled to her, she felt compelled to level the playing field.  From Ambrogi at Legal Blog Watch :

U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner, concerned about the imbalance between big record companies and pro se defendants, pointed lawyerless defendant Joel Tenenbaum to Charles Nesson, a professor at Harvard Law School and a founder of Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society. Nesson took up his defense and also saw in the case a broader educational opportunity. One of his first moves was to seek an order allowing a motion hearing to be webcast — an order granted but later put on hold.

But this honeymoon, like all, didn’t last forever.  In the course of his “representation,” Nesson decided to reinvent the Rules of Civil Procedure, ignoring predicate discovery requirements and local rules, together with efforts to convert the suit into a “teaching opportunity” for his Harvard Law students.  Judge Gertner finally hit the wall.

While the Court understands that counsel for the Defendant is a law professor, and that he believes this case serves an important educational function, counsel must also understand that he represents a client in this litigation — a client whose case may well be undermined by the filing of frivolous motions and the failure to comply with the Rules. Submission of a plainly flawed motion cannot be justified as a clinical exercise. The Court will not hesitate to impose appropriate sanctions, including potentially substantial costs, should the Defendant waste either the Plaintiffs’ time and money or scarce judicial resources by filing frivolous motions in the future.

Having received a kindly worded rejection from Harvard Law School, I never had the opportunity to experience life under the pedagogy of Charlie Nesson.  Fortunately, the same can’t be said for Ken at Popehat, who had the pleasure of this exchange in Nesson’s Civ Pro class.

Nesson asked a rather mundane, facially rules-related question. I offered a mundane rules-related answer. He got a terribly disappointed, pensive look on his face, as he was prone to do. “That wasn’t a very profound answer,” he said. “It wasn’t a particularly profound question,” I replied. The class laughed, and he got an angry look on his face and chucked the chalk at me.

Ken learned a lesson that day, though not the lesson that Nesson thought he was teaching.

The exchange revealed the conflict between my attitude and Nesson’s — and, for that matter, Harvard’s. I wanted to learn how most effectively and skillfully to use the rules of evidence to serve clients. Nesson, and Harvard, wanted to teach me how to feel about the rules of evidence, and how the illusion of a rule-bound approach to evidence illuminated various metaphysical, deontological, epistemological, and social divisions in “reality.” They hoped that this would prepare me to teach other people how to feel about evidence, who could then teach other people, and so on, in an endless feedback loop of ivy-festooned wankery. Nesson seemed to share the view recently expressed elsewhere that law school is not meant to train lawyers, but to “appreciate the depth of the legal discourse and explore its rich complexities.”

(As an aside, Ken links to Bennett’s rendition of the absurd remarks of Marquette Lawprof  David Papke, rather than mine, showing that the better blawgers hang together to keep the riff-raff out.)  While we can scoff at the notion that law school professors should be engaged in teaching students to become lawyers, the evidence is clear that they neither want to nor believe that to be their calling.  They are theorists, not practitioners.  They teach.  We do.  Granted, this is a gross oversimplification, and many lawprofs are also regular practitioners, but more are not and wouldn’t have the slightest clue what to do if they found themselves in the well.

But rather than castigate Charlie Nesson, Harvard Law procedural theorist extraordinaire, for his maladept effort at representing David in the face of Goliath, I can’t help but wonder what Nancy Gertner expected when she sought his help.  For crying out loud, he’s a Harvard Law professor.  Did you expect competent counsel?  Did you expect him to put aside his pedagogical interests and focus instead on the plight of Tenenbaum?  Lawyers represent clients.  Lawprofs teach.  What did you expect Nesson to do?

Charlie Nesson wasn’t retained by Joel Tenenbaum to represent him before Judge Gertner.  It was the judge herself who sought his help and brought him into the case.  Nesson didn’t lobby for the opportunity, or actively seek a role.  He accommodated the court and took it on as a courtesy.  He tried to take lemons and make lemonade, using the case as means of teaching students and expanding the audience of the case so that as many people could learn from it as possible.  He pushed the limits of litigation, but then he did so for entirely legitimate purpose: He’s a lawprof.  He came by it honestly.  And this is what he gets for it?

I’ve had the experience of working a few cases in my time with Harvard Law professors.  I’ve found them dogmatic in their approach and understanding, and almost entirely lacking in an understanding of jurisprudence; the mechanics of winning a case.  They were far more concerned with pursuing a theory they thought valid and important than the life of the individual in their hands.  It was generally a painful and often tedious experience, trying to explain why brilliance really wasn’t the point of legal representation.  But in my cases, the lawprofs were chosen by the individuals involved, and hence they got what they paid for.

In this case, the judge picked Charlie Nesson to defend Tenenbaum.  If he wasn’t the best pick, who’s to blame?  After all, she knew he was a lawprof when she took him in.

The Madoff Gambit (Update)

News has broken from the Curcio hearing that Bernard Madoff will plead guilty to 11 counts in an information, with no deal from the government.  None.  Zero.  Nada.  Having handicapped the possible tactics behind a plea, things are now getting really interesting. 

Either Ira Lee Sorkin has the most brilliant, the most fantastic, the most daring plan ever devised by a criminal defense lawyer up his sleeve, or this is utter madness. 

On its surface, it appears that Madoff has given it all away.  Granted, it’s not good enough for the victims, but short of him paying every one of them back personally, and then allowing each to individually shove a knife in his heart, it’s unlikely that they will ever feel satisfied.  Still, from the defense perspective, Madoff can anticipate receiving nothing more than the standard 3 point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which will likely do absolutely nothing for him given his age and the fact that he has so maxed out the guidelines (ending at a mere $400 million fraud loss) that he’ll never walk out of prison under any circumstances.

So what gives?

Jeralyn at TalkLeft notes that he’s likely to be put in on Thursday, when the plea is scheduled to be taken.  That seems reasonable, given that there’s little basis to argue that he should be left out until sentence under the circumstances.  But then why agree to waive indictment?  Why agree to plead guilty?  Run the government through its paces and stay home with the wife for as long as possible.  Who knows how much longer he’s going to live.  Fight hard and he may never see the end of this case.

Since hearing the news that Madoff was taking an open plea, I have strained to come up with a reason why.  I tried so hard that I think I’ve broken something, to no avail.   If Sorkin has a reason, some trick up his sleeve, I can’t figure out what it could be.  While there are very good reasons to take an open plea under certain circumstances, I don’t see how any apply in this case.  I’m totally blown away.

It could well be that Bernie Madoff has decided, as have many defendants before him, that he can’t stand the pressure and wants to end this prosecution as quickly as possible.  Is this just unconditional surrender?  Has Bernie collapsed on the ground, quivering like jelly and prepared to silently accept his fate?  Perhaps, though I would certainly expect Sorkin to talk him out of it, allowing the defense a couple of days to cut some sort of deal that would bring Madoff some sort of benefit.  Something. 

As it stands, he gets nothing.  Worse than nothing, since Jeralyn is likely right that he stands a very good chance of being put in at the plea, while the case will go on for quite a while before sentence is imposed.  Did he at least get a concession to stay out pending sentence?  According to Lev Dassin, not only are there no concessions whatsoever, but


“The filing of these charges does not end the matter,” said Acting Manhattan U.S. Attorney Lev Dassin. “Our investigation is continuing.”

That means Ruth and boys are still at risk, as is Bernie should the investigation unearth something new, which may well happen.

If Ira Lee Sorkin has a plan, I can’t figure it out.  Otherwise, this just looks like the Fool’s Gambit, with Bernie Madoff as the fool.  I don’t get it.

Update:  It would appear that similar thoughts have run through the minds of  Doug Berman and Jeralyn Merritt as well, who asks:


He’s 70 years old. Even if he gets a 25 year sentence with good time, he’s likely to die in prison. He’s not going to a minimum security camp. So why is he pleading guilty? Are there secret agreements we don’t know about?

It’s not like the Government could give him any more time if he went to trial and lost. What was he afraid of? That he’d be sentenced to life plus cancer?

She’s very funny, that Jeralyn.  Life plus cancer.  That’s a keeper.

Shifting Speedy Trial Blame

The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Vermont v. Brillon reverses the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision and reinstates a conviction for a defendant who waited nearly 3 years for trial.  The sorry tale of his trek through public defenders was a problem:

During the time between his arrest and his trial, at least six different attorneys were appointed to represent him. Brillon “fired” his first attorney, who served from July 2001 to February 2002. His third lawyer, who served from March 2002 until June 2002, was allowed to withdraw when he reported that Brillon had threatened his life. His fourth lawyer served from June 2002 until November 2002, when the trial court released him from the case. His fifth lawyer, assigned two months later,withdrew in April 2003. Four months thereafter, his sixth lawyer was assigned, and she took the case to trial in June 2004.

The Court framed the issue as whose problem, the defense or prosecution, based on Barker v. Wingo.  The Supremes answered that it was Brillon’s problem, as he was not the most pleasant defendant around and therefore, in the relative scheme of who gets nailed for the delay, the defendant was to bear the weight.

In arriving at that conclusion, the Court rejected the Vermont view that public defenders are state actors, but ascribed the same position as private counsel.  Moreover, the Supremes disagreed with the Vermont court’s parsing each adjournment to determine its cause, rather than simply bunch it together as the product of Brillon’s generalized intransigence and lack of cooperation.

This is a problem case.  Not merely because of some weird facts, showing that Brillon was indeed as much of a difficult defendant as suggested, but similarly showing some systemic failures in the public defender system, most notably when his lawyer withdrew because his contract with the state lapsed.  But in reviewing the problems and issue that arose, lawyer by lawyer, two predominant themes prevail:  Brillon was difficult, and the system was severely overburdened.  It’s the latter that makes this case important.

The question posed by Brillon that is meaningful for others is what happens to defendants whose cases are delayed as a result of public defenders being so overburdened that they can’t get a case to trial within sufficient time to pass speedy trial muster.  The answer, it appears, is nothing. 

By attributing the public defenders’ issues with the state to the defense, and making the defendant responsible for the delay caused by his lawyer, even if his lawyer’s problems are caused by state demands and funding problems, seems a rather meandering route to shifting the state’s inability to provide sufficient public defenders, and sufficient funds, onto the backs of defendants. 

Reactions have varied across the blawgosphere.  Bobby Fredericks of South Carolina thinks the Supremes got it right, largely because this was the wrong set of facts for the court to rule on the issue.

Where a defendant causes the delay by purposefully switching attorneys or by his conduct which necessarily results in new counsel being necessary, the defendant can’t claim that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial. Where counsel for the defendant requests a continuance in the case, the general rule is that the right to a speedy trial has been waived. If the defendant does not ask for a speedy trial, the right to a speedy trial may be waived. Only when the state is the cause of the delay – whether it is purposeful or whether it is due to overcrowded dockets or whether it is due to the state’s inability to provide adequate counsel in a timely manner – should a dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial be granted. Like I said, this was not the ideal test case for this issue.

Jon Katz of Underdog, on the other hand, finds the Breyer dissent (with Stevens joining) more persuasive:


Brillon’s sole dissenters are Justices Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, who seem to grasp and handle the facts and law of the case in a more sensible and just manner. The dissent finds the cert. petition in this case as improvidently granted, after asserting that the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed Brillon’s conviction without counting delays caused by court-appointed counsel. The dissent points out that even the state of Vermont conceded in its brief to the U.S. Supreme Court that approximately seven-month delay in getting Brillon his final lawyer cannot be attributed to the defendant.


While there isn’t much doubt that the facts of Brillon were unnecessarily ugly, burdening the bigger picture and diverting attention from the competing facts that squarely lay blame for much (though not all) of the problems on the state, I suspect the Supremes are smart enough to have parsed the details to recognize that the issue really wasn’t about Brillon’s lack of cooperation, but about who takes ownership for delays caused by public defenders that are contrary to the expressed wishes of the defendant. 

There is a harsh reality that the Supreme Court chose not to recognize here; a defendant cannot control or direct a public defender to drop his other work and attend only to one defendant’s needs and wishes.  While a public defender is properly compared to private counsel in some ways, the public defender still serves a different master in others.  This was made abundantly clear when Brillon’s lawyer pulled out because his PD contract was not renewed.  Was it up to Brillon to renew the contract?  Was Brillon supposed to fund the PDs office?  Where could Brillon have altered the course of the delay?

It was an unfortunate case to present an important issue, and I can well appreciate the dissent’s angst in watching bad law (yet again) derive from bad facts.  But I similarly feel confident that the Court could have done far better with this case, bad facts notwithstanding.  Instead, as public defenders across the country find themselves in a state-created bind that will inure to the massive detriment of defendants, the individuals who expect Gideon v. Wainwright to provide them with some solace will have to give up their speedy trial rights as a condition of receiving a defense.

Once again, the state’s failure becomes the defendant’s burden.  What a surprise.

Beware the Demise of the Rockefeller Laws

The New York Times has been broadcasting the imminent death of the Rockefeller Laws for the past couple of weeks, claiming the Assembly Bill spells the end of the draconian laws that compelled judges to sentence defendant accused of sale or possession of drugs to absurdly long mandatory minimum sentences.  Today, the Times has another editorial, arguing against the Senate version following the Assembly’s approval last week.

The Assembly voted last week to restore judicial discretion and end mandatory sentencing for many nonviolent low-level drug crimes. The bill, which has been introduced in the State Senate as well, would limit the longstanding and widely discredited system under which prosecutors decide who goes to jail and for how long.

Once the measure becomes law, courts would be able to sentence many addicts to treatment instead of cramming them into prisons where addiction generally goes untreated.

Republican senators who represent prison districts have long obstructed reforms like these. The latest attempt seems likely to succeed now that Democrats control the governor’s mansion and both houses of the Legislature — if Assembly lawmakers can broker a deal with the governor and some prosecutors in the state.

The prime sticking point is likely to involve a provision of the Assembly bill that deals with second-time offenders — who make up the largest group of people jailed under the laws. The Assembly bill would do away with mandatory sentences for low-level, second-time offenders who have not committed violent crimes.

Much as I hate to sound like an old curmudgeon, this is all nonsense.  The Assembly bill, touted by the Times as the end of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, hardly means the death of the Rockefeller laws.  It’s not even half a loaf.  Maybe a slice or two, but that’s it.

For those unfamiliar, the Rockefeller laws were predicated on the simplistic theory that if there are extraordinarily harsh mandatory penalties for drugs, people will stop selling and using them.  It produced the need for prisons, lots of them, which were located in upstate counties with high unemployment.  It did nothing to stem the tide of drugs.  As examples of the draconian penalties, possession of 4 ounces or sale of 2 ounces of a scheduled drug constituted an A-1 felony, the same as murder, and compelled a mandatory sentence of 15 years to life in prison.  The laws are structured solely upon the weight of the drugs, as if the mule knows whether the suitcase contains an ounce or a kilo.

The bills don’t end mandatory sentencing.  The bills allow judges at the bottom of the weight spectrum to divert first time offenders to drug treatment, upon pain of mandatory sentencing should they fail to satisfactorily complete it.  Woo hoo.  While I have nothing against treatment, and believe that it should have always been available to those in need (and it’s still not available to those in prison, though drugs usually are, and the treatment that’s available on the outside remains of dubious value), let’s not proclaim that the problem is solved.

The death of the Rockefeller Drug Laws will come when New York eliminates mandatory minimum sentences, and leaves it in the hands of judges to determine the proper sentence for each individual defendant under the particular circumstances of each individual case.  As of now, this isn’t even a twinkle in Assembly Leader Shelly Silver’s eye.  Neither Silver, nor Governor Paterson, have any plans on leaving judges to do their jobs, at least not without their hands placed firmly in their sphincters.  Is it that they can’t trust those activist judges to sentence properly, or they can’t let go of a political pendulum that could quickly swing the other way and cut their throats?


Mr. Paterson and his allies in law enforcement believe that would send the wrong message to the communities where drug crimes are committed and to the police officers who have worked hard to make these cases. They also fear that without mandatory sentences, some offenders might ignore treatment sanctions. But sentencing statistics show that judges can be very harsh in such cases.

As anyone in the trenches knows, New York’s judges are no more pushovers than anywhere else, and they can indeed be quite harsh without any prodding.  The fear is that the politicians won’t be well-positioned to take credit for putting the miscreants behind bars forever if they can’t lay claim to the mandatory sentencing laws. 

If this is the best New York can muster with a Democratic Governor, Assembly and Senate, then it’s clear that the Rockefeller Drug Laws are going to be with us for a long time to come, if not forever.  Whether that’s fine with everyone is one thing, but these claims that the Rockefeller laws are dead is just another cynical political ploy. The New York Times is either ignorant or enabling in perpetrating this fiction on the people of New York. Maybe if they had a few reporters left on the payroll, someone could explain to the editors what the bills mean, and stop this journalistic lunacy. 

Is It Really A Woman’s Thing? (Update x2)

It’s not that debates don’t break out within the law professor blogs, but that you wouldn’t normally know that it’s a debate because they are so unbearably “temperate” in their disagreement that you can’t quite tell that it’s happening.  Normally.  This one is different.

Over at Co-Op, Danielle Citron argues that the AutoAdmit scandal was not a simple matter of puerile to defamatory comments, but a cyber assault on women.  Referring to a March 3rd NPR show with Citron, Marc Randazza and David Margolick, this was her take:

During the program, former New York Times At the Bar columnist and current editor at Portfolio magazine David Margolick characterized the AutoAdmit attacks as mostly “juvenile, immature, and obnoxious, but that is all they are.” He called them “frivolous frat boy rants.” Margolick said that because the female law students who graduated from the most prestigious law school in the country now have good jobs, they suffered no harm. Mark Randazza agreed with this characterization of the harassment: “these are digital natives; it is their juvenile shtick.”
Citron doesn’t merely disagree that this can be chalked up to “frivolous frat buy rants,” but contends:



As my article “Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment” (forthcoming Michigan Law Review) argues in great detail, far too many people like Margolick and Randazza trivialize the serious harms that women uniquely suffer as a result of such cyber harassment in much the same way that society downplayed or ignored workplace sexual harassment until 1970s. In the face of threats of sexual violence, women not only feel afraid, but also chilled to act on their own desires. Women withdraw from online discussion groups, shut down their blogs, and alter their physical activities to avoid offline harassment connected to the online harassment. For instance, AutoAdmit victims stopped going to the gym to ensure that the anonymous posters could not take a picture of her and post it online. The cyber harassment also harms women’s dignity and sense of equal worth. Online assaults objectify women by reducing them to their body parts. Harassers further humiliate women by reducing them to diseased body parts. This treats women as moral subordinates and undermines their self-respect just as workplace sexual harassment makes women feel like sex objects, not competent workers. Women suffer a performative harm: they may assume male pseudonyms online to avoid cyber harassment. And cyber harassment inflicts distinct harms to women’s emotional and physical well-being. Women fear that online threats of sexual violence will be realized: anonymous threats are all the more frightening as they are shorn of any cues that might alleviate that fear.

Was this, as argued, proof that cyberspace is rife with gender harrassment, or has Citron taken a individualized instance that happened to involve women and claimed gender ownership as evidence of a phenomenon?  Is it truly different for women, with society downplaying or ignoring the unique suffering of women? 

While the post alone sounds like another Womens Studies 101 indictment, with the first comments adopting the academic orthodoxy that says no man can ever challenge a gender claim without himself being a nasty discriminator, Marc Randazza takes the side of intellectual integrity to challenge feminist ownership of cyber harrassment.

You say that “80% of the victims are women,” but I am not convinced of that. The sources in your law review article were a bit thin on this stat, but lets presume that they were accurate.

Isn’t it more likely that 80% of those who *complain* about it are women? Men are more likely to either ignore it, see it as trivial, or engage in self-help.

As far as women withdrawing from online discussion, this is something else I highly question. First off, there have always been less women involved in online discussion. I’d attribute this to the fact that online discussion is just now starting to get past its geek stage. However, the only forum where women seemed to withdraw was AutoAdmit… and frankly, given what it became, what self-respecting woman wouldn’t? On the other hand, when JuicyCampus was alive, it seemed that the vast majority of the perpetrators of online harassment were other women.

In the real world, Randazza’s response would be considered not only reasonable, but relatively low-key. Not in the Academy, however, where this evoked a reaction accusing Randazza of being “glib and trivializing” of feminist issues.  The problem appears to be that any time gender is inserted into an argument, everyone must be very serious and deferential, even if it may not be accurate.  It makes for great dogma, even if it precludes disagreement.  You have to be very empathetic to survive in the Academy.

But what’s the big deal about letting women lay claim to ownership of cyber harrassment?  It comes at the expense of the first amendment.  As expressed in a comment by Devon B:


However your “someone said something mean about me on the internets,” is designed to imply that the person making the comment is childish and unreasonable. There is a sharp divide between childish comments online “dood ur gay” and things along the lines of “I would rape her” and “Take a picture of her next time you’re in the gym” Even in jest these comments are designed to be BEYOND a puerile discussion. The comments are trying to actively destroy her sense of safety and security. Furthermore, if such things had been sent to her by an anonymous letter. Or in this case, sent to everyone around her. There would be outrage. The internet is seen as harmless because the generation making the laws have never experienced it. The life being lead by students today is wildly different than the life being led by the students of 10 and 20 years ago.

Devon contends that free speech is “wildly different” today.  Every generation sees its circumstances as being “wildly different,” thereby justifying a wholesale revision in fundamental rights to accommodate the latest ox being gored.  Another commenter, A.W., responds:


My God, we creep toward fascism pretty quickly in this area, don’t we? All in the name of proving how enlightened we are on women’s rights. But you can recognize the real and unfair damage done here and still say, freedom trumps.

If you spend any time at all enjoying lawprof mud-wrestling, you realize that this is tantamount to a kick in the groin.  It doesn’t get any harsher than this.  While the subject of the debate is important, as one sacred cow butts heads with another, and how intellectual honesty is almost lost in the quest for political correctness. 

Mind you, the effort at trying not to offend, despite the loss of rhetorical clarity and strength, is Herculean and, at times, painful to watch, it’s important that someone keep reminding the forces that seek to convert any perceived harm into a feminist issue that they aren’t going to take ownership of basic civil rights without being called on it. 

Now why is it that there aren’t any women willing to stand up for freedom of speech when it clashes with the feminist orthodoxy?  Could this be women discriminating against the rest of us?

Update:  Danielle Citron has taken up arms to battle back the Philistines in a second post, Cyber Harassment: Yes, It is a Woman’s Thing.  I can’t imagine what made her pick that name, considering that she doesn’t bother to link to this post.  Not that it reflects an inability to confront a challenge directly, of course.  But it does show that practicing lawyers aren’t the only rude people around.  (Never mind, the omission has now been corrected.)

Beginning with some facile stats that fail to address the issues raised by the last set of facile stats, which essentially prove conclusively that women complain more than men (yes, they actually did a study for that, Jdog), it leaves the question open about what constitutes “threats of attack,” the criterion claimed here but discredited in her last post, where any comment shy of nurturing was deemed harassing. 

Citron then shifts into a curious defense of her 1st Amendment bona fides:


Some commentators suggest that my work ignores the First Amendment. As my article Cyber Civil Rights develops in great detail, the civil rights proposal that I suggest for the most egregious of these attacks accords with both First Amendment doctrine and theory. Indeed, working to change our online culture to prevent such cyber sexual harassment would, in fact, enhance more valuable speech than it would inhibit. As L.P. Sheridan and T. Grant explain in their work, victims of cyber harassment are often advised to stop using computers.

If this doesn’t make any sense to you, you’ve got company.  It appears that Citron advance the theory that suggests we can enhance the 1st Amendment rights of people Citron likes by curtailing the 1st Amendment rights of people Citron dosen’t like, thus allowing the people Citron likes to be able to exercise their rights without anybody being mean to them and hurting their feelings.  That’s what “valuable speech” means, as opposed to speech Citron doesn’t value, and hence she deems unworthy of protection. 

As to the Sheridan and Grant work, either their participants need to get better advisors or Sheridan and Grant need to talk to tougher participants.  Sticks and stone, you know.  Free speech is definitely not for crybabies.

So is this what makes it a woman’s thing?

Update 2: Another voice has chimed in on the subject, again lacking the balls to show his face publicly and take a licking.  This gets increasingly bizarre as it makes its way down the intellectual ladder, leaving one to wonder whether this attempt to manufacture a position out of false assumptions and strawman arguments is the best that neo-feminists, or their male supplicants, can do?  

Thank the lord for those who want to protect the rights of their personal “downtrodden” by advocating the elimination of everyone’s rights.  However could we survive without defending the weak and the oppressed from mean people.

Taking Up the Slack

Seth Godin is part marketing guru and part pop philosopher.  It makes for a fascinating mix, as he varies from the typical hypster by his nagging compulsion for thoughtfulness.  Trust me, this can be a serious inhibition for a marketer.  Lawyer too.

So recognizing that some of his readers may have a little bit of free time on their hands at the moment, Seth offers some suggestions to take up the slack:

A lot of corporations have seen dramatic decreases in revenue and have cut back projects as well. In many cases, this is accompanied by layoffs, and so everyone is working far harder.

But in other organizations, and for a lot of freelancers, there’s more time than work. In other words, slack time.

Assume for a moment you don’t have money to develop and launch something new. So, what are you going to do with the slack?

Seth then discusses ways to fill the void, which of course is far better than sitting at home contemplating one’s navel.  But he poses a solution that troubles me:


Use social networking tools to connect to people for no good reason. Post tons of useful answers on discussion boards where your expertise is valued. Build a permission asset in the form of an email newsletter or a fascinating blog that people want to read. Do resume makeovers for 100 friends. Start a neighborhood or industry book group. Don’t go to conventions, earn the right to speak at them.

While he uses the word “earn” in the last sentence, does promoting oneself as an expert make you one?  In order to “post tons of useful answers,” you must first have useful answers to post.  The pervasive belief that creating the perception of expertise is a full-blown substitute for expertise is unfortunate.  In the blogosphere, as in listervs and discussion board before, and the web, twitter and facebook during, there are a vast array of people trying desperately to portray themselves as “experts”.  Indeed, this is the key motivation behind the dreaded Avvo Answers, as well as the pretender websites offering “free legal advice of experts” for the asking.

Forget for a moment that these are unhelpful and destructive to the public, who receives advice worth less than they are paying.  It also serves to make clear to the rest of us that some of you are total incompetent idiots.  You don’t have a clue what you’re talking about, and once you put it in writing for the world to see, you’ve provided conclusive proof.

In fairness to Seth, his first suggestion is to gain expertise.  I’m a little dubious that this can be accomplished during slack time, as opposed to say 20 years in the trenches, plus a whole lot of extra effort throughout, plus a certain level of innate intelligence, plus some other stuff.  Expertise isn’t easy to gain in most fields of endeavor.  That doesn’t mean that we can’t strive to improve ourselves, to become better than we are.  That’s easy, and it’s a worthy way to spend down time.  But improvement doesn’t equal expertise.

As I write this post, I’m checking the clock because I have a conference call, something I generally consider an offensive waste of my valuable time, with some corporate-types, who consider a day without a conference call a day wasted, to discuss a talk to be given to a prestigious group of lawyers in Chicago.  The people asked to speak aren’t there because they promiscuously roamed the internet soliciting invitations by posting “tons of useful answers,” but rather did whatever they did and were, for whatever reason, viewed as possessing something to say that the group would want to hear.  If this is expertise, then so be it, but the point is that the expertise comes first, and the recognition follows.

One can’t help seeing many bloggers and twitterers and others trying desperately to set themselves up as experts when it’s painfully obvious that they are anything but.  Indeed, some have conclusively proven that they are thick as a brick, apparently to everyone but themselves.  That may well be the best they can ever hope to be, particularly given the low cost of entry to social media.  But while social media offers everyone the chance to express their deepest and best thoughts publicly, it doesn’t mean that anyone with internet access has a right to be accepted as an expert.  To suggest otherwise is foolhearty.  Chances are equally good that those who try to promote themselves as brilliant will destroy what little credibility they might otherwise have if they just kept their mouths shut.

Granted, P.T. Barnum said that there’s a sucker born every minute, and even those who show no indicia of expertise will likely find someone even more foolhearty than them to be willing to accept their advice.  But I somehow doubt that Seth is suggesting that people should spend their downtime trying to be first amongst village idiots.  So let’s not get carried away with creating an online persona of expertise in lieu of actually becoming the expert one hopes to be.  If you lack the latter, you are likely to fail in the former.  And you won’t be any better off for proving to the world that you don’t have a clue.

Deconstructing Eyewitness IDs in 60 Minutes

I didn’t make it home in time to watch 60 Minutes, but thankfully found that Howard Wasserman watched for me (and anyone else so lacking in a desire to be “in touch” as to have missed it). 


Tonight’s 60 Minutes featured a two-part story on the weakness of eyewitness memory and witness testimony, including demonstrations of some of the ways that memory can be wrong.

It also presented two good, paradoxical thoughts on how trials (and the law of evidence) operate. On one hand, the legal system is designed to (and perhaps does a decent job at) sorting those who tell the truth from those who lie (in the sense of deliberately misrepresenting) and who have motive to lie; it does not do as good a job of exposing honest mistakes or errors. On the other hand, the system could not function without eyewitness testimony.

Howard has put up videos of the segment at PrawfsBlawg for anyone who missed it.  It’s not that it presents anything new to those of us following the debates, and disasters, derived from mistaken eyewitness IDs, but that one segment on 60 Minutes is worth far more than a never-ending discussion of the failings of eyewitness ID on every blawg ever created.  Painful as this is to say, it has an even larger audience than Volokh Conspiracy, proving yet again that the blawgosphere is not the center of the universe.

Rather than steal Howard’s thunder by inserting the videos here as well, pop some corn, go over to PrawfsBlawg and give them a watch.  Remember, this is what all those nice jurors are watching on TV when Family Guy isn’t on, so don’t let the melodramatic intro bother you.  It’s just a hook for the public, who likes that sort of thing. 

The important point is that a whole lotta people learned that mistaken eyewitness IDs, even in the face of certainty, really do happen.  Spreading this message far and wide is critical to the public’s understanding of the problem, and the value of the evidence, and may well mean that another innocent person doesn’t spend a life in prison.  Nothing wrong with that, right?

But having failed to include the significant 60 Minutes videos, I instead offer this: